State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1087

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kacey Emmanuel Kamara,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-22-4345

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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doubt that he possessed a firearm and ammunition found in his fiancée’s apartment.
Because the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellant possessed the firearm and
ammunition, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Kacey Emmanuel
Kamara with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd.
1(2) (2020). The charge resulted from a search warrant officers with the Rochester Police
Department executed at an apartment in Rochester on July 7, 2022. The apartment was
rented by M.T., Kamara’s fiancée. M.T. resided there with her two children, whom she
shares with Kamara. Kamara was not on the lease for the apartment and had his own
separate apartment, but both he and M.T. testified that he spent most days at M.T.’s
apartment and frequently stayed overnight there to spend time with her and the children.
Throughout his testimony, Kamara referred to this apartment as “home” or “my
apartment.”
When officers executed the search warrant, M.T. was not home and Kamara was in
the apartment with the children. In a bedroom in the apartment that appeared to be
occupied by both male and female adults, officers found a Taurus brand nine-millimeter
handgun and a loaded magazine of nine-millimeter ammunition on top of a bookshelf.
Officers also found seventy rounds of nine- millimeter ammunition in the closet of the
bedroom and fourteen 20-gauge shotgun shells in a black backpack within the bedroom.
3
The black backpack also contained medical documents, some identifying only Kamara as
the patient and some identifying either M.T. or Kamara’s son.1
The matter proceeded to a bench trial, at which M.T. testified that she is the sole
owner of the handgun found in the bedroom and that she typically locks the gun in a safe
but forgot to do so that day. The state introduced evidence that a mixture of DNA from
four individuals was found on the handgun and that Kamara could not be excluded as a
possible contributor to the mixture. The scientist who conducted the DNA testing testified
that “[t]he probability of observing the profile would be greater than a hundred billion times
more likely if it was a mixture of [Kamara] and three unknown unidentified individuals
versus a mixture of four unknown unidentified individuals,” and that Kamara’s DNA made
up about 49 -and-a-half percent of the mixture. During cross-examination, the scientist
acknowledged that the results of the testing assumed that the contributors of DNA were
“unrelated” individuals.
The district court found Kamara guilty of unlawful possession. The court concluded
that Kamara “constructively possessed a firearm, ammunition in a cardboard box in a
closet, and ammunition within the black backpack” while being ineligible to possess them.

1 The officer who found the backpack testified that he found “miscellaneous documents
with [Kamara’s] name on it, along with [Kamara’s son’s]” or “maybe [Kamara’s] wife or
girlfriend, [M.T.]” In terms of documentary evidence of these materials, the state
introduced only a photo of the medical document naming solely Kamara. The foregoing
testimony by the officer who found the backpack is the only point in the record when other
documents in the backpack are mentioned. It is unclear from the record whose names were
on the other documents.
4
Kamara appeals, arguing that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove
constructive possession.
DECISION
In a criminal prosecution, due process requires that the state prove every fact
material to the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200,
204 (Minn. 1999); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. In determining
whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, we “carefully examine the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the [fact-finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d
257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved
contrary evidence. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989); State v. Moore, 438
N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We “review criminal bench trials the same as jury trials.”
State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Kamara was convicted of unlawful possession under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd.
1(2). To prove Kamara guilty of this crime, the state needed to prove that Kamara was
ineligible to possess a firearm or ammunition on the dates alleged and that he knowingly
possessed a firearm or ammunition on those dates. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2);
State v. Lyons, 997 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024).
Kamara does not dispute that he was ineligible on the dates alleged. But he disputes that
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the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed the handgun and
ammunition.
“Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Actual possession refers to “direct
physical control” over an item. State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 2016)
(quotation omitted). If the state cannot prove actual possession, it may prove constructive
possession in one of two ways. State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015). The
state can prove constructive possession by showing that police found the item in a place
that was under the defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not normally
have access. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). Alternatively, if police
found the item in a place to which others did have access, the state must show a strong
probability, inferable from other evidence, that the defendant was consciously or
knowingly exercising dominion or control over the item at the time. Id. Additionally, “[a]
defendant may possess an item jointly with another person.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, our standard of review differs depending
on whether the conviction relies on direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Hokanson,
821 N.W.2d 340, 353 (Minn. 2012). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the
fact-finder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. at 354 n.3
(quotation omitted). Because Kamara’s conviction rests on constructive possession, it is
necessarily proved by inference, so the circumstantial-evidence standard applies. Both
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parties agree that the circumstantial-evidence standard applies. 2 When a conviction is
based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-step standard of review.
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013).
A. Circumstances Proved
Under the circumstantial-evidence standard, our first step is to identify the
circumstances proved. Id. at 598. In doing so, “we defer to the jury’s acceptance of the
proof of [the] circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State.” Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). This means that
“we consider only those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.” Id.
The circumstances proved consist of the following. On July 7, 2022, officers with
the Rochester Police Department executed a search warrant at an apartment in Rochester.
M.T. was the only renter on the lease, but Kamara spent most of his time at the apartment
and often stayed overnight. Kamara and the children were home when officers executed
the search warrant; M.T. was not home. Officers found a nine -millimeter Taurus brand
handgun and nine-millimeter ammunition on a bookshelf in a bedroom in the apartment.
They also found more nine-millimeter ammunition in the closet of the bedroom. Officers
found a black backpack in the bedroom that contained fourteen 20- gauge shotgun shells

