Douglas Edward Simpson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1000

Douglas Edward Simpson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-19-717

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Braden M. Hoefert, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
This appeal is from an order denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief
from a conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant argues that his
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conviction must be reversed because it was plain error to admit documentary evidence
related to his guilty plea and sentence for another criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. We
need not determine whether the admission of this documentary evidence was plain error
because we conclude that any plain error in its admission did not affect appellant’s
substantial rights and did not undermine the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Douglas Edward
Simpson with one count of third- degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2018), for an offense involving H.K. in May 2011.
Before trial, the state moved under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) to admit evidence of
Simpson’s 2015 conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state argued that
the evidence was relevant to show “modus operandi and a common scheme or plan.” The
state also moved to “allow the State to impeach” Simpson with the same prior conviction
if he testified, as permitted by Minn. R. Evid. 609.
At a hearing, Simpson’s attorney opposed admitting evidence of the 2015
conviction. The prosecuting attorney argued to admit both victim testimony and documents
relating to Simpson’s 2015 conviction under rule 404(b). The prosecuting attorney added
that, “if the evidence comes in” under rule 404(b), the district court “wouldn’t necessarily
have to address the impeachment issue.” Following the hearing, the district court granted
the state’s motion, determining that evidence of Simpson’s 2015 conviction was admissible
under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) to establish “a common scheme or plan.” The district court
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did not rule on the use of Simpson’s prior conviction for impeachment under Minn. R.
Evid. 609.
At Simpson’s jury trial in June 2021, the state offered testimony from H.K. and four
other witnesses who testified about H.K.’s statements and demeanor when she disclosed
Simpson’s sexual conduct. The prosecuting attorney also called M.H., the victim from
Simpson’s 2015 conviction. Simpson did not testify. The following summarizes the trial
record relevant to the issue raised in postconviction proceedings.
H.K. testified that she dated Simpson while they both attended the same high school
in a small town in Nobles County. At the time of the assault, both H.K. and Simpson were
15 years old.1 After a softball game in May 2011, H.K. went to Simpson’s home to shower.
No one else was home at that time. When H.K. got out of the shower, Simpson opened the
bathroom door. H.K. was undressed. Simpson picked H.K. up, brought her into a bedroom,
and placed her “down on the bed.” Simpson “pulled [H.K.’s] underwear down” and put
“his mouth and tongue” on her “vaginal area.” H.K. told Simpson to “stop.” Simpson held
H.K. down with “a pillow over [her] face.” H.K. also testified that Simpson “slapped [her]
private area.”
Several years later, in 2014 and 2015, H.K. disclosed Simpson’s assault to a
mental-health counselor at her college, her college boyfriend, and her mother. In 2018,

