Dale Zubke, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1141

Dale Zubke,
Respondent,

vs.

David Nelson, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed April 28, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-19-143

Bryan M. Lindsay, The Trenti Law Firm, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Robert E. Mathias, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal, appellants challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of respondent on respondent’s breach-of-contract claim. Appellants also challenge
the district court’s separate grant of summary judgment dismissing three of appellants’
counterclaims. And appellants seek reversal of the district court’s denial of their motion
2
for an amended judgment seeking to reduce the district court’s award of damages on
respondent’s breach-of-contract claim. We affirm.
FACTS1
Appellant David Nelson and respondent Dale Zubke were once business partners
who each held equal membership interests in appellant companies Bluewater Residential
Services LLC, Northern Lights of Duluth LLC, and Preferred Dealer Services LLC. Over
time, the relationship between Nelson and Zubke deteriorated, resulting in litigation
regarding their jointly owned businesses. That litigation commenced in 2012. The parties
resolved the litigation in 2016 by entering into two related agreements: a “Settlement
Agreement and Release” and a “Redemption and Security Agreement” (RSA). Together,
the two documents released the parties’ claims against each other and provided for
appellants to buy out Zubke’s membership interests in the three companies.
Appellants’ performance under the RSA gave rise to the current litigation. The RSA
required appellants to pay Zubke $1,140,000, plus 6% interest per annum, as consideration
for Zubke’s membership interests in the companies. Appellants’ financial obligation was
to be paid primarily through monthly payments of $10,035.20. The parties also agreed on
security for this obligation. Specifically, appellants were to “take all necessary action” to
transfer title to four properties to Northern Lights and to obtain a mortgage executed by
Northern Lights in favor of Zubke with the properties as collateral. Northern Lights was

1 The following facts are based on the parties’ summary -judgment filings, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Henson v. Uptown Drink,
LLC, 922 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Minn. 2019).
3
responsible for document preparation and any other associated professional fees and
recording fees. The parties further agreed that appellants would not lend or advance any
money or incur any additional indebtedness, outside of the ordinary course of business,
without the written consent of Zubke. The RSA also specifically provided that the failure
of appellants to meet any of the covenants set forth in the agreement was an “[e]vent of
[d]efault.” If an event of default was not cured within seven days of receiving notice,
appellants’ outstanding financial obligations “shall be subject to a default interest rate of
an additional 10% per annum over” the standard 6% interest rate. The RSA further
provided that, if a default was not cured within 30 days, Zubke could require Nelson to sell
his membership interests or the assets of the companies and ask a court to appoint a receiver
to preside over the sale. The proceeds of the sale would then go to satisfy any outstanding
obligations owed to Zubke. Relatedly, the parties’ settlement agreement expressly
provided that the settlement did not release any “claims that may arise out of a breach of
the . . . [RSA].”
On May 1, 2017, approximately ten months after the parties signed the RSA, Zubke
provided notice of default to appellants. The notice stated that appellants were in default
because they had failed to transfer title to all four properties to Northern Lights and failed
to execute a mortgage for the same as required by the RSA. The notice also provided that
appellants were in default because Nelson used company funds to pay personal debts, in
violation of the RSA. The notice further stated that appellants had seven days from receipt
of the notice to execute and deliver the required real-estate documents, consistent with the
cure period in the RSA, and gave appellants until June 30 to repay company funds used for
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personal reasons. In November 2017, Zubke provided an additional notice of default which
alleged 13 events of default, including the two events of default noticed in May.
In January 2019, more than two years after the RSA became effective, Zubke
commenced the current litigation against appellants. Zubke brought a breach -of-contract
claim, based on allegations that appellants breached the RSA. The factual allegations in
the complaint generally reflect events detailed in the notices of default, including that
appellants failed to transfer title to all four properties and execute the associated mortgage,
and that Nelson paid personal debts with company funds. As relief, Zubke requested “[a]n
award against [appellants] in an amount equal to the unpaid principal plus accrued and
unpaid interest owed.” In response, appellants filed a document including an answer and
counterclaims. The district court interpreted the filing as asserting counterclaims for (1)
tortious interference, (2) breach-of-contract, (3) bad faith, and (4) contribution.2
In June 2022, Zubke moved for summary judgment on his claim for breach-of-
contract. Zubke argued that he was entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed
evidence showed that appellants had “not transferred the real property into ownership of
Northern” or executed “the mortgage securing” the buyout of Zubke’s stake in the
businesses. Zubke supported his motion with property records. He also emphasized that
for one of the four properties, Nelson had transferred title into his personal name instead
of Northern Lights, contrary to the terms of the RSA. Zubke further argued Nelson

