In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1137

In the Marriage of:

Allison Baron Bonnett, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Theodore James Bonnett,
Appellant.

Filed April 28, 2025
Affirmed in part and remanded
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-22-355

Joani C. Moberg, Susan A. Daudelin, Michelle L. Travers, Henschel Moberg, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Denis E. Grande, DeWitt LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bentley, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this marital dissolution appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred by
(1) “restricting” his parenting time below 25 percent; (2) awarding respondent conduct-
based attorney fees; (3) dividing marital and nonmarital property and calculating the cash
property-equalization payment owed to respondent; (4) valuing his business and the
2
parties’ four 5291 accounts; and (5) not disqualifying the special master. We conclude that
appellant’s challenge regarding the valuation of his business and the parties’ 529 accounts
are not properly before us. We also conclude that the district court’s calculation of the cash
property-equalization payment was not clearly supported by the record and we therefore
remand for further findings. But because we discern no abuse of discretion by the district
court as to the remaining issues, we affirm in part and remand for further findings only
regarding the cash property-equalization payment.
FACTS
Appellant Theodore James Bonnett (husband) and respondent Allison Baron
Bonnett (wife) married in November 2012 and share two minor children, P.B. and T.B.
The parties separated in October 2021. Soon after, the parties agreed to an informal
parenting time and alternating holiday schedule. Wife filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage in January 2022, requesting, in part, joint legal custody of the children and
reserving the issue of physical custody. In August 2022, wife filed an amended petition
requesting sole legal and sole physical custody of the children. Due to high conflict over
vacation, holiday time, and parenting time with the children, the district court ordered a
custody and parenting time (CPT) evaluation and modified the parenting schedule.
Throughout the two years of litigation, wife’s attorney submitted several affidavits
to the district court requesting conduct-based attorney fees under Minnesota Rule of Civil

1 A 529 account is a type of savings plan for a child’s higher education.

3
Procedure 37 and Minnesota Statutes section 518.14, subdivision 1 (2022). 2 Wife’s
attorney’s affidavit from July 2022 explains that wife had incurred costs because of
husband’s conduct related to parenting time conflicts, taking unilateral vacations, refusing
to communicate through Our Family Wizard, 3 and selecting and scheduling a mediator.
The affidavit also mentions that wife incurred nearly $20,000 in attorney fees to defend
against husband’s “baseless claim via his Order for Protection.”
In August 2023, the district court filed an order scheduling the case for a January
2024 trial as well as setting deadlines for both parties to submit witness lists, exhibit lists
and expert reports. In December 2023, husband’s attorney filed a notice of withdrawal
based on a breakdown in the attorney- client relationship. In addition to his withdrawal,
husband’s attorney requested a continuance on husband’s behalf. Wife timely submitted
her witness and exhibit lists; husband filed none.
Trial
The matter proceeded to a three-day trial in January 2024. Husband was self-
represented at trial. The district court heard testimony from husband; wife; wife’s expert
witness, Mr. Hiley; and J.H., a principal at the children’s school. In addition, the court

2 Minnesota Statutes section 518.14 was amended in 2024. See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 101,
art. 1, § 5 at 862. Because the 2024 amendment does affect the resolution of the case or a
party’s vested interest, we would typically cite the current statute. But because the 2022
version of the statute was in effect at the time of the district court’s order and the statute
was renumbered, we cite to the 2022 version for clarity.

3 “Our Family Wizard” is a court-ordered communication platform for co-parenting
purposes. Winkowski v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2023).
4
received 91 exhibits.4 Wife testified about husband’s conduct throughout the proceedings
and the negative impact it has had on their children.
Wife also retained Mr. Hiley to prepare an analysis of her nonmarital property
claims, prepare property division schedules, and prepare income and child support
calculations. Mr. Hiley testified generally about property division schedules, marital and
nonmarital property of husband and wife, and the sources he used to valuate certain assets.
In May 2024, the district court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, order
for judgment, and judgment and decree, dissolving the parties’ marriage. The district court
awarded wife sole legal and sole physical custody of the children. The district court also
noted that it was restricting husband’s parenting time to less than 25 percent.
The district court awarded husband parenting time on alternating weekends and one
weekday every other week and ordered a holiday parenting time schedule. The district
court also divided the parties’ marital property and ordered husband to pay wife a cash
equalizer payment of $790,887. Finally, the district court ordered husband to pay wife
conduct-based attorney fees of $193,794.78. Neither party filed any post-trial motions.
Special Master
In December 2023, wife’s attorney filed a motion requesting the appointment of a
special master. In February 2024, the district court appointed S.L. as a special master under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 53.01. When S.L. was appointed, J.S. worked at S.L.’s

