In re the SUPERVISED Estate of David Victor Page, Deceased.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1043

In re the SUPERVISED Estate of David Victor Page, Deceased.

Filed March 3, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-PR-23-1085

Katherine Disterhaft-Cumings, Eveleth, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Julie N. Nagorski, Mary Alice Fleming, DeWitt, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents Andrea Briese and Rachel Disterhaft)

Lori L. Guzman, Guzman LaLonde, PA, Apple Valley, Minnesota (for respondent
Navigator Fiduciary and Forensic Services, Inc.)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Katherine Disterhaft-Cumings challenges the district court’s decisions to
deny her petition for appointment as the personal representative of decedent David Victor
Page’s estate and to deny her petition to remove respondent Navigator Fiduciary and
Forensic Services, Inc. (Navigator) as the personal representative for the estate. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in either decision, we affirm.
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FACTS
Page died intestate in April 2023 with no surviving spouse or children. At the time
of his death, Page had three nieces who inherited his estate: Disterhaft-Cumings and her
sisters, respondents Rachel Disterhaft and Andrea Briese (the sisters). From early in the
probate proceedings, the district court observed an “irretrievable breakdown in the
relationship between” Disterhaft-Cumings and the sisters, and the district court appointed
Navigator as a special administrator, in its capacity as a third-party professional fiduciary.1
See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-614 (2024).
In October 2023, Disterhaft-Cumings petitioned for appointment as the personal
representative of Page’s estate, asserting priority under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-203 (2024 ).
The sisters cross-petitioned for the district court to appoint Navigator as the personal
representative.
The district court held a hearing on the petitions. Disterhaft-Cumings testified about
her qualifications to be the personal representative. She stated that she had “employment
history and experience in project management” and that, as the personal representative, she
would “work with her sisters, [and] she is a communicator, researcher, and facilitator.”
She also testified that she wanted “to do what her Uncle wanted and honor his wishes.”
Disterhaft-Cumings did not present any evidence aside from her testimony.

1 Disterhaft-Cumings moved to remove Navigator as the special administrator, but the
district court denied the motion. Disterhaft-Cumings does not challenge that decision on
appeal.
3
Next, Navigator’s president—who had already been involved in managing the
estate—testified. The president testified that Disterhaft-Cumings (1) demonstrated “a lack
of respect in scheduling events” she requested; (2) made “excessive requests for
communications”; (3) failed to comply with requests to stop photographing Navigator’s
employees; and (4) showed “a lack of respect for the shared assets of the Estate,”
specifically by “interfering in the work to secure [Page’s] home after a recent break in.”
As evidence to support the president’s testimony, Navigator submitted various email
communications with Disterhaft-Cumings for admission into the record.
Finally, Disterhaft testified about ongoing tension between the sisters and
Disterhaft-Cumings. Disterhaft testified that Disterhaft-Cumings engaged in “persistent
and consistently repetitive and unnecessary communications,” and that the sisters “were
unable to reach agreements [with Disterhaft-Cumings] on matters ranging from the simple
task of disposal of broken glass from [Page’s] home to those which were more complex,”
such as whether to cremate or bury Page’s remains. As supporting evidence, Disterhaft
provided three months’ worth of text messages—totaling 123 pages—between the sisters
and Disterhaft-Cumings.
After the hearing, the district court denied Disterhaft-Cumings’s petition and
granted the sisters’ cross-petition, explicitly finding the president and Disterhaft credible
and Disterhaft-Cumings not credible. The district court found that, although Disterhaft-
Cumings and the sisters had the highest priority for appointment, the “evidence
overwhelmingly show[ed] [Disterhaft-Cumings had] difficulty in working with anyone to
preserve the estate, as she often [was] uncooperative and obtuse.” Based on these findings,
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the district court determined that Disterhaft-Cumings was not suitable to act as the personal
representative under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-203(f)(2) and, instead, appointed Navigator as the
personal representative.
Two days later, Disterhaft-Cumings petitioned to remove Navigator as the personal
representative for cause under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-611 (2024). The district court denied
the petition on three bases. First, Disterhaft-Cumings petitioned for removal only two days
after Navigator became the personal representative, and no facts had changed during that
time. Second, Disterhaft-Cumings filed the petition before the district court issued the
Letters of General Administration that would enable Navigator to undertake its duties as
the personal representative. See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-103 (2024). Third, Navigator had not
become incapable of discharging its duties as the personal representative, nor had it
committed acts that merited removal, such as “intentionally misrepresent[ing] material
facts,” disregarding a court order, mismanaging the estate, or failing “to perform any duty
pertaining to the office.” See Minn. Stat. § 525.3-611(b).
Disterhaft-Cumings appeals both decisions.
DECISION
On appeal, Disterhaft-Cumings challenges the district court’s decisions to deny her
petition for appointment as the personal representative and her petition to remove
Navigator as the personal representative. 2 We review both decisions for an abuse of

