State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1002

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lindsey Rose Schneeberger,
Appellant.

Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-23-3564

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
On appeal from her conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion at sentencing by denying her motion for
a downward dispositional departure. Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
2
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Lindsey Rose Schneeberger with
three counts of first- degree criminal sexual conduct. The complaint alleged that
Schneeberger—a volleyball coach and teacher —repeatedly sexually abused the victim—a
volleyball player and student—during the time when the victim was 13 and 14 years old.
According to the complaint, the victim’s mother contacted law enforcement after
seeing concerning text messages between Schneeberger and the victim. After asking about
the messages, the victim disclosed to her mother that Schneeberger had inappropriately
touched her. In a forensic interview, the victim disclosed that several times before and
after she turned 14 years old, Schneeberger penetrated the victim’s vagina orally, digitally,
and with an object.
Schneeberger pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in
exchange for the state’s dismissal of the other charges and an agreement that the sentence
would not exceed 144 months. Schneeberger also agreed to complete a presentence
investigation report and the parties acknowledged Schneeberger’s plan to move for a
downward sentencing departure. The district court accepted Schneeberger’s guilty plea.
Schneeberger moved for a downward dispositional departure. She argued that
substantial and compelling circumstances—particular amenability to treatment, remorse,
attitude, cooperation, lack of criminal history, and familial support—favored a departure.
At Schneeberger’s sentencing hearing, Schneeberger’s counsel argued in support of
the departure motion, citing Schneeberger’s particular amenability to probation and
highlighting that Schneeberger had experienced similar abuse when she was a child.
3
Defense counsel noted that Schneeberger was engaged in treatment to address underlying
issues stemming from her own abuse and argued that a prison sentence would disrupt the
constructive progress Schneeberger made while in treatment. Schneeberger addressed the
court, expressing shame and remorse and accepting “full responsibility for everything.”
The state opposed the motion and requested a guidelines prison sentence of 144
months. The state argued that the sentencing was about “retribution and deterrence” given
the “deplorable and egregious” nature of Schneeberger’s actions and that no substantial
and compelling circumstances supported a departure. The victim addressed the court with
an impact statement, explaining that the abuse has caused increased anxiety, worsening
familial relationship, difficulties in school, lack of interest in activities, and issues with
anger. The victim’s mother also addressed the court, noting the negative impacts the abuse
has had on the victim’s education and the stress that it has caused her family.
The district court noted it had reviewed the presentence investigation report, the
sentencing worksheet, the psychosexual evaluation, a treatment recommendation, letters of
support from Schneeberger’s family and friends, and the departure motion. The court noted
the existence of facts that supported a downward dispositional departure but found a
guidelines prison sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of the offense. The
district court denied the motion and sentenced Schneeberger to the presumptive sentence
of 144 months in prison.
Schneeberger appeals.
4
DECISION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences “to maintain
uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat.
§ 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). The district court must impose a presumptive sentence unless
“aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present, and those circumstances provide a
substantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines sentence[.]” State v. Soto,
855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quotations and citation omitted). The court need not
provide an explanation when the court “considers reasons for departure but elects to impose
the presumptive sentence.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).
We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for a dispositional departure
for an abuse of discretion. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. “[W]e will not ordinarily interfere
with a sentence falling within the presumptive sentence range . . . even if there are grounds
that would justify departure.” State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006)
(quotation omitted). Only in a “rare” case will we reverse a district court’s imposition of
the presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Schneeberger argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion for a downward dispositional departure beca use she demonstrated that she is
particularly amenable to probation based on the Trog
1 factors. Schneeberger argues that
many of these factors supported a downward dispositional departure.

1 State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (articulating nonexclusive list of factors
district courts may consider when deciding whether to impose a downward departure).
5
At sentencing, the district court acknowledged the presence of several Trog factors
that supported a downward departure. For example, the district court explained that
Schneeberger was “probably amenable to probation” because she was in treatment and had
complied with her conditions of release. The district court also acknowledged that
Schneeberger was unlikely to reoffend, was remorseful, took responsibility for her actions,
and had support from family and friends. But the district court found a guidelines sentence
was appropriate because “for some offenses of a very harmful nature, offenses which cause
immense pain to a perfectly innocent victim, justice demands the punishment of a prison
sentence as proper retribution for the enormity of the offense.”
While Schneeberger may have demonstrated the existence of several Trog factors,
“the presence of mitigating factors does not obligate the court to place a defendant on
probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.” Wells v. State,
839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18,
2014). Instead, the district court retains broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a
motion for a downward departure. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Schneeberger also argues that other facts— including her history of experiencing
similar sexual abuse when she was a teenager and the low rate of recidivism among female
sexual offenders—supported a departure. The district court did not ignore these facts. The
district court expressly recognized both of these circumstances during sentencing. But,
again, the mere presence of these potentially mitigating facts did not obligate the district
court to depart from the presumptive sentence. See Wells, 839 N.W.2d at 781.
6
Schneeberger further maintains that the denial of her motion contravened the
supreme court’s decision in State v. Brusven because the district court improperly based its
decision upon facts accounted for in the underlying offense and charges that had been
dismissed. 327 N.W.2d 591, 593-94 (Minn. 1982). We disagree.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Brusven determined that the district court erred
by imposing an upward durational sentence because the court used the same facts that
accounted for a presumptive sentence. Id. at 594. Here, the district court did not enhance
the sentence. Instead, the court imposed the presumptive guidelines sentence. Also, unlike
in Brusven, the district court’s decision was based upon the “very harmful nature” of the
offense and the court’s belief that “justice demands the punishment of a prison sentence as
proper retribution for the enormity of the offense.”
While some record evidence could support departure, the district court was not
required to depart. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at 668. And the record shows that the district
court thoughtfully considered arguments both for and against a dispositional departure
before imposing a presumptive guidelines sentence. Because the record reveals that the
district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before
making a determination[,]” we “may not interfere with the sentencing [judge’s] exercise of
discretion[.]” Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 80 -81. This is not the “rare” case requiring
reversal of a presumptive guidelines sentence. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Affirmed.