4 The exhibits consisted of 90 exhibits disclosed in wife’s exhibit list and an additional
amended expert report disclosed in an amended exhibit list. Husband did not object to
these exhibits. Because husband failed to comply with trial disclosure deadlines, he was
precluded from offering any exhibits at trial and from calling any witnesses except himself.
5
firm as a paralegal. Because J.S. formerly worked on the Bonnett case as a paralegal at
wife’s attorney’s firm, wife’s attorney inquired with S.L. about a potential conflict of
interest. S.L. provided the details of her firm’s screening procedures and stated that J.S.
“does not work on ADR files. She will be locked out of accessing files for this matter on
the firm’s file share system and she will not be included on any communication or
discussion of this matter within the office.” Husband wrote to the district court “strongly
disagree[ing]” with the appointment of S.L. Husband explained that even though “access
to files has been limited . . . there is no proof that conversations would not happen that
would completely taint any objectiveness.”
In April 2024, S.L. informed the district court that she did not believe that J.S.’s
employment at her law firm disqualified her from serving as a special master and explained
her firm’s screening procedures. One month later, husband’s newly retained counsel
objected in writing to S.L.’s appointment, arguing that J.S.’s previous employment at
wife’s attorney’s firm “create[d] a relationship between her and [wife’s] counsel, which
could interfere with the Special Master’s role.” In June 2024, the district court issued an
order deciding that S.L. was not disqualified and could proceed as special master.
Husband appeals.
DECISION
I. Husband raises two claims that are not properly before us.
Husband first argues that the district court erred when it adopted wife’s proposed
values of two businesses, Limpro Inc. and Northeast LLC , because it did not consider the
Revenue-Ruling 59-60 factors under Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 189-90 (Minn.
6
1987). He also argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the parties’
four 529 accounts to wife.
As a threshold matter, husband failed to file post-trial motions. Absent a motion for
a new trial, our scope of review is limited to substantive legal issues properly raised to and
considered by the district court, whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and
whether those findings support the conclusions of law and the judgment. See Alpha Real
Est. Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 664 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2003)
(stating that new- trial motion is not prerequisite to appellate review of substantive legal
issues properly raised and considered in district court); Gruenhagen v. Larson, 246 N.W.2d
565, 569 (Minn. 1976) (stating that absent motion for new trial, appellate courts may
review whether evidence supports findings of fact and whether findings support
conclusions of law and judgment). Further, generally, “litigants are bound [on appeal] by
the theory or theories, however erroneous or improvident, upon which the action was
actually tried below[,]” Annis v. Annis, 84 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1957), and we
“generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented [to] and
considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Moreover, “[a] party cannot complain
about a district court’s failure to rule in [the party’s] favor when one of the reasons it did
not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that
would allow the district court to fully address the question.” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk,
668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
7
Here, h usband failed to present any evidence to the district court to support his
arguments about the value of the assets at issue in this appeal.5 And, over the course of the
three-day trial, husband had the opportunity to challenge Mr. Hiley’s valuation of the
businesses or testify in his own defense about how they should have been valuated. In
addition, husband did not bring any post-trial motions. 6 The arguments he makes to this
court, therefore, were not presented to or considered by the district court. Accordingly,
husband’s challenges to the district court’s valuation of Limpro and Northeast, and its
decision to award wife the 529 accounts are not properly before us.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in restricting husband ’s
parenting time after finding he is likely to endanger the children’s emotional
health.

“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118,
123 (Minn. App. 2009). A district court’s findings of fact underlying its parenting-time
determination are reviewed for clear error. Id. A district court abuses its discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the record, misapplying the law, or
resolving the question in a way contrary to logic and the facts on record. Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022).