2 Disterhaft-Cumings also requests that “the courts . . . list . . . both the condo and the house
[as] exempt from being sold as she has a 1/3 interest in these properties,” and that “the
courts . . . subpoena documents, contracts, signed documents, assets and debits from [the
president] as she refuses to provide them to the heirs.” However, it is not apparent from
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discretion. Crosby v. Hunt (In re Estate of Crosby), 15 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Minn. 1944)
(suitability-determination); In re Estate of Michaelson, 38 3 N.W.2d 353, 355-56 (Minn.
App. 1986) (removal). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact
that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn.
2022) (quotation omitted). We address Disterhaft-Cumings’s arguments with respect to
each decision in turn below.
I.
Disterhaft-Cumings first challenges the district court’s decision not to appoint her
as the personal representative on the ground that she had priority under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-
203. Minnesota’s version of the Uniform Probate Code ( MUPC) governs appointments
of personal representatives. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-203. Potential representatives are
accorded priority for appointment in the following order:
(1) the person with priority as determined by a probated
will including a person nominated by a power conferred in a
will;
(2) the surviving spouse of the decedent who is a
devisee of the decedent;
(3) other devisees of the decedent;
(4) the surviving spouse of the decedent;
(5) other heirs of the decedent;
(6) . . . any creditor;
(7) . . . any conservator of the decedent who has not
been discharged.

the record that she raised these issues below and, if she did, the district court did not address
them. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts
generally address only those questions previously presented to and considered by the
district court). Therefore, these issues are forfeited.
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Id. (a)(1)-(7). However, “[n]o person is qualified to serve as personal representative”
whom a district court “finds unsuitable in formal proceedings.” Id. (f)(2); see also Crosby,
15 N.W.2d at 505 (“Unsuitability is now a ground for refusing appointment, whereas
formerly it was only a ground for removal of an executor.”).
The MUPC does not define “suitable” and the word “has no fixed and inflexible
meaning.” Crosby, 15 N.W.2d at 506. A district court determines “suitability” by
analyzing an individual’s “temperament, experience, and sagacity to discharge the trust
with fidelity, prudence, and promptness[,] . . . having regard to the special conditions of
each estate and those interested in it as creditors, legatees, and next of kin.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Here, for two reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found
Disterhaft-Cumings unsuitable to serve as the personal representative. See Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-203(f)(2). First, the district court explicitly found Disterhaft-Cumings’s testimony
regarding her suitability not credible, and we defer to the district court’ s credibility
determinations. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Second, the
district court determined Disterhaft-Cumings was “unsuitable” because “[ t]he evidence
overwhelmingly show[ed] [Disterhaft-Cumings had] difficulty in working with anyone to
preserve the estate, as she often [was] uncooperative and obtuse.” These findings were
well-supported by the president’s and Disterhaft’s testimony, and record evidence that
documented Disterhaft-Cumings’s disrespectful and uncooperative communication about
the estate.
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For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined Disterhaft-Cumings was unsuitable and, accordingly, denied her
petition for appointment as the personal representative.
II.
Disterhaft-Cumings next argues the district court abused its discretion when it
denied her petition to remove Navigator as the personal representative, arguing that
Navigator was “wasting the estate’s money ,” “rude, unprofessional to the heirs,” and
“disrespectful to [the heirs].”
Under Minn. Stat. § 525.3-611(a), “[a] person interested in the estate may petition
for removal of a personal representative for cause at any time.” A petitioner has cause for
removal when:
removal is in the best interests of the estate, or if it is shown
that a personal representative or the person seeking the
personal representative’s appointment intentionally
misrepresented material facts in the proceedings leading to the
appointment, or that the personal representative has
disregarded an order of the court, has become incapable of
discharging the duties of office, or has mismanaged the estate
or failed to perform any duty pertaining to the office.

Minn. Stat. § 525.3-611(b).
Here, Disterhaft-Cumings petitioned for removal only two days after Navigator
became the personal representative and the district court had not yet issued the Letters of
General Administration to allow Navigator to act as the personal representative. See Minn.
Stat. § 524.3-103 (“[T]o acquire the powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of a
personal representative of a decedent, a person must be appointed by order of the court or
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registrar, qualify and be issued letters. Administration of an estate is commenced by the
issuance of letters.”). The record amply supports the district court’s determination that,
during those two days, nothing occurred to warrant removing Navigator as the personal
representative. And Disterhaft-Cumings does not point to any evidence demonstrating that
the district court acted contrary to logic and the facts in record. Accordingly, we conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Disterhaft-Cumings’s petition
for removal.
Affirmed.