State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0979

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Teresa Marie Massey,
Appellant.

Filed June 30, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Pope County District Court
File No. 61-CR-22-236

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Neil Nelson, Pope County Attorney, Glenwood, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Pope County jury found Teresa Marie Massey guilty of aiding and abetting a
controlled-substance crime based on evidence that she drove her boyfriend to a pre-
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arranged drug sale and received the proceeds of the sale in her mobile-payments account.
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
This case arises from a fatal fentanyl overdose. During the early evening of
February 20, 2021, law-enforcement officers in Pope County responded to a 911 call
concerning an overdose at a residence in the city of Glenwood. Upon arrival, the officers
found T.K., a 31-year-old man, who was nonresponsive. The officers searched the
residence and found drugs and drug paraphernalia, including an uncapped hypodermic
needle containing fentanyl and methamphetamine residue, two needles loaded with
methamphetamine, a container of fentanyl, and a bag of methamphetamine.
Law-enforcement officers investigated the circumstances surrounding T.K.’s death
for several months. They conducted interviews and reviewed cellphone records, cell-site-
location information, mobile-payments accounts, and social-media accounts of various
persons who were believed to be involved in T.K.’s death. They eventually focused their
investigation on four persons: Jorma Thornton, Samuel Long, Theoplus Richmond, and
Teresa Massey. The evidence shows that Thornton lived in the Glenwood area and was a
friend or acquaintance of T.K., that Long was a person whom T.K. contacted for the
purpose of obtaining drugs, that Richmond was a person who supplied Long with drugs,
and that Massey was Richmond’s girlfriend and shared an apartment with him in
Minneapolis.
The state’s electronic evidence shows that, shortly after 5:00 p.m. on February 20,
2021, T.K. and Thornton exchanged messages about jointly obtaining drugs. At 5:14 p.m.,
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T.K. messaged Long to ask whether he could “get . . . some,” and they exchange d
additional messages about quantity and price. Meanwhile, Richmond’s and Massey’s
cellphones were traveling together in a northwesterly direction along interstate highway 94
from Minneapolis to the Glenwood area. Between 5:59 p.m. and 6:29 p.m., Long’s
cellphone called Richmond’s cellphone four times, and Richmond’s cellphone called
Long’s cellphone six times.
At 6:06 p.m., Long messaged T.K., saying, “tell me what you want and I’m sending
my plug,” i.e., supplier. At 6:10 p.m., T.K. messaged Thornton to say that a supplier was
“on his way” and that Thornton should send him “240 asap or deal is dead in water.” At
6:14 p.m., Thornton transmitted $240 to T.K.’s mobile-payments account. At 6:15 p.m.,
Long messaged T.K. to say that his supplier could provide T.K. with a gram of drugs, and
T.K. responded by asking whether he could buy that amount for $240. Approximately one
minute later, T.K. messaged Long to say that he had the money and would pay the supplier
after receiving the drugs.
Between 6:17 and 6:23 p.m., T.K. and Long exchanged multiple messages about
where the supplier should deliver the drugs to T.K. At 6:25 p.m., Long messaged T.K. to
say that the supplier had arrived at T.K.’s home. At 6:28 p.m., T.K. transmitted $240 to a
mobile-payments account registered to Massey. At 6:34 p.m., T.K. messaged Thornton to
say that the drugs had been delivered. Richmond’s and Massey’s cellphones were in the
general area of Glenwood at the time of the delivery. At 6:48 p.m., Thornton messaged
T.K. to ask whether “it” was “f or h,” and T.K. responded, “H,” meaning heroin. At 6:54
p.m., Thornton messaged T.K., saying, “Be there soon.”
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Thornton testified at trial that, after the drugs were delivered, he went to T.K.’s
home, which T.K. shared with another person. Shortly after he arrived, T.K.’s roommate
asked Thornton to move his car so that it would not block the roommate’s vehicle. T.K.
told Thornton that he wanted to “test” the drugs while Thornton was outside. Thornton
moved his car and, when he returned, found T.K. on the floor, nonresponsive. Thornton
told T.K.’s roommate to call 911, and the roommate did so. Two days later, Long
transmitted $30 to Massey’s mobile-payments account.
