State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1042

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Larry Tabell Davis,
Appellant.

Filed September 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-22-3197

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal from judgment of conviction for third-degree driving while
impaired ( DWI), and following a stay and remand for postconviction proceedings,
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appellant argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and, in the
alternative, that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Appellant raises three issues:
whether his plea was accurate, whether it was intelligent, and whether his attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that appellant’s plea was valid and that
appellant fails to assert grounds establishing that his attorney’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. We also conclude that the files and record
conclusively show that appellant is not entitled to relief, so the district court did not err by
denying appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the relevant record and procedural history. In September
2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Larry Tabell Davis with two
gross-misdemeanor DWI counts—the first count for driving while under the influence of
alcohol under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2022), and the second count for driving
with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5)
(2022). Counts one and two were both alleged to include one aggravating factor— a prior
impaired-driving-related loss of license in 2015. In the same complaint, the state alleged
count three —driving with a license restriction related to alcohol/controlled-substance
violations under Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 1(f)(1) (2022)—and count four— driving after
cancellation under Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2022).
The complaint alleged that, on September 3, 2022, a Minnesota state trooper
stopped Davis after he failed to move his car into the left lane while passing
law-enforcement squad cars that were stationary on the right shoulder with their emergency
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lights activated while assisting a stalled vehicle. The trooper observed that “Davis had
bloodshot, watery, and glassy eyes.” The trooper also smelled “a moderate odor of alcohol
and marijuana coming from the vehicle” and saw “a 42 ounce bottle of malt liquor at
Davis’s feet and a 50mL bottle of brandy next to Davis on the seat cushion.” Davis
cooperated with one field sobriety test, “performed poorly,” then refused additional testing.
Davis was arrested. At the jail, Davis’s breath test results showed “an alcohol concentration
of 0.10.” The complaint also alleged that “Davis has a prior impaired driving related loss
of license [from] April 2015.”
Davis was represented by counsel throughout the district court proceedings. At an
omnibus hearing in March 2023, Davis “waived” the proceeding; his attorney stated, “We
didn’t find any omnibus issues.” Davis requested that the district court schedule a pretrial
hearing. At the scheduled pretrial hearing in May 2023, however, Davis “requested to
reopen omnibus issues” so he could challenge the traffic stop. The district court scheduled
a contested omnibus hearing “as to the stop issue.”
A few days later, Davis moved to dismiss the state’s complaint, arguing that the
traffic stop was unlawful because the squad cars’ emergency lights were not activated
before Davis passed by. Davis withdrew the motion to dismiss in December 2023, first in
writing and then at a scheduled omnibus hearing.
In March 2024, the parties appeared for a pretrial hearing to address motions in
limine. The state moved to prohibit “the defense from inquiring, offering evidence, or
commenting upon issues or questions of law reserved for challenge at an omnibus hearing
specifically . . . the reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.” After the court reporter and
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Davis asserted that the district court held a contested omnibus hearing, the prosecuting
attorney stated that a scheduled omnibus hearing was held but “any omnibus issues were
waived.” Davis’s attorney agreed that he waived any issues at the omnibus hearing but
sought to cross-examine law -enforcement witnesses about their observation of Davis’s
conduct as he drove by the stationary squad cars. The district court granted the state’s
motion, ruling that Davis could not argue that the traffic stop of Davis’s car was unlawful
at trial but could “cross-examine [witnesses] on the facts of the stop” and his arrest.
After the district court made this ruling, Davis spoke up and said, “Excuse me, Your
Honor. Can I say something?” The district court replied, “Not at this time.” Davis said
nothing more about the omnibus issue, and his attorney continued to argue other motions
during the pretrial hearing.
In April 2024, the parties appeared for a scheduled plea hearing. Davis’s attorney
stated that she sent Davis “a Rule 15” plea petition that day but “did not get it filed.” Davis
agreed to “plead guilty to count two, a DWI greater than 0.08 within two hours of driving”;
the state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and recommend an executed sentence of
180 days in jail and a $200 fine.
The district court questioned Davis, who waived his trial rights. The district court
also explained that the DWI conviction could “be used to enhance or make more serious a
future DWI.” Davis confirmed that he understood and, in response to another inquiry from
the district court, said that he had no questions.