2 Although the state’s brief follows the circumstantial-evidence framework, it also argues
that we should uphold Kamara’s conviction based on other evidence in the case that it
characterizes as “direct evidence” of Kamara possessing a firearm on a day other than July
7. Because we conclude that the evidence in the record that law enforcement observed and
seized in executing the search warrant on July 7 is sufficient to sustain Kamara’s
conviction, we need not consider the other evidence the state identifies in its brief as part
of the circumstances proved.
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alongside several medical documents, at least one of which identified Kamara as the
patient. The bedroom contained clothing typically associated with both males and females.
The handgun that officers found in the bedroom contained a mixture of four
individuals’ DNA on it. Kamara could not be excluded as a contributor to, and his DNA
consisted of nearly half of, that mixture. The probability of the DNA testing returning that
specific mixture is one hundred billion times more likely if Kamara and three unknown
individuals contributed to it than if four unknown individuals contributed and not Kamara.
B. Reasonable Inferences

Having identified the circumstances proved, our “second step is to determine
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). In this step, we
“examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved, [including] inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.”
State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). “We give no
deference to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Silvernail , 831
N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain
that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to
exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-
Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Kamara does not argue that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with guilt.
Rather, he argues that the circumstances proved fail to disprove any rational hypothesis
8
except that of guilt. He asserts this argument for both (i) the gun and ammunition found in
the bedroom and closet, and (ii) the ammunition found in the backpack.
1. Handgun and Ammunition in Bedroom and Closet

First, Kamara argues that the circumstances proved are not consistent with the
rational hypothesis that M.T. solely possessed the handgun and ammunition found on the
bookshelf in the bedroom and in the closet. Kamara contends that the district court
erroneously reasoned that because Kamara had access to the handgun and ammunition, he
constructively possessed it. He challenges the reliability of the state’s DNA evidence
because it did not include a major profile for Kamara, which he argues supports the
possibility that Kamara’s DNA could have been on the handgun via DNA transfer. He also
argues that the DNA evidence is unreliable because the forensic testing did not consider
that the mixture could have included Kamara’s blood relatives spending time in M.T.’s
home, including Kamara’s brother or son.
It is correct that “the State must prove more than the defendant’s mere proximity to
the firearm” to prove constructive possession, and that ease of access to the firearm is not
the “sole factor” relevant to constructive possession. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601-02
(quotation omitted). But the district court here did not base its verdict on Kamara merely
having proximity or ease of access to the handgun in M.T.’s apartment. The district court
also based its verdict on the circumstances proved of “the frequency of [Kamara’s] stays”
at M.T.’s apartment and the bedroom showing signs of being occupied by both Kamara
and M.T. The circumstance proved that Kamara appeared to at least sometimes reside in
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the bedroom in which the firearm and ammunition were found constitutes more than mere
proximity or ease of access to those items.
Kamara’s challenges to the DNA evidence on the handgun are unconvincing
because they are not based on the circumstances proved. “[T]he absence of evidence in
the record regarding a certain circumstance does not constitute a circumstance proved.”
State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 473- 74 (Minn. App. 2019). A rational hypothesis
inconsistent with guilt cannot be based on conjecture; there must be some evidence in the
record to support it. State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008).
Kamara’s transfer argument is unavailing because there is no evidence in the record
to support how Kamara’s DNA could have been transferred onto the gun. And his
argument that the analysis is unreliable because it failed to account for the fact that his
brother or son could have contributed to the mixture is unavailing because there is no
evidence in the record that either Kamara’s brother or his son possessed or had access to
the handgun or ammunition. The evidence in the record shows that Kamara’s DNA made
up nearly half of the mixture found on the handgun. Even without a major profile, the
mixture was one hundred billion times more likely to appear in the DNA results if Kamara
had been a contributor versus if he had not. This DNA evidence, in combination with the
other circumstances proved, leads to no rational hypothesis other than that Kamara
possessed the handgun.
Kamara likens this case to State v. Sam, in which we reversed a defendant’s
conviction of possession of methamphetamine for insufficient circumstantial evidence.
859 N.W.2d 825, 835-36 (Minn. App. 2015). In that case, the defendant had been driving
10
someone else’s car when police pulled him over and found methamphetamine in the glove
compartment. Id. at 834-35. We concluded that these circumstances were insufficient to
prove that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine because the defendant had no
possessory interest in the vehicle and no other circumstances directly tied him to the drugs.
Id. at 835-36. Kamara argues that, like the defendant in Sam, the only thing tying him to
the handgun and ammunition in the bedroom is his access to M.T.’s bedroom. But this
comparison ignores the circumstance proved that Kamara was frequently staying at M.T.’s
apartment in that bedroom, connecting him to the handgun and ammunition within it much
more closely than the defendant in Sam.
The circumstances proved do not support Kamara’s alternative hypothesis that the
handgun and ammunition belonged only to M.T. Both the handgun and ammunition were
found in a bedroom not occupied solely by M.T., but frequently by Kamara as well. The
bedroom also contained other clothing and personal items belonging to Kamara. These
circumstances do not support a rational hypothesis that Kamara had no possessory interest
in the handgun or ammunition. See State v. Wiley, 205 N.W.2d 667, 675-76 (Minn. 1973)
(affirming conviction of constructive possession of contraband where contraband was
found next to items belonging to defendant in a house where “defendant lived or, at the
very least, spent much time in”). The evidence is sufficient to show that Kamara at least
jointly constructively possessed the handgun and ammunition found in the bedroom and
closet. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601 (“A defendant may possess an item jointly with
another person.”).

