Juan Humberto Castillo-Alvarez, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1024

Juan Humberto Castillo-Alvarez, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 7, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bond, Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-CR-10-31

Juan Humberto Castillo-Alvarez, Bayport, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristi Meyeraan, Jackson County Attorney, Jackson, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
On appeal from a denial of a motion for sentence correction under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 9, appellant argues that the district court erred by determining that he is not
entitled to credit for time he spent in custody in Mexico and that his challenges to his
consecutive sentences and upward durational departure are barred by the law-of-the-case
2
doctrine. We conclude that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars appellant’s challenges to his
consecutive sentences and upward durational departure. But we conclude that appellant is
entitled to custody credit under the interjurisdictional custody-credit rule and Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B), for the time appellant spent in custody in Mexico solely in
connection with the kidnapping and murder offenses for which he was later charged,
convicted, and sentenced in Minnesota. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
FACTS
In 2010, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Juan Humberto Castillo-
Alvarez with one count of aiding and abetting kidnapping and two counts of aiding and
abetting second-degree murder. The charges arose out of the 1997 kidnapping and murder
of 15-year-old G.S.E. Castillo-Alvarez and G.S.E. both lived in Estherville, Iowa. In June
1997, several of Castillo-Alvarez’s associates kidnapped G.S.E. in Iowa and brought him
to a farmhouse in Jackson County, Minnesota, where they killed him. Castillo-Alvarez
directed his associates to kill G.S.E. and provided them the murder weapon. 1
Castillo-Alvarez is a Mexican citizen who, at the time of the offense, had been living
in the United States under an assumed name. At some point after G.S.E.’s body was found,
Castillo-Alvarez fled to Mexico. Federal and Iowa state charges were filed against
Castillo-Alvarez shortly after the murder but were subsequently dismissed because federal

1 We include only the facts relevant to the issues in this appeal. For a full recitation of the
facts underlying the offense, see State v. Castillo-Alvarez, 836 N.W.2d 527, 530-32 (Minn.
2013) (Castillo-Alvarez II).
3
authorities were unable to extradite Castillo -Alvarez from Mexico. In July 2004, a
provisional arrest warrant was issued for Castillo-Alvarez in Mexico at the request of
United States authorities. On September 20, 2004, Iowa refiled state charges of
kidnapping, conspiracy, and second-degree murder.
Castillo-Alvarez was arrested on the Iowa charges in Mexico on October 24, 2005,
roughly 399 days after Iowa refiled its charges. Castillo-Alvarez challenged his extradition
to the United States for the Iowa charges but Mexico approved Castillo-Alvarez’s
extradition on September 20, 2006. Castillo-Alvarez was extradited from Mexico to the
United States on October 2, 2006. He was in custody in Texas for a two- day transfer
period, then was in custody in Iowa from October 4, 2006, until his extradition to
Minnesota on May 13, 2010, for the charges in this case.
An Iowa jury convicted Castillo-Alvarez of all the Iowa state charges. In September
2009, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the convictions based on the delay between the
Iowa charges being filed and Castillo- Alvarez’s arrest in Mexico, which violated Iowa’s
speedy-trial rule.
2
On February 25, 2010, the Jackson County Attorney’s Office filed the charges in
this case against Castillo-Alvarez for his conduct in connection with G.S.E.’s kidnapping
and eventual murder in Jackson County, Minnesota. A jury found Castillo-Alvarez guilty
on all counts. The district court sentenced him to 48 months for kidnapping and 480
months for second-degree murder, which was an upward durational departure, and ordered