2 Appellants’ counterclaims do not allege specific causes of action but the district court
interpreted their counterclaims as alleging these causes of action, without objection, when
it analyzed the claims pursuant to Zubke’s motion for summary judgment.
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breached the RSA by using business funds in a manner that was not permitted by the RSA.
He filed financial records and the opinion of a certified personal accountant to support this
basis for summary judgment. Consequently, Zubke argued that he was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law for these breaches of the RSA.
Appellants responded by bringing a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking
dismissal of Zubke’s breach-of-contract claim. Appellants agreed that there were no
genuine issues of material fact regarding the transfer of title or execution of the mortgage
but argued that they had not violated the provision in the RSA because the RSA did not
have a deadline for taking those actions. With regard to the claim of improper use of
company funds, appellants argued that any personal use of company funds was permitted
by the RSA as “management fees” or “ordinary business dealings,” and therefore the claim
was precluded by the settlement agreement.
The district court granted Zubke’s motion for summary judgment on his breach-of-
contract claim and denied appellants’ cross-motion. The district court concluded, based on
publicly available property records, that there was no disputed issue of material fact as to
whether appellants had transferred title and executed a mortgage for the properties as
required by the RSA because “these failures are proved by the public record.” The district
court further concluded that Zubke was entitled to summary judgment because this breach
was material. Additionally, the district court determined, based on the financial records
submitted by Zubke, that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Nelson
had used company funds in violation of the RSA.
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After concluding that Zubke was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the district court turned to the issue of damages. The district court determined
that, in the event of default, the RSA allowed for liquidation of company assets to pay
appellants’ outstanding obligations under the contract and the imposition of an additional
10% interest rate. As a result, the district court granted relief in the form of liquidation of
company assets to satisfy appellants’ outstanding obligations and ordered Zubke to submit
an updated amortization schedule with the imposition of the additional 10% interest rate.
Zubke submitted such an amortization schedule, without objection from appellants. The
updated amortization schedule, which included the additional 10% interest rate, reflected
that appellants’ outstanding financial obligation to Zubke under the RSA was
$1,328,856.43. After reviewing the updated amortization schedule, the district court
determined that the schedule gave Nelson credit for all payments he previously made to
Zubke pursuant to the RSA, and ordered judgment be entered against Nelson in the amount
specified. The district court later appointed a receiver to oversee appellants’ operations
and finances.
In June 2023, Zubke moved for summary judgment on appellants’ counterclaims.
The district court granted Zubke’s motion in part, dismissing all of appellants’
counterclaims except their counterclaim for contribution. The parties proceeded to a bench
trial on appellants’ counterclaim for contribution. The district court determined that Zubke
was liable for contribution to appellants and ordered judgment be entered in favor of
appellants in the amount of $5,397.50.
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Following entry of judgment, appellants then moved for a new trial and to amend
the judgment. Appellants’ motion asserted multiple grounds for relief, including that the
district court erred in granting Zubke’s motions for summary judg ment. Appellants also
asked the district court to reduce the $1,328,856.43 in damages awarded to Zubke in the
judgment by $812,000, to reflect the amount that appellants had paid under the RSA prior
to the court entering judgment. The district court denied appellants’ motion.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants raise several issues on appeal. Appellants first challenge the district
court’s order granting Zubke’s motion for summary judgment on his breach-of-contract
claim. Appellants also challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Zubke on three of appellants’ counterclaims. Finally, appellants argue that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to amend the judgment against them.
We address each argument in turn and conclude that none of appellants’ arguments warrant
reversal.
I. The district court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of
Zubke on Zubke’s breach-of-contract claim.