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Davis entered a guilty plea to count two and provided the following factual basis:
The Court: Tell me what you did that makes you guilty.
Mr. Davis: Uh, I was driving on the night in question, had a
couple drinks, and that was it.
The Court: Okay. So, this happened on September 3rd, 2022?
Mr. Davis: Yes.
The Court: And you were driving in Blue Earth County?
Mr. Davis: Yup—yes.
The Court: You were dri—okay. And at the time you were
driving, apparently, uh, you had an alcohol concentration of
0.10?
(Pause)
Mr. Davis: I thought it was two times the double limit to
enhance it.
The Court: Well, it’s—the reason this is enhanced is because
you have a prior, uh, impaired driving, uh, loss of license back
in April of 2015.
Mr. Davis: Uh, yes, that case was vindicated. That—that case
was found out to be unconstitutional so they —they—vacated
that and gave me all my rights back because that case was
unconstitutional in the eyes of the higher courts so they—
Davis’s attorney then asked for a recess to speak with Davis, which the district court
granted. Before the recess, Davis said, “Straight up. That’s not good ‘cuz that’s not the
case. I didn’t—I didn’t have no cases. No.”
After the parties returned from a recess, Davis’s attorney agreed that they were
“prepared to go forward.” The district court continued questioning Davis about the factual
basis:
The Court: Okay. So, I got to the point where, um, you, uh,
took a test and that was a 0.10, was that correct?
Mr. Davis: Yes.
The Court: And you do have a prior impaired driving related
loss of license back in April of 2015, is that correct?
Mr. Davis: Yes.
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The prosecuting attorney asked whether the test “was done within two hours of driving, ”
and Davis agreed it was. The district court accepted the plea and sentenced Davis as
recommended by the parties.
Davis appealed, which this court stayed for postconviction proceedings. In
December 2024, Davis petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that his plea was
invalid and requesting an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied the petition without
an evidentiary hearing. Davis moved for reconsideration, which the district court also
denied. This court dissolved the stay and reinstated his appeal.
DECISION
Appellate courts “review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an
abuse of discretion.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). A district court
abuses it discretion when it denies a postconviction petition and “exercise[s] its discretion
in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or
ma[kes] clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). And “[w]hen a
defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction
relief, [appellate courts] review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same
standard that [they] apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn.
2012).
On appeal, Davis argues he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it is
invalid. Validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “A defendant has no absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” Id. at 93. The court, however, “must allow a
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defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of
the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh ,
778 N.W.2d at 94. To be valid, a guilty plea must be (1) accurate, (2) voluntary, and
(3) intelligent. Id. “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Id.
In the alternative, Davis seeks a remand for an evidentiary hearing. A district court
must hold an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition “[u]nless the petition and the
files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no
relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). In making this decision, “a postconviction
court considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State, 913 N. W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). An appellate court reviews “the ultimate decision by the
postconviction court to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.”
Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 2014).
I. Davis’s plea was accurate.
Davis first argues that his plea was not valid because it was not accurate. The
purpose of the accuracy requirement is to “protect[] the defendant from pleading guilty to
a charge more serious than he or she could be convicted of were the defendant to go to
trial.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Accordingly, the defendant’s
testimony at a plea hearing must include a “proper factual basis” for a plea to be accurate.
Id. The factual basis must provide “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion
that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” State
8
v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). “The district court
typically satisfies the factual basis requirement by asking the defendant to express in his
own words what happened.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The supreme court has
“repeatedly discouraged the use of leading questions to establish a factual basis,” but has
“never held” that responding to “leading questions on its own invalidates a guilty plea.”
State v. Jones, 7 N.W.3d 391, 396 (Minn. 2024).
A factual basis is inadequate if “the defendant makes statements that negate an
essential element of the charged crime, unless the defendant subsequently withdraws or
corrects the statement, or the guilty plea is otherwise rehabilitated.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“[E]ven if a district court fails to elicit proper responses, a defendant may not withdraw his
plea if the record contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
In its order denying postconviction relief, the district court determined that Davis’s
plea was accurate because his testimony established a factual basis for each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court reasoned that the use of leading
questions did not make Davis’s plea inaccurate because the “first factual question was not
leading” and the district court followed up with “specific questions about each element of
the crime charged.”
