In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. B. H. and R. V. S., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1142

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
C. B. H. and R. V. S., Parents.

Filed January 13, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-24-96

MacKenzie Guptil, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant mother C.B.H.)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Rändi A. Setter, Assistant County Attorney, Center
City, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago County Health and Human Services)

Kayla Boettcher, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s termination of appellant’s parental rights,
appellant argues that the record does not support the district court’s determinations that
(a) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, (b) a statutory ground for
termination exists, and (c) it is in the child’s best interests to terminate parental rights. We
discern no basis to disturb the district court’s conclusions and, therefore, affirm.
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FACTS
This case involves the welfare of J.D.H., the child of appellant C.B.H. (mother) and
R.V.S. (father). Because of concerns about J.D.H.’s wellbeing, respondent Chisago County
Health and Human Services (the county) intervened in the family and, ultimately,
petitioned to terminate mother’s and father’s parental rights. Father consented to the
termination of his parental rights because he was incarcerated and, by his admission, would
be unable to parent for the foreseeable future. Mother did not consent, and the district court
held a bench trial on the county’s petition in June 2024. At trial, the district court heard
testimony from nine witnesses and received 56 exhibits.
A. Circumstances Leading to Petition for Termination
In May 2023, the county received a report that, J.D.H., then four years old, would
wander around his apartment building every day, telling neighbors that he was hungry, and
asking for food. Someone reported that JDH was frequently alone in the apartment
hallways and, when brought back to mother’s apartment, it would take mother several
minutes before she would answer the door. Mother had told the person who made a report
that she “struggles with drug addiction,” and the county had received “multiple reports
regarding concern for [mother’s] drug use” in the past. Concerned that mother’s substance
use was impacting her ability to provide for J.D.H.’s basic needs, the county investigated.
A few days later, a social worker with the county and a detective visited mother’s
home unannounced. The social worker noticed that mother’s speech was “very slow” and
“a little bit on the slurred side,” and her affect was “kind of lethargic . . . like she was
struggling to keep herself awake.” Mother reported that she was taking prescribed
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medications and had used illegal substances “within the last few weeks.” Mother declined
to take a urinalysis, stating that she “would do one when it was . . . ‘better.’” The detective
noticed that there was food in the home, but “[i]t wasn’t something readily accessible to a
child of [J.D.H.’s] age.” At the end of the visit, the detective placed J.D.H. on a 72-hour
hold. Two days later, the social worker met with mother again. Mother agreed to take a
drug test, which came back positive for fentanyl.
Later that week, the county sought emergency protective custody of J.D.H. and filed
a petition alleging that he was a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS). The district
court granted the county emergency protective custody, and J.D.H. was placed with
nonrelative foster parents. At a well-child check soon after his placement, J.D.H. was found
to be “in the 25 percentile based on his weight and height.” He gained five or six pounds
within three months in placement.
When the district court held a hearing on the CHIPS petition, mother did not attend.
The district court proceeded by default, adjudicated J.D.H. a child in need of protection or
services, and adopted an out-of-home placement plan.
The out-of-home placement plan required mother to (1) obtain stable housing,
(2) complete a substance use disorder assessment and psychological evaluation and follow
recommendations from her treatment providers, (3) remain sober from nonprescribed
controlled substances and submit to random drug testing , (4) attend all visits with J.D.H.,
and (5) demonstrate behavioral changes and insight into the issues leading to J.D.H.’s
removal. The plan also committed the county to support mother in complying with the plan
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requirements. We address the district court’s findings of fact relevant to each of the five
case-plan requirements, in turn.
Stable-housing requirement. Shortly after the plan was adopted, mother
experienced housing instability. In July 2023, mother was evicted from her apartment. In
response, mother’s county case manager and another county employee tried to help mother
find housing. They located apartments and shelters, helped mother fill out applications, and
discussed the option of outpatient treatment with lodging or residential treatment. But
mother opted to move to Wisconsin and live with her grandfather because she wanted her
adult son to be able to live with her. She lived there until January 2024, when she moved
back to Minnesota and into a four-bedroom house in Minneapolis with three housemates.