5 Husband did attempt to introduce as evidence a bankruptcy exhibit on the first day of
trial. The district court declined to receive his exhibit as husband had “ample notice of trial
deadlines” and its admission would have risked prejudice to wife for lack of notice.
6 Husband did not file a motion for amended findings under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 52.02, and did not move for a new trial under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
59.01
8
“In the absence of other evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is
entitled to receive at least 25 percent of the parenting time for the child.” Newstrand v.
Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 690-91 (Minn. App. 2015) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 1(g) (2014)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015).
The Minnesota statutes provide:
If the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time
with a parent is likely to endanger the child’s physical or
emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development,
the court shall restrict parenting time with that parent as to
time, place, duration, or supervision and may deny parenting
time entirely, as the circumstances warrant. The court shall
consider the age of the child and the child’s relationship with
the parent prior to the commencement of the proceeding.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(b) (2022).
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting him less than
25 percent parenting time because it did not explain its reasoning “with any degree of
particularity” how his conduct negatively impacted his children. He claims that the district
court only made findings related to his conduct toward third parties (his wife and the
children’s school professionals) and his disregard of the district court’s orders, but did not
make findings on his conduct towards the children. We are not persuaded.
A district court is not bound to follow its temporary order. Indeed, the duration of
a temporary order is just that: temporary. See Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5 (2022) (“A
temporary order shall continue in full force and effect until the earlier of its amendment or
vacation, dismissal of the main action or entry of a final decree of dissolution or legal
separation.”). And while the district court may seek the recommendations of professional
personnel in contested custody proceedings, the district court is not obligated to adopt those
9
recommendations given its broad discretion. See Roehrdanz v. Roehrdanz, 410 N.W.2d
359, 362 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming district court’s order that rejected custody study’s
recommendations because it made extensive findings and properly considered relevant
statutory factors), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1987); Lawver v. Lawver, 360 N.W.2d 471,
472-73 (Minn. App. 1985) (remanding district court’s order which contradicted custody
study’s recommendations because district court did not make adequate findings on
children’s best interests). When the district court’s order is contrary to the professional’s
recommendation, appellate courts have required that the district court “either (a) express
its reasons for rejecting the custody recommendation, or (b) provide detailed findings that
examine the same factors the custody study raised.” Rogge v. Rogge, 509 N.W.2d 163,
166 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1994).
In addressing custody and parenting time here, the district court made detailed
findings for each of the best interest factors under section 518.17, subdivision 1 (202 2),
just as the CPT evaluation did. For example, the district court’s order discusses how
(1) husband undermined and degraded wife in front of their children, adversely impacting
their emotional development; (2) husband “weaponize[d] the children, placing them in the
middle [of conflict]”; (3) husband had known for four months that P.B. was struggling
emotionally but refused to enroll her in therapy; (4) husband refused to cooperate with the
children’s school’s policies and procedures;7 (5) husband took the children on a five-mile

7 On two occasions, for example, husband entered the children’s school through the
preschool entrance and walked directly into the children’s classrooms to drop off
homework and lunch, despite being told to enter through the main office for the safety and
security of students. Husband also walked into school Mass while the priest was leading

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hike, an activity that the CPT evaluator thought to be excessive, dangerous, and stressful
for such young children; (6) husband twice attempted to enroll children into a different
school without wife’s consent or naming her as the children’s second parent; (7) husband
was not responsive to or cooperative with wife, disobeyed the court’s orders to
communicate via Our Family Wizard, and escalate d matters when wife did not
accommodate his wishes. For these reasons, the district court stated:
The Court will order a parenting time schedule that
restricts Husband’s parenting time as it is less than the current
schedule and below the minimum 25 percent. The Court does
not do this lightly. However[,] it is abundantly clear from the
evidence presented in the nearly two years this case has been
open that Husband has repeatedly and continuously not acted
with the children’s best interests in mind, but his own. He has
shown this through his conduct with Wife, [the children’s]
school professionals and his disregard of this Court’s Orders.
His conduct has negatively impacted the children’s emotional
health and development as shown in the CPTE and through
Wife’s credible testimony.

(Emphasis added.)

