State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1060

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Allen Moncrief,
Appellant.

Filed June 23, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Pine County District Court
File No. 58-CR-21-1016

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jamal Zayed, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion by (1) allowing the state to introduce the audio
recording of the victim’s statement to law enforcement and (2) allowing a deputy to testify
about what the victim told him to establish context for the investigation. Because appellant
2
did not meet his burden to demonstrate that the admission of the victim’s statements
through the deputy and the audio recording significantly affected the verdict, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Shawn Allen Moncrief with two
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct—force or coercion—personal injury, under
Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(c)(i) (Supp. 2021). 1 Count 1 alleged
that Moncrief engaged in sexual penetration with the victim using his penis, and count 2
alleged that he engaged in sexual penetration with the victim using his finger. Moncrief
pleaded not guilty, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The following facts were
established at trial.
The victim and Moncrief had a mutual friend and were communicating via
Facebook messenger and text message. They planned to meet for dinner and a movie at
Moncrief’s house because Moncrief could not drive. Moncrief told the victim to bring
“cuddle clothes” to wear while they watched the movie. The victim changed into the
“cuddle clothes,” and then they started watching a movie while a pizza was cooking. Then,
according to the victim, “things started to happen,” and “escalat[ed] into different, [and]
inappropriate touches.” The victim described Moncrief attempting to pull down her pants
multiple times, “[sticking] his fingers in [her] private area,” and biting her breasts. The
victim explained that the interaction eventually escalated to intercourse and described it as

1 In the complaint, Moncrief was charged under the 2020 version of the statute. Because
the statute was amended in 2021, the district court granted the state’s oral motion to amend
the complaint.
3
“forceful.” The victim made up an excuse to leave, went home and took a shower, and told
her roommate what happened. The n, the victim went to the hospital for a sexual assault
examination and reported what happened to law enforcement.
At trial the victim admitted that her memory faded a little bit because the incident
was a few years ago. The victim stated that she “honestly [didn’t] remember what [she]
said” in response to Moncrief sticking his fingers in her private area. When the assault
escalated to intercourse, the victim explained she “was [at ] the point where [she] was . . .
in [her] head saying things and praying and wanting it to stop.” The victim remembered
talking to law enforcement and making a statement that she tried to say no. During cross-
examination, defense counsel asked the victim if she told Moncrief “no at any point.” The
victim responded, “I don’t recall.”
The deputy testified that he received a call from a female reporting a sexual assault
from the previous night. The deputy met the victim at the hospital and took a recorded
statement, which was later received into evidence and played for the jury. The deputy
testified about what the victim told him during her recorded statement and stated, in
relevant part, “She mentioned at one point that . . . he had like taken his hand and rubbed
around her genitals, . . . and at that point she said, like, ‘No, I don’t want to do this,’ . . .
and he continued to just kind of force himself on to her.”
A forensic nurse testified about the sexual assault examination and to portions of
the victim’s statements that were relevant to the medical diagnosis. The nurse testified that
the victim “was penetrated . . . and her pleas to stop were ignored.” The nurse further
4
testified that the victim told her “she said no at the beginning, but kind of quit protesting
just to get it over with.”
Moncrief waived his right to testify. However, the jury heard his version of events
via a recorded statement he gave to law enforcement. Moncrief maintained that the victim
never said no, and he stopped because “it didn’t feel right.” Moncrief stated, “I’m not lying
to you. She never said no to me. If she would’ve said no[,] I would’ve stopped right away
and nothing would’ve happened. I’m serious.” Then, when questioned further, Moncrief
stated, “I don’t remember if she said no at any time. I swear. If she did, I am sorry. I just
wanna go home. I want my life back.” Moncrief also admitted, “We did have sex . . . . I
kept asking her if she was okay with it and she did say that she was alright with it but I
don’t know if she really was alright with it.”
During deliberations, the jury asked to listen to Moncrief’s and the victim’s recorded
statements. A juror asked to rewind the victim’s statement “[b]ecause there’s certain
things, and [she] . . . didn’t catch all of it.” The jury later requested to listen to the victim’s
statement again, and approximately five minutes in, the same juror requested to pause the
recording to make a note. Approximately one hour later, the jury found Moncrief guilty of
count 1 and not guilty of count 2. The district court sentenced Moncrief to the presumptive
sentence of 144 months in prison and 10 years on conditional release.
Moncrief appeals.
DECISION
Moncrief argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) allowing the state
to introduce the audio recording of the victim’s statement to the deputy and (2) allowing
5
that deputy to testify about what the victim told him to establish context for the
investigation. Moncrief argues that his conviction must be reversed because there is a
reasonable possibility that these hearsay statements significantly affected the verdict. The
parties disagree about whether Moncrief properly preserved these evidentiary issues for
appeal. Therefore, we first consider whether Moncrief properly preserved these issues at
trial and whether Moncrief’s arguments are forfeited. Then, assuming error, we turn to
whether Moncrief met his burden to establish that the alleged evidentiary errors affected
his substantial rights.
I. Moncrief did not properly preserve the issues for appeal by renewing his
pretrial objections to the alleged errors at trial.