Davis argues on appeal, as he did in his petition for postconviction relief, that he
“negated an essential element of the offense” during the plea hearing, specifically “the
element that he had a qualified prior impaired driving incident within ten years of the
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current offense, as was necessary to prove the third-degree offense to which he pleaded
guilty.”
In count two, the state alleged that Davis violated Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5),
which states that “[i]t is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control
of any motor vehicle” if “the person’s alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured
within two hours of the time, of driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor
vehicle is 0.08 or more.” Under Minn. Stat. § 169A.26, subd. 1(a) (2022), a “person who
violates section 169A.20, subdivision 1 . . . (driving while impaired crime), is guilty of
third-degree driving while impaired if one aggravating factor was present when the
violation was committed.” One aggravating factor is “a qualified prior impaired driving
incident within the ten years immediately preceding the current offense.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.03, subd. 3(1) (2022). Therefore, Davis’s prior impaired- driving incident was an
essential element of his conviction for third-degree DWI.
Davis argues that he negated this element twice during the plea hearing. First, in
response to the district court’s question about his “loss of license back in April 2015,”
Davis testified that his previous “case was found out to be unconstitutional so they—they—
vacated that and gave me all my rights back because that case was unconstitutional in the
eyes of the higher courts.” He added, “Straight up. That’s not good ‘cuz that’s not the case.
I didn’t—I didn’t have no cases.” The state seems to acknowledge that Davis’s testimony
negated an essential element of count two but argues that Davis’s plea is accurate because
Davis’s later testimony corrected or rehabilitated the factual basis.
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We conclude that Davis negated an element of his offense when he testified that he
did not have a prior impaired-driving “case. ” To rehabilitate the factual basis, Davis’s
subsequent testimony must either withdraw or correct his early testimony or otherwise
rehabilitate the factual basis; alternatively, a plea is accurate if “the record contains
sufficient evidence” outside the factual basis “to support the conviction.” Jones, 7 N.W.3d
at 396 (quotations omitted).
Nelson v. State guides our analysis. 880 N.W.2d 852 (Minn. 2016). Nelson “pleaded
guilty to first-degree premeditated murder.” Id. at 853. During the plea hearing, the district
court asked Nelson if he intended to kill the victim by stabbing her, and he replied, “I think
it was . . . just to get her hurt . . . but it . . . went too far.” Id. at 855. After Nelson described
the stabbing as “more of a sigh of relief that it’s done,” the district court took a recess for
Nelson to meet with his attorney. Id. at 856. After the recess, the district court asked Nelson
if he “intended to kill” the victim, and Nelson said, “Yes.” Id.
On appeal, Nelson argued “that after he made statements during the plea colloquy
that negated the elements of intent and premeditation, the district court failed to properly
rehabilitate the plea.” Id. at 859-60. He also argued that “the plea was inaccurate because
the district court used leading questions to elicit the necessary admissions.” Id. at 860. The
supreme court rejected Nelson’s argument, reasoning that “the facts supporting Nelson’s
intent and premeditation overlap.” Id. The supreme court recognized that the use of leading
questions to establish a factual basis is discouraged but added that it has “never held that
the use of leading questions automatically invalidates a guilty plea” and “decline[d] to do
so in this case.” Id. The supreme court noted that “the district court started questioning
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Nelson about the incident using open-ended questions” and “only a few of the questions
were leading.” Id. at 860-61. The supreme court concluded that Nelson attested to facts
showing his intent at the plea hearing and that “there was a solid factual basis for the plea.”
Id.
By contrast, in Jones, the defendant “pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual
conduct using force.” 7 N.W.3d at 397. “But moments after telling the district court judge
that he was pleading guilty to third -degree criminal sexual conduct, Jones clearly stated
that he did not commit ‘rape.’” Id. The district court asked Jones some leading questions
about the incident; for example, the district court asked Jones, “[B]ecause you were
using . . . force, you were able to have sexual intercourse with [the victim] despite her not
consenting to that, correct?” and Jones replied, “Yes.” Id. at 394.
