In Re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1029

In Re the Marriage of:

Katherine Patterson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Jerry Lyn Patterson,
Respondent.

Filed December 30, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-22-1264

Katherine Elizabeth Patterson, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Kathryn M. Lammers, Carlo E. Faccini, Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
In this marriage -dissolution appeal, appellant -wife argues that the district court
clearly erred in its domestic-abuse and income-related findings and abused its discretion in
selecting the parties’ marital property valuation date, by not appointing a guardian ad litem
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for the parties’ child, by not awarding wife spousal maintenance, by awarding the parties
joint legal and joint physical custody of their minor child , by not assigning any medical -
support obligations, and in denying wife’s request for need - and conduct-based attorney
fees. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 4, 2022, appellant-wife Katherine Patterson petitioned the district court
to dissolve her marriage to respondent -husband Jerry Lyn Patterson. In fall 2023 , the
district court held a two-day trial on wife’s dissolution petition. A summary of the district
court’s relevant posttrial factual findings follows.
In March 2004, husband and wife were married in Wyoming. During their
marriage, the parties had two children: PP, born in September 2004, and GP, born in
December 2009. At the time of the judgment and decree, PP had reached the age of
majority.
At trial, husband requested joint legal and joint physical custody of GP; wife
requested sole legal and sole physical custody. Wife had “repeatedly, through emails,
letters, and pleadings . . . sought [c]ourt involvement to end [husband’s] parenting time
with [GP] due to [husband’s] chemical and mental health.” Much of the trial focused on
husband’s mental - and chemical -health issues, and the district court had ordered both
parents to complete psychological and chemical-dependency assessments before the trial.
The district court found that husband “has acknowledged and addressed his mental
health” and that husband’s mental health “does not affect his ability to safely and
adequately parent.” In its best-interests findings, the district court acknowledged that the
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parties “have a difficult and contentious relationship” but ultimately found that husband
had not engaged in domestic violence. After considering the minor child’s best interests,
the district court awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical custody.
In calculating the parties’ incomes for child-support purposes, the district court
found that wife was voluntarily unemployed and imputed to her gross monthly income of
$7,183. The district court ordered husband to pay wife $276 per month in child support,
but it did not order husband to pay medical support for the minor child.
The district court denied wife’s request for spousal maintenance, finding that wife
“is fully capable of providing for her own support and is not dependent” on husband for
support.
The district court divided the parties’ marital property, using a property valuation
date of August 15, 2022.
Finally, the district court addressed wife’s requests for need- and conduct-based
attorney fees and husband’s requests for conduct-based attorney fees. The district court
denied all requests for attorney fees.
Wife appeals.
DECISION
Wife has filed an informal pro se brief in this court, which makes approximately 48
requests of this court. The majority of her requests are for amended findings of fact. This
court does not amend a district court’s findings of fact; our review is “limited to identifying
errors and then correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
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We therefore construe wife’s requests for amended findings as a challenge to the district
court’s findings.
“Appellate [courts] set aside a district court’s findings of fact only if clearly
erroneous, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness
credibility. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous [when] an appellate court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748
N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation and citations omitted). “When determining
whether findings are clearly erroneous, the appellate court views the record in the light
most favorable to the [district] court’s findings.” Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d
468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). “That the record might support findings other than those
made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.” Id. at
474.
Other standards govern our review and are worth repeating here. “[O]n appeal error
is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be
reversal. . . . [T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Loth
v. Loth , 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted). Issues that are not
adequately briefed are waived. Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (“This
issue was not argued in the briefs and accordingly must be deemed waived.”) . And, “[a]n
assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons
Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
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Neither wife nor husband has provided this court a transcript of the underlying
dissolution trial. It is the appellant’s duty to order a transcript “of those parts of the
proceedings not already part of the record which are deemed necessary for inclusion in the
record.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.02, subd. 1(a). Although “we are disposed to disregard
defects resulting from failure to comply with the rules of this court relating to the contents
of [a pro se] brief,” a pro se appellant retains the burden to “provide an adequate record
and preserve it in a settled case to enable us to review questions [the appellant] desires to
raise on appeal.” Noltimier v. Noltimier , 157 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1968) (citation
omitted). “When an appellant fails to provide a transcript, this court’s review is limited to
whether the [district] court’s conclusions of law are supported by the findings.”
Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. App. 1995); see Duluth Herald
& News Tri b. v. Plymouth Optical Co. , 176 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1970) (stating that
without a transcript, “this court is not cognizant of the evidence upon which the [district]
court based its findings of fact”).
With these principles in mind, we note that only a few of wife’s requests are
supported by both an adequate record and adequate legal argument and authority. Wife’s
other requests are not adequately briefed or lack an adequate record for review (or both) ,
and we therefore do not consider them . Our analysis of the adequately supported and
adequately briefed issues follows.
I.
Wife contends that the district court erred in finding that no domestic abuse had
occurred between the parties and in its determination of the parties’ incomes. We address
each argument in turn.
A.
Wife assigns error to the district court’s best-interests finding that no domestic abuse
has occurred between the parties.
“In determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of each
child . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3( 3) (2022); see Durkin v. Hinich , 442 N.W.2d
148, 152 (Minn. 1989) (“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interest of
the child.”). In determining the best interests of the child, the district court “must make
detailed findings” on 12 statutory best-interests-of-the-child factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(1) (2022). One of these factors is “whether domestic abuse, as defined in section
518B.01, has occurred in the parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the
nature and context of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the dom estic abuse for
parenting and for the child’s safety, well -being, and developmental needs.” Id., subd.
1(a)(4) (2022).
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9) (2022), the district court must use a
rebuttable presumption that, upon the request of either parent, “joint legal custody is in the
best interests of the child.” However, the district court
shall use a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or
joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if
domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred
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between the parents. In determining whether the presumption
is rebutted, the court shall consider the nature and context of
the domestic abuse and the implications of the domestic abuse
for parenting and for the child’s safety, well -being, and
developmental needs.