2 State v. Castillo-Alvarez, No. 08-0868, 2009 WL 2960419, at *5-6 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept.
2, 2009).
4
the sentences to be served consecutively. The district court gave Castillo-Alvarez 1,677
days of custody credit, accepting Castillo-Alvarez’s argument that he was entitled to credit
for all the time he served in custody in Texas, Iowa, and Minnesota, because he was in
custody for that time solely due to his involvement in G.S.E.’s kidnapping and murder.
Castillo-Alvarez appealed to this court from the judgment of conviction, challenging
both his convictions and sentence. As to his sentence, Castillo-Alvarez argued the district
court erred by imposing consecutive sentences without stating a departure reason, by
failing to explain the reasons supporting an upward durational departure on the murder
conviction, and by imposing both consecutive sentences and an upward durational
departure without finding severe aggravating factors. State v. Castillo-Alvarez, 820
N.W.2d 601, 609 (Minn. App. 2012) (Castillo-Alvarez I), aff’d, 836 N.W.2d 527 (Minn.
2013). We affirmed Castillo-Alvarez’s convictions and sentence. Id. at 621-27. The
supreme court granted further review and affirmed Castillo-Alvarez’s convictions.
Castillo-Alvarez II, 836 N.W.2d at 532-33. The supreme court did not grant review on
Castillo-Alvarez’s sentencing issues.
In November 2018 and June 2020, Castillo- Alvarez filed motion s to correct his
sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. In these motions, Castillo-Alvarez
challenged his consecutive sentences and upward durational departure on the same grounds
as he did in Castillo-Alvarez I. In the June 2020 motion, he also argued that he was entitled
to credit for the time he spent in custody in Mexico awaiting extradition to the United States
because he was in custody solely for his involvement in the offenses of G.S.E.’s kidnapping
and murder. The district court denied Castillo-Alvarez’s 2018 and 2020 sentence-
5
correction motions, determining that the consecutive sentences and upward durational
departure were proper and that he was not entitled to credit for his Mexico time because
the time was “related to a charge brought in Iowa” and thus not solely due to his Minnesota
offense. Castillo-Alvarez did not appeal either of the district court’s orders.
In May 2024, Castillo- Alvarez filed the present motion to correct his sentence. In
this third sentence-correction motion, Castillo -Alvarez again argued that his consecutive
sentences and upward departure are unauthorized by law and that he is entitled to additional
custody credit. The district court denied Castillo-Alvarez’s motion, determining that both
the custody-credit and sentence-duration
issues had previously been raised and decided.
Castillo-Alvarez appeals.
DECISION
Under rule 27.03, a “court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by
law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. A sentence is unauthorized if it is “contrary to
law or applicable statutes.” Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). We review a district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence
for abuse of discretion, reviewing the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. Townsend v. State, 834 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 2013).
A. The district court erred by determining that Castillo- Alvarez is not
entitled to credit for the time he spent in custody in Mexico awaiting
extradition to the United States for the kidnapping and murder of G.S.E.

Castillo-Alvarez argues that he is entitled to credit for the time spent in custody in
Mexico because, like the time in Texas and Iowa, it was solely based on his involvement
6
in the “offense or behavioral incident” of G.S.E.’s kidnapping and murder. Castillo-
Alvarez’s argument has merit.
At Castillo-Alvarez’s 2011 sentencing, the district court gave him credit against his
Minnesota sentence for the time he spent in custody in Texas and Iowa. The court
reasoned:
Because the sole reason Mr. Castillo- Alvarez has been
incarcerated [is] for the death of [G.S.E.] the Court believes
that the law writes as well [as] fairness and equity that he be
given credit for time served against the Minnesota sentence
since the arrest [in Texas] on October 2, 2006.

The issue of whether Castillo-Alvarez was entitled to credit for the time spent in Mexican
custody awaiting extradition to the United States was not addressed by the parties or the
district court at that time. The district court denied Castillo-Alvarez’s 2018 and 2020
requests for additional custody credit, determining that the time Castillo-Alvarez spent in
custody in Mexico was “related to a charge brought in Iowa.”3
A defendant is entitled to credit against their sentence for time spent in custody “in
connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 4(B). Whether a defendant is entitled to custody credit is not up to the
district court’s discretion. State v. Roy , 928 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 2019). “A district

3 Because the district court considered and rejected Castillo-Alvarez’s interjurisdictional
custody-credit claim in his first two sentence- correction motions, it relied on the law-of-
the-case doctrine to deny Castillo-Alvarez’s third sentence-correction motion that is the
subject of this appeal. Castillo-Alvarez did not appeal the denial of those prior motions.
Therefore, the interjurisdictional custody-credit issue is before us for the first time and the
law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar us from conside ring Castillo -Alvarez’s argument.
See State v. Stutelberg, 435 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. App. 1989).
7
court’s decision whether to award custody credit is a mixed question of fact and law; the
court must determine the circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks credit for, and
then apply the rules to those circumstances.” State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 379
(Minn. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that they are entitled to
custody credit. Id. at 379. In reviewing a district court’s decision whether to award custody
credit, we review the court’s factual findings for clear error but review questions of law
de novo. Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 344.
When determining whether to award custody credit, Minnesota courts distinguish
between custody within Minnesota (intrajurisdictional) and custody outside of Minnesota
(interjurisdictional). Id. at 345. Under the interjurisdictional custody rule, to receive credit
against a Minnesota sentence for time spent in custody in another jurisdiction, “the
Minnesota offense must be the sole reason for the custody.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[A]
defendant can only receive credit for time spent in the custody of another jurisdiction if the
time was served solely in connection with the Minnesota offense.” Id. Thus, to be entitled
to credit for the time he spent in custody in Mexico, Castillo-Alvarez must establish that
the Minnesota offense for which he was being sentenced —the murder and kidnapping of
G.S.E.— was the “sole reason” for his custody in Mexico.
The record establishes that Castillo-Alvarez was arrested in Mexico solely because
of his involvement in G.S.E.’s kidnapping and murder. U nlike the defendant in Roy,
Castillo-Alvarez was not in custody in Mexico because of any offense or conduct
committed in Mexico. Id. at 345-46 (concluding that defendant was not entitled to credit
for time spent in custody in the Red Lake Nation in connection with separate Red Lake
8
crimes); see also State v. Willis, 376 N.W.2d 427, 428-29 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that
defendant was not entitled to credit for time spent in custody in Illinois “on Illinois charges
unrelated to the Minnesota offenses”). It is undisputed that Castillo-Alvarez was extradited
to the United States solely because of the kidnapping and murder of G.S.E. And except
for a separate conspiracy charge in Iowa—a charge which appears to reflect a difference
between Iowa’s and Minnesota’s statutory schemes for the crime of conspiracy—the Iowa
and Minnesota charges are identical. 4 Thus, Castillo-Alvarez was in custody “solely in
connection” with the offense of G.S.E.’s kidnapping and murder, offenses for which he
was later charged, convicted, and sentenced in Jackson County, Minnesota. Roy, 928
N.W.2d at 345.
The state argues that the district court properly denied Castillo-Alvarez’s motion
because “[a]t the time of his incarceration in Mexico, appellant had not been charged with
a Minnesota crime.” While the charges that Castillo-Alvarez faced at the time he was in
custody in Mexico were filed in Iowa, and Minnesota filed its charges after the Iowa Court
of Appeals later reversed Castillo-Alvarez’s Iowa conviction, neither the interjurisdictional
rule as established in Roy nor the plain language of rule 27.03 refers to “charges.” Rather,
the standard which governs an award of credit for custody outside of Minnesota is whether
the Minnesota “offense” is “the sole reason” for the interjurisdictional custody. Id. (“Under