On appeal, the supreme court determined that Jones’s plea was not accurate because,
by stating that he did not “rape” the victim, “Jones denied committing at least one element
of the offense, effectively asserting his innocence of the crime.” Id. at 397, 399. The
supreme court distinguished Nelson for three reasons: (1) “the district court judge stopped
the plea proceedings to clarify Nelson’s statements,” and Nelson then spoke privately with
his counsel, (2) “Nelson was asked leading questions only at the end of the plea hearing,”
and (3) Nelson explained his offense in his own words earlier in the factual basis. Id. at
398. On the other hand, during Jones’s plea hearing, “neither counsel nor the district court
stopped proceedings to clarify Jones’s assertion of innocence . . . , and Jones himself made
no admission of any element of the crime except in response to defense counsel’s leading
questions.” Id. The supreme court concluded that “although the use of leading questions
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will not on its own invalidate a guilty plea, as demonstrated in Nelson, Jones’s affirmative
responses to exclusively leading questions were not sufficient to rehabilitate his plea after
he asserted his innocence of the crime.” Id.
We agree with the state that Davis corrected his initial testimony that he had no prior
“case” of impaired driving. After the district court took a recess for Davis to speak with his
attorney, Davis answered, “Yes,” when the district court asked if he had “a prior impaired
driving related loss of license back in April of 2015.” We conclude that Davis, like Nelson,
corrected the negating statement. Similar to Nelson’s plea hearing, the district court took a
recess at the request of Davis’s attorney to allow them to speak off the record. See Nelson,
880 N.W.2d at 856. After consulting with his attorney, Davis admitted that he had a prior
impaired-driving loss of license. These similarities suggest that this case is more like
Nelson than Jones.1

1 Our recent nonprecedential opinion in State v. Yarborough is also persuasive.
No. A24-0294, 2025 WL 969282 (Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2025); see State v. Monyak,
14 N.W.3d 210, 215 n.2 (Minn. App. 2024) (“ [N]onprecedential opinions are not binding
but may be cited as persuasive authority.” (quotation omitted)). In Yarborough, we
assumed without deciding that Yarborough negated the intent element of second-degree
intentional murder during the factual basis for his guilty plea. 2025 WL 969282, at *1, *3.
After Yarborough’s testimony negating his intent, his attorney “stepped in to clarify
Yarborough’s statement” and explained on the record “the purpose of laying a factual basis
and the reason why the prosecutor asked Yarborough about intent.” Id. at *4. The
prosecuting attorney continued questioning Yarborough using only leading questions,
asking Yarborough if he intended to kill the victim, and Yarborough said, “[Y]es.” Id. at
*2. This court reasoned that “[b]ecause Yarborough’s attorney intervened to explain the
process after Yarborough negated intent and Yarborough then initiated the prosecutor’s
continued questioning, during which he expressly admitted that he shot with the intent to
kill the victim,” his “negation was cured.” Id. at *4. This court concluded that the
prosecuting attorney’s use of leading questions did not invalidate Yarborough’s plea. Id.
The facts in Yarborough are very similar to those at Davis’s plea hearing. The district court

13
We conclude that the district court rehabilitated Davis’s testimony by recessing after
he negated an element of the offense, allowing Davis to confer with his attorney, and
resuming Davis’s testimony about the negated element. Therefore, Davis’s plea was
accurate.
II. Davis’s plea was intelligent.
Davis argues that his plea was invalid because it was not intelligent. “The purpose
of the requirement that the plea be intelligent is to [ensure] that the defendant understands
the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, and understands the
consequences of his plea.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). If a defendant
understands “all three aspects . . . then [the] plea was intelligently entered.” Dikken v. State,
896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017).
“[A] valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry
of the plea.” Id. at 878 (quotation omitted). Davis argues that his plea was not intelligent
because he did not understand that, by pleading guilty, he waived the right to appeal any
nonjurisdictional defects, including his pretrial challenge to the traffic stop. The district
court determined in its order denying postconviction relief that the loss of this right is a
“collateral consequence” rather than a “direct” one and “[o]nly ‘direct consequences’ are
relevant in assessing the intelligence of a guilty plea,” quoting State v. Bell, 971 N.W.2d
92, 101 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2022). Davis argues on appeal that
his “intelligence claim is not premised on his lack of understanding about a direct or

took a recess after Davis’s testimony negated an element, while the defense attorney in
Yarborough explained the purpose of providing a factual basis on the record. Id.