1 Although Simpson was a minor when these events occurred, the district court certified
him as an adult offender. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 6 (2018) (providing that a
district court has juvenile jurisdiction to hold a certification hearing when an adult is
charged with an offense committed before the adult’s 18th birthday).
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H.K. reported the assault to the police. The counselor, college boyfriend, mother, and
law-enforcement officer testified and corroborated H.K.’s statements to them.
Consistent with the district court’s pretrial ruling, M.H. testified about events
leading to Simpson’s 2015 conviction. M.H. testified that, at that time, she was 15 years
old and Simpson’s friend. On June 24, 2015, she met Simpson at the high-school football
field around 11:00 p.m. to talk about her recent breakup. They “sat around the 50-yard line
in the middle” of the football field. While they were talking, M.H. started to cry and
Simpson “pulled [M.H.] in for a hug,” then kissed her. Simpson then “laid [her] down and
straddled [her] body” so she “couldn’t move.” Simpson took off M.H.’s shorts and
underwear and inserted “his fingers” into her. M.H. told Simpson to stop “multiple times.”
Simpson did not stop. Later, M.H. reported what happened to the police. M.H. testified that
Simpson was charged with and pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Before M.H. testified, the district court instructed the jury about how to consider the
evidence.
Members of the jury, you are about to hear and receive
evidence of occurrences on June 24th, 2015, at a football
field . . . . This evidence is being offered for the limited
purpose of assisting you in determining whether the defendant
committed those acts with which the defendant is charged in
this complaint. The defendant is not being tried for and may
not be convicted of any offense other than the charged offense.
You are not to convict the defendant on the basis of
occurrences on June 24th, 2015, at the football field . . . . To
do so might result in unjust double punishment.
After M.H. completed her testimony, the state offered exhibit 4, which included
certified copies of Simpson’s 2015 conviction documents. Simpson objected to the
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criminal complaint in exhibit 4, which the district court sustained. He did not object to any
other part of exhibit 4, the rest of which was received. As admitted, exhibit 4 included
Simpson’s plea petition, a sentencing order and warrant of commitment (first sentencing
order), and an amended sentencing order and amended warrant of commitment (second
sentencing order). The second sentencing order stated that Simpson violated probation by
having contact with a person under the age of 18. After the admission of exhibit 4, both
parties rested.
During final jury instructions, the district court stated: “You have heard evidence of
an occurrence on June 24th—you have heard, and the Court has received documents
regarding evidence of an occurrence on June 24th, 2015, at a football field.” The district
court then repeated the cautionary instruction it gave before M.H. testified.
The jury found Simpson guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct involving
H.K., and the district court sentenced Simpson to 53 months in prison. Simpson did not file
a direct appeal.
In July 2023, Simpson petitioned for postconviction relief ; he did not request an
evidentiary hearing. Simpson’s postconviction petition and memorandum argued that he
was entitled to a new trial because the district court plainly erred when it admitted “the plea
petition and sentencing order from the 2015 offense.” Simpson contended that exhibit 4
was “irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, cumulative, constituted hearsay and
improper impeachment, and erroneously presented sentencing considerations to the jury.”
To be clear, Simpson’s postconviction memorandum did not argue that M.H.’s testimony
was inadmissible under rule 404(b) but it did argue that the admission of exhibit 4 was
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plain error because it did not “show a common plan or rebut fabrication” along with other
reasons. The state opposed Simpson’s petition.
In a written order denying postconviction review, the district court determined that
no plain error occurred in the admission of the plea petition and first sentencing order. But
the district court determined that admitting the second sentencing order was plain error
because it referred to Simpson’s probation violation, which “did not make any facts in issue
at the trial more or less probable” and was more prejudicial than probative. The district
court concluded, however, that Simpson’s substantial rights were not affected by the
admission of the second sentencing order in exhibit 4, reasoning that it was “a small part
of a larger admissible exhibit.”
Simpson appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts “review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief . . . for an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). “A postconviction
court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Simpson argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
postconviction petition because the district court plainly erred during trial when it admitted
exhibit 4. Simpson’s brief to this court acknowledges that he did not object to exhibit 4 as
admitted at trial and that “the ruling is therefore reviewed for plain error.” 2 “When a

2 It is accurate that Simpson’s trial objection was limited to the criminal complaint
involving M.H. and that he did not object to the documents admitted as exhibit 4.
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defendant fails to object at trial, the forfeiture doctrine generally precludes appellate relief.”
State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 784-85 (Minn. 2017). Appellate courts, however, have
“a limited power to correct errors that were forfeited” when the district court committed
plain error. Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 355-56 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
To meet the plain-error standard, “a defendant must establish (1) an error, (2) that
is plain, and (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. at 356. Before granting
relief, an appellate court must also conclude that the “failure to correct the error” has “an
impact beyond the current case by causing the public to seriously question the fairness and
integrity of our judicial system.” Id.
A. Plain Error
“An error is plain if it was clear or obvious.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681,
688 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). “Usually this is shown if the error contravenes case
law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006).
Simpson argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting exhibit 4 because
it amounted to improper impeachment, was not relevant, was more prejudicial than
probative, and was cumulative. The state argues that the plea petition and sentencing order
were admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), were not otherwise inadmissible under