Id., subd. 1(b)(9) (emphasis added).
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2 (2022) , defines domestic abuse to include the
following, if committed against a family or household member by a family or household
member: (1) “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” (2) “the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” or (3) terroristic threats, criminal sexual
conduct, sexual extortion, or interference with an emergency call.
After “weighing the evidence, testimony, and credibility of the witnesses” before it,
the district court acknowledged that the “parties have a difficult and contentious
relationship,” but the court ultimately found that “it is not domestic violence.” The district
court described the incidents wife alleged to show domestic abuse as follows:
[Wife] reports an incident in 2014 in which [husband]
shoved [wife] and an incident in 2018 in which [husband]
kicked a plastic laundry basket into [wife], pushed [wife] up
against the wall, and grabbed [wife] by the neck as if he was
going to choke her. [Wife] also argues [husband] has admitted
to multiple incidents of domestic abuse against [wife].

(Emphasis and citations omitted.)
Wife argues that her trial exhibits demonstrate that husband both physically abused
her and threatened to physically abuse her. She asserts that in a June 2022
order-for-protection (OFP) proceeding, the district court found that husband had engaged
in domestic abuse against wife. She argues that because there was domestic abuse between
8
the parties, the district court should have applied the rebuttable presumption that joint legal
and joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the parties’ minor child, and that
husband did not rebut such a presumption.
Even if the district court erred in finding an absence of domestic abuse under Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01 (2022), wife fails to demonstrate that the error was prejudicial. To obtain
relief on appeal, wife must show both error and prejudice. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (“The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).
A finding of domestic abuse would have triggered application of a rebuttable
presumption that an award of joint legal and joint physical custody was not in the best
interests of the minor child. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9). The district court’s
findings regarding “the nature and context of the domestic [-]abuse” allegations and the
implications of the allegations for “parenting and for the child’s safety, well -being, and
developmental needs” indicate that, if the district court had applied th at presumption,
husband would have rebutted it. Id. For example, the district court found:
• “[B]oth parents are actively involved in the care of [GP] during their parenting
time.”
• “[GP] would like to have both parents involved in his life, and . . . he enjoys having
time with each parent.”
• “There are no credible safety threats to [GP] in the care of either parent.”
• Husband “is adequately addressing his mental health, and his mental health is not
of danger to [GP].”
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• “[T]here have been no issues during [ husband’s] unsupervised parenting time and
no instances where [GP] has been placed in harm’s way by [husband].”
• Husband “has no current physical, mental, and chemical health issues that affect[]
[GP’s] safety and development.”
• “[B]oth parents care deeply for and love [GP].”
• “[GP] has a strong attachment to both parents.”
• “Despite the contentious co-parenting relationship,” wife and husband “are able to
cooperate and make legal custody decisions,” and “both parties are able to
diplomatically share information with each other regarding [GP] and communicate
in an information[-]forward manner.”
In addition, the domestic -abuse best -interests factor is one of 12 statutory best -
interests factors. Id. The district court expressly found that every best-interests factor
favored an award of joint legal and joint physical custody. In sum, if the district court erred
by failing to find domestic abuse based on the two alleged incidents of domestic violence
in 2014 and 2018, the error was harmless.
B.

