State of Minnesota v. Kacey Emmanuel Kamara

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1087

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kacey Emmanuel Kamara,
Appellant.

Filed September 28, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-22-4345

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
On remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court, appellant argues there was
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed
a firearm and ammunition found in his fiancée’s apartment where he frequently stayed.

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We conclude that the circumstantial evidence is consistent with appellant’s guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Kacey Emmanuel Kamara with
unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition based on evidence discovered in Kamara’s
fiancée’s apartment on July 7, 2022. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). The state
also charged Kamara with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated
first-degree witness tampering, and drive-by shooting for conduct alleged to have occurred
on June 3, 2022. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.222, subd. 1, .498, subd. 1b(a)(4) (2020), .66,
subd. 1e(a)(3) (Supp. 2021). Kamara waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded
to a court trial, after which the district court found Kamara guilty of unlawful possession
of a firearm or ammunition and not guilty of the other charges. The following summarizes
the evidence received at trial and the district court’s factual findings, as relevant to this
appeal.
On July 7, 2022, police executed a search warrant at the apartment of M.T., who is
Kamara’s fiancée. M.T. lived in the apartment with her two children, whom she shares
with Kamara. Kamara was not on the lease for the apartment, but he spent most of his time
at M.T.’s apartment, frequently stayed overnight, and referred to it as “home” and “my
apartment.”
Kamara and the children were in the apartment when police executed the search
warrant. In a bedroom that appeared to be occupied by male and female adults, officers
found a Taurus-brand nine-millimeter handgun on top of a shelving unit. A magazine

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containing nine-millimeter ammunition was next to the gun. Officers also found 70 rounds
of nine-millimeter ammunition in a box in the bedroom closet. There was a black backpack
on the bedroom floor that contained 14 20-guage shotgun shells and various documents,
including a 2019 medical document bearing Kamara’s name. The officer who found the
backpack testified that other documents inside the backpack may have listed the name of
either M.T. or M.T. and Kamara’s son.
M.T. testified that she owned the firearm and that she typically kept it in a safe with
a digital thumb-print lock in the bedroom, but she forgot to do so on July 7 because it was
her first day at a new job. Kamara testified that he knew that M.T. owned a gun and knew
where she kept it but he denied that he ever handled or possessed it.
A scientist from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) testified
that the firearm contained a mixture of DNA from four individuals and that Kamara could
not be excluded as a contributor to the mixture. The scientist explained that “[t]he
probability of observing the profile would be greater than a hundred billion times more
likely if it was a mixture of [Kamara] and three unknown unidentified individuals versus a
mixture of four unknown unidentified individuals” and that the DNA attributable to
Kamara made up about 49 and one-half percent of the mixture. On cross-examination, the
scientist acknowledged the limitations of the DNA evidence, including that the results
presumed that the DNA contributors were “unrelated” individuals.
The district court found Kamara guilty of unlawfully possessing the firearm, the
ammunition in the bedroom closet, and the ammunition in the black backpack in the
bedroom. In its factual findings, the district court noted M.T.’s testimony that she owned

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the firearm and forgot to put it in the safe on July 7 but did not expressly find M.T. either
credible or not credible. The court found that Kamara’s testimony “regarding his
knowledge of the guns and ammunition in M.T.’s apartment” not credible and found that
he regularly stayed overnight at the apartment, that male clothing was in the bedroom and
documents with his name were in the backpack, and that the firearm and ammunition were
open and accessible in the bedroom. Other than a notation that it had received testimony
from the BCA scientist, among other witnesses, the district court’s order does not include
any factual findings or credibility determinations about the DNA evidence and the
scientist’s testimony.
Kamara appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence proving that he
constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition. We affirmed. State v. Kamara,
No. A24-1087, 2025 WL 2030048, at *5 (Minn. App. July 21, 2025), vacated and
remanded mem. (Minn. Apr. 29, 2026). The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Kamara’s
petition for further review and stayed proceedings pending final disposition in State v.
Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468 (Minn. 2026). After the supreme court filed its decision in Firkus,
the supreme court lifted the stay, vacated this court’s decision, and remanded the matter
for reconsideration in light of Firkus. We reinstated the appeal and ordered supplemental
briefing on the impact of Firkus.
DECISION
Due process requires the state to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 654 (Minn. 2023); see U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. To convict Kamara of unlawful possession of a firearm

