Craig Stevenson, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1041

Craig Stevenson, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Sean Stevenson, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed February 3, 2025
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge*

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CV-20-2928

Cassandra C. Wolfgram, Matthew J. Schaap, Dougherty, Molenda, Solfest, Hills & Bauer
P.A., Apple Valley, Minnesota (for appellants)

Ross N. Tentinger, Joseph C. Tourand, Tentinger Law Firm, P.A., Apple Valley,
Minnesota (for all respondents); and

Kirsten J. Hansen, Stitch, Angell, Kreider & Unke, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents Sean and Renee Stevenson)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellants challenge a costs-and-disbursements judgment, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion by taxing against them (1) costs and disbursements incurred
because of respondents’ intentional spoliation of evidence and perjury, (2) certain motion
fees, (3) costs related to evidence respondents failed to produce and witnesses respondents
failed to identify, and (4) costs related to an expert report that appellants contend was
unnecessary. Appellants also assert that the district court erred by entering judgment nunc
pro tunc. We affirm.
FACTS
This case is before us for the fourth time. See Stevenson v. Stevenson (In re
Stevenson), No. A23-0077, 2023 WL 2662579 (Minn. App. Feb. 21, 2023) (granting in
part and denying in part petition for extraordinary writ in relation to discovery orders);
Stevenson v. Stevenson, No. A23 -1209, 2024 WL 1506989 (Minn. App. Apr. 8, 2024)
(affirming summary-judgment dismissal of claims), rev. denied (Minn. July 23, 2024);
Stevenson v. Stevenson (In re Stevenson), No. A24-0697, 2024 WL 2592854 (Minn. App.
May 21, 2024) (denying writs of prohibition and mandamus related to district court’s
failure to enter judgment on costs and disbursements as moot after district court entered
judgment).
In 2020, appellants Craig and Marie Stevenson brought claims of defamation per
se, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and civil conspiracy against
respondents Sean Stevenson, Renee Stevenson, Lisa Stevenson -Allen, and Ashley
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Anderson.1 The district court granted summary judgment to respondents and dismissed all
of appellants’ claims in June 2023. Appellants appealed that dismissal and we affirmed.
Stevenson, 2024 WL 1506989, at *1.
In July 2023, respondents filed a Notice and Application for Taxation of Costs and
Disbursements asking the district court to tax 121 costs and disbursements, totaling
$80,747.28, against appellants pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 549.04 (2024).
Appellants objected to many of respondents’ costs and respondents filed a short response
to that objection. On October 13, 2023, the district court granted in part and denied in part
respondents’ application, taxing 85 costs totaling $60,757.12 against appellants in a
thorough and detailed order. On May 17, 2024, following a delay in court administration
entering the judgment, the district court issued an order entering judgment nunc pro tunc
to October 13, 2023.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by taxing certain costs
against them for several reasons. They also argue that the district court abused its discretion

1 We use first names of the parties throughout this opinion for ease of reference as most
parties share the same last name. Appellants Craig and Marie Stevenson are married, and
respondent Sean Stevenson is Craig’s adult son. Renee Stevenson is Sean’s mother, Lisa
Stevenson-Allen is Sean’s aunt, and Ashley Anderson is Sean’s significant other. The facts
underlying the claims involve many complex intrafamilial interactions and are generally
irrelevant to the issues currently on appeal, except for those discussed below. For a
recitation of the underlying facts, see Stevenson, 2024 WL 1506989, at *1-5.
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in issuing an order nunc pro tunc backdating the judgment to the date it issued the costs
order.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by taxing the challenged costs
against appellants.