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collateral consequence of his plea . . . [r]ather, it is Davis’s lack of understanding regarding
a right he waived by pleading guilty that makes his plea invalid.”
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.02 sets out guilty-plea procedures for
misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors; subdivision 1 provides that, before a judge accepts
a guilty plea, a defendant must be questioned as to certain topics, including trial rights that
the defendant will waive by entering a guilty plea. The rule seeks to determine whether
defense counsel has informed the defendant of these rights and the defendant understands
the rights before proceeding. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15 cmt. (stating that rule 15.02,
subdivision 1, “prescribes minimal standards” for the record to show that a plea is
“knowingly and voluntarily entered”). Davis did not submit a rule 15 plea petition to the
district court, but at the plea hearing, his attorney stated that she sent Davis a copy of one.
The right to appeal nonjurisdictional issues is not included in the list of waived
rights. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.02, subd. 1. Davis emphasizes that rule 15.02 states that the
defendant must understand that they have a right to a “pretrial hearing to contest the
admissibility at trial . . . of any evidence obtained from a search and seizure” and waive
that right. He contends that the district court erred by finding that he was “advised of and
acknowledged all the rights outlined in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.02” because the district court
questioned him generally about waiving his trial rights, but not about waiving his right to
appeal nonjurisdictional issues by pleading guilty.
Davis’s argument is unavailing. Davis is correct that the district court did not
specifically question him about waiving his pretrial rights or his appeal rights. But this does
not support Davis’s claim for relief because the right to a pretrial hearing to contest
15
evidence from a traffic stop is different from the right to appeal based on the validity of the
traffic stop. And, in Davis’s case, he expressly waived any challenge to the validity of the
traffic stop and had a pretrial hearing at which he contested the admissibility of evidence
about his traffic stop.
Some nonprecedential opinions assist our analysis of this issue because we have
considered whether an appellant’s plea is intelligent in circumstances somewhat similar to
Davis’s. In Walford v. State, this court concluded that Walford’s pleas were unintelligent
because he “did not understand that he was waiving his right to appeal non-jurisdictional
pretrial issues when he entered his [guilty] pleas.” No. A23-0709, 2024 WL1506992, at *6
(Minn. App. Apr. 8, 2024).
During pretrial hearings, Walford “expressed his desire to
preserve his right to appeal” and entered guilty pleas “on the express condition that he
reserve his ability to appeal decisions or things that had happened prior to the plea.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, in State v. Dwyer, this court concluded that Dwyer’s plea was
unintelligent when the record showed that “Dwyer intended to preserve [a] Fourth
Amendment issue” and “thought he could raise that issue on appeal even if he pleaded
guilty.” No. A22-1088, 2023 WL 3939569, at *3 (Minn. App. June 12, 2023). In fact,
Dwyer directly asked the district court “if he could raise his Fourth Amendment issue on
appeal,” and this court concluded that the district court’s response left Dwyer “with the
misimpression” that he could appeal the issue after pleading guilty. Id. at *3-4.
In State v. Lueck, this court rejected Lueck’s argument that his plea was unintelligent
because “he did not understand that if he pleaded guilty, he would not be able to raise any
16
issues on appeal related to his previous attorney’s representation.” No. A23-1789,
2024 WL 4481408, at *1, *3 (Minn. App. Oct. 14, 2024). In doing so, this court analyzed
and distinguished several nonprecedential opinions—including Walford and Dwyer. Id. at
*3.2 This court’s reasoning is helpful. First, this court determined that, before he pleaded
guilty, Lueck did not express “a desire to preserve his right to appeal challenges to his prior
attorney’s representation.” Id. Second, this court observed that Lueck did not enter his plea
“on the express condition that he would be permitted to do so,” nor did the record show
“that he was misled to believe that he would be able to do so, or that he would have rejected
the state’s plea offer had he understood that he would be unable to do so.” Id. While Lueck
stated at sentencing that “he did not realize that he would not be able to raise issues
regarding his prior attorney’s representation on appeal,” this court concluded that Lueck
did not show that he “entered his guilty plea based on the belief that he could do so or with
the intent to pursue an appeal on that ground.” Id. Similar to Lueck, and unlike the
appellants in Walford and Dwyer, Davis did not express a desire to appeal a
nonjurisdictional issue before he pleaded guilty.
