A24-1098

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1085
A24-1098

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gale Allen Rachuy,
Appellant.

Filed June 9, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-23-743

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Alexander J. Goering, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant was convicted and sentenced for the offense of theft by swindle involving
a vehicle he received in exchange for a check that, ultimately, was not honored due to
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insufficient funds. As part of his sentence, appellant was ordered to pay restitution, which
is the sole issue in this direct appeal. Appellant claims that the district court erred in
awarding restitution for his use of the vehicle and for the victim’s e xpense of having the
vehicle towed. Because there is no evidence in the record to support restitution for the
value of appellant’s use of the vehicle, we reverse in part and remand. However, because
the victim incurred a towing expense to return the vehicle, we affirm in part.
FACTS
In April 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Gale Allen Rachuy
with one count of theft by swindle in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd.2(a)(4) (2022).
Rachuy pleaded guilty to the charged offense in December 2023.
Rachuy’s conviction was the result of his purported desire to purchase a vehicle
from J.M. Rachuy provided a check to J.M. for $1,700 and drove away with the vehicle.
The check was returned to J.M. due to insufficient funds. When J.M. informed Rachuy
that the check was returned on October 4, 2022, Rachuy assured J.M. that by October 11
he would pay for the vehicle or return it. Because Rachuy neither paid for nor returned the
vehicle by October 11, J.M. contacted law enforcement.
Rachuy was criminally charged with theft by swindle because he neither paid for
nor returned the vehicle. Because the vehicle had not been returned, J.M. filed a restitution
affidavit in May 2023 , which included the agreed-upon purchase price of $1,700. In
February 2024, an impound lot informed J. M. that the vehicle was in their possession.
When J.M. attempted to retrieve the vehicle, he learned that it had a flat tire and missing
license plates, so he paid to have it towed to his home.
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The district court sentenced Rachuy to 18 months’ imprisonment and ordered that
he pay restitution in the amount of $3,190.54, representing (1) $1,700 related to Rachuy’s
use of the vehicle; (2) a $350.31 impound fee; (3) a $390.23 tow fee; (4) a $200 cleaning
fee; (5) $50 for the missing license plate and license reinstatement; and (6) $500 in time
away from work.
Rachuy appeals.
DECISION
Rachuy argues that the district court erred by ordering restitution for two of the
items: $1,700 for his use of the stolen vehicle and the $390.23 tow fee. He argues that
there is no evidence in the record to support a value for his use of the vehicle and that the
tow fee is improper because the district court also awarded J.M. $200 in lost wages for
traveling to pick up the vehicle.1
“A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and the district court’s
order will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Andersen, 871
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). “A [district] court abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law.” State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). “The district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous.” Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 913. “Whether a particular
claim for restitution fits within the statutory definition is a question of law, which this court

1 Rachuy also argues that J.M. is not a victim because he is not the registered titleholder of
the vehicle. Because this argument applies only to the value of the vehicle and we reverse
that portion of the restitution order, we need not address this claim.
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reviews de novo.” In re Welfare of M.R.H., 716 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Minn. App. 2006), rev.
denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).
“A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of
a criminal charge . . . . A request for restitution may include, but is not limited to, any
out-of-pocket losses resulting from the crime, ” and may include “replacement of wages
and services.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2022). The record must provide the
court with a factual basis to award restitution. State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn.
2014). This may be supported by the victim’s restitution affidavit or “other competent
evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a).
Use of Vehicle
Rachuy claims, and the state agrees, that there is no evidence to support the $1,700
in restitution awarded to compensate for his use of the vehicle. We agree as well.
The purpose of restitution is “to restore crime victims to the same financial position
they were in before the crime.” State v. Palubicki , 727 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn. 2007).
The district court reasoned that an award of $1,700 as a “vehicle usage fee” was reasonable
based upon a calculation of $100 per month for the 17 months during which Rachuy
possessed the vehicle.
But J.M.’s restitution claim was not based upon Rachuy’s use of the vehicle.
Instead, J.M. sought restitution for the value of the vehicle based upon the agreed purchase
price of $1,700 because it had not been returned at the time of the restitution request. J.M.
sought no restitution for Rachuy’s use of the vehicle, however, and the record provides no
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evidence to support such a loss. The district court therefore erred in awarding $1,700 for
Rachuy’s use of the vehicle as part of the restitution amount.
Towing Fee
Rachuy argues that J.M. should not have been awarded the towing fee, because he
was awarded for his loss of work when he attempted to retrieve the vehicle. We are not
persuaded.
During the sentencing hearing, J.M. testified regarding his restitution request and
specifically explained why he had to have the vehicle towed to his home from the impound
lot. J.M. explained that he did not learn of the vehicle’s flat tire or missing license plates
until he arrived at the impound lot. Because he was not able to drive the vehicle home, he
needed to have it towed. The record therefore supports that J.M. incurred two expenses
related to his retrieval of the vehicle—one related to time away from work and another
related to towing the inoperable vehicle. T he district court therefore acted within its
discretion by awarding J.M. restitution for the tow fee.
In sum, we affirm the restitution award except for the $1,700 for Rachuy’s use of
the vehicle, and we remand to the district court to amend its sentencing order accordingly.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.