To persuade us otherwise, husband claims that the district court’s reasoning was
merely conclusory. Again, we are not convinced. His argument overlooks the district
court’s extensive findings under the best -interest factors and the documentary and
testimonial evidence in the record. In sum, the district court made detailed findings to
support the reduced parenting time schedule, and these findings are supported by the record

prayer at the altar and walked across the front of the pews to approach T.B. Husband then
approached P.B., “bent across a male staff [member] to kiss P.B. on the top of her head,”
and “dipped his gloved hand into the font of holy water” before leaving.
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and not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the district court’s parenting-time decision was not
an abuse of discretion.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding conduct-based
attorney fees.

Husband next argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding wife
$193,794.78 in conduct-based attorney fees. More specifically, he argues that $20,000 of
the total award was for need-based attorney fees, but the district court did not make the
required findings to differentiate between need-based and conduct-based attorney fees.
District courts have discretion to award “additional fees, costs, and disbursements
against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. “A conduct-based attorney-fee award is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” Sanvik v. Sanvik, 850 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App. 2014).
In dissolution proceedings, the district court may award both need-based and
conduct-based attorney fees. Baertsch v. Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn. App.
2016). A district court “shall” award need-based attorney fees if it finds that (1) “the fees
are necessary for the good faith assertion of the party’s rights . . . and will not contribute
unnecessarily to the length and expense of the proceeding,” (2) the party ordered to pay the
fees “has the means to pay them,” and (3) the party awarded the fees “does not have the
means to pay them.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. In contrast, “conduct-based attorney
fees are to be based on the party’s behavior occurring during the litigation process.”
Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d at 238. The party moving for conduct-based attorney fees has the
burden of showing that the other party’s conduct “unreasonably contributed to the length
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or expense of the proceeding.” Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. App.
2001).
If a party takes positions that are “duplicitous and disingenuous and have had the
effect of further delaying distribution, lengthening [the] litigation, and increasing the
expense of [the] proceedings” then an award of conduct-based attorney fees is appropriate.
Redmond v. Redmond, 594 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Minn. App. 1999).
Here, the district court’s findings of fact explain:
[I]t is abundantly clear from the evidence presented in the
nearly two years this case has been open that husband has
repeatedly and continuously not acted with the children’s best
interests in mind, but his own. He has shown this through his
conduct with Wife, [the children’s] school professionals and
his disregard of this Court’s Orders.

In its decree, the district court awarded wife conduct-based attorney fees and costs
totaling $193,794.78. When ordering husband to pay conduct-based attorney fees, the
district court did not explicitly state in its decree that husband unreasonably added to the
length and expense of the proceeding under section 518.14, subdivision 1(a). However,
the district court referenced wife’s affidavits that cited Minnesota Statutes section 518.14,
subdivision 1, and Minn. R. Civ. P. 37. Moreover, the district court considered the record
evidence and husband’s conduct throughout the proceedings, all of which tend to show that
husband caused unreasonable delay and expense to the proceedings.
In September 2023, for example, wife’s attorney explained in an affidavit that “[t]he
parties’ contentious relationship has required nearly daily attorney and staff intervention
and assistance. The parties have been unable to reach agreements on any issue, and even
after the Court has ordered relief, [husband] frequently fails to follow the Court’s Order,
13
which requires attorney involvement.” Additional affidavits show that husband failed to
comply with discovery requests by refusing to provide written answers to interrogatories
and refusing to disclose his property, assets, income, and liability interests, all of which
were critical to the dissolution proceedings. Wife’s attorney also asserted that husband
filed a petition for an order for protection that was quickly dismissed because he failed to
present an “immediate and present danger as the most recent alleged incidents were several
months old, the parties no longer lived together, and the petition lacked specific facts,
details and circumstances to justify ex parte relief.” Despite husband’s assertions
throughout proceedings that he wanted to resolve the matter quickly, the district court
concluded that he disobeyed court orders, failed to timely respond, and cancelled mediation
sessions last-minute.
Husband also claims that the district court failed to account for $20,000 in need-
based attorney fees based in an affidavit filed in July 2022. He adds that to award need-
based attorney fees, the “district court must make findings consistent” with the three
requirements under section 518.14, subdivision 1.
8 But those requirements are necessary
only when the district court awards need-based attorney fees. See Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd.1 (“[T]he [district] court shall award attorney fees . . . in an amount necessary to
enable a party to carry on or contest the proceeding, provided it finds” the listed