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or ammunition under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), the state had to prove that Kamara
knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2); see State
v. Lyons, 997 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024).
Kamara argues that his conviction should be reversed because the state’s evidence
fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the firearm or ammunition.
“Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” State
v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Actual possession is proved by showing an
individual physically possessed an item. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn.
1975). Constructive possession may be proved in one of two ways: (1) by showing that
“the police found the item in a place under the defendant’s exclusive control to which other
people normally did not have access” or (2) by showing “that there is a strong probability
(inferable from other evidence) that[,] at the time[,] the defendant was consciously or
knowingly exercising dominion and control over [the item].” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
Two or more people may jointly possess an item. Id.
We begin with the standard of review. Appellate courts “use the same standard of
review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State
v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). “The relevant standard of review depends
on whether the factfinder (the district court here) reached its conclusion of law based on
direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018).
Direct evidence is based on personal knowledge or observation that proves a fact without
any inference or presumption, while circumstantial evidence requires an inferential step to
prove a fact. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599.

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The parties dispute the standard that applies to our review of the evidence proving
the possession element. Kamara argues that we should apply the circumstantial -evidence
standard of review to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that he
constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition in M.T.’s apartment on July 7. While
seeming to acknowledge the circumstantial-evidence standard might apply, the state urges
us to apply the direct-evidence standard of review, pointing to testimony from witnesses
that Kamara was in actual possession of a gun during the purported events of June 3. On
this point, we agree with Kamara.
The district court found the witnesses’ testimony as to the “specific events or
details” of June 3, including testimony regarding Kamara’s alleged use of a firearm that
day, not credible. The district court acquitted Kamara of the charges based on the events
of June 3 and found him guilty of constructively possessing the firearm and ammunition in
the apartment on July 7. Therefore, the question before us is whether the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Kamara possessed the firearm or ammunition on July 7.
Because Kamara was not in actual, physical possession of the firearm or ammunition when
police found them in the apartment, the state had to prove that Kamara was constructively
possessing those items. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Accordingly, the circumstantial-
evidence standard of review applies to our consideration of whether the evidence proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a strong probability, inferable from other evidence,
that Kamara was consciously exercising dominion and control over the firearm or
ammunition at the time police found them in the apartment. See id.

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Under the two-step circumstantial-evidence standard of review, we first identify the
circumstances proved. Id. In doing so, we “‘winnow down the evidence presented at trial
by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the . . . verdict,’ which results in ‘a subset of
facts that constitute the circumstances proved.’” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (quoting Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 600). Identifying the circumstances proved in this manner “protects the
well-established legal principle that the [factfinder] is in a unique position to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” Id. at 479 (quotation
omitted). We do not re-weigh the evidence or “sit . . . as a 13th juror.” Id. (quoting State
v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 166 (Minn. 2020)).
At the second step, we consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated
facts, ‘are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis other than guilt.’” Id. at 478 (quoting State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d
543, 565 (Minn. 2024)). At this stage, we independently review the reasonableness of
inferences and do not defer to the factfinder. Id. at 483 (citing State v. Isaac, 9 N.W.3d
812, 818 (Minn. 2024)). We will not reverse a conviction “based on mere conjecture.” Id.
(quoting State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 861 (Minn. 2008)). However, “[i]f the
circumstances proved when viewed as a whole, support a reasonable inference ‘that is
inconsistent with guilt, the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction and we must
reverse.’” Id. (quoting Isaac, 9 N.W.3d at 818).