The state argues that Moncrief did not properly preserve the issues below, and
therefore the plain-error standard of review applies. Moncrief argues that he preserved the
issues by objecting to the audio recording and the deputy’s testimony prior to trial.
“A defendant may preserve an evidentiary error by making a pretrial motion to
exclude the challenged evidence or by objecting at trial when the evidence is introduced.”
State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018). “Once the court makes a definitive
ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need
not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error.” Minn. R. Evid.
103(a). “[E]videntiary objections should be renewed at trial when an in limine or other
evidentiary ruling is not definitive but rather provisional or unclear, or when the context at
trial differs materially from that at the time of the former ruling.” State v. Word, 755
N.W.2d 776, 783 (Minn. App. 2008). “[W]hen an attorney is unsure whether evidence
6
offered at trial violates an evidentiary ruling, the attorney should renew an objection or
seek clarification or reversal of a prior ruling.” Id. When a defendant does not object at
trial, the issue is forfeited and may only be reviewed “when there is a plain error affecting
a substantial right.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted).
A. Moncrief did not object to the audio recording as inconsistent during
trial and the district court did not definitively rule on Moncrief’s pretrial
objection.

Moncrief argues that the district court erred by admitting the audio recording of the
victim’s statement to the deputy as a prior consistent statement under Minnesota Rules of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). Prior to trial, Moncrief argued that the jury should not hear these
statements because the victim’s credibility was not being challenged. He argued that they
were not going to attack the victim’s credibility, “except maybe her ability to remember
events, but that’s not the same thing as calling her a liar on the stand and then permitting
[the state] to remedy that by playing [the recording].”
The district court determined that “there is a credibility issue central to this case,”
but reserved ruling on whether the state could introduce the victim’s recorded statements,
noting that it could not make this decision until after the victim testified. When discussing
the recording with the court outside the presence of the jury, Moncrief did not object to the
recording as a prior consistent statement and rested on his prior stated objections. The
district court found the recording was admissible as a prior consistent statement, stating:
[T]oday what I am going to do is indicate that I did make the
determination already that the . . . credibility of [the victim] is
squarely at issue in this case, and that is one of the factors
7
under the rule for admitting a prior consistent statement. I did
indicate that I would not be able to make a final determination
until the testimony was heard in court by the witness.

I have had her statement on my screen during her testimony . . .
and I do find that it is a prior consistent statement . . . and so I
am going to authorize . . . or allow the State to . . . play the . . .
audio of that statement as a prior consistent statement.

(Emphasis added.) Moncrief also did not object when the state offered the recording
during the deputy’s testimony.
On appeal, Moncrief argues that the district court erred by admitting the audio
recording because the victim’s credibility had not been challenged and because the
recording was inconsistent with the victim’s trial testimony. Because the district court
definitively ruled that credibility was at issue in the case prior to trial, Moncrief preserved
this portion of his argument by resting on the previous objections. See Minn. R. Evid.
103(a). However, Moncrief did not also preserve the issue of whether the recording was a
“consistent statement” because the district court reserved ruling on this issue. And an
“objection to the admission of evidence preserves review only for the stated basis for the
objection or a basis apparent from the context of the objection.” Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d at
649. The district court’s pretrial ruling was limited to the victim’s credibility, and it
correctly reserved the issue of whether the recorded statement was admissible as a prior
consistent statement until after the victim testified. Therefore, Moncrief should have
renewed his objection at trial or sought clarification or reversal of the district court’s prior
credibility determination. Word, 755 N.W.2d at 783. Trial was the first opportunity for
Moncrief to object to the recording as inconsistent with the victim’s trial testimony, and
8
Moncrief did not raise such an objection at trial. See Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 785 (stating
“an objection to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the first opportunity”).
Therefore, this argument is forfeited and may only be reviewed for plain error. Id.
B. Moncrief did not object to the deputy’s testimony as hearsay during trial
and the statements went beyond the context of the district court’s
provisional ruling on Moncrief’s motion in limine.