8 To award need-based attorney fees under section 518.14, subdivision 1, the district court
must find that (1) the fees are necessary for a good-faith assertion of rights; (2) the payor
has the ability to pay the award; and (3) the recipient does not have the means to pay his or
her own fees. Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 816; see also Minn. Stat. § 518.14.
14
requirements). Here, t he district court did not award wife need-based attorney fees, only
conduct-based attorney fees.
The record supports the district court’s findings that husband unreasonably added
to the length and expense of litigation. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding wife conduct-based attorney fees.
IV. The district court clearly erred in calculating the cash property -equalization
payment.

Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
a cash property equalizer because it made clearly erroneous factual findings regarding three
major liquid accounts that were nonmarital in character.
Upon the dissolution of a marriage, the district court “shall make a just and equitable
division of the marital property of the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2022).
District courts have “broad discretion” to evaluate marital assets and debts, and appellate
courts will not overturn a district court’s distribution absent an abuse of discretion.
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 358 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. App. 1984). “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey ,
975 N.W.2d at 506 (quotation omitted). District courts are “guided by equitable
considerations in distributing rights and liabilities.” Kreidler v. Kreidler, 348 N.W.2d 780,
784 (Minn. App. 1984).
“We independently review the issue of whether property is marital or nonmarital,
giving deference to the district court’s findings of fact.” Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644,
649 (Minn. 2008). Property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumptively
15
marital, but a spouse may defeat that presumption by showing that the property is
nonmarital by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b
(2006)). As relevant here, nonmarital property includes property that is “acquired before
the marriage.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(b) (2022). “For nonmarital property to
maintain its nonmarital status, it must either be kept separate from marital property or, if
commingled with marital property, be readily traceable.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797,
800 (Minn. 1997).
We begin with the three accounts that husband contests. The district court made the
following findings of fact:
(1) Wells Fargo Checking ending in 6262 had a
balance of $261,865 as of April 30, 2022. Of this
balance, the parties agree that $200,488 is husband’ s
nonmarital funds.

(2) Husband’s Fidelity Roth IRA ending in 6963
had a balance of $157,095 as of April 30, 2022.
Husband’s nonmarital interest in this account totals
$5,627.

(3) Husband’s Fidelity IRA ending in 5122 had a
balance of $158,944 as of April 30, 2022. Husband’s
nonmarital interest in this account totals $107,521.

(Emphasis added.)

The total of husband’s nonmarital funds in the accounts above equals $313,636.
But, when the district court awarded wife $790,887 as a cash property equalizer, it appears
the $313,636 was calculated as husband’s marital property.
Notably, Mr. Hiley submitted two reports as exhibits to the district court: one exhibit
supports the district court’s findings of fact (that identified the three accounts as husband’s
16
nonmarital property), and the other supports its cash property equalizer, which was
calculated by identifying, or at least treating, the full value of the three accounts as marital
property. The difficulty here is that the district court explained neither how it calculated
the property equalizer, nor which exhibit it relied upon. Although wife’s attorney relied on
the exhibit that did not allocate any portions of the disputed accounts as nonmarital in
questioning Mr. Hiley at trial, the district court did not explain or distinguish between the
two reports in its order. In any event, the district court’s findings of fact do not support its
determination on the cash property equalizer. Because of this discrepancy, we remand to
the district court to clarify or recalculate the cash property equalizer. On remand, whether
to reopen the record is discretionary with the district court.
V. The district court did not err in determining that S.L. was not disqualified to
serve as special master.