Simpson’s attorney opposed the state’s pretrial motion to admit evidence of the 2015
conviction under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). At the pretrial hearing on the state’s motion, the
prosecuting attorney described the evidence of the 2015 conviction as including documents
related to Simpson’s 2015 conviction. The district court granted the state’s motion in a
pretrial order. Simpson was not required to renew his pretrial objection to preserve error.
Minn. R. Evid. 103(a). We agree with the parties that, because Simpson challenges
exhibit 4’s admission on grounds that he did not raise before or during trial, we apply the
plain-error standard of review.
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rule 403, and were not offered or used as improper impeachment. 3 The state’s brief to this
court appears to accept implicitly the postconviction ruling that admission of the second
sentencing order was plain error.
We briefly consider Simpson’s argument on the relevance of exhibit 4. Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. “All relevant evidence is admissible.” Minn. R. Evid. 402.
Character evidence, however, is generally not admissible “for the purpose of proving action
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(a). But “[e]vidence
of another crime, wrong, or act” may be “admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
Simpson argues that documents in exhibit 4 are not evidence of other “crimes,
wrong, or acts” under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) because they are evidence of a prior
conviction, not prior “conduct.” This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First,
caselaw generally recognizes the relevance of prior criminal sexual conduct for the other
purposes identified in rule 404(b). For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
concluded that evidence of previous criminal sexual conduct may be admissible to show a
common modus operandi in a subsequent criminal-sexual-conduct trial. See State v.

3 If a defendant testifies, evidence of a prior criminal conviction may be used for
impeachment purposes, meaning “[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness.” Minn. R. Evid. 609(a). Here, however, Simpson did not testify.
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Washington, 693 N.W.2d 195, 198, 203 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that testimony about
Washington’s previous sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl was admissible in Washington’s
trial for sexually assaulting another 15-year-old girl several years later). This court has also
upheld the admission of evidence of previous criminal-sexual-conduct convictions under
rule 404(b). In doing so, we explained that, “[i]n criminal sexual conduct cases, prior sexual
conduct convictions are often probative where the defendant disputes that the sexual
conduct occurred or where the defendant asserts the victim is fabricating the allegations”
because the “prior convictions are relevant to show a common plan or scheme.” State v.
Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551, 557 (Minn. App. 2000) (concluding that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Duncan’s “five prior criminal sexual
conduct convictions”), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).
Second, the supreme court has upheld the admission of a certified copy of court
records to show a defendant’s prior criminal sexual conduct. The supreme court reasoned
that documentary evidence of “a prior conviction is obviously the most efficient method of
proof of a prior offense under Rule 404(b).” State v. Crocker, 409 N.W.2d 840, 843-44
(Minn. 1987) (quotation omitted) (concluding that “it was entirely proper for the [district]
court to allow the state to use certified court records to prove” a prior
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and affirming the district court’s admission of
testimony that Crocker attempted to sexually assault his 15-year-old stepdaughter). The
supreme court added, however, that sometimes “the conviction will not reveal the facts
concerning the prior crime that are relevant in the instant case and, in such a case, the party
proving the other crime will want to call witnesses.” Id. at 844 (quotation omitted).
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Simpson emphasizes that the district court plainly erred by admitting exhibit 4 under
Minn. R. Evid. 403. “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” or based on concerns about
the “needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. Specifically,
Simpson argues that exhibit 4 was more prejudicial than probative. Simpson contends that
the information contained in exhibit 4 was already elicited through M.H.’s testimony so it
was unnecessarily cumulative and that “the danger for unfair prejudice was substantial”
because (1) the plea petition refers to two counts of sexual misconduct, which could
confuse the jury, (2) the plea petition states that Simpson was “treated by a psychiatrist or
other person for a nervous or mental condition,” (3) the plea petition states that Simpson
had to register as a predatory offender, and (4) the first sentencing order includes
Simpson’s probation condition that he participate in a psychosexual evaluation.
Simpson’s brief to this court does not cite any caselaw holding that a district court
plainly erred by admitting documentary evidence of a prior criminal-sexual-conduct
conviction. Still, we need not decide whether the district court plainly erred by admitting
exhibit 4 if Simpson’s challenge fails on the third and fourth steps of plain-error review.
We therefore consider Simpson’s arguments on those issues.
B. Any plain error in admitting exhibit 4 did not affect Simpson’s
substantial rights.