Wife argues that the district court clearly erred in its findings regarding the parties’
incomes for the purpose of determining child support.
Upon dissolution, the district court shall make a just and proper order regarding
financial support of minor children. Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 1 (2022). “If a parent is
voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or employed on a less than full -time basis, or
there is no direct evidence of any income, child support must be calculated based on a
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determination of potential income.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (2022). Potential
income must be calculated using one of three methods: (1) “the parent’s probable earnings
level based on employment potential, recent work history, and occupational qualifications
in light of prevailing job opportunities and earning levels in the community,” (2) “if a
parent is receiving unemployment compensation or workers’ compensation, that parent ’s
income may be calculated using the actual amount of the unemployment compensation or
workers’ compensation benefit received,” or (3) “the amount of income a parent could earn
working 30 hours per work at 100 percent of the current federal or state minimum wage,
whichever is higher.” Id., subd. 2 (2022).
“A court’s determination of income must be based in fact and will stand unless
clearly erroneous.” Newstrand v. Arend , 869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. App. 2015)
(quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). “Whether a parent is voluntarily
unemployed is a finding of fact, which we review for clear error.” Welsh v. Welsh , 775
N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. App. 2009).
The district court made several findings of fact regarding wife’s “employment
potential, recent work history, and occupational qualifications in light of prevailing job
opportunities and earning levels in the community.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 2. The
court found that wife is unemployed, is licensed as a realtor in Arizona, and has worked
remotely in Minnesota for a real estate agency in Arizona. The district court also found,
based on husband’s exhibit showing wife’s Social Security earnings statement, that wife
earned over $100,000 in 2021 and that according to wife’s testimony, “the numbers for
some of those years on that statement may actually have been low.” The court
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acknowledged wife’s arguments that she is not qualified or licensed to work in real estate
in Minnesota, but it ultimately stated that “it cannot ignore the reality” that wife has
“proven skills in real estate, knowledge that is still usable, and a history of having worked
remotely.”
The district court imputed wife’s gross monthly income based on a local real-estate-
agent job posting listing an estimated annual pay of $86,200, which is less than the district
court found wife had earned in 2021. The district court properly applied Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.32 (2022), and its application of the law is supported by its findings . Once again,
without a transcript, our review is “limited to whether the [district] court’s conclusions of
law are supported by the findings.” Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d at 494.
Wife also argues that the district court should have calculated her income by using
“the amount of income a parent could earn working 30 hours per week at 100 percent of
the current federal or state minimum wage, whichever is higher” under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.32, subd. 2(3), instead of using “the parent’s probable earning s level based on
employment potential, recent work history, and occupational qualification s in light of
prevailing job opportunities and earning s levels in the community” under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.32, subd. 2(1), as the district court did.
We review the district court’s income-imputation method for an abuse of discretion.
See Butt v. Schmidt, 747 N.W.2d 566, 577 (Minn. 2008) (making this statement regarding
the predecessor statute to section 518A.32). Given the district court’s finding that wife has
“proven skills in real estate, knowledge that still is usable, and a history of having worked
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remotely,” we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s chosen income -
imputation method.
Finally, wife argues that the district court erred in determining husband’s income
because the district court averaged husband’s annual income even though husband only
worked for two months in 2022. Wife does not cite to any legal authority indicating that
the district court erred in doing so. Similarly, wife “asks the Appeals Court to reevaluate
Child Support calculations” based on the amount husband paid in arrears and based on
overnight credit but does not cite to any legal authority supporting that ap proach. Wife
does not meet her burden of showing error on appeal. Loth, 35 N.W.2d at 546.
II.
Wife contends that the district court abused its discretion in selecting August 15,
2022, as the valuation date for the parties’ marital property.
The district court “shall make a just and equitable division of the marital property”
upon dissolution of a marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2022). “The court shall
value marital assets for purposes of division between the parties as of the day of the initially
scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless a different date is agreed upon by the
parties, or unless the court makes specific findings that another date of valuation is fair and
equitable.” Id. “Because a [district] court has broa d discretion in dividing property , its
[valuation date] decision will stand unless it has abused that discretion.” Desrosier v.
Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. App. 1996).
Wife lists several reasons why this court should “reevaluate the date set as an
equitable valuation date.” She claims that she requested a June 1, 2022 valuation date; that
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as of June 1, 2022, husband stopped providing her with child support and contributions for
unreimbursed medical expenses; that the dissolution petition would have been filed earlier
if not for husband; that she does not have the same opportunities for futu re acquisition of
capital assets as husband does; that wife wrongfully shared in husband’s attorney fees and
costs; that starting in June 2022, husband’s banking activities were “very out of the norm
for his usual banking activities” ; and that the valuatio n date affects consideration of the
parties’ vehicle as marital property.
The district court recognized that the valuation date was a “contested issue at trial,”
noting that husband requested August 15, 2022 , as the valuation date and that although
wife “argued for a June 1, 2022[] date in a motion that was denied, [wife] gave no testimony
or produced any evidence to rebut [husband’s] request at trial.” And the district court made
“specific findings” regarding why August 15, 2022, was a “fair and equitable” valuation
date. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. The district court found that the parties separated
in May 2022, that husband was served with divorce pleadings on August 2, 2022, that the
Initial Case Management Conference was held on December 20, 2022, and that the court
held a pretrial hearing on April 28, 2023. The co urt acknowledged that wife “sought a
valuation date closer to the date of the parties’ separation,” that since separation, “the
parties each conducted themselves in a manner where they were responsible for their own
support and utilized their funds for the mutual benefit of the children,” and that both
husband and wife “experienced downturns in their respective incomes, albeit for differing
reasons.”
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The district court ultimately rejected wife’s proposed valuation date because it
predated initiation of the dissolution proceeding. The district court selected August 15,
2022, as the valuation date because of “the separate finances at separation, the date of
service of the pleadings, and the length of time from separation and the prehearing
settlement conference.”
Again, the lack of a transcript affects our ability to fully review this issue. See Am.
Fam. Life Ins. Co. v. Noruk , 528 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn . App. 1995) (stating that if a
transcript is not provided on appeal, this court’s review is “limited to determining whether
the [district] court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law”), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 27, 1995); Thorp Loan and Thrift Co. v. Morse , 451 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. App.
1990) (“When an appellant acts as attorney pro se, appellate courts are disposed to
disregard defects in the brief, but that does not relieve appellants of the necessity of
providing an adequate record . . . .”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990). But we are
satisfied that the district court’s findings support its conclusion. In sum, wife has not shown
that the district court abused its “broad discretion” in using August 15, 2022, as the
valuation date.
III.

