State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1091

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Keyonte Devon McDowell,
Appellant.

Filed June 30, 2025
Reversed
Slieter, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-23-1636

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Cody M. Dorumsgaard, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julia Q. Brady, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Chutich, Judge.∗

∗ Retired justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court
of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10, and Minn. Stat. § 2.724,
subd. 3 (2024).
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction for violating a
domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) and for providing a false name to a peace
officer, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence and dismiss the charges based upon an illegal vehicle stop. Because the officer
lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the vehicle stop, we reverse.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Keyonte Devon McDowell with
violating a DANCO in violation of Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2 (d)(1) (2022), and
providing false identification to a peace officer in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd.
2 (2022). The charges stem from a traffic stop of a vehicle in which McDowell was a
backseat passenger. The following facts derive from the state’s two exhibits received
during the suppression hearing.
On July 28, 2023, a West St. Paul police officer was traveling northbound on a city
street when he observed a 2013 Silver GMC Acadia traveling in the same lane of traffic
immediately in front of the officer’s squad car. The officer ran the license plate, which
revealed a Keep Our Police Safe (KOPS) alert that indicated that the vehicle was previously
involved in a felony fleeing incident. The vehicle description provided in the KOPS alert
3
matched the vehicle the officer observed. 1 The officer was informed by dispatch that a
second officer was en route to assist. Once the assisting officer arrived, the officer initiated
a traffic stop.
During the traffic stop the officer observed four occupants in the vehicle.
McDowell, who was seated in the back seat next to a female passenger, initially identified
himself to the officer as Keon Donte McDowell whom, the officer later learned , is
McDowell’s brother. With the use of a portable scanner and McDowell’s fingerprint,
McDowell was ultimately identified. The officer also learned that the identity of the other
backseat passenger was M.T.M. and that there was a DANCO in place which prohibited
McDowell from having contact with M.T.M. McDowell was arrested and taken into
custody.
McDowell moved to suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop because the
officer failed to articulate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to initiate the stop.
During the suppression hearing, the state elected not to present any testimony and, instead,
submitted the officer’s report and the KOPS alert as evidence.
The district court denied McDowell’s suppression motion. It determined that “the
existence of a KOPS alert . . . is not sufficient on its own to support an investigatory stop
of a motor vehicle. However, the Court finds that [the officer] made additional
observations that led him to form the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to conduct

1 As we previously explained in State v. Arnold, No. A12-1362, 2013 WL 2301944, at *2
(Minn. App. May 28, 2013), “‘KOPS’ is an alert system that notifies police of vehicles or
individuals that might present ‘potentially unsafe situations.’”
4
a stop of the vehicle.” In particular, the district court found that the officer “observed that
the vehicle was displaying the license plate CKD259 but the registered license plate for
that vehicle was BARR4.” The district court further found that the officer “discovered that
an individual, later identified as Defendant herein, had a felony warrant and was identified
as an individual being in possession of the vehicle.”
The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 3. The district court adjudicated McDowell guilty on both charges and sentenced
him to 33 months’ imprisonment in relation to the DANCO violation. The district court
did not impose a sentence for the other count.
McDowell appeals.
DECISION
McDowell argues that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity when he stopped the vehicle in which McDowell was a passenger because
the sole reason for the stop was based upon information in the KOPS alert, rather than the
officer’s objective suspicion of criminal activity.
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts]
may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district
court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590
N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). Appellate courts review district courts’ findings of fact under
a clearly erroneous standard, but we review its legal determinations de novo. State v.
Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported
5
by the evidence as a whole.” State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 509 (Minn. App. 2013)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). Deference must be given to district
courts’ credibility determinations. See State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989)
(stating that “[t]he weight and credibility of the testimony of individual witnesses” is for
the fact-finder to determine).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A police
officer may, however, initiate a limited investigative stop without a warrant if the officer
has reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968). The Minnesota Constitution requires the application of Terry principles when
“evaluating the reasonableness of seizures” during traffic stops. State v. Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” State v.
Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). Even a minor traffic
violation may serve as a basis for a stop. State v. Wagner, 637 N.W.2d 330, 335-36 (Minn.
App. 2001). “To reasonably suspect a person of criminal activity, the officer’s suspicion
must be based on specific, articulable facts.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn.
1995). “The officer must be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Id.
The officer may make this assessment based on all the circumstances and “may draw
inferences and deductions that might elude an untrained person.” Id. However, the officer
must “point to objective facts and may not base his or her conclusion on a ‘hunch.’” Id. at
391-92 (quoting State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Minn. 1989)).
6
At the outset, we note that the district court determined that an officer may not
formulate a legal basis to stop a motor vehicle solely on the information provided via a
KOPS alert. To the extent that, by this determination, the district court meant that the
officer must take steps to corroborate the source of the information included on the KOPS
alert, we agree. We are persuaded by our court’s analysis in Arnold, 2013 WL 2301944,
at *3, that a KOPS alert is similar to a citizen’s tip that may provide, under the totality of
the circumstances, a reasonable basis to believe a crime has been committed. 2
Minnesota caselaw involving traffic stops based on informant tips focuses on two
factors: (1) sufficient identification of the tipster, Rose v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 637
N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2001), and (2) adequate specificity regarding why the tipster
believes the suspect driver is engaged in illegal behavior. Olson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985). Neither factor is independently dispositive, and the
determination of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the
time of the stop is based on the totality of the circumstances. Jobe v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 609 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. App. 2000). The factual basis to justify a stop can
“be met based on information provided by a reliable informant.” Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d
at 393. “[I]nformation given by an informant must bear indicia of reliability that make the
alleged criminal conduct sufficiently likely to justify an investigatory stop by police.” Id.
at 393-94.