Davis argues that the record shows he was confused about whether he made an
omnibus challenge to the validity of his traffic stop when he spoke up at the pretrial hearing

2 Lueck argued that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under the “fair and just”
standard. Id. at *2. This court noted that other nonprecedential cases analyzed a similar
argument under the “manifest injustice” standard. Id. at *3. Although Lueck applied a
different standard to plea withdrawal than Davis urges in this appeal, this court’s analysis
in Lueck is persuasive because it is factually similar to this case. Id.
17
on the state’s motion in limine.3 We are not persuaded. This record does not show Davis’s
affirmative intent or belief that he could appeal the validity of the traffic stop. The record
also does not show that Davis entered his plea on the condition that he could appeal, that
he was misled to believe he could appeal, or that he stated before his postconviction petition
that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known he could not appeal. Thus, we
conclude that Davis’s plea was intelligent.
III. Davis’s plea is not invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Davis argues that his plea was invalid because his attorney did not advise him that
he would be unable to appeal nonjurisdictional issues after pleading guilty. “The Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Minnesota
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel”
before entering a guilty plea. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted). “[I]neffective assistance of counsel may render a plea con stitutionally invalid,
and a manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Ellis-Strong,
899 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Minn. App. 2017) (citation and quotation omitted).
“To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced [their] defense.” State v. Zielinski, 10 N.W.3d 1, 19 (Minn. 2024)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “A court may address the two

3 After the district court ruled that his attorney could cross-examine law enforcement about
their observations of Davis’s driving conduct when he passed the stationary squad cars,
Davis asked the district court if he could “say something.”
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prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing
the other.” Id. at 20 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review a “postconviction court’s
analysis of the two Strickland requirements” de novo. Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 600.
Beginning with the first step in the Strickland analysis, we assess whether Davis’s
counsel’s performance was deficient. Zielinski, 10 N.W.3d at 19. “An attorney’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness when they fail to exercise
the skills and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under the circumstances.”
Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 536 (Minn. 2023).
In its order denying postconviction relief, the district court determined that
counsel’s representation “did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness”
because Davis was advised of and acknowledged “the rights he was waiving including all
the rights listed in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.02.” The district court added that, before the plea
hearing, Davis “waived omnibus issues” and withdrew his motion to dismiss based on the
traffic stop. Finally, the district court reasoned that Davis “did not express any confusion
at the plea hearing regarding his prior suppression motion.”
On appeal, Davis argues that the “ postconviction court acknowledged Davis’s
assertion that his trial counsel failed to inform him that by pleading guilty he was waiving
his right to appellate review of non-jurisdictional issues” and “necessarily credited this
assertion.” Davis urges us to conclude that the “record is therefore clear that Davis’s
counsel failed to fully inform and advise Davis about the effect his guilty plea had on his
rights on appeal.” The state argues that, even assuming that Davis’s attorney failed to
advise him that he was waiving any appeal of nonjurisdictional issues, Davis’s argument
19
fails. The state contends that Davis’s attorney’s performance was not deficient because the
applicable rules do not require Davis’s attorney to advise Davis that, by pleading guilty, he
waived his right to appeal nonjurisdictional issues.
An attorney has a “central role” in informing the defendant’s decision to plead guilty
or go to trial. Anderson v. State, 746 N.W.2d 901, 909 (Minn. App. 2008) (citing Von
Moltke v. Gillies , 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) , overruled on other grounds by Wheeler v.
State, 909 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2018). A defendant “is entitled to be advised as to all his
legal rights under the law and facts involved.” State ex rel. Dehning v. Rigg, 86 N.W.2d
723, 726 (Minn. 1957). Neither precedential caselaw nor the rules of criminal procedure
hold that an attorney must advise a defendant that the right to appeal nonjurisdictional
issues is waived by pleading guilty.