Law-enforcement officers interviewed Massey in September 2021, seven months
after T.K.’s death. T he state introduced an audio-recording of th e interview at trial.
Massey told the officers that she lived in Minneapolis with Richmond, who was her fiancé.
She stated that she knew that Richmond had sold drugs in the past. She said that Richmond
“didn’t ever drive” and that she “always drove him around.” She told the officers that
Richmond would not have taken her cellphone to Glenwood without her also being present
with him. When the officers asked whether Richmond had ever used Massey’s mobile-
payments account, Massey initially said that he “never used it” but later stated that
Richmond sometimes tells his friends to send him money through her mobile-payments
account. Massey also said that she did not know either Long or T.K and did not remember
their sending any money to her mobile-payments account.
In July 2022, t he state charged Massey with aiding and abetting a third-degree
controlled-substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § § 152.023, subd. 1(1), 609.05,
subd. 1 (2020). The case was tried to a jury on three days in January 2024. The state called
seven witnesses, including B.S., a resident of Glenwood, who testified that he had used
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drugs with T.K. before his death, that he knew Long, and that Richmond was Long’ s
supplier in the Twin Cities. B.S. also testified that he had seen Richmond in Glenwood on
two occasions before T.K.’s death, each time with a “white girl,” who was driving and
whom Richard described as his girlfriend. Photographs of Massey that were introduced
into evidence show that she is white.
Massey did not testify and did not introduce any evidence. The jury found her
guilty. She filed a post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court
denied. The district court stayed the imposition of a sentence and placed her on probation
for five years. Massey appeals.
DECISION
Massey argues that the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to support her
conviction.
A.
A person is guilty of aiding and abetting the sale of a controlled substance in the
third degree “if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels , or conspires with”
another to “unlawfully sell[] one or more mixtures containing a narcotic drug.” Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.05, subd. 1, 152.023, subd. 1(1). “The ‘intentionally aids’ element requires that the
defendant ‘knew that [her] alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime’ and that the
defendant ‘intended [her] presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’”
State v. Isaac, 9 N.W.3d 812, 815 (Minn. 2024) (quoting State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d
675, 682 (Minn. 2007)). Because the “intentionally aids” element is a state-of- mind
requirement, it often is established by circumstantial evidence. State v. McAllister, 862
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N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2015). A defendant’s state of mind can be inferred from a variety
of circumstances such as the defendant’s “presence at the scene of the crime,” “close
association with the principal before and after the crime,” and “lack of objection or surprise
under the circumstances.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 156 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted).
Thus, to establish that Massey is guilty of third-degree sale of a controlled substance
under an aiding-and-abetting theory, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) Richmond committed the crime of third-degree sale of a controlled substance;
(2) Massey knew that Richmond was going to commit that crime; and (3) Massey
intentionally aided Richmond in the commission of that crime. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05,
subd. 1, 152.023, subd. 1(1). Massey does not dispute that Richmond committed the crime
of third-degree sale of a controlled substance on February 20, 2021, by selling fentanyl to
T.K. But Massey argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that she knew that Richmond was going to commit that crime and that she
intentionally aided Richmond in his commission of that crime.
B.
When determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, this court
undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Jones, 977
N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). This court “carefully examines the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
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reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d
895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We assume that the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205,
214 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
The above- described standard of review applies so long as a conviction is
adequately supported by direct evidence. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016).
In this case, the parties agree that the conviction rests on circumstantial evidence and that
this court should apply the standard of review that is appropriate for circumstantial
evidence. When reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a
heightened standard of review with a two-step analysis. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1,
6-7 (Minn. 2018); State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014).
At the first step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, we “identify the
‘circumstances proved.’” Isaac, 9 N.W.3d at 815; (quoting State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d
874, 890 (Minn. 2021)). “In identifying the circumstances proved, [this court] assume[ s]
that the jury resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent with the jury’s
verdict.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88. Accordingly, this court “disregard[s] evidence that is
inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017).