Moncrief argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the deputy
to testify about what the victim told him to establish context for the investigation. Moncrief
relies on State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2002), to argue that the district court
erred by allowing the deputy “to testify about the substance of [the victim’s] hearsay
statements . . . ‘to give context to why [the police] took the action that they did and how
they moved forward.’ ” Moncrief’s argument focuses on the following portion of the
deputy’s testimony: “She mentioned at one point that . . . he had like taken his hand and
rubbed around her genitals, . . . and at that point she had said, like, ‘No, I don’t want to do
this,’ . . . and he continued to just kind of force himself on to her.”
Moncrief relies on a portion of his motion in limine to argue that this error was
preserved. The defense moved “ [f]or an Order prohibiting testimony of any law
enforcement officer, investigator, or other agent for the State of Minnesota concerning
statements made by other persons, or opinions derived from statements made by other
persons.” The state did not respond to this particular portion of the defense’s motion in
limine. However, prior to the discussion of the defendant’s motion in limine, the district
court made a definitive ruling that law enforcement could testify about the victim’s
9
statements “to give context to why they took the action they did and how they moved
forward.” The district court described the scope of its ruling in detail, explaining:
My intent, my expectation, was th[ at] [law
enforcement] would get on the stand and say, “We got a phone
call for service. We went out and met with [the victim]. She
reported that she had, you know, been the victim of a sexual
assault. Uh, we asked her for details. This is what she provided
us. She seemed upset. She was nervous. She was, you know,
crying, tearful,” whatever their report is. “We then, you know,
with that information, we then, you know, set up an
examination, we went to the home of the alleged perpetrator.”

The defense did not object to this ruling, or seek clarification. In fact, the defense
stated, “we may have hearsay objections to certain parts of [law enforcement’s] statements,
but the focus is that [the state] would then play a statement, a recorded statement, from two
years ago.” The next day, the district court clarified its ruling again, stating:
I did make that determination that clearly the
investigators can say, “Look, we got this call, and she said,
‘This is what happened,’ and we asked her about the situation,
and she identified Mr. Moncrief, and that’s why we went over.”
You know, you’ve got to have a story, right, I mean, to explain
to the jury what’s going on.

On appeal, Moncrief now argues that the district court erred because it should have
limited the deputy’s testimony “to the fact that he spoke to [the victim] without disclosing
the substance of that conversation.” It appears the district court did just that. If, during
trial, Moncrief believed that the state was eliciting inadmissible hearsay that was not being
offered to explain the context of the investigation in violation of the district court’s limited
ruling, he had the burden to renew his objection. Word, 755 N.W.2d at 783. Moncrief did
not object during this portion of the deputy’s testimony describing the substance of the
10
victim’s recorded statement, and now does not argue that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by, for example, intentionally eliciting inadmissible hearsay in violation of the
district court’s order or failing to properly prepare the witness. Therefore, this argument
is also forfeited and may only be reviewed for plain error. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 785.
II. Moncrief forfeited his arguments by not arguing the plain -error standard on
appeal.