Wife contends that the district court misapplied the law in failing to assign a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the parties’ minor child in this dissolution
proceeding.
Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2 (2022) states that in all marriage dissolution
proceedings in which custody or parenting time of a minor child is at issue, if the district
15
court “has reason to believe that the minor child is a victim of domestic child abuse or
neglect, as those terms are defined in section 260C.007 and chapter 260E, respectively, the
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem.” (Emphasis added.) However, “[n]othing in this
subdivision requires the court to appoint a guardian ad litem in any proceeding f or child
custody, marriage dissolution, or legal separation in which an allegation of domestic child
abuse or neglect has not been made.” Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2.
Wife argues that the district court was required to appoint a guardian ad litem under
Minn. Stat. § 518.165 (2022) based on husband’s 2021 psychological assessment and
because husband “failed to provide anything more recent” indicating “that he is no longer
a safety threat to [GP].” She also argues that a guardian should have been appointed
because husband was required to register as a predatory offender.
Wife does not demonstrate that the district court misapplied the law. Under Minn.
Stat. § 518.165, the district court is required to appoint a guardian ad litem if it has reason
to believe that the parties’ child is a victim of domestic child abuse or neglect. Id. The
record does not suggest that the minor child has been a victim of domestic child abuse or
neglect, and “[n]othing in [ Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2] requires the court to appoint a
guardian ad litem” if there is no allegation of domestic child abuse or neglect. Id.
As to discretionary appointment of a guardian ad litem, Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd.
1, provides that the district court “may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests
of the child” in a dissolution proceeding in which no allegation of domestic child abuse or
neglect has been made. (Emphasis added.) We review a decision not to appoint a guardian
ad litem for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. Albaaj, 723 N.W.2d 50, 59 (Minn. App. 2006).
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“An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court resolves the matter in a manner that
is against logic and the facts on the record.” O’Donnell v. O’Donnell , 678 N.W.2d 471,
474 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion. As the district court emphasized, the
then fourteen-year-old minor child was “of a normal maturity and ability for a child of his
age to be able to have an opinio n,” “the child would like to have both parents involved in
his life, and . . . he enjoys having time with each parent.” Additionally, the district court
noted wife’s concerns regarding husband’s predatory-registration requirement and her
concerns that husband “has significant mental [-] and chemical[-]health issues that affect
his ability to parent” the minor child. The district court acknowledged that husband’s
previous mental-health incident “should not be ignored,” but it found that husband “has
acknowledged and addressed his mental health” and that wife “has repeatedly relied upon
decade old information and incidents from over one to [one -and-a-half] years ago.” On
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not appointing a guardian ad
litem to represent the interests of GP.
IV.