We review summary-judgment decisions de novo. City of Waconia v. Dock ,
961 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Minn. 2021). When reviewing a summary-judgment decision, “we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts
and factual inferences against the moving parties.” Henson, 922 N.W.2d at 190 (quotation
omitted). Summary judgment is properly granted only when there are no genuine issues
8
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R.
Civ. P. 56.01; Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Minn. 2021 ).
There is a genuine issue of material fact “when there is sufficient evidence regarding an
essential element to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” St. Paul
Park Refin. Co. v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). But
“the nonmoving party ‘must do more than rest on mere averments’ to create a genuine issue
of material fact that precludes summary judgment.” Hagen, 963 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting
DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70-71 (Minn. 1997)).
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in
favor of Zubke on his breach-of-contract claim. Specifically, appellants argue that the
district court erred when it determined that appellants breached the RSA and awarded
damages that were not related to any injury Zubke incurred as a result of the breach. Zubke
responds that the district court properly granted summary judgment because the undisputed
facts show that appellants breached the RSA when they failed to perform their duties under
the RSA in a reasonable amount of time after performance was demanded. Zubke also
contends that the district court did not err in its award of damages because the damages
awarded were specifically authorized by the RSA. We consider each argument below.
Liability
To recover based on a breach-of-contract, the plaintiff must show “(1) formation of
a contract, (2) performance by plaintiff of any conditions precedent to his right to demand
performance by the defendant, and (3) breach of the contract by defendant.” Park Nicollet
Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 2011). The issue raised by appellants on
9
appeal focuses on the third prong: whether the district court correctly determined that the
undisputed facts established that appellants breached the RSA.
In seeking summary judgment, Zubke argued that appellants breached the RSA
provision requiring appellants to transfer title to four properties to Northern Lights and
execute a mortgage in favor of Zubke. The RSA does not include a deadline for completion
of the title transfers and execution of the mortgage, but it does provide that appellants shall
“take all necessary action to title the real property . . . and to effectuate the mortgage[].”
At the summary -judgment hearing in June 2022, appellants argued that they were
not in breach because the RSA does not include a deadline for performance under this
provision. The district court disagreed. The district court concluded that they were in
breach because appellants had not complied with the “clear and absolute” requirement in
the RSA regarding the real property, long after they received notice of default in May 2017.
The district court emphasized that, as of the hearing in June 2022, appellants still had not
complied with this requirement of the RSA, and concluded they were in breach.
“Failure to perform under a contract when performance is due establishes an
immediate breach.” Id. at 837. If the contract does not specify when performance is due,
it is due within a “reasonable amount of time” once another party requests performance.
Chin v. Zoet, 418 N.W.2d 191, 194-95 (Minn. App. 1988); see also Hill v. Okay Constr.
Co., 252 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn. 1977) (stating “where a contract is silent as to the time
of performance, the general rule is that the contract must be performed within a reasonable
time”). While the question of what constitutes a reasonable time for performance is usually
10
a fact question, “the court may and should in a proper case determine the question as a
matter of law.” Henry v. Hutchins, 178 N.W. 807, 809 (Minn. 1920).
On appeal, a ppellants do not contest that the property records show that, as of
June 2022, they did not complete all four title transfers and execute a mortgage with the
properties as collateral as required by the RSA. Instead, they again argue that their lack of
compliance does not constitute a breach because the RSA does not include a specific
deadline for completion of these obligations. Alternatively, they seem to argue that a fact
question exists as to whether they failed to perform in a reasonable amount of time.
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive.
The undisputed facts demonstrate, as a matter of law, that appellants did not perform
within a reasonable amount of time after Zubke demanded performance. See Chin ,
418 N.W.2d at 194-95. The RSA states that appellants “shall take all necessary action to
title the real property identified in exhibit D in the name of Northern Lights and to
effectuate the mortgage[].” (Emphasis added.) On May 1, 2017, Zubke provided notice
of default based on appellants’ failure to complete the title transfers and execute the
mortgage, effectively demanding performance of this provision. Appellants subsequently
did not perform within the seven-day cure period provided by the RSA. And public land
records filed with the district court indicate that appellants had still not performed as of
June 2022— more than five years after appellants first provided notice of default.
Appellants do not point us to any facts in the record that provide a reason for their
nonperformance beyond mere averments that were made well after the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Zubke. Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude
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that five years was, as a matter of law, more than a reasonable amount of time for appellants
to retitle the four parcels of real property identified in the RSA and execute the associated
mortgage, particularly given that these actions were required to secure appellants’ buyout
of Zubke’s interests under the RSA. See Henry, 178 N.W. at 809 (stating that, in the proper
case, a reasonable time to perform can be determined as a matter of law). We therefore
conclude that the district court did not err when it determined that appellants breached their
obligation under the RSA to “take all necessary action to title the real property” and
“effectuate the mortgage[].” See Chin, 418 N.W.2d at 194-95 (stating that if a contract
does not specify when performance is due, it is due within a “reasonable amount of time”
once another party requests performance).
Appellants appear to argue, in the altern ative, that there are genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment because the RSA is ambiguous as to when
performance was due. Appellants further argue that the district court “inserted an arbitrary
date” for performance. The district court’s analysis, however, was tied to the terms of the
RSA. The district court did not insert an arbitrary date. Nor did the district court create an
ambiguity regarding when performance was due. Instead, the district court determined that
because Zubke provided notice of default on May 1, 2017, appellants had until May 8 under
the terms of the RSA to perform to avoid the consequences specified in the RSA. T he
district court also emphasized that appellants were still in default as of the time of the
summary-judgment hearing in July 2022. Based on our de novo review, and for the reasons
explained above, we agree with the district court that the undisputed facts show, as a matter
of law, that appellants failed to comply with the RSA real-estate requirements within a
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reasonable amount of time, and there is no ambiguity in the RSA precluding summary
judgment. See Henry, 178 N.W. at 809. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of Zubke on his breach-of-contract claim. 3
Damages
Appellants further argue that the district court erred in its award of damages to
Zubke for his claim of breach-of-contract. A breach-of-contract claim “fails as a matter of
law if the plaintiff cannot establish that he or she has been damaged by the alleged breach.”
Roberts v. Brunswick Corp., 783 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2010). When the plaintiff makes a general claim for damages,
they may “recover those damages that naturally and necessarily result from the alleged
breach.” Logan v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 603 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. App. 1999).
But when the “parties stipulate what the consequences of a breach of agreement shall be,
such stipulation, if reasonable, is controlling and excludes other consequences.” Indep.
Consol. School Dist. No. 24, Blue Earth Cnty. v. Carlstrom, 151 N.W.2d 784, 786 (Minn.
1967).
Appellants contend that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment
and awarded damages in favor of Zubke because there are factual disputes regarding
whether Zubke was financially damaged by appellants’ breach. Appellants’ argument is
unavailing. Because the RSA provided specifi c remedies in the event of a breach, Zubke

