State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1071

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Michael Manton,
Appellant.

Filed February 24, 2025
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-20-2529

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Jackson J. Elmquist, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Shawn Manton, intoxicated, pulled a fake gun on a liquor-store patron and kicked a
police officer in the mouth while on probation for having drunkenly stabbed a different
victim in the back. The same district court judge who originally sentenced Manton for his
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prior assault revoked his probation, citing public-safety concerns and Manton’s previously
having received a downward dispositional departure. Manton argues unconvincingly on
appeal from his revocation that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that
the need for his confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. We therefore
affirm.
FACTS
Shawn Manton stabbed his former girlfriend’s acquaintance in the back with a
paring knife after consuming alcoholic beverages. A jury found Manton guilty of second-
degree assault with a dangerous weapon, and the district court sentenced him to 21 months
in prison. The district court granted Manton a downward dispositional departure, however,
staying execution of his imprisonment conditioned on probationary terms. The district
court departed from the presumptive commitment to prison because of Manton’s newfound
sobriety, his remorse for his crime, and his family support. The district court concluded
Manton’s sentencing with the admonishment, “[Y]ou got a departure, so this is your
break.” The probationary terms included Manton’s obligation to remain law abiding,
abstain from consuming alcohol, and attend anger-management treatment, among other
requirements.
A bit more than a year later , Manton was convicted of felony assault of a police
officer, along with other crimes, in North Dakota. Manton accosted liquor-store patrons—
pulling a replica handgun on one—and erratically drove his vehicle towards another car.
Manton resisted his consequent arrest. He head-butted a squad car. Then he kicked a deputy
in the mouth while he was being booked into jail. Manton admitted that he had consumed
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alcohol preceding the episode . His probation agent responded to his new crimes by
reporting the probation violation to the district court, alleging that Manton had failed to
remain law abiding, failed to abstain from alcohol, and failed to complete an anger-
management program.
The district court held a probation-revocation hearing . The probation agent
recommended that Manton serve 15 days in jail. Manton represented himself and admitted
to the violations but urged the district court to give him another chance on probation. The
state asked the court to execute Manton’s prison sentence. The district court judge—the
same one who presided over Manton’s trial and sentencing—reiterated that she had already
given Manton a chance on probation. The judge revoked his probation, finding that his
violations were intentional and inexcusable, observing that she had “very significant”
concerns for public safety given the nature of his new convictions, and concluding that not
revoking Manton’s probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of his violations.
Manton appeals.
DECISION
Manton contests the district court’s probation-revocation order. We review a district
court’s decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d
246, 249–50 (Minn. 1980). We see no abuse here.
Manton argues that the district court erred by finding that the need for his
incarceration outweighs the policies favoring probation. This is a required finding before
the district court may revoke probation. Id. at 250. The district court satisfies this
requirement by making a revocation-supporting finding on at least one of three subfactors:
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(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005). Manton argues that the probation
agent’s position undermines the district court’s decision on this factor, elaborating that the
district court abused its discretion by not accepting or closely following the agent’s
intermediate-sanctions recommendation. The argument fails because, although probation
agents and probationers have a “special relationship,” State v. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128,
137 (Minn. 2007), the district court is not bound to follow a probation agent’s
recommendation as to whether to revoke probation, State v. Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 375
(Minn. App. 2023). The district court did not abuse its discretion by not following the
probation agent’s recommendation.
We add that Manton’s new assault conviction particularly s upports the district
court’s decision to revoke probation on public-safety grounds. A probation violation
“relevant to the crime of which [the probationer] ha[s] been convicted” is usually not a
mere technical violation, which would counsel against revocation. See State v. Smith, 994
N.W.2d 317, 321–22 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023); State v.
Johnson, 679 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Johnson was operating a vehicle after
drinking alcoholic beverages. This was precisely why Johnson was on probation.”).
Manton committed a felony assault after consuming alcohol while he was on probation for
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having been convicted of felony assault after consuming alcohol. The district court’s
reasoned concerns about public safety are especially well-founded.
The district court also acted within its discretion by finding that not revoking
probation here would unduly diminish the seriousness of Manton’s violations. Although
“[o]nly one Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation,” Smith, 994 N.W.2d at
320, in the interest of thoroughness we also consider but reject Manton’s position about
the seriousness of his violation. The violation involved another alcohol-fueled felony
assault despite his having been granted a dispositional departure from an executed prison
sentence for materially similar behavior. The district court considered but rejected the
probation agent’s suggestion for an intermediate sanction, recognizing that its reason for
departing previously was because of the steps Manton had taken to improve himself at that
time. This history, the district court noticed, made Manton’s now repeated keep-me-on -
probation-so-I-can-improve-myself plea far less credible. The district court appropriately
concluded that Manton’s probation violations, like his underlying offense, were serious.
For these reasons, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion by
deciding that the public’s need for Manton’s confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation and executing Manton’s stayed prison sentence.
Affirmed.