The housemates operate an “intentional community” that sets rules for itself, and after
mother moved in, they agreed that no one is allowed to be drunk or high. The district court
found that the home is “a supportive environment for Mother.”
Substance-use and mental-health treatment requirements. When mother moved
to Wisconsin, she lost access to services that were tied to her Minnesota residency or to her
Minnesota-based health insurance, including a mental-health case worker through the
county, a psychiatrist for medication management, an individual therapist, an Adult
Rehabilitative Mental Health Services (ARMHS) worker,1 and parenting support. She also

1 An ARMHS worker helps individuals who are diagnosed with a severe and persistent
mental-health condition to attend to daily tasks, coordinate a calendar, and follow through
with commitments.
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did not move forward with an outpatient treatment program where she had completed an
intake prior to her eviction.
While mother was in Wisconsin, her case manager tried to connect her with services
to comply with the plan. The case manager met with mother several times, provided
brochures for mental-health services in her area, and made phone calls with mother to try
to identify a local therapist. The case manager also contacted the local Wisconsin county
to set up adult mental- health case-management services but was told that mother would
have to call herself.
After two months in Wisconsin, mother completed a chemical-health assessment
from a local provider, as the plan required. The assessment recommended chemical-health
and mental-health treatment about once per week, and the plan required her to follow that
recommendation. Mother did not complete those services, reporting concerns of not having
gas to get there and getting the days mixed up. But that account somewhat conflicted with
the case manager’s testimony about efforts the case manager made to connect mother with
services. For example, the case manager called the provider “several times to try to be used
as a collateral [contact],” called mother to remind her of appointments, provided gas cards,
and met with mother to help her keep track of her obligations. During their meetings, the
case manager made sure that mother wrote her obligations down in her planner, provided
a form with dates and times of things she needed to do, and helped mother put alarms on
her cell phone as a reminder. Mother still did not attend appointments consistently.
Around the same time as the chemical-health assessment, mother complied with the
case-plan requirement that she undergo a psychological evaluation. She was diagnosed
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with generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder,
opioid use disorder, and unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder.
The evaluation recommended that mother complete substance-use treatment, work with a
psychiatrist to monitor her medication, engage in a parenting program, participate in
individual therapy, resume ARMHS services, maintain sobriety for at least six months, and
work with a vocational counselor to find job opportunities “once the chemical health and
mental health services were in place.” Mother continued to work with a psychiatrist for
medication management, but she did not follow through with any of the other
recommended services.
Although the psychiatrist was managing mother’s medications, the case manager
was concerned that mother was misusing her prescription drugs, which included Xanax
and Adderall. The case manager noticed that mother often appeared “under the influence
of some sort of substances”: she slurred her words and struggled to keep her eyes open,
had difficulty keeping a schedule and tracking conversations, and “[o]ften didn’t remember
things after meeting even just two days later.” Other times, mother seemed to be in
withdrawal: she was shaky, sweaty, had watery eyes, and on one occasion reported flu-like
symptoms from forgetting to take a medication. When the case manager attempted to
discuss her observations with the prescribing psychiatrist, she never received a call back.
But the case manager did share her concerns with mother’s psychologist.
After mother moved back to Minnesota, the case manager met with her several times
to set up her Minnesota health insurance so that services could resume. At the time of trial,
mother “still needed to provide some additional financial verifications to Hennepin
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County” for her health insurance to be approved. As a result, mother was not receiving any
mental-health therapy or treatment, other than seeing a psychiatrist for medication
management and participating in a suboxone program. Mother reported participating in
Narcotics Anonymous or Alcoholics Anonymous from her phone, but she did not provide
verification to the county.