Wife contends that the district court abused its discretion by not award ing her
spousal maintenance.
The district court “may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds that
the spouse seeking maintenance”:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of
the spouse considering the standard of living established
17
during the marriage, especially, but not limited to, a period of
training or education, or
(b) is unable to provide adequate self -support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it app ropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2022); see Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989)
(stating that an award of spousal maintenance requires a showing of need).
A spousal maintenance order is made based on “all relevant factors” including:
(a) the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to the
party, and the party’s ability to meet needs independently,
including the extent to which a provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment, and the probability, given the party’s
age and skills, of completing education or training and
becoming fully or partially self-supporting;
(c) the standard of living established during the
marriage;
(d) the duration of the marriage and, in the case of a
homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the
extent to which any education, skills, or experience have
become outmoded and earning capacity has become
permanently diminished;
(e) the loss of earnings, seniority, retirement benefits,
and other employment opportunities forgone by the spouse
seeking spousal maintenance;
(f) the age, and the physical and emotional condition of
the spouse seeking maintenance;
(g) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(h) the contribution of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in the amount or
value of the marital property, as well as the contribution of a
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spouse as a homemaker or in furtherance of the other party’s
employment or business.

Id., subd. 2 (2022).
“When applying these factors, a court must balance the financial needs of [wife] and
her ability to meet those needs against the financial condition of [husband].” Fink v. Fink,
366 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. App. 1985). “The purpose of [spousal maintenance] is to
care for the [requesting spouse’s] needs after divorce, not to provide [the spouse] with a
lifetime profit -sharing plan.” Snyder v. Snyder , 212 N.W.2d 869 , 875 (Minn. 1973)
(quotation omitted). Because of “the fact -dependent nature of the inquiry, ” the supreme
court has held that “a [district] court has broad discretion in deciding whether to award
maintenance and before an appellate court determines that there has been a clear abuse of
that discretion, it must determine that there [is] a clearly e rroneous conclusion that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted).
The district court explicitly found that wife “failed to meet either” of the two
statutory requirements for the court to award spousal maintenance. And the court made
detailed findings regarding each of the factors in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 , and
determined that only two of the eight statutory factors supported an award of spousal
maintenance. On this record, wife has not shown an abuse of discretion.
V.