Because, as discussed above, Moncrief did not object at trial, the alleged evidentiary
errors are forfeited. Id . However, appellate courts have discretion to consider forfeited
errors under the plain-error standard. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993);
State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. 2015); Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02. Under the
plain-error standard, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate (1 ) error; (2) that was
plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998). If any prong of the plain-error standard is not met, we need not address the other
prongs. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 785.
The state argues that Moncrief’s arguments are forfeited because he did not argue
the plain-error standard in his brief. 2 Moncrief argues that both errors were objected to at
trial and that the abuse -of-discretion standard of review applies. However, as discussed

2 The only suggestions of the plain-error standard in Moncrief’s brief are a footnote to a
nonprecedential case where the district court erred by admitting a recording as a prior
consistent statement, and a discussion of harmless-error, which could be construed as a
substantial-rights argument. We also note that Moncrief did not file a reply brief rebutting
the state’s characterization of the record, or otherwise arguing that the plain-error standard
does not apply.
11
above, Moncrief did not properly preserve the issues by renewing any pretrial objections,
so the plain-error standard applies.
The state’s forfeiture argument raises the question of whether we should conduct
the plain-error analysis on our own initiative when the plain-error standard was not briefed
by the appellant. We recognize that the plain-error standard is discretionary and should
only be used to correct “particularly egregious errors,” and only “in those circumstances in
which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519,
528 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). And, in general, “issues th at are not raised by
appellant on appeal are deemed waived unless prejudicial errors are obvious from the
record.” State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 312-13 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted).
We conclude that Moncrief’s arguments are forfeited because plain error is not
obvious from the record. See State v. Levie, 695 N.W.2d 619, 627, n.3 (Minn. App. 2005)
(stating that appellant who did not argue plain error in appellate brief forfeited the issue).
An evidentiary error constitutes plain error if it is “so clear under applicable law at the time
of the conviction, and so prejudicial to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, that the
defendant’s failure to object—and thereby present the [district] court with an opportunity
to avoid prejudice—should not forfeit his right to a remedy.” State v. Manthey, 711
N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Both of Moncrief’s arguments are challenges to hearsay statements. We are hesitant
to analyze the district court’s admission of hearsay statements for plain error. State v.
Stone, 982 N.W.2d 500, 512- 13 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d on other grounds, 995 N.W.2d
12
617 (Minn. 2023). In Manthey, the supreme court recognized the difficulty of reviewing
hearsay for plain error stating:
The number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion
make objections to such testimony particularly important to the
creation of a record of the trial court’s decision-making process
in either admitting or excluding a given statement. The
complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule
and its exceptions make it particularly important that a full
discussion of admissibility be conducted at trial.

711 N.W.2d at 504.

As the state argues, multiple hearsay exceptions could apply here. For example, the
audio recording may have also been admissible under the residual hearsay exception. See
Minn. R. Evid. 807. The district court could have also determined that the deputy’s
testimony was not hearsay. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c), (d)(1)(B). Therefore, because plain
error is not obvious and because Moncrief did not argue the plain-error standard in his
brief, Moncrief’s arguments are forfeited.
III. Even if we assume that the district court plainly erred, Moncrief did not meet
his burden to demonstrate that the alleged evidentiary errors affected his
substantial rights.

Moncrief argues that the district court’s admission of the victim’s statements
through the audio recording and the deputy ’s testimony was not harmless. Although
harmless error and plain error are different, the substantial -rights prong of the plain -error
standard “is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis.” State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d
629, 634 (Minn. 2011).
An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights “if there is a reasonable likelihood
that the error significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688
13
(Minn. 2002). To determine whether the error significantly affected the verdict, we
consider non-exclusive factors, including “the manner in which the evidence was
presented, its persuasive value, its use in closing argument, and [the defendant’s] counter
of the evidence.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 56 (Minn. 2024). We also consider
strong evidence of guilt because “[s]trong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive
value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. at 59 (quotation omitted).
Here, Moncrief argues that erroneous admission of the victim’s statements to the
deputy significantly affected the verdict because the statements were prominent and
persuasive, used in the state’s closing argument, not effectively countered, and because the
evidence of guilt was not strong. The challenged statements involve whether the victim
told Moncrief “no.” Moncrief challenges the following portion of the victim’s recorded
statement to law enforcement:
Q: How, how did it escalate? Oh. Can, can you tell me how it
escalated?
A: Um . . . basically first it was like, you know, pulling the shirt
um . . . then it went to just rubbing down there and then um . . .
he kept trying to get in further but I kept trying to pull em up
and I said no at first because I had the strength but then it
started going in and then I . . .

Q: So at first you were able to verbally say no?
A: Yeah.