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Circumstances Proved
Winnowing down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact
in favor of the factfinder’s verdict, Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 484, the relevant circumstances
proved are as follows.
Police executed a search warrant at the apartment of M.T., who is Kamara’s fiancée.
Kamara and the children he shares with M.T. were in the apartment when officers arrived.
M.T. is the only person listed on the apartment’s lease, but Kamara refers to the apartment
as “home” and “his apartment,” and spent substantial time there, including frequent
overnight stays.
Police discovered a nine-millimeter Taurus handgun and loaded magazine on top of
a shelving unit in a bedroom that, based on the clothing in the room, appeared to be
occupied by an adult male and female. Kamara knew that M.T. owned a gun and knew
where she kept it. In addition to the firearm and ammunition on the shelf, police found
nine-millimeter ammunition in a cardboard box in the bedroom closet and 20-gauge
shotgun shells in a black backpack on the bedroom floor. The backpack contained a 2019
medical document naming Kamara as the patient, as well as other documents that may have
listed the names of Kamara’s family members. Kamara was previously convicted for
falsely reporting a crime to police in July 2022 arising out of an incident during which
Kamara accidentally shot himself in the foot with a nine-millimeter Taurus gun.
The parties dispute whether two additional pieces of evidence are circumstances
proved: M.T.’s testimony that she owned the gun and normally kept it locked in a gun safe

9
and the BCA scientist’s testimony about the DNA mixture obtained from the firearm and
its statistical probability.
Turning first to M.T.’s testimony, Kamara contends that the district court’s
inclusion of her testimony in its factual findings shows that the court (here, the factfinder)
did not disregard or discredit the testimony. And Kamara maintains that, because a person
can jointly possess an item with another person, M.T.’s ownership of the firearm was not
a factual question that the factfinder had to resolve.
The district court’s findings of fact include that “M.T. claimed ownership” of the
firearm and that, “according to M.T., she typically kept the firearm in a gun safe under her
bed. She testified that she forgot to put it into the safe [on July 7].” The court further
determined that, “regardless of whether the firearm was properly secured . . . there were
boxes of ammunition open and accessible in the closet in the room in which Kamara slept.”
Because the district court included M.T.’s testimony in its factual findings on the
possession element but did not make an express credibility determination regarding the
truthfulness of that testimony, it is difficult to discern on this record whether M.T.’s
testimony that she owned the firearm and normally kept it secured in a gun safe is part of
the “subset of facts that constitute the circumstances proved.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478.
Because it does not affect our ultimate conclusion, we assume without deciding that it is a
circumstance proved that M.T. was the firearm’s owner and that the firearm was normally
secured in the safe.
As to the DNA evidence, Kamara argues that it is not a circumstance proved because
“the factfinder did not credit that evidence and gave it no weight.” Kamara highlights

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Firkus’s command that a reviewing court’s determination of the circumstances proved
must preserve the factfinder’s “unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses
and weigh the evidence before it.” Id. at 479, 480, 482, 489. The state acknowledges that
the district court’s written findings “are silent with respect to the sworn testimony” of the
BCA scientist. But the state maintains that the findings do not discredit the BCA scientist’s
testimony or his report, which was received as an exhibit at trial, and the absence of any
reference to the DNA evidence does not mean we should exclude it from the circumstances
proved.
For two reasons, we conclude that the BCA scientist’s testimony about the DNA
evidence is a circumstance proved. First, we disagree with Kamara that the absence of any
reference to the BCA scientist’s testimony in the district court’s factual findings necessarily
means that the evidence is not part of the circumstances proved under Firkus. After a court
trial in a felony or gross-misdemeanor case, a district court must make a general finding of
guilt and written findings of the essential facts. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(a)-(b).
“If the court omits a finding on any issue of fact essential to sustain the general finding, it
must be deemed to have made a finding consistent with the general finding.” Id.,
subd. 2(e). The purpose of the written-findings requirement is “to aid the appellate court
in its review of [a] conviction resulting from a nonjury trial.” State v. Scarver, 458 N.W.2d
167, 168 (Minn. App. 1990). A district court sitting as factfinder in a court trial thus is not
required to make specific factual findings on all the evidence received at trial that it
considers probative of guilt. We discern nothing in either rule 26.01 or supreme court
caselaw instructing that a district court’s silence, in and of itself, on a particular piece of