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2. Ammunition in Backpack

Kamara next argues that the circumstances proved are not inconsistent with the
rational hypothesis that M.T. solely possessed the backpack and the ammunition within it.
The district court found Kamara guilty of constructively possessing the ammunition in the
backpack, noting that the backpack contained “medical documents containing [Kamara’s]
name.” Kamara argues this is insufficient to show constructive possession because a police
officer testified that the backpack contained medical documents with M.T.’s or their son’s
names on them in addition to Kamara’s.
In support of its finding of constructive possession, the district court cited
State v. Colsch, 284 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn. 1979), and Wiley, 205 N.W.2d at 675-76. In
Colsch, the supreme court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of constructive
possession of contraband when the contraband was found in a bedroom in the defendant’s
residence that “contained items of male clothing, as well as papers and a checkbook bearing
defendant’s name.” 284 N.W.2d at 841. In Wiley, the supreme court reached the same
conclusion when the contraband was found in a drawer alongside items with the male
defendant’s name on them, a man’s sock, and a handkerchief, in a house where the
defendant lived or spent a significant amount of time. 205 N.W.2d at 675-76.
Kamara attempts to distinguish Colsch by arguing that that case involved a
residence occupied only by the defendant, while in this case, the apartment was also
occupied by M.T. But the fact that the backpack also contained documents bearing M.T.
or Kamara’s son’s name does not support Kamara’s alternate hypothesis that the backpack
and its contents were owned solely by M.T. It could support a reasonable hypothesis that
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Kamara and M.T. jointly possessed the backpack and its contents, but constructive
possession may be found jointly with another person. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Kamara
attempts to distinguish Wiley by noting that the personal items in that case were more
numerous and had more identifying information than only that defendant’s name, and by
arguing that unlike the drawer in Wiley, the backpack in this case also contained documents
belonging to either M.T. or Kamara’s son. These are distinctions without a difference.
Though the items in Wiley contained more identifying information than just that
defendant’s name, the items here still bore Kamara’s name, positively identifying him.
The circumstances proved do not support Kamara’s alternate hypothesis that only
M.T. possessed the backpack and its contents. The backpack was found in a bedroom
containing clothing and other items belonging to Kamara. The backpack may have
contained medical documents identifying M.T. or M.T. and Kamara’s son, but it also
contained at least one medical document identifying only Kamara. These circumstances
do not support any rational hypothesis other than that Kamara had at least a joint possessory
interest in the backpack and the ammunition within it. The evidence is sufficient to show
Kamara constructively possessed the ammunition in the backpack.
Affirmed.