4 Under Minnesota’s aiding-and-abetting statute, “a person is criminally liable for a crime
committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires
with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1
(1996) (emphasis added). Iowa’s aiding-and -abetting statute does not contain similar
“conspires with” language. See Iowa Stat. § 703.1 (1995). Instead, Iowa law provides for
a separate conspiracy charge. Iowa Stat. § 703.2 (1995).
9
the test for determining interjurisdictional custody credit, a defendant can only receive
credit for time spent in the custody of another jurisdiction if the time was served solely in
connection with the Minnesota offense.”) ; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B)
(providing that a defendant is entitled to credit against their sentence for time spent in
custody “in connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced”).5
Minnesota caselaw has interpreted “charge” and “offense” as having different
meanings in the criminal law. An “offense” refers to “[a] violation of the law; a crime,
often a minor one.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Minn. 2015) (alteration in
original) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1250 (10th ed. 2014)). A “charge,” on the other
hand, in the criminal context means “the specific crime the defendant is accused of
committing” or the “[a]ccusation of a crime by a formal complaint, information or
indictment.” State v. Clow, 600 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. App. 1999) (alteration in original)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 233 (6th ed. 1990)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1999) .
Here, Castillo-Alvarez was in custody in Mexico solely for the “offense” of G.S.E.’s
kidnapping and murder, the same “offense” for which he was convicted and sentenced in

5 Castillo-Alvarez argues that he is entitled to credit for the time he spent in custody in
Mexico because it was based solely on the “offense or behavioral incident” of G.S.E.’s
kidnapping and murder. While Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B), provides that a
defendant is entitled to credit against their sentence for time spent in custody “in connection
with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced,” in Roy, the supreme court held
that, to receive interjurisdictional custody credit, the time spent in the custody of another
jurisdiction must be served “solely in connection with the Minnesota offense.” 928
N.W.2d at 345. Because we decide that Castillo-Alvarez was in custody in Mexico solely
in connection with his conduct involving G.S.E.’s kidnapping and murder, the offenses for
which he was convicted and sentenced in Minnesota, we do not address Castillo-Alvarez’s
argument that he is entitled to interjurisdictional custody credit because he was in custody
in Mexico in connection with the “same behavioral incident.”
10
Minnesota. We discern nothing in the caselaw or rule 27 requiring that, in order for a
defendant to be entitled to interjurisdictional custody credit for time spent in custody in a
jurisdiction outside of Minnesota solely in connection with a Minnesota offense, Minnesota
charges must have been filed.
6
The state also contends that Castillo-Alvarez is not entitled to additional credit under
State v. Moss. 374 N.W.2d 590, 591 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 1, 1985).
In Moss, the defendant absconded after pleading guilty in Hennepin County to theft by
swindle and was later arrested in England for crimes he committed in England. Id. After
serving his sentence in England, Moss was deported to the United States. Id. At his
probation revocation hearing on the Hennepin County theft-by -swindle conviction, the
defendant argued that he should receive credit for the time he served in custody in England
because he was being held “partly” because of his Minnesota convictions. Id . at 591-92.
We rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding that the time he spent in English custody

6 We acknowledge that in Willis, the supreme court held:

A defendant charged with a crime in Minnesota and
held in custody in another state at request of Minnesota
authorities is not entitled to credit against a Minnesota sentence
for time in custody in the other state unless the Minnesota
charge was the sole reason for the detention by the other state.