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evidence necessarily excludes that evidence from the circumstances proved for purposes
of the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.
Second, in undertaking our task of determining the circumstances proved, “we
accept the circumstances proved as determined by the verdict.” State v. McInnis, 962
N.W.2d 874, 891 n.6 (Minn. 2021); see Firkus, 31 N.W.2d at 478 (stating that, when
determining the circumstances proved, the reviewing court must “winnow down the
evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the . . . verdict”
(quoting Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600)). In other words, a reviewing court ascertains the
circumstance proved based on the entire record of the evidence presented at trial and is not
necessarily limited to considering the evidence identified in the district court’s factual
findings. See State v. Hendrickson, No. A14 -1298, 2015 WL 1514177, at *3 n.4 (Minn.
App. Apr. 6, 2015) (affirming a felony terroristic-threats conviction despite the district
court’s limited written findings because “[w]e determine the circumstances proved based
on the entire record, and we are not limited to considering only those circumstances
specifically identified in the district court’s findings of fact”).
1
The district court here received the scientist’s testimony about the DNA evidence
on the firearm. In its written findings, the district court did not affirmatively discredit the
scientist’s testimony, as it did with testimony from other witnesses, or expressly state that
it assigned no weight to the DNA evidence. We acknowledge that the factfinder may have

1 We cite nonprecedential opinions of this court for persuasive value only. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding
authority. . . but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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determined that the DNA evidence had limited probative value to the question of whether
Kamara constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition on July 7. But, on this
record, we cannot conclude that the DNA evidence should be excluded from the
circumstances proved because it had no probative value. Cf. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 488
(determining that FBI’s digital model showing bullet trajectories was not a circumstance
proved because, given the FBI specialist’s testimony that “the presence or absence of an
intruder had no effect on the calculations, and therefore the trajectory calculations are
neutral[,]” the digital model “provided no probative evidence on whether there was an
intruder”). Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light favorable to the verdict and
preserving the factfinder’s unique role “to assess witness credibility and weigh the
evidence,” we conclude that the BCA scientist’s testimony is a circumstance proved in this
case. Id. at 480.
Reasonable Inferences From the Circumstances Proved
Having identified the circumstances proved, we next “consider whether the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a
whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that [Kamara]
is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at 483. Kamara
does not dispute —and we agree—that it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances
proved that he constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition. But Kamara argues
that it is equally reasonable to infer from the circumstances proved that M.T. solely
possessed the firearm on the shelf, the ammunition in the closet, and the ammunition in the
black backpack.

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Firearm and Ammunition in the Closet
Kamara contends that the district court misapplied the law on constructive
possession and convicted him based solely on his “access” and “proximity” to the firearm
and the ammunition in the closet. As we explained, constructive possession requires proof
“that there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that[,] at the time[,] the
defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over [the item].”
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. “To establish that a defendant was consciously or knowingly
exercising dominion and control over a firearm at the time in question, the [s]tate must
prove more than the defendant’s mere proximity to the firearm.” Id. Accordingly, a
defendant’s “ease of access to a firearm is but one factor relevant to establishing
constructive possession.” Id. at 602 (quotation omitted).
Kamara relies on State v. Sam , in which we concluded that the circumstantial
evidence failed to prove that the defendant possessed drugs found in the center console of
a car he was driving. 859 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. App. 2015). The car was borrowed
and a passenger was in the front seat. Id. We reversed the conviction, concluding that the
circumstances proved supported reasonable inferences that either the car ’s owner or the
passenger was exercising sole dominion and control over the items in the console. Id. at
835-36.
Unlike Sam, the circumstances proved in this case establish more than Kamara’s
mere proximity and access to the firearm and the ammunition in the closet. Here, the
circumstances proved include that Kamara frequently stayed at the apartment and
considered it home; Kamara and the children were in the apartment when police arrived to