Finally, husband argues that the district court erred by not disqualifying S.L. as
special master.9 He alleges that because J.S. is a paralegal at the special master’s law firm,
there is an imputed conflict because J.S. previously worked on wife’s case while at wife’s
attorney’s firm. This conflict, he argues, cannot be cured through screening measures.
“[I]n reviewing dispositions of motions seeking attorney disqualification,” we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Prod. Credit Ass’n of Mankato
v. Buckentin, 410 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. 1987). But the interpretation of court rules is a

9 Wife’s attorney stated at oral argument that the issue was moot because the paralegal is
no longer employed by the special master’s law firm. However, this statement is outside
of the appellate record. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.
17
question of law that we review de novo. Lennartson v. Anoka–Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 11, 662 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2003).10
The rule providing for the appointment of a special master states that a “master must
not have a relationship to the parties, counsel, action, or court that would require
disqualification of a judge, unless the parties consent with the court’s approval to
appointment of a particular person after disclosure of any potential grounds for
disqualification.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 53.01(b). Under the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct 2.11(A), “[a] judge shall disqualify [themself] in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Here, in applying rule 53.01, the
district court found that S.L. was not disqualified because although J.S. (the paralegal),
“has a relationship to the case, she does not work on the instant matter as her scope of work
does not include those involving a special master. [The special master] assures the Court
that the paralegal has ‘no contact’ with this case in her current role.” In the context of rule
2.11(A), the fundamental inquiry for disqualification “is whether an objective examination
of the facts and circumstances would cause a reasonable examiner to question the judge’s
impartiality.” State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2008). “[A] reasonable
examiner . . . is an objective, unbiased layperson with full knowledge of the facts and

10 We note that neither party briefed the proper standard of review for the removal of special
masters. The standard of review for appointment of a special master is abuse of discretion.
Brickner v. One Land Dev. Co., 742 N.W. 2d. 706, 712 (Minn. App. 2007). While the
standard for the disqualification of judges is reviewed de novo, In re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d
748, 750–51 (Minn. 2011), and the standard for disqualification of attorneys is reviewed
for clear error, Buckentin, 410 N.W.2d at 822, our caselaw has not yet addressed the proper
standard of review for disqualification of special masters. For purposes of this analysis,
and because husband would be unsuccessful under either standard of review, we proceed,
without deciding, to review for clear error.
18
circumstances.” State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 876 n.8 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Here, our objective examination of the record leads us to conclude that the district court
did not err in deciding that the special master was not disqualified because fact s and
circumstances would not cause a reasonable examiner to question the special master’s
impartiality.
Husband argues that the district court erred because a reasonable litigant would
question the special master’s impartiality. For the first time on appeal, husband argues that
under Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(b) and Lennartson, had the paralegal
been an attorney, the special master’s firm would have been disqualified due to an imputed
conflict. Wife argues that the model rules and the Lennartson decision apply only to
lawyers. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating a party may not
“obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different
theory”); Crowley v. Meyer, 897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn. 2017) (applying this aspect of
Thiele in a family-law appeal).
Even considering husband’s argument, we agree with wife that the district court did
not err because rule 1.10(b) does not directly apply to paralegals.
The rule addressing imputed disqualifications provides that:
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, and the
lawyer is prohibited from representing a client pursuant to
Rule 1.9(b), other lawyers in the firm may represent that client
if there is no reasonably apparent risk that confidential
information of the previously represented client will be used
with material adverse effect on that client because:
(1) any confidential information communicated to the
lawyer is unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter;
19
(2) the lawyer is subject to screening measures adequate
to prevent disclosure of the confidential information and to
prevent involvement by that lawyer in the representation; and
(3) timely and adequate notice of the screening has been
provided to all affected clients.

Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(b).
In Lennartson, the supreme court held that the “plain language of [r]ule 1.10(b)
requires that the subparts of the rule be read conjunctively”, meaning that a conflict will be
imputed unless all three requirements outlined in the subparts are met. 662 N.W.2d at 131-
32.
The comments to rule 1.10 explain that “the term ‘firm’ denotes lawyers in a law
partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to
practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department
of a corporation or other organization.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10, cmt. 2.
Although lawyers employing nonlawyers must give “appropriate instruction and
supervision concerning the ethical aspects of [the nonlawyers’] employment, particularly
regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to the representation of the
client, the rule provides that nonlawyers “are not subject to professional discipline.” Minn.
R. Prof. Conduct 5.3, cmt. 2.
Therefore, the district court did not err by failing to consider rule 1.10(b) as a reason
to question the special master’s impartiality.
Affirmed in part and remanded.