2 Nonprecedential opinions of the court of appeals are not binding, but they may be
persuasive authority. Adams v. Harpstead, 947 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Minn. App. 2020)
(quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2020).
7
Nothing in this record shows that the officer sought to corroborate the accuracy of
the information provided by the KOPS alert before the stop. The officer’s report does not
indicate that the officer contacted the Burnsville police department at the number provided
on the KOPS alert to confirm its contents. Additionally, the officer’s report does not state
that he independently verified that the vehicle’s license plate did not match the registered
license plate. The officer noted in his report that he observed “a 2013 Silver GMC Acadia
(MN CKD-259)” and that “[he] ran the license plate of the vehicle via CAD and observed
there to be a KOPS Alert on the vehicle out of Burnsville for Felony Fleeing.” And because
the record does not reveal an independent investigation by the officer to confirm the
license-plate discrepancy, the district court’s finding that the officer “observed that the
vehicle was displaying the license plate CKD259 but the registered license plate for that
vehicle was BARR4” is clearly erroneous.
The state concedes that “[the officer’s] report does not explicitly state that the
registered license plate was different” but suggests we can apply the collective-knowledge
doctrine to conclude the vehicle stop was, nevertheless, proper. See State v. Conaway, 319
N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “the entire knowledge of the police force is
pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient
probable cause exists for an arrest.”) . However, it is undisputed that the officer did not,
before initiating the stop of the vehicle, communicate with the Burnsville police
department, which was listed on the KOPS alert and which included a phone number.
Therefore, the collective-knowledge doctrine does not apply. See State v. Lemieux, 726
8
N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2007) (such knowledge is imputed as long as the officers have
some degree of communication between them).
The district court’s finding that the officer “discovered that an individual, later
identified as [McDowell] herein, had a felony warrant and was identified as an individual
being in possession of the vehicle” is also unsupported by evidence in the record. As we
previously noted, only two documents comprise the entire record—the officer’s report and
the KOPS alert.
The KOPS alert makes no reference to an outstanding felony warrant involving an
individual in possession of the vehicle. The information regarding this vehicle from the
KOPS alert is as follows:
TXT/ATL FOR FELONY FLEEING LAST SEEN NORTH
ON 35W LEAVING BURNSVILLE/REASON FOR STOP
WAS THEFT SUSPECT /UNK OCCUPANTS OTHER
THAN B/M DRIVER/ VEHICLE DISPLAYING CKD259
BUT CURRENT PLATE LISTS AS BARR4/ IF LOCATED
CONTACT DAKOTA 911 FOR BURNSVILLE PD
MN019013N OR 651 322 2323

The officer’s report states that the “KOPS Alert [mentioned] that the male identified
as being in possession of the vehicle [has] a Felony Warrant for a Firearms related offense.”
However, the KOPS alert does not mention an outstanding arrest warrant for anyone
associated with this vehicle. And absent the state providing the officer’s testimony during
the suppression hearing, which might explain how the officer learned this information, the
record does not support the finding that he was aware of it. See Cripps, 533 N.W.2d at 391
(“The officer must be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.”).
9
In sum, the record does not support the district court’s findings that the officer made
observations separate from the information provided in the KOPS alert. And the
information in the KOPS alert alone simply does not articulate a reasonable basis to believe
that the vehicle was involved in criminal activity to warrant its stop.
We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of McDowell’s suppression of
evidence seized during the stop and his convictions.3
Reversed.

3 McDowell raises an alternative challenge that there exists insufficient evidence to support
the DANCO-violation conviction. B ecause we reverse his convictions based upon the
illegal stop, we need not address this argument.