Wife contends that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the parties
joint legal and joint physical custody of the parties’ minor child, GP.
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“In determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of each
child . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(3); see Durkin, 442 N.W.2d at 152 (“The guiding
principle in all custody cases is the best interest of the child.”). In determining the best
interests of the child, the district court “must make detailed findings” on 12 statutory best-
interests-of-the-child factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1). “The court may not use
one factor to the exclusion of all others, and the court shall consider that the factors may
be interrelated.” Id. “The court shall use a rebuttable presumption that upon request of
either or both parties, joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child.” Id., subd.
1(b)(9). “However, the court shall use a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or
joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse, as defined
in section 518B.01, has occurred between the parents.” Id.
“Appellate review of custody determinations is limited to whether the [district] court
abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly
applying the law.” Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). In reviewing a
custody determination, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question
the [district] court’s balancing of best -interests considerations.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d
at 477.
Wife asserts that the district court erred in its custody determination because
husband is “statutorily barred from obtaining custody of the child .” She relies on statutes
and caselaw governing termination of parental rights, but she states, “Please note [wife] is
NOT requesting [husband’s] rights be terminated just that safety be paramount.” Based on
our review of the available record, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in
20
determining that given the work that husband has done, he currently does not pose a safety
threat to the child.
Wife also argues that there is a “rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or
joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse has occurred
between the parents” and that husband “has failed to rebut this presumption.” As discussed
above, even if the district court erred by declining to find that husband subjected wife to
domestic abuse and therefore erred by declining to apply the presumption against joint
custody, the alleged error was harmless because the district court’s findings show that it
would have found that husband rebutted the presumption. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (“The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). Again, the district court found
that every best-interests factor favored an award of joint legal and joint physical custody.
The law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s
balancing of best-interests considerations.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477. We discern
no reason to do so here.
VI.
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering husband to
provide medical support for the minor child.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.41 (2022) governs medical support determinations in the context
of child support. “If a joint child is presently enrolled in health care coverage, the court
must order that the parent who currently has the joint child enrolled continue that
enrollment unless the parties agree otherwise or a party requests a change in coverage and
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the court determines that other health care coverage is more appropriate .” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.41, subd. 4 (a). The statute defines “public coverage ,” in part, as “health care
benefits provided by any form of medical assistance under chapter 256B.” Id., subd. 1(f).
The district court generally must order that “all unreimbursed and uninsured medical
expenses under the health plan be divided between the obligor and obligee based on their
proportionate share of the parties’ combined monthly PICS.” Id., subd. 5(a).
The district court “is accorded broad discretion” with respect to “support of the
children of the parties.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). “There must
be a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record before this
court will find that the [district] court abused its discretion.” Id.
Wife argues that husband is “grossly over income for medical assistance,” that
husband did not “provide evidence of availability of insurance” to the district court, and
that it is “an absolute necessity that the J&D address [husband] covering Child under his
employer offered health/dental/vision insurance.”
The district court found both parties receive medical assistance. The court held that
wife “shall continue to carry the minor child’s health and dental insurance under Medical
Assistance” and that neither wife nor husband “shall be responsible to the other for
payment for the child’s health and dental insurance for so long as all the parties remain on
Medical Assistance, as stated by the County Attorney in their letter to the Court.” The
district court also found that if insurance does not cover all of th e minor child’s health -
related expenses, wife “has the ability to pay 35% of the unreimbursed and uninsured
health-related expenses of the minor child,” and husband “has the ability to pay the
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remaining 65%.” The district court’s order was consistent with the requirements of Minn.
Stat. § 518A.41. Once again, wife does not demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion.
Wife’s remaining arguments regarding husband’s qualifications for medical
assistance challenge the district court’s finding s of fact, which we cannot adequately
review without a transcript.
VII.
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for
need- and conduct-based attorney fees.
The district court “shall” award attorney fees “in an amount necessary to enable a
party to carry on or contest the proceeding,” if it finds: (1) “that the fees are necessary for
the good faith assertion of the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not contribute
unnecessarily to the length and expense of the proceeding,” (2) “that the party from whom
fees, costs, and disbursements are sought has the means to pay them,” and (3) “that the
party to whom fees, costs, and disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022). “Nothing in this section . . . precludes the
court from awarding, in its discretion, additional fees, costs, and disbursements against a
party who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Id.
In the context of need -based attorney fees, our standard of review “is whether the
district court abused its discretion.” Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999).
Conduct-based attorney fee awards “are discretionary with the district court.” Szarzynski
v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007).
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Wife argues that she has high credit card debt as a result of her attorney fees, “most
of which was spent to defend against the manipulative lies [husband] has submitted to the
[d]istrict [c]ourt repeatedly .” She also a rgues that she has “wrongfully shared in
[husband’s] attorney fees/costs.” The district court “thoroughly reviewed the record as
well as the parties’ submissions and memorandum” regarding the parties’ requests for
attorney fees and examined “the financial resources of both parties . . . , t he parties’
arguments, and the parties’ efforts both prior to and during trial to resolve outstanding
disputes.” On this record, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion.
In conclusion, the district court’s judgment and decree indicates that it carefully
considered and weighed the competing evidence presented at trial, as well as the parties’
positions. It is not our role to retry the case on appeal. See Stiff v. Associated Sewing
Supply Co., 436 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. 1989) (“An appellate court exceeds its proper
scope of review when it bases its conclusions on its own interpretation of the evidence and,
in effect tries the issues anew and substitutes its own findings for those of the trial judge.”).
Under the standards that govern our review, we do not discern a basis to disturb the district
court’s careful consideration of the issues in this case.
Affirmed.