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execute the search warrant; the gun and ammunition were in multiple unsecured locations
in a bedroom containing adult male and female clothing; Kamara’s personal documents
were in the backpack in the bedroom; Kamara could not be excluded as a contributor to the
DNA mixture on the gun; and Kamara had a previous conviction involving use of a Taurus
nine-millimeter firearm.
As Kamara recognizes, “two or more people can constructively possess an item
jointly.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 603 n.9. Viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved
are inconsistent with any reasonable inference that M.T. was solely exercising dominion
and control over the firearm and ammunition in the closet. See State v. Lorenz, 368 N.W.2d
284, 287- 88 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to infer that the
defendant jointly possessed drugs found in the defendant’s bedroom with the homeowner);
State v. Wiley, 205 N.W.2d 667, 675-76 (Minn. 1973) (concluding that evidence was
sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed drugs that were found next to items
belonging to defendant in a house where “defendant lived or, at the very least, spent much
time in”).
Kamara also argues that the DNA evidence found on the gun could have come from
one of his blood relatives or been transferred via M.T. While the BCA scientist testified
that, as a general matter, DNA can be transferred from one person to another, there was no
evidence presented at trial that the DNA attributable to Kamara was transferred from M.T.
or from another person onto the gun. See State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 158 (Minn. 2024)
(concluding that “[t]he absence of evidence in the record regarding certain circumstances
does not constitute a circumstance proved from which reasonable inferences may be

16
drawn”). We will not reverse a conviction “based on mere conjecture.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d
at 483 (quoting Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 861).
Furthermore, we observe that the state needed to prove that Kamara knowingly
possessed the firearm or the ammunition. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Accordingly,
even if we were to accept Kamara’s argument that the alleged infirmities in the DNA
evidence support a reasonable inference that M.T. was solely in constructive possession of
the firearm, the same cannot be said about the ammunition in the closet. In sum, the
circumstances proved, viewed as a whole, do not support Kamara’s alternative hypothesis
that M.T. was the sole person in constructive possession of the firearm and the ammunition
found in the bedroom closet on July 7. Viewed in their entirety, the circumstances proved
are consistent with the rational hypothesis that Kamara was at least jointly exercising
dominion and control over the firearm and the ammunition in the closet and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.
Ammunition in the Black Backpack
Kamara argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with the rational
hypothesis that M.T. solely possessed the black backpack and the ammunition within it
because the backpack appeared to contain documents bearing other peoples’ names and the
medical document listing Kamara’s name was from 2019. We disagree. The presence of
unspecified documents in the backpack apparently bearing the names of other family
members does not make an inference that Kamara was jointly possessing the ammunition
in the backpack unreasonable. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601 (stating that constructive
possession may be found jointly with another person). And, as we have explained, when

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determining the reasonableness of inferences, we must consider the circumstances proved
not in isolation, but as a whole. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. Kamara’s alternative hypothesis
that M.T. was in sole constructive possession of the ammunition in the backpack is not
reasonable considering the circumstances proved as a whole, which include Kamara’s
frequent stays at the apartment, male clothing in the bedroom, and Kamara’s medical
record in the backpack.
Viewed in their entirety, the circumstances proved are consistent with the rational
hypothesis that Kamara was at least jointly exercising dominion and control over the
firearm and ammunition in the apartment and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
other than guilt. The evidence is therefore sufficient to sustain Kamara’s conviction.
Affirmed.