3 We need not address the district court’s alternative ground for summary judgment—
misuse of company funds—because this material breach alone supports the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for breach of contract.
13
was not required to present evidence that he was financially damaged by appellants’ breach
of the RSA for the district court to award damages pursuant to the RSA. See id. Therefore,
no disputed issues of fact exist as to the existence of damages under the RSA. 4
Appellants next argue that the amount of damages awarded to Zubke was
unreasonable. This argument is similarly unavailing. T he RSA specifies how damages
are to be calculated in the event of default. Because the parties stipulated to the calculation
of damages in the RSA, it is controlling if reasonable. Id. Appellants argue that the
application of the remedy provided by the RSA is unreasonable because it “had no relation
to any actual loss for the failure to file documents.” But the title transfers and mortgage
that appellants failed to execute were meant to secure the large amount of funds that
appellants owed Zubke under the RSA. And the title transfers and mortgage were a
material term of the contract because the security they provided was part of the
consideration offered to Zubke in exchange for the buyout. See Black’s Law Dictionary
1778 (12th ed. 2024) (defining material term as “[a] contractual provision dealing with a
significant issue such as subject matter, price, payment, quantity, quality, duration, or the

4 Appellants also argue that the district court erred in its award of damages because the
award “seems to have been treated almost like liquidated damages that must not be punitive
in nature or excessive in amount.” We decline to consider the argument because appellants
have not adequately briefed the issue. See State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (stating appellate courts decline to reach
issues that are inadequately briefed). In their brief, appellants do not address the
requirements for determining whether a liquidated damages clause is punitive, including
whether the actual damages are “incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation” and
whether the damages are “a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is
caused by the breach.” Lagoon Partners, LLC v. Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., 999
N.W.2d 113, 119-20 (Minn. App. 2023) (quoting Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 99 N.W.2d
69, 74-75 (Minn. 1959)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2024).
14
work to be done”). Failing to obtain the mortgage secured by those properties damaged
Zubke because, without the mortgage, the amount he was owed under the RSA was never
secured in the manner agreed to by the parties. We therefore conclude that the RSA
reasonably provided damages in an amount equal to what appellants still owed Zubke
under the RSA. While the RSA also imposed an additional 10% interest on appellants’
outstanding obligation, the resulting 16% interest rate is a permissible interest rate in this
circumstance. See Minn. Stat. § 334.01, subd. 2 (2024) (establishing permissible interest
rates). Consequently, the district court’s award of damages was related to appellant’s
breach, and it did not err when it calculated damages based on the terms in the RSA.
Procedural Defects
Appellants next argue that Zubke’s motion for summary judgment did not conform
to the Minnesota Rules of General Practice and therefore the district court abused its
discretion by hearing the motion. Specifically, appellants contend that Zubke’s motion did
not provide notice of the issues as required and was untimely because it was filed 24 days
prior to the hearing, not 28 days. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.03(a), (d). While appellants are
correct that Zubke’s motion was four days late under the rules, appellants’ own cross-
motion for summary judgment was filed three days after the deadline for such motions.
Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.03(a)-(b). Because both parties’ filings were untimely, the district
court waived formal compliance with the timelines and heard the motion in the interest of
justice. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.07. In their brief, appellants fail to acknowledge that
the district court waived compliance with the rule. Instead, they focus on Zubke’s lack of
compliance. But, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion by the district court in waiving
15
compliance with the rule, appellants have not demonstrated that the district court erred by
hearing Zubke’s motion for summary judgment. See id. (“If irreparable harm will result
absent immediate action by the court, or if the interest of justice otherwise require, the court
may waive or modify the time limits established by this rule.” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, appellants fail to detail how they are prejudiced by either the timing of Zubke’s
filing of his summary -judgment motion or the lack of notice of the issues. Without the
existence of prejudice, “no grounds exist for reversal.” Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407
N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987). Consequently, appellants’ argument is unavailing.5
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of Zubke on his breach-of-contract claim and awarded damages
consistent with the RSA.
II. The district court did not err in its summary-judgment analysis of appellants’
counterclaims.