Sobriety and d rug-testing requirement. Mother started the drug-testing
requirement in June 2023 using sweat patch tests, and the first result was positive for
methamphetamine, cocaine, and fentanyl. Mother then opted for urinalysis testing instead.
But after mother moved to Wisconsin, that method required that she commute from
Wisconsin to Chisago County for testing, and mother missed five urinalysis appointments
between August and September 2023. Mother switched back to semi-monthly sweat patch
testing, and she tested positive for methamphetamine on three occasions: October 2023,
January 2024, and April 2024. In all, mother tested positive for nonprescribed substances
in 4 of the 16 tests conducted over a period of 10 months. Mother disputes some of the
positive tests and testified that she had been sober for 13 months.
Visitation requirement. Mother was scheduled to visit with J.D.H. in the
community on weekdays two times per week, in addition to weekly phone calls. This
visitation plan continued while mother lived in Wisconsin, but the county moved the visits
from a weekday to a weekend day to accommodate J.D.H.’s school schedule and mother’s
travel. After mother still missed the first three weekend visits, the visits were changed back
to weekdays. Mother’s attendance remained inconsistent. In total, mother attended slightly
over half of the 69 visits that were scheduled. Mother was also inconsistent in making the
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weekly phone calls; the case manager estimated that she made fewer than half of them
since January 2024. When mother did attend visits, the results were mixed. Sometimes,
mother was engaged with J.D.H. Other times, mother slurred her words, nodded off, or was
unable to keep her eyes open, resulting in J.D.H. “asking her to wake up.” On one occasion
in October 2023, mother was “unable to interact” for most of the visit. About half of the
visits that the case manager supervised involved healthy interactions between mother and
J.D.H.
B. Petition for Termination of Parental Rights
In March 2024, eight months after the plan was adopted, the county petitioned to
terminate mother’s parental rights, alleging that mother “made minimal progress on her
case plan goals” and “continue[d] to struggle with maintaining consistency with services,
her sobriety, and visitation with [J.D.H.].” The case manager testified that mother was
“very dismissive” and demonstrated “minimal insight into what the concerns are and the
reasons for [the county’s] involvement.” Likewise, the psychologist testified that mother
denied the concerns from the original report and that there needed to be “accountability
and insight . . . before we would expect that there would be significant changes.”
The petition also detailed mother’s prior involvement with the child welfare system.
In 2013, the Scott County District Court permanently transferred legal and physical custody
of mother’s oldest son to a relative because of concerns about mother’s substance use.
Between July 2019 and February 2021, Burnett County Child Protective Services received
five reports concerning mother’s care for J.D.H. and conducted an assessment for two of
the reports: that mother was breastfeeding while taking unsafe medications and that mother
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overdosed at her apartment, leaving J.D.H. to wander the building. Neither of the
assessments substantiated the reports. And between May 2021 and June 2022, Chisago
County Child Protection received four reports, including that mother had recently relapsed
on “oxys” and got in a car accident on her way to pick up J.D.H.
Around the same time that the petition was filed, J.D.H. was placed with a maternal
relative who responded to relative search letters from the county. The relative was
described by the district court as a “permanency option for [J.D.H.]” The guardian ad litem
testified that J.D.H. was comfortable in the foster home and benefited from the structure
and consistency.
After a two-day trial, t he district court determined that the county proved by clear
and convincing evidence that there were three statutory bases for termination of mother’s
parental rights, that the county had made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and that
termination was in J.D.H.’s best interests. Accordingly, the district court terminated
mother’s parental rights to J.D.H. and granted legal custody to the county until adoption is
finalized.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
“A district court may terminate parental rights if (1) at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family,” or those efforts were not required, “and
(3) termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d
593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); see Minn. Stat.
10
§ 260.012(a) (2022) (identifying circumstances when reasonable efforts to reunite the
family are not required). Mother challenges each of these factors on appeal.
