In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: G. U. T., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1045

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: G. U. T., Parent.

Filed January 13, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-23-268

Brooke Beskau Warg, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant G.U.T.)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)

Michael P. Berger, Fourth District Public Defender, Amanda Johnson, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for children)

Christine Brick-Contreras, Juvenile Justice Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad
litem)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant argues the district court abused its discretion by terminatin g his parental
rights. Because the district court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm.

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FACTS
Respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department
(Department) filed a petition to terminate appellant G.U.T.’s (father’s) parental rights to
three children. At the time of trial, the children were ages 14, 13, and 12. The children’s
mother has sole legal and physical custody.
At trial, the district court heard testimony from father, mother, the oldest child, a
guardian ad litem, and a social worker who supervised the Department’s management of
the case. Except for the social worker, all witnesses opposed terminating father’s parental
rights. The two younger children did not testify but also opposed termination.
After trial, the district court filed an order1 terminating father’s parental rights. In a
55-page single-spaced order, the court recounted testimony and evidence, made detailed
findings of fact, rendered credibility findings, and provided thorough conclusions of law.
In the order, the district court reviewed father’s criminal history. For sexually
assaulting a 14-year-old-girl in 2001, father was convicted for third-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Father was later convicted for failing to register as a sex offender. In 2013, father
choked mother in front of one of their children. Father was also convicted and incarcerated
for third-degree criminal sexual conduct after he assaulted a 15-year-old girl in 2021.
The district court found that father’s psychosexual evaluation listed him as a Level
IVa sex offender and at an “above average” risk of reoffending. The district court also
found that father had not completed sex-offender treatment.

1 Father filed a posttrial motion for a new trial and amended findings. The district court
granted the motion in part and issued an amended order from which father appealed.
3
The district court recounted mother’s testimony, including that the three children
were not aware of father’s convictions or why he was incarcerated. Mother testified that
she did not plan to prohibit father from seeing the children upon his release. Mother has
multiple other children, several of whom had been sexually abused by different men,
including one of the children subject to these termination proceedings.
The district court made several credibility findings. The district court gave limited
weight to mother’s testimony because, in part, several of her children had been victims of
sexual abuse yet she allowed father—an unregistered, un-treated sex offender—to live with
her children. The district court also found father not credible and noted that his testimony
“demonstrated a profound lack of insight about his behavior and the damage it caused[,]”
including a lack of remorse and failing to “take any serious action to seek treatment for this
behavior.” The district court found the social worker’s testimony credible, including that
father poses a risk of harm to the three children and that terminating father’s parental rights
will increase the safety of the children. The district court found the eldest child’s testimony
and the guardian ad litem’s testimony to be credible but did not find their testimony
opposing termination persuasive given the totality of the evidence.
In its legal conclusions ,
2 the district court thoroughly analyzed the children’s best
interests and determined that they favored termination. The district court acknowledged

2 In a prior order, the district court relieved the Department of its obligation to make
reasonable efforts toward reunification prior to termination because father has been
convicted of an offense that requires registration as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a)(6) (2022). In the termination order, the district court determined that two
statutory bases supported terminating father’s parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4), (9) (2022). Father does not challenge these rulings on appeal.
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that the children and father had an interest in preserving their relationship, but determined
that the competing interests of the children favor termination because father “is not a stable,
safe, or appropriate caregiver.” The district court provided several reasons for its
determination, including that (1) father is incarcerated from a conviction for sexually
assaulting a 15-year -old; (2) father has a previous conviction for sexually assaulting a
14-year-old; (3) father has failed to register as a sex offender; (4) father has failed to “take
any serious action to seek” sex-offender treatment; (5) the three children will be within the
age range of father’s two sexual assault victims when he is released; (6) father has
“demonstrated a profound lack of insight” and remorse for his prior abuse and sexual
criminal conduct; and (7) father previously abused mother in front of one of their children.
The district court explained why it rejected the testimony opposing termination. The
district court gave little weight to mother’s preference given that she has failed to protect
her children from multiple sexual assaults. The district court rejected the children’s desire
to keep their father’s parental rights intact because, without knowledge about the specifics
of his criminal history, they were unaware of the risks he poses to them. Finally, the district
court did not find the guardian ad litem’s testimony persuasive given its deep concern about
the children’s safety and the potential for father to gain greater access to and control over
the children without termination, such as by seeking custody or parenting time.
The district court determined that the Department presented clear and convincing
evidence that it is in the best interests of the children that father’s parental rights be
terminated. Father appealed.