Simpson contends that his substantial rights were affected by the error and that the
district court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. An error affects substantial
rights “if the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Griller ,
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583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998). An error is prejudicial “if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.” Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 688.
This is “the equivalent of a harmless error analysis.” State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629,
634 (Minn. 2011). When conducting a harmless-error analysis, appellate courts determine
whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 55 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted). When “assessing whether an error is harmless, the question is not
whether the other evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, but rather whether the
error substantially influenced the verdict.” Id. at 54 (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts consider several “[n]on-exclusive factors . . . to determine whether
a reasonable possibility exists that the erroneously admitted evidence significantly affected
the jury’s verdict.” Id. These factors include “(1) the manner in which the party presented
the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who
offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively
countered the evidence.” State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020). Appellate
courts also consider whether there is “[s]trong evidence of guilt” that “undermines the
persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. We consider each factor in turn.
4

4 In its postconviction decision, the district court considered different factors under State
v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009). We apply the factors set out in Smith, as
the Minnesota Supreme Court instructed in Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54-55.
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How the Evidence Was Presented
We first consider the manner in which the state presented exhibit 4. Even though
Simpson’s brief to this court cites the Smith factors, Simpson does not address this factor.
The state argues that “[e]xhibit 4 was introduced without fanfare or flourish after M.H.
testified” and “was not published to the jury.” The state also argues that any prejudice “was
substantially mitigated” because the trial court “gave a limiting instruction” for the jury
“about the proper use of the evidence.”
The postconviction order states that the “offending documents were a small part of
a larger admissible exhibit[;] the prosecution did not rely on the documents or call attention
to them.” We agree with this description. Although exhibit 4 was admitted into evidence,
the trial transcript reflects that the prosecuting attorney did not discuss its contents during
opening statements or closing arguments. The district court also gave a cautionary
instruction before M.H.’s testimony and the admission of exhibit 4 as well as before
deliberations. The final instruction referred to “documents regarding evidence of an
occurrence on June 24 th, 2015, at the football field” and instructed the jury that the
evidence was “admitted for the limited purpose of assisting you in determining whether
the defendant committed those acts with which the defendant is charged in this complaint”
and that the jury was “not to convict the defendant on the basis of any occurrences”
described in exhibit 4 and M.H.’s testimony. Appellate courts “assume that the jury
followed the court’s instructions and properly considered the evidence.” State v. Vang ,
774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009). We conclude that this factor weighs in favor of
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determining that any plain error in admitting exhibit 4 did not affect Simpson’s substantial
rights.
The Persuasiveness of the Erroneously Admitted Evidence
We next consider the persuasiveness of exhibit 4. During postconviction
proceedings, the district court reasoned that H.K.’s credibility was the focus at trial.
Simpson argues that exhibit 4 “was persuasive because it contained negative- character
inferences showing that Simpson violated probation by having unsanctioned contact with
a minor.”
As noted above, the specific content of exhibit 4 was never discussed during trial.
Additionally, the persuasive value of exhibit 4 was limited, given M.H. testified that
Simpson pleaded guilty to assaulting her and was convicted. We therefore conclude that
this factor weighs in favor of a determination that any plain error in admitting exhibit 4 did
not affect Simpson’s substantial rights.
How the Evidence Was Discussed During the State’s Closing Argument
During postconviction proceedings, the district court determined that the state
“made no reference to, nor drew the jury’s attention to, the plea petition or sentencing
orders” during closing arguments. Simpson does not discuss this factor in his brief to this
court. The state argues that the prosecuting attorney “did not refer to [exhibit 4] or its details
in her closing argument” and that the prosecuting attorney “reminded the jury of the proper
use of” exhibit 4 by stating that the jury should not use exhibit 4 “as character or propensity
evidence.”