At the second step of the analysis, we “examine independently the reasonableness of [the]
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved,” determine whether “the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt,” and determine whether the circumstances
proved are “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846
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N.W.2d at 88 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). At the second step, we do not
give deference to the jury’s verdict. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
C.
In this case, the circumstances proved that are relevant to whether Massey knew that
Richmond was going to commit a third-degree controlled-substance crime and intended to
aid him in his commission of that crime are the facts stated above, which are consistent
with the verdict. See Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88.
The state contends that the circumstances proved support a reasonable inference that
Massey knew that Richmond intended to sell drugs in Glenwood and that Massey
intentionally aided and abetted his commission of that crime in two ways: by driving him
to Glenwood and by receiving the proceeds of the drug sale in her mobile-payments
account. We agree with the state that the circumstances proved allow for a reasonable
inference that Massey intended to aid and abet Richmond’s crime and, thus, are consistent
with the jury’s finding of guilt.
Massey contends that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational
hypothesis that she is not guilty, for three reasons. First, Massey contends that the
circumstances proved do not exclude the rational hypothesis that she drove Richmond to
Glenwood “without knowledge of Richmond’s plan to commit a crime.” This hypothesis
is inconsistent with multiple circumstances proved. Massey stated in a pre-trial interview
that she knew that Richmond had dealt drugs in the past. B.S. testified that he knew Long,
that Richmond supplied drugs to Long, and that he had seen Richmond in Glenwood on
two prior occasions, each time with a white woman whom Richmond described as his
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girlfriend. Cell-site-location data shows that Richmond’s cellphone and Massey’s
cellphone traveled together along interstate highway 94 from Minneapolis to the Glenwood
area between approximately 4:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. on the day of T.K.’s death and that
both cellphones were in the general area of Glenwood when drugs were delivered to T.K.
Between 5:59 p.m. and 6:29 p.m., Long’s cellphone and Richmond’s cellphone exchanged
ten calls. Massey stated to investigators that Richmond “didn’t ever drive” and that she
“always drove him around.” In light of this evidence, a jury could not rationally conclude
that Massey did not know that Richmond intended to sell drugs in Glenwood on February
20, 2021.
Second, Massey contends that the circumstances proved do not exclude the rational
hypothesis that, if she knew of Richmond’s plan to sell drugs in Glenwood, she did not
intend, by driving him, “to further the commission of Richmond’s crime.” As stated above,
the “intentionally aids” element may be proved with circumstantial evidence. McAllister ,
862 N.W.2d at 53. “The requisite state of mind . . . can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence” such as “presence at the scene of the crime,” “close association with the principal
before and after the crime,” and “lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances.”
Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 156 (quotation omitted). Here, the circumstances proved include the
facts that Massey and Richmond were in a romantic relationship, that Richmond did not
drive and that Massey frequently served as his driver, and that Massey was with Richmond
throughout his trip from Minneapolis to Glenwood on February 20, 2021. Given that
Massey knew that Richmond intended to sell drugs in Glenwood, the state introduced
ample circumstantial evidence that she intended to aid his commission of that crime by
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serving as his driver. In light of this evidence, a jury could not rationally conclude that
Massey did not intend to aid Richmond’s commission of the crime when she drove him to
Glenwood.
Third, Massey contends that the circumstances proved do not exclude the rational
hypothesis that Massey did not intend for T.K. and Long to transmit money to her mobile-
payments account and that Richmond instructed T.K. and Long to do so without Massey’s
knowledge. We need not determine whether this hypothesis is rational. We have
concluded that Massey’s conviction on one count of aiding and abetting a third-degree
controlled-substance crime is sufficiently proved by the circumstantial evidence that she
aided and abetted Richmond’s crime by driving him to Glenwood. Proof that Massey also
aided and abetted Richmond’s crime by allowing him to use her mobile-payments account
is, thus, unnecessary.
In sum, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support Massey’s conviction of
aiding and abetting the third-degree sale of a controlled substance.
Affirmed.