5
DECISION
In cases involving the termination of parental rights, we review a district court’s
findings of fact for clear error. In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660
(Minn. 2008). A district court’s best-interests determination and its “ultimate decision
whether to terminate parental rights” are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare
of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6,
2021). Being in the best position to assess witness credibility, we afford a district court’s
credibility findings considerable deference. In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn. 1996).
If a district court rules that a statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists, to
terminate parental rights, the district court must also rule that termination is in the child’s
best interests. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012);
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2022). To determine whether termination is in a child’s
best interests, a district court must analyze: “1. the child’s interests in preserving the
parent-child relationship; 2. the parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child
relationship; and 3. any competing interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health
considerations and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4
(Minn. App. 1992). The Department must prove termination is in the children’s best
interests by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 3-4.

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Father raises several arguments on appeal. First, he challenges the district court’s
determination that the children’s interests in safety and stability favored termination.
Second, father argues that the district court improperly rejected the guardian ad litem’s
recommendation to preserve the parent-child relationship. Third, father asserts the district
court abused its discretion by rejecting the children’s preference against termination. We
address each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the
children’s interests in safety and stability favored termination.

Father argues the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
children’s “interests in stability, health, and safety” favored termination. Father contends
that the district court impermissibly imposed on him the obligations of a custodial parent
by finding that he is unable to provide day-to-day care for the children for the foreseeable
future. But even for noncustodial parents, “[t]he right of parentage . . . is subject to [a]
correlative duty to protect and care for [a] child.” In re Adoption of Anderson,
50 N.W.2d 278, 284 (Minn. 1951). Accordingly, the termination statute does not
distinguish between custodial and noncustodial parents. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 ,
subd. 1(b)(4) (providing that a person is palpably unfit to parent when they are “unable, for
the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child”); In re Welfare of Children of A.I., 779 N.W.2d 886, 892
(Minn. App. 2010) (noting that it is well established that “[i]ncarceration alone does not
necessarily preclude a person from acting in a parental role”), rev. dismissed (Minn.
Apr. 20, 2010); In re Welfare of N.F., No. CX-92-1307, 1993 WL 19711, at *4 (Minn.
7
App. Jan. 25, 1993) (“While development of a close, healthy parent-child relationship may
be made more difficult when the parent does not have custody of the child, noncustodial
status alone neither precludes nor supports termination of parental rights.”). 3 The district
court acted within its discretion by considering father’s capacity to care for the children’s
needs and determining that his lack of capacity supported termination.
Father also argues that the district court misapplied the law by failing to consider
the individualized needs of the children. Father has not, however, identified considerations
specific to any child that the district court failed to consider. Instead, the district court
determined—and the record reflects—that the three children share the same need for a
home that is safe, stable, and free from an increased risk of abuse. Given the children’s
shared need for safety and stability, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
evaluating that need collectively rather than individually. See In re Welfare of Children of
J.J.B., No. A22- 0436, 2022 WL 9612781, at *4 (Minn. App. Oct. 17, 2022) (affirming
termination of parental rights where the district court did not consider each child’s
individual needs, but the record reflected that the children “share the same need for a safe,
sober, and stable home” and appellant failed to identify any “considerations specific to any
of the children that the district court failed to consider”).
Father also disputes the district court’s finding that he posed a risk to the children’s
safety and stability. But the record contains ample evidence related to father’s conduct and
inactions to support the district court’s decision. Father has twice been convicted of

3 We cite nonprecedential cases in this opinion for their persuasive authority. Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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criminal sexual conduct with minors and both victims were close to the ages that the three
children will be when father is released from prison. Father has refused to complete
sex-offender treatment. The district court found that father refuses to take responsibility
for the crimes he committed. Father also physically abused mother in front of one of the
children. Given the record evidence, the district court’s finding that father posed a threat
to the children’s safety and stability was not clearly erroneous and had support from clear
and convincing evidence.4
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the guardian
ad litem’s recommendation.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
children’s best interests favored termination because the guardian ad litem recommended
that father’s parental rights remain intact. But father cites no authority for the proposition
that a district court abuses its discretion if it fails to adopt the guardian ad litem’s
recommendation. Instead, we have held that a district court does not abdicate its discretion
by failing to adopt the position of a guardian ad litem. See Rutanen v. Olson, 475 N.W.2d
100, 104 (Minn. App. 1991) (noting that a district court has discretion to reject a
professional’s custodial recommendation); see also In re Child of Green , No. C3-03-125,
2003 WL 21652472, at *6-7 (Minn. App. July 15, 2003) (“[N]either caselaw nor statutory