376 N.W.2d at 427. But it appears that Willis used the term “charge” interchangeably with
the term “offense.” Id. at 428 (stating that Illinois charges were “unrelated to the Minnesota
offenses”). And Roy, the most recent and controlling case from the supreme court, is clear:
“For a defendant to receive credit on a Minnesota sentence for time spent in another
jurisdiction’s custody, the defendant’s Minnesota offense must be the sole reason for the
custody.” 928 N.W.2d at 345 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
11
was solely because of the offenses that he committed in England. Id. Castillo-Alvarez did
not commit any crimes in Mexico and was not in custody in Mexico for any offenses
committed in that jurisdiction. Accordingly, Moss is inapposite.
Because Castillo-Alvarez has demonstrated that he was in custody in Mexico
“solely in connection with” the offenses for which he was sentenced in Minnesota —the
kidnapping and murder of G.S.E.—the district court erred by denying him custody credit
for the time he spent in custody in Mexico. See Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 345; Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 4(B). We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to calculate
and award Castillo-Alvarez credit for the time he spent in custody in Mexico.7
B. Castillo-Alvarez’s challenges to his upward durational departure and
consecutive sentences are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine.

Castillo-Alvarez also challenges his consecutive sentences and upward durational
departure. The district court applied the law-of-the-case doctrine to deny Castillo-
Alvarez’s claims that the imposition of consecutive sentences and the upward departure
were an abuse of discretion.
The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that , “when a court decides upon a rule of
law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the
same case.” Townsend v. State, 3 N.W.3d 13, 16 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted). The
doctrine “functions to bar issues that were previously considered and denied in the same

7 The record indicates that Castillo-Alvarez was in custody in Mexico between his arrest
on October 24, 2005, and his extradition to the United States on October 2, 2006 , but the
exact number of days is unclear. We leave the calculation of custody credit to the district
court.
12
case,” and applies to a rule 27 motion, “when the claim underlying the motion was
previously denied on direct appeal.” Smith v. State, 974 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (Minn. 2022)
(concluding that law-of-the-case doctrine barred defendant’s challenges to his consecutive
sentences and upward durational departure). Additionally, the doctrine bars relitigating an
issue resolved earlier in the same case “even if the issue presented is not precisely the same
in all its details.” Townsend, 3 N.W.3d at 17 (citing Lynch v. State, 749 N.W.2d 318 (Minn.
2008)).
The issues of whether the district court properly imposed consecutive sentences and
an upward durational departure were raised and decided on direct appeal. In Castillo-
Alvarez I, Castillo-Alvarez argued that the district court imposed consecutive sentences for
his murder and kidnapping convictions without making a finding of aggravating
circumstances, constituting an impermissible departure. 820 N.W.2d at 621- 22. We
affirmed the consecutive sentences because Castillo-Alvarez’s argument that they
constituted a departure was based on an older version of the sentencing guidelines not in
effect at the time of his offense, and the version in effect allowed consecutive sentences
under these circumstances without constituting a departure.
8 Id. at 622. Castillo-Alvarez
also argued that the district court erred in imposing an upward durational departure on his
murder sentence “based upon the aggravating factors of treating the victim with ‘particular
cruelty for which the individual offender should be held responsible ’ and committing the

8 At the time the offense occurred in 1997, the sentencing guidelines permitted consecutive
sentences for “[m]ultiple current felony convictions for crimes against persons” to be
“given without departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.F (1996).
13
crime ‘as part of a group of three or more persons who all actively participated in the
crime’” without adequately explaining those reasons for departure. Id. at 622-23 (quoting
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.D.2.b(2), (8) (1996)). We agreed that the district court did not
sufficiently explain its reasoning under the particular-cruelty factor, but we affirmed the
departure because the district court adequately relied on and explained its reasoning under
the group-of-three-or-more factor. Id. at 623 (“An upward departure may be supported
based on the presence of a single aggravating factor.” (citing State v. O’Brien, 369 N.W.2d
525, 527 (Minn. 1985))).
In Castillo-Alvarez II, the supreme court did not address either of these sentencing
arguments. As such, our affirmance of Castillo-Alvarez’s consecutive sentences and of the
upward durational departure based on the group-of-three -or-more aggravating factor are
law of the case on those issues. Castillo-Alvarez’s current challenges to his consecutive
sentences and the upward durational departure are based on the same grounds that we
considered and rejected in Castillo-Alvarez I and, therefore, are barred by law-of-the-case
doctrine. See Smith, 974 N.W.2d at 581-82. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Castillo-Alvarez’s motion to correct his sentence with respect to his upward
durational departure and consecutive sentences.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.