Appellants next challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing
all but one of their counterclaims. As discussed above, the district court interpreted
appellants’ counterclaims as alleging claims of (1) tortious interference, (2) breach-of-
contract, (3) bad faith, and (4) contribution. After considering the summary-judgment
filings, which included an affidavit and exhibits filed by Zubke’s counsel, the district court
dismissed the first three counterclaims. The district court concluded, based on the

5 Appellants also argue that Zubke’s motion for summary judgment on appellants’
counterclaims have the same procedural defects. However, Zubke’s summary-judgment
motion was timely and provided notice of the counterclaims that he sought to have
dismissed.
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undisputed facts, that Zubke was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of those
counterclaims.
Appellants seem to argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
and dismissing those counterclaims because Zubke’s motion for summary judgment was
in effect a motion for judgment on the pleadings. But appellants do not explain why the
district court should have viewed Zubke’s motion for summary judgment as a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Nor do they provide any legal support for this argument.
“[T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Midway Ctr.
Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (quoting Waters v.
Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Minn. 1944)). And assignments of error based on mere
assertions “unsupported by argument or authority” are forfeited. Scheffler v. City of Anoka,
890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017). Because
appellants do not fully explain their argument or provide any authority in support of it, we
consider this argument forfeited.
Regardless, our review of the district court’s order shows that it properly applied
the summary-judgment standard to Zubke’s motion on the counterclaims and correctly
granted summary judgment in favor of Zubke on three of the counterclaims. Therefore,
appellants have not demonstrated that the district court erred when it dismissed three of
appellants’ counterclaims pursuant to Zubke’s motion for summary judgment.
17
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellants’ motion
to amend the judgment.

Finally, appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
appellants’ posttrial motion for an amended judgment because it should have amended the
judgment to reduce the amount owed by the amount appellants had already paid Zubke
under the RSA.
6 Zubke responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion because
the updated amortization schedule, which the district court used to calculate the amount
awarded, accounted for all payments that appellants had made to Zubke under the RSA.
The district court may, upon a motion from a party, “amend its findings or make
additional findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly if judgment has been
entered.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02. “We review the district court’s decision whether to grant
a motion for amended findings for an abuse of discretion.” Landmark Cmty. Bank, N.A. v.
Klingelhutz, 927 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Minn. App. 2019). A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or against logic and facts in the
record. Id. “On appeal from denial of a motion for amended findings, the burden is on the
appellant to show there is no substantial evidence reasonably tending to sustain the
[district] court’s findings.” Crittenden v. Whippoorwill Ranch Campground, Inc.,

6 Following trial, appellants filed a motion which, in part, requested that the district court
amend the judgment entered against them. While appellants did not specifically ask the
district court to amend any of its findings, we address appellants’ argument regarding their
motion to amend the judgment as a motion for amended findings in the interest of
completeness. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 (providing that, upon timely motion, a district
court “may amend its findings or make additional findings” and “may amend the judgment
accordingly if judgment has been entered”).
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406 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing Nielsen v. City of St. Paul, 88 N.W.2d
853, 864 (Minn. 1958)).
Appellants’ argument that the district court abused its discretion in denying their
motion to amend the judgment to reduce the damages award is unavailing. Appellants do
not point to any facts in the record that suggest that the updated amortization schedule does
not credit them for the payments that they made to Zubke. And our independent review of
the updated schedule confirms that it does in fact credit appellants for their payments to
Zubke. While appellants’ resulting obligation under the schedule is larger than what they
originally owed under the RSA, the increase is because appellants’ monthly payments did
not cover the interest that accrued while appellants were in default. Consequently,
appellants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that “there is no substantial
evidence reasonably tending to sustain the [district] court’s findings .” Id. The district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied their motion to amend the judgment.
Affirmed.