Molina Investment Group, LLC, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1140

Molina Investment Group, LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Well #4, LLC,
Appellant,

John Doe, Mary Roe, individuals whose true names are unknown,
Defendants.

Filed April 21, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HG-CV-24-1646

Kevin S. Sandstrom, Keith A. Marnholtz, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Stillwater, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Kelly Vince Griffitts, Griffitts Law Offices, PLLC, Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
In this eviction action, appellant Well #4, LLC (Well), challenges the district court’s
decision to issue a writ of recovery of the premises and order to vacate, removing it as the
tenant of real property. Because Well’s only defenses pertain to an underlying foreclosure
and are outside the scope of the eviction proceeding, we affirm.
FACTS
The property at issue is a water well structure in Saint Paul. A third-party owned
the property and leased it to Well . The third-party defaulted on its mortgage. After
foreclosure, respondent Molina Investment Group, LLC, (Molina) took title to the property.
Molina thereafter filed a complaint to evict Well from the property. Well answered
the complaint and raised two affirmative defenses: that it was not served with proper notice
of the foreclosure sale and that the foreclosure sale was not properly advertised. Well
requested a jury trial under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.335(b) (2024).
The district court held a hearing on Molina’s eviction-action complaint. The district
court continued the matter for two weeks to give Well an opportunity to file a parallel civil
action to litigate the validity of the foreclosure. The district court noted that the eviction
action would be consolidated with the foreclosure action if Well filed a civil action.
Well filed the parallel civil action to challenge the mortgage foreclosure. Well also
filed a motion in the eviction action to consolidate the civil lawsuit with the eviction case.1

1 Once Well filed the parallel civil action, the record does not suggest that Well moved to
stay the eviction proceeding. See Bjorklund v. Bjorklund Trucking, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 312,
3
At the second hearing in the eviction action, Molina noted that it would agree to a
temporary restraining order (TRO) on a writ of recovery, pending resolution of the parallel
civil action. Well argued that a TRO was unnecessary because Molina was not entitled to
a writ of recovery. The district court neither addressed Well’s defenses, nor ruled on the
motion to consolidate the two cases. Instead, at the conclusion of the hearing, the district
court stated that it would issue the writ but stay issuance for one week to allow Well to
“bring a TRO in district court outside of housing court.” The next day, the district court
filed an order stating that it would issue the writ “after 1 week.”
Five days after the district court filed its order, Well filed this appeal and moved for
the district court to stay the writ pending appeal. The district court granted the motion.
DECISION
Well argues that the district court erred by issuing a writ of recovery because its
defenses regarding the alleged foreclosure defects merit a jury trial. The parties
characterize the district court’s decision as a sua sponte grant of summary judgment. We
agree with that characterization and analyze the district court’s decision accordingly.
We review summary judgment decisions de novo. Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,
972 N.W.2d 362, 371 (Minn. 2022). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the court properly applied the law. Id. at 371-72.

317-20 (Minn. App. 2008) (determining that district court abused its discretion by denying
a motion to stay an eviction proceeding pending resolution of related civil action), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008).
4
An “eviction” is “a summary court proceeding to remove a tenant or occupant from
or otherwise recover possession of real property by the process of law set out in [Chapter
504B of the Minnesota Statutes].” Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2024). Property
owners can “recover possession by eviction when . . . any person holds over real
property . . . after the expiration of the time for redemption on foreclosure of a mortgage.”
Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 1(a)(1)(ii) (2024).
Eviction proceedings are “limited in scope .” NY Props., LLC v. Schuette,
977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 2022). The sole question in an eviction matter is who
holds “present possessory rights to the property.” Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v.
Mitchell, 862 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
June 30, 2015). Issues over “legal or equitable rights of ownership” are generally not
litigated in an eviction action. Id. (quotation omitted).
Well argues that the district court erred by issuing the writ because issues of material
fact exist as to whether Well received proper notice of the foreclosure sale. We disagree.
We previously determined that defects in an underlying foreclosure are outside the
scope of an eviction action when a party can litigate the alleged defects in other
proceedings. See AMRESCO Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange, 631 N.W.2d 444, 444-46
(Minn. App. 2001). In AMRESCO, two defendants to an eviction action counterclaimed
and raised issues with an underlying foreclosure, including that they did not receive notice
of the foreclosure sale. Id. at 444-45. The district court dismissed the counterclaims as
outside the scope of the eviction proceeding, and afterward, the defendants “commenced a
separate proceeding . . . to set aside [the plaintiff’s] foreclosure.” Id. at 445. On the day
5
of trial in the eviction action, without a motion, the district court granted the plaintiff
summary judgment, but stayed the writ of recovery. Id. On appeal, we upheld the district
court’s dismissal of the counterclaims, reasoning that there was “no evident reason to
interfere with the summary nature” of the eviction proceeding when the defendants could
use the separate lawsuit to resolve the alleged foreclosure defects. Id. at 445-46.
We conclude that AMRESCO controls. In its answer, Well’s defenses alleged
foreclosure defects. At the conclusion of the first hearing, the district court continued the
proceeding for two weeks to give Well an opportunity to file a separate civil action
regarding the foreclosure. Well did so. After the second hearing, the district court
dismissed Well’s counterclaims and determined that a writ of recovery was warranted. The
district court stayed issuance of the writ for one week to allow Well to seek injunctive relief
in its parallel civil action. Well did not do so. Instead, Well filed this appeal.
This situation is nearly identical to AMRESCO and the result must be the same. Id.
at 445-46. Because Well could separately litigate the validity of the foreclosure in its
parallel civil action, the district court had no reason to disrupt the summary nature of the
eviction proceeding based on the grounds presented.
1 Id. Well’s arguments about the
alleged foreclosure defects did not create genuine issues of fact that were material to the
eviction action because they were outside the scope of the proceedings. Id.
Affirmed.

1 Well argues the district court should have granted the motion to consolidate the eviction
action with his civil lawsuit. We are not persuaded that the failure to rule on the motion to
consolidate is an error on appeal, especially when the district court provided Well with an
opportunity to enjoin the writ of recovery pending the outcome of the civil action.