Following “a detailed application for taxation of costs and disbursements,” a district
court “shall be allowed” to award those costs and disbursements as provided by law.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04. “In every action in a district court, the prevailing party . . . shall
be allowed reasonable disbursements paid or incurred.” Minn. Stat. § 549.04. The
prevailing party bears the burden to show it is entitled to costs and disbursements.
Capacity Wireless, LLC v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 978 N.W.2d 275, 283
(Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2022). The test for awarding costs and
disbursements is reasonableness. Id. (“[T]he district court is bound to allow only
reasonable disbursements.”). We review a district court’s award of costs and
disbursements for an abuse of discretion. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d
147, 155 (Minn. 2014).
Appellants challenge the district court’s costs-and-disbursements judgment on
several bases, arguing that the district court (1) taxed costs against them that were incurred
because of respondent Sean’s spoliation of evidence and perjury, (2) improperly taxed
several motion fees against them, (3) taxed costs associated with evidence respondents
failed to produce and witnesses respondents failed to identify, and (4) taxed costs related
to an expert report appellants contend was unnecessary. We address each argument in turn.
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1. Costs Incurred based on Spoliation and Perjury
First, appellants challenge the cost of an expert forensic technology report
conducted by Carney Forensics (the Carney report), arguing that it cannot reasonably be
taxed to them because respondents only obtained the Carney report to mitigate respondent
Sean’s spoliation of evidence and perjury.
In 2022, the district court found that Sean had spoliated evidence and committed
perjury. In his deposition, Sean denied that he had ever intentionally deleted text messages
between him and his co-defendants that he knew were relevant to the litigation. Following
his deposition, Sean’s counsel became aware that he had deleted relevant text messages
from his phone after litigation had begun and pursued a forensic examination of his,
Renee’s, and Lisa’s phones conducted by Carney Forensics. Appellants also obtained their
own forensic examinations of all three phones conducted by a different forensic examiner.
Appellants filed separate motions for sanctions against respondents Sean, Renee, and Lisa,
claiming they had each spoliated evidence by deleting text messages relevant to the
litigation. Respondents filed three separate responses to each motion. The district court
found that only Sean had intentionally spoliated evidence and granted appellants’ motion
only against him, ordering him to pay for the forensic examinations of Renee’s and Lisa’s
phones that appellants had obtained from the other forensic examiner.
Respondents asked the district court to tax the costs associated with the Carney
report against appellants. Appellants objected, arguing that the report was obtained due to
Sean’s spoliation. Respondents countered that the purpose of the report was partially to
rectify Sean’s spoliation but was also to comply with appellants’ “overburdensome
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discovery requests” and examine the phones of Lisa and Renee— who did not engage in
spoliation—to obtain potential evidence. The district court taxed half of the Carney report
costs against appellants, concluding that the request was “partially justified and partially
unjustified” and therefore finding it would achieve “rough justice” to award respondents
half of their fees related to the Carney Forensics report and deny the other half.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of half of the Carney
report costs. The record supports that appellants made extensive discovery requests, and
it was reasonable for respondents to obtain the Carney report not only because of Sean’s
spoliation, but to comply with those requests. And the Carney report costs also encompass
the work done on the phones of Lisa and Renee, who the district court determined did not
engage in spoliation. Because the record supports the dual purpose of the Carney report
and the partial award accounts for that dual purpose, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in partially taxing this cost against appellants.
2. Motion Fees
Second, appellants challenge several motion fees taxed to them, arguing that the
district court improperly taxed fees for motions in which respondents were not the
prevailing party and improperly taxed motion fees respondents did not actually incur.
Costs are only recoverable by the “prevailing party.” Minn. Stat. § 549.04. The
district court has “discretion to determine which party, if any, qualifies as a prevailing
party.” Benigni v. County of St. Louis, 585 N.W.2d 51, 54-55 (Minn. 1998). In determining
which party is the prevailing party, the district court is to consider the general result of the
action and “who has, in the view of the law, succeeded in the action.” Haugland v. Canton,
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84 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Minn. 1957) (quotation omitted). If the district court deems a party
prevailing in the action, that party may recover motion fees associated with motions on
which it was only partially successful because “[e]ven partly successful motions require a
filing fee.” Capacity Wireless, 978 N.W.2d at 285.
Appellants challenge two motion fees —(1) respondents’ opposition to appellants’
motion for sanctions and (2) respondents’ motion to strike statements from declarations
appellants filed in opposition to respondent’s summary-judgment motion—arguing that
respondents were not the prevailing party. As respondents point out, the application for
costs shows that the fee taxed against appellants for respondents’ opposition to appellants’
motion for sanctions relates to sanctions against Renee, not Sean. Because the district court
denied appellants’ motion for sanctions against Renee, there is no question that respondents
prevailed on the opposition motion taxed to appellants.
Appellants correctly assert that the district court never ruled on respondents’ motion
to strike statements from appellants’ declarations. The district court nonetheless taxed the
fee for this motion against appellants because it “was a reasonable part of [respondents’]
pursuit of summary judgment,” even though the court “did not reach [the] motion because
it was able to resolve the underlying summary[-]judgment motion on other grounds.” This
was not an abuse of discretion. The motion to strike was tangential to respondents’
overarching motion for summary judgment, and there is no dispute that respondents
prevailed on that overarching motion. That the district court never formally ruled on the
motion to strike is immaterial because, as the district court correctly explained, the motion
was reasonably construed as part of the larger summary-judgment motion. Because
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respondents prevailed on the overarching summary-judgment motion, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding them the prevailing party in this related supporting
motion.
Appellants also challenge two motion fees that they claim respondents did not
actually incur. In their opposition to respondents’ application for costs, appellants pointed
out these two motion fees that should have been incurred but were not, along with four
motion fees that they claimed were incurred when they should not have been.2 The district
court taxed two of these motion fees against appellants, refunded two from the court to
respondents, and disallowed the other two.
Though respondents did not technically incur fees specifically for these motions,
they did, as appellants concede, incur fees for four motions they should not have. The
district court did not err in effectively shifting the erroneous costs from the filings to which
they were attached to these two motions because all motion fees were the same, $80.00,
and respondents did incur the $160.00 taxed against appellants through the other
erroneously charged fees. Nor do appellants dispute—and the record supports— that
respondents were the prevailing party on the motions for which the fees were ultimately
taxed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding motion fees to
respondents.