This court considered an argument similar to Davis’s in a nonprecedential opinion,
State v. Vogel, in which Vogel argued that his plea was invalid because “he did not know
that by pleading guilty, he waived his right to appellate review of a pretrial ruling” and that
“the district court abused its discretion when it determined that [Vogel] did not suffer
prejudice from his trial attorney’s ineffective assistance.” No. A19-1220, 2021 WL
1344018, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 12, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). To satisfy
the first step of the Strickland analysis, Vogel pointed out that his attorney advised him that
there was a “possibility that by pleading guilty, he would not be able to appeal” a
nonjurisdictional pretrial issue. Id. at *2.
This court concluded that “the Minnesota rules do not reference a defendant’s right
to appeal nonjurisdictional pretrial rulings or the waiver of that right” and that “[n]owhere
20
in rule 15 is there a requirement that a criminal defendant be told that by pleading guilty,
he waives his right to appeal nonjurisdictional pretrial rulings.” Id. at *3. We affirmed the
district court’s postconviction ruling, rejecting Vogel’s argument that his attorney’s advice
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at *4. In doing so, we noted that
Vogel’s position “asks us, in effect, to create a new requirement” for what an intelligent
plea is and that “[t]his rule does not currently exist in the rules of procedure or Minnesota
caselaw.” Id. This court also concluded that Vogel failed to show prejudice based on his
trial attorney’s performance. Id. at *4-6. We are persuaded by the reasoning in Vogel and
conclude that Davis also asks this court to “create a new requirement” for an intelligent
plea and that Davis has failed to show that his trial attorney’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at *4. As we did in Vogel, we decline to create a
new requirement. Thus, Davis’s ineffective-assistance claim fails on the first step.
Davis urges us to follow a nonprecedential opinion, Robinson v. State, and argues
that “[f]ailure to advise a defendant of the effect his guilty plea has on his rights to appeal
is deficient performance.” No. A03-1885, 2004 WL 1728582, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 3,
2004). We are not persuaded that Robinson is analogous because, in that case, we
considered ineffective assistance of counsel in a context different from entering a guilty
plea. Id. at *1. Robinson contended that, after he entered his guilty plea and before
sentencing, he moved to withdraw his plea because his attorney failed to advise him that
he could appeal a sentencing error after pleading guilty. Id. The district court allowed
Robinson to withdraw his guilty plea, and the case proceeded to trial. Id.
21
On appeal, Robinson argued that he was “denied effective assistance of counsel”
before he moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at *2. This court first concluded that an
attorney’s conduct is not objectively reasonable when the attorney fails to advise a client
that “he could challenge his sentence even if he accepted the plea offer,” based on the
attorney’s mistaken belief that the client “could [not] appeal a bargained-for sentence.” Id.
at *3 (quotation marks omitted). This court next determined that Robinson’s attorney
“erroneously advised [Robinson] that he had only two options, either accept the plea and
sentence or withdraw his plea and go to trial.” Id. We also concluded that Robinson was
prejudiced by his attorney’s performance. Id. at *4.
Robinson is distinguishable from Davis’s case because Robinson’s attorney
affirmatively misadvised him of his options before he moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
See id. at *3. In contrast, Davis does not allege that his attorney affirmatively misadvised
him before he entered his guilty plea.
Because no rule or caselaw requires an attorney to advise a client that entering a
guilty plea waives an appeal of nonjurisdictional issues and Davis’s attorney did not
provide affirmative misinformation, we conclude that Davis’s attorney’s conduct was not
objectively unreasonable. We therefore need not address the second step of the Strickland
analysis. See Zielinski, 10 N.W.3d at 20.4

4 On the second step, Davis argues that “he would not have pled [guilty] if he knew that by
doing so he would waive his right to appeal the suppression issue.” Even assuming this to
be true, we observe that Davis withdrew his motion to suppress and the district court did
not enter a pretrial ruling on the “suppression issue.”
22
Because the district court did not err by rejecting Davis’s argument that his plea was
invalid as inaccurate or unintelligent, and because he received effective assistance of
counsel, we also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Davis’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.