Moncrief also directly challenges the following portion of the deputy’s testimony:
She mentioned at one point that . . . he had like taken his hand
and rubbed around her genitals, . . . and at that point she said,
like, ‘No, I don’t want to do this,’ . . . and he continued to just
kind of force himself on to her.

14
Based “on the relative number of transcript pages,” the challenged statements were
a small portion of the trial, approximately five transcript pages and 30 seconds of a 13-
minute audio recording. Id. at 56. But the state emphasized the statements by using them
throughout its case. Id. For example, the challenged statements were referenced both at
the beginning and at the end of the state’s case-in-chief and introduced by two different
methods— the deputy’s statement and the audio recording. And even though whether the
victim said “no” is not directly correlated with whether she consented, whether the victim
said “no” was emphasized by law enforcement while interviewing Moncrief and
throughout the state’s case. Id.
However, we conclude that Moncrief did not meet his burden to demonstrate that
the challenged statements significantly affected the verdict because Moncrief effectively
countered the evidence during cross-examination of the victim and during closing
argument, the evidence was not key on a material element of the offense, and there was
other evidence of guilt. Moncrief argues that he did not counter the evidence during cross-
examination or address it in closing argument. This is not supported by the record. During
cross-examination, defense counsel asked the victim if she told Moncrief “no at any point.”
The victim responded, “I don’t recall.” And during closing argument, the state referenced
the victim’s statements to the deputy, but then stated:
Let me remind you that . . . [the victim] is not required, as the
jury instructions say, to resist a particular sexual act. You are
not here to judge her on if she said no enough times, if she said
it loud enough, if she chose to go to the defendant’s house.
You’re here to look at whether she consented to these particular
sexual acts, which she did not. Her words say so.

15
The state later emphasized that the victim “was consistent throughout her
statements.” Moncrief countered during his closing argument by noting the discrepancies
between the victim’s trial testimony and the recorded statement to law enforcement. The
defense argued: “In her direct testimony on a cross-examine, she says she doesn’t
remember if she said no, . . . and we’re not really clear from either one of those recordings
when no was said, if it was said at all or if she said it out loud.”
Moncrief argues that the state used the victim’s recorded statement to the deputy to
prove the element of lack of consent. However, “[c]onsent does not mean . . . that the
complainant failed to resist a particular sexual act.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341(a) (Supp. 2021).
Although Moncrief argued that this case was about “people remembering different things,”
the record contains other evidence of the victim’s lack of consent and Moncrief’s guilt. 3
The victim described Moncrief attempting to pull down her pants multiple times,
“[sticking] his fingers in [her] private area,” and biting her breasts so hard that “it felt like
they were going to be ripped off.” She testified that “everything was so rough.” The victim
also described pulling up her pants multiple times after Moncrief kept pulling them down
because she “didn’t want it.” When the assault escalated to intercourse, the victim
explained that she “was [at] the point where [she] just was . . . in [her] head saying things
and praying and wanting it to stop.” The victim also testified about making a statement to
law enforcement and remembered telling law enforcement that she “tried to say no.”

3 We also note that the challenged statements are related to the victim saying “no” in
response to attempted digital penetration. But the jury acquitted Moncrief of the count
involving digital penetration.
16
And the challenged statements about the victim saying “no” did not “elicit[] new
information.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 57 (quotation omitted). The nurse testified that the
victim’s “pleas to stop were ignored,” and that “she said no at the beginning, but kind of
quit protesting just to get it over with.” The nurse also testified consistently with the victim,
explaining that Moncrief penetrated the victim vaginally, that the victim described the
assault as “rough and painful,” and that Moncrief slapped the victim’s nipples and pulled
her hair. The nurse also described photographs of the victim’s injuries.
In sum, after weighing the factors, we conclude that Moncrief did not meet his
burden to demonstrate that the erroneous admission of the victim’s statements through the
deputy and the audio recording significantly affected the verdict.4
Affirmed.

4 Even if Moncrief did meet his burden on this prong, “an appellate court may correct the
error only when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022). Moncrief did not
address that the alleged error affected “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings” in his brief and any argument on this prong is forfeited. And because
the alleged errors involve discretionary evidentiary determinations that were not objected
to, “failing to correct the error[s] would [not] . . . caus[e] the public to seriously question
whether our court system has integrity and generally offers accused persons a fair trial.”
Id.