2 These fees were incurred by erroneous double-charging or improperly charging motion
fees for correspondence.
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3. Costs Related to Alleged Discovery Violations
Third, appellants challenge various costs because they are related to evidence
respondents failed to produce, and witnesses they failed to identify. Appellants challenge
the Carney report on this basis too, along with three printing and copying costs, the cost
for service on a person appellants claim was not identified to them as a witness, and the
cost for respondents’ use of Great Plains, Inc., a private investigator.
Appellants point to various entries in the Carney and Great Plains billing narratives
to contend that respondents committed discovery violations and should not be awarded
costs incurred because of those violations. In awarding the cost for Great Plains, the district
court addressed appellants’ contentions as follows:
[Appellants] allege that the billing invoices reveal that
[respondents] engaged in discovery violations, withholding of
relevant discovery, and post-deadline discovery. As such, they
argue that it would be inequitable for the Court to award fees
for the private investigator. The Court has repeatedly rejected
many of the premises underlying these arguments. . . . The
Court has reviewed [appellants’] arguments again and finds
that they fall short.

We agree with the district court that appellants’ claim that the application for costs
revealed discovery violations is not supported by the record. The entries appellants
highlight consist of various technical terms used in Carney’s reporting work and names of
people Great Plains may have contacted; they do not make clear that any of the work
performed or people contacted uncovered discoverable evidence or witnesses. The district
court pointed out that appellants made similar tenuous accusations when they moved to
compel discovery of all information respondents obtained from Great Plains once they
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learned respondents had employed them, and it rejected those arguments then too. The
district court “granted multiple motions seeking to limit [appellants] from engaging in
overburdensome discovery” throughout this case, finding that appellants’ “discovery
strategy has borne less relation to an attempt to litigate their claims on the merits than . . .
an attempt to use the court system to impose burdens upon, and exert control over,
[respondents].” The district court reviewed appellants’ arguments on potential discovery
violations associated with this cost and its decision is supported by the record.
The printing and copying fees were from the Todd and Dakota County courthouses
and an unidentified law library. Appellants argue respondents did not show these costs
were reasonable because they never produced any of these copies or printed documents.
But as the district court explained, it was reasonable for respondents to obtain documents
from Todd County because Renee and Craig’s divorce occurred there, and factual
assertions underlying the claims involved Renee and Craig’s relationship. And though
respondents did not provide a similar explanation for the Dakota County or law library
fees, the district court also found it reasonable that respondents would have had to print
documents from a law library or from another courthouse. We discern no abuse of
discretion in this decision. We also note that the Dakota County courthouse printing fee is
$8.00 and the law library printing fee is $3.75, totaling $11.75 out of the $60,757.12
awarded. Even if taxing these costs were error, such error would be de minimis.
See Wibbens v. Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App. 1985) (refusing to remand for
de minimis error).
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The district court also taxed the service costs for a person who has the same last
name as Marie’s father, presumably a family member. Appellants argue this cost is not
taxable because this person was not disclosed to them as a witness. The IIED claim here
was asserted solely by appellant Marie against respondent Sean and rested mainly on
allegations that Sean had contacted Marie’s estranged father and expressed concern for
Marie in her marriage to Craig. The district court pointed out that Marie’s IIED claim
“turned, in large part, on the idea that [she] was particularly vulnerable due to her childhood
experiences with her father,” so it was reasonable for respondents to attempt to contact
other members of Marie’s family because they “might obviously have information about
[those childhood experiences].” Here too, we discern no abuse of discretion. As the district
court explained, “[respondents] were entitled to conduct their own investigation.” Because
it was reasonable to conduct preliminary investigation into a person who may have had
insight into a central component of Marie’s claim, the district court did not err in awarding
this cost.
4. Expert Report
Finally, appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by awarding the
cost of an independent medical examination ( IME) of appellant Marie because the IME
was not favorable to respondents and they did not use it for their summary-judgment
motion. They also argue that the cost is not taxable because “Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 127
precludes recovery for examinations or preparation outside of trial” conducted by experts.
In support of her IIED claim, Marie claimed Sean’s conduct caused her to suffer
from several medical issues, including chest pain, heart palpitations, night terrors, and
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“severe intestinal distress.” Respondents requested that Marie submit to an IME pursuant
to Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.01, 3 and the district court granted respondents’ motion to compel
her to do so. The district court taxed this cost against appellants, finding that it was
reasonable for respondents to conduct an IME when Marie had put her own health at issue
by bringing an IIED claim and asserting the existence of medical symptoms to support it.
We agree with the district court’s reasoning here. And even though respondents did not
use the IME to obtain summary judgment, it was still a reasonable step to take in
preparation for their summary-judgment motion on which they ultimately prevailed.
We have rejected appellants’ argument that Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 127 precludes
awarding this type of cost. Blehr v. Anderson , 955 N.W.2d 613, 625 (Minn. App. 2021)
(rejecting this rule 127 preclusion argument because the rule “specifies only the daily
expert fees that the court administrator may tax” (quotation omitted)). Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
127 provides, “No allowance shall be made for preparation or in conducting of experiments
outside the courtroom by an expert.” Appellants argue that because the IME was
preparation conducted outside of trial, rule 127 precludes the recovery of its cost. But “[i]t
is well established in Minnesota that it is within the district court’s discretion to award
expert-witness fees to the prevailing party for pretrial preparation time.” Blehr,
955 N.W.2d at 625. The district court did not abuse its discretion by taxing the cost of the
IME to appellants.