4 Father argues that because the district court clearly erred by finding that father posed a
risk to the children’s safety and stability, it should not have weighed the children’s interests
in safety and stability against any financial support father would have been able to provide.
But we discern no clear error in the district court finding a threat to the children’s safety
and stability, and the district court acted within its discretion by weighing that threat against
the benefit of any financial support from father.
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law mandates that the district court adopt the [guardian ad litem’s] opinion. Because the
guardian ad litem has no greater authority before the district court than does any other
party, and because a party’s opinion is not controlling on a district court’s findings or
determinations, the district court did not err by rejecting the guardian’s opinion.”). The
statute and caselaw requires a district court to independently exercise its own discretion
when weighing the best interests factors. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2022); see also J.H.,
968 N.W.2d at 600 (reviewing district court’s best interests considerations and decision to
terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion).
Father contends that the district court gave inadequate weight to the guardian ad
litem’s testimony and evaluated it against concerns for safety and stability that lack support
in the record. But the district court acknowledged this testimony, found it unpersuasive,
and provided rationale for rejecting the opinion. As we already determined, the district
court properly determined that father threatened the children’s safety and stability, and
given those dangers, the district court noted that if his parental rights were not terminated,
father retained “the right to seek custody or parenting time[,]” could withhold his consent
to an adoption, and could become the legal custodian if something happened to mother.
We have previously held that a district court’s consideration of such circumstances is valid
when a noncustodial parent’s rights were terminated. In re Welfare of Child of A.S.R., No.
A15-0419, 2015 WL 4994676, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Aug. 24, 2015) (affirming termination
of noncustodial parent’s rights even though father was unlikely to be awarded custody or
parenting time due to criminal history). The district court appropriately exercised its
discretion by rejecting the guardian ad litem’s recommendation.
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C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering termination
despite the children’s preference to the contrary.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the children’s
preference that his parental rights remain intact. A district court “is required to take into
account [a] child’s wishes[,]” In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 177 (Minn.
App. 1997), but the preferences of a child are not dispositive. See In re Welfare of Child
of K.K., 964 N.W.2d 915, 923 (Minn. 2021) (noting, in a termination of parental rights
appeal, that “a child’s testimony may carry considerable weight in a district court’s
decision, particularly with respect to preference as to custody,” but not saying that the
child’s preference is dispositive); see also In re Welfare of M.S., No. A06-0828, 2006 WL
2947652, at *2 (Minn. App. Oct. 17, 2006) (“A child’s preference is not dispositive . . . .”)
The district court individually weighed all three children’s preferences. For the
oldest child, the district court —as required by caselaw—gave her testimony significant
weight. See In re Welfare of M.P., 542 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. App. 1996), overruled in
part on other grounds by In re Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 722-24 (Minn. 1998); In
re Welfare of M.M.B., 350 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. App. 1984). The district court,
however, found her stated preference to not be in her best interests. The district court noted
that it was unclear whether the eldest child knew the specifics of father’s criminal history
and the risk “he poses to her safety.” The district court agreed with the social worker’s
opinion that father’s parental rights should be terminated despite the child’s wishes.
The district court noted the middle child did not testify, but mother and guardian ad
litem both noted the child’s preference that father’s parental rights not be terminated. The
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district court, again, gave significant weight to the child’s testimony. Nonetheless, the
district court found that it was also unclear whether the child knew about the nature of
father’s criminal conduct and his safety risks.
Mother informed the district court that the youngest child —who also did not
testify—wished for father’s parental rights to remain intact. But to the extent mother
testified about the child’s wishes, the district court did not find her testimony credible
because she provided little detail about the child’s wants and needs and, instead, focused
on her own wishes. In addition, like the older children, the district court found that the
child’s preference was entitled to limited weight because there was a lack of evidence about
the child’s understanding of father’s criminal history and his threats to safety. The district
court appropriately gave weight to the children’s preferences and, within its discretion,
determined that their best interests favored termination.
Affirmed.