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We agree that the prosecuting attorney did not refer to exhibit 4 during closing
argument, focused on H.K.’s testimony, and discussed M.H.’s testimony briefly. Before
discussing M.H.’s testimony, the prosecuting attorney reminded the jury that “[t]he
purpose of [M.H.’s] testimony was to show you the similarities between how the defendant
acted with both victims” and not to show that “because [Simpson] did this to [M.H.] . . . he
also must have done it this time to [H.K.].” Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of
determining that any plain error in admitting exhibit 4 did not affect Simpson’s substantial
rights.
Whether the Defense Effectively Countered the Evidence
Simpson argues that he was unable to counter exhibit 4 “without drawing more
attention to it.” The state does not address this factor in its brief to this court. During closing
argument, Simpson’s attorney noted that Simpson pleaded guilty to the 2015
criminal-sexual-conduct charge and “[t]hat is not the question that you have to decide
today.” Simpson’s attorney did not discuss M.H.’s testimony during closing argument.
Still, we conclude that Simpson had few, if any, options to counter exhibit 4 specifically.
Thus, this factor weighs in favor of determining that any plain error in admitting exhibit 4
affected Simpson’s substantial rights.
Evidence of Simpson’s Guilt
Finally, we assess whether there is “[s]trong evidence of guilt” that “undermines the
persuasive value of [the] wrongly admitted evidence.” Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505. During
postconviction proceedings, the district court acknowledged that there was not
“overwhelming” evidence of Simpson’s guilt for the offense against H.K., that the case
15
“rested largely on the jury’s determination of H.K.’s credibility,” and that M.H.’s
testimony, corroborated by exhibit 4, “was a strong piece of evidence to bolster H.K.’s
credibility.”
Our review of the evidence leads us, nonetheless, to determine that the evidence of
Simpson’s guilt is strong. H.K. testified in detail about the assault. T estimony from her
counselor, college boyfriend, mother, and the law-enforcement officer corroborated her
disclosures of the assault, even though H.K. did not report the assault for years and no
physical evidence corroborated her testimony. Also, M.H.’s testimony showed a common
plan or scheme that bolstered H.K.’s credibility, and the admission of M.H.’s testimony is
not challenged on appeal. As a result, this factor favors determining that any plain error in
admitting exhibit 4 did not affect Simpson’s substantial rights.
Considering the Smith factors as a whole, we conclude that the evidence of
Simpson’s guilt was strong, but not overwhelming, and that Simpson was not able to
effectively counter exhibit 4. Still, the manner in which exhibit 4 was admitted raises no
concerns because the prosecuting attorney did not discuss its contents. The persuasiveness
of exhibit 4 was limited, given M.H.’s testimony, that the prosecuting attorney did not
mention exhibit 4 during closing arguments, and that the district court gave cautionary
instructions to the jury explaining the appropriate use of exhibit 4.
Thus, we conclude that any plain error in admitting exhibit 4 did not affect
Simpson’s substantial rights and that there was no reasonable likelihood that any plain error
in admitting exhibit 4 substantially affected the verdict.
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C. Any plain error in admitting exhibit 4 did not undermine the fairness
and integrity of the judicial proceedings.

In the interest of being thorough, we consider the final step in the plain -error
analysis. Relief for plain error may be granted only when “a failure to correct the error
would have an impact beyond the current case by causing the public to seriously question
the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.” Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356.
During postconviction proceedings, the district court determined that “[o]n this
record there is no basis for concluding that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of the proceedings.” Simpson’s brief to this court argues that “[t]he
fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings are undermined when convictions are
based on inadmissible evidence” without citing legal authority or providing further
explanation. The state argues that Simpson does not sufficiently raise this issue because he
did not cite any legal authority in support of his argument.
We have already concluded that the admission of exhibit 4 did not affect Simpson’s
substantial rights. Here, Simpson does not argue why the admission of exhibit 4 affects the
fairness and integrity of our judicial system. The Minnesota Supreme Court has declined
to exercise its discretion under the plain- error doctrine when an appellant made “no
argument that a failure to correct [an error] will seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings generally” and the court “perceive[d] no reason
why a failure to correct the alleged error will cause the public to seriously question the
fairness and integrity of our judicial system.” Id. at 360. We conclude that nothing in the
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record suggests that any plain error in admi tting exhibit 4 undermined the fairness and
integrity of judicial proceedings.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Simpson’s petition for postconviction review.
Affirmed.