3 Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 provides that the court “may order” a party to submit to “a physical,
mental, or blood examination” “[i]n an action in which the physical or mental condition”
of that party “is in controversy.”
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing an order nunc pro tunc
backdating the judgment to the date it issued the costs order.

The term “nunc pro tunc” refers to a “retroactive legal effect through a court’s
inherent power.” County of Washington v. TMT Land V, LLC, 791 N.W.2d 132, 135
(Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted). “A nunc pro tunc entry of judgment is allowed
only” to correct the record or account for clerical deficiencies, such as “correcting an
omission of the court, fixing a clerical error, or properly recording a step in the trial
procedure which occurred but was omitted from the record.” Id. (quotations omitted). A
court may enter a nunc pro tunc judgment “as of the time when the party would otherwise
have been entitled to it, if justice requires, [when] the delay in entering it is caused by
action of the court.” Hampshire Arms Hotel Co. v. Wells, 298 N.W. 452, 453 (Minn. 1941).
We review a district court’s decision to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc for an abuse of
discretion. TMT Land V, 791 N.W.2d at 135.
The district court issued its order on costs and disbursements on October 13, 2023.
The order stated that the “award of costs and disbursements shall promptly be INSERTED
in the JUDGMENT,” presumably referring to the June 16, 2023, summary-judgment order.
On January 10, 2024, the district court administrator inserted the costs award into the June
16, 2023, judgment and filed a “Notice of Entry of Judgment” stating that judgment had
been entered on October 13, 2023. But there was still no judgment on the costs award in
the register of actions. In April 2024, appellants requested a writ of mandamus asking that
we direct the district court to enter judgment. In re Stevenson, 2024 WL 2592854, at *1.
We denied the writ as moot because on May 17, 2024, while the petition for a writ was
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pending, the district court issued an order directing that the district court administrator
“complete entry of judgment for the costs and disbursements award in the amount of
$60,757.12 by creating a judgment document with a judgment certification stamp nunc pro
tunc to October 13, 2023.” Id. And the district court administrator did so.
Appellants argue that the district court’s entry of judgment nunc pro tunc was an
abuse of discretion because “[i]t appears . . . the date was designed to deprive Appellants
of their right to appeal, while subjecting Appellants to eight (8) months’ worth of interest,”
thereby prejudicing appellants. Appellants rely primarily on two cases to support their
argument that the nunc pro tunc judgment prejudiced them: TMT Land V and Hampshire
Arms Hotel. In TMT Land V, we reversed a nunc pro tunc judgment because “it [was]
obvious that the district court issued the nunc pro tunc order . . . to avoid application of [an
updated interest rate.]” 791 N.W.2d at 138. In Hampshire Arms Hotel, our supreme court
reversed a nunc pro tunc judgment because “it [was] obvious that the court amended the
date of the judgment to save the appeal.” 298 N.W. at 453. These cases are inapposite
because there is no indication that the district court here acted for any purpose other than
to correct a clerical error. In this case, the district court issued its nunc pro tunc judgment
only to correct the court administrator’s error and reflect the actual date it intended to enter
judgment.
Appellants provide no factual support for their contention that the district court
“designed” the nunc pro tunc date to deprive them of their right to appeal. And we have
held that “entry of judgment nunc pro tunc cannot operate to cut off a party’s appeal rights.”
Duluth Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 520 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Minn. App.
15
1995), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1994). It is clear from the district court’s October 13
costs order and the record that the only reason judgment was not entered until
May 17, 2024, is because the district court administrator failed to do so. As a result, it was
not an abuse of discretion for the district court to enter judgment nunc pro tunc to
October 13, 2023, because the parties were entitled to judgment at that time following the
court’s order and “the delay in entering [judgment was] caused by action of the court.”
Hampshire Arms Hotel, 298 N.W. at 453.
Affirmed.