Before we turn to the merits of those arguments, we briefly address our standard of
review. With respect to the district court’s fact-findings, appellate courts review them only
for “clear error.” Id. That means we (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the findings, (2) do not find our own facts, (3) do not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not
reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-
22 (Minn. 2021); see J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6 (applying Kenney in reviewing a
juvenile-protection order). Thus, we “need not go into an extended discussion of the
evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court.”
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). “[A]n appellate court’s duty is fully
performed after it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the
evidence reasonably supports the decision.” Id. (quotation omitted).
With respect to the district court’s determinations that a statutory ground for
termination exists and that termination is in the child’s best interests, we review them for
an “abuse of discretion.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. That means we reverse only if the
district court “makes findings of fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or
resolves discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and facts on record.” In re
Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024).
With those standards in mind, we address mother’s arguments. We first consider
mother’s challenges to the second factor in the termination- of-parental-rights analysis,
whether the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, because mother disagrees
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with the district court’s factual findings that underpin the decision. We next address
mother’s arguments as to the first factor, whether a statutory ground for termination exists.
And finally, we consider mother’s arguments regarding the third factor, whether
termination is in the best interests of J.D.H.
I
Generally, before a district court may terminate a parent’s parental rights, it must
ensure that the social services agency made “reasonable efforts . . . to reunite the child with
the child’s family at the earliest possible time.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a); J.H., 968 N.W.2d
at 600. To determine whether reasonable efforts have been made, the district court
considers whether services to the child and family were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well -being of
the child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). “[T]he nature of services which constitute reasonable
efforts depends on the problem presented.” In re Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
The district court found that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother
and J.D.H. based on the provision of the following services:
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a. Case planning;
b. Uber cards and other transportation assistance;
c. Coordination of supervised visits and phone calls;
d. Drug screening;
e. Coordinating services; and
f. Monthly face-to-face meetings with Mother.
The district court also found that “[m]other never followed the recommendations of the
psychological evaluation, despite the Agency’s efforts to assist her in setting up
recommended services.”
Mother challenges three factual findings that the district court relied on in its
reasonable-efforts determination. We are not persuaded that the district court clearly erred
with respect to any of them.
First, mother challenges the district court’s finding that the county coordinated
services for mother. Her argument specifically relates to the case manager’s efforts to
communicate with mother’s psychiatrist about the case manager’s concern that mother was
misusing her prescription medication. Mother asserts that the case manager’s attempts to
contact the psychiatrist were “minimal.” The district court found, however, that the case
manager “attempted to communicate with [the psychiatrist] . . . a number of times,” and
the psychiatrist never returned her calls. That finding was supported by the case manager’s
testimony that she called the psychiatrist’s office every other month or so, about three or
four times in total, so that she could discuss her concerns about mother’s prescription
medication use. The case manager also testified that she left voicemails and sent emails,
but she never heard back from the psychiatrist. And she separately raised her concerns with
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mother’s psychologist.2 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in finding that the county coordinated services for mother, despite
the fact that the case manager was unable to connect with mother’s psychiatrist.
Second, mother argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that the county
assisted with transportation costs. Mother points to the case manager’s testimony that the
county does not cover the full cost of travel for visits and urinalysis appointments. But
mother does not offer any support for the position that the county has an obligation to cover
full travel costs. And there is ample evidence in the record that the county assisted with
travel costs and made efforts to reduce travel when possible. For example, the county
provided mother with gas cards every other week worth between $20 and $60. And to
reduce mother’s need to travel from Wisconsin to Chisago County for urinalysis
appointments, the county offered her long-term sweat- patch testing. When mother opted
out of sweat-patch testing, the county cautioned that urinalysis could be difficult because
it required driving and calling a testing center every morning. Mother still opted for

2 Relatedly, mother argues that the district court should not have relied on the case
manager’s “opinion regarding abuse of prescribed medication despite [the case manager’s]
own admission that she was neither a chemical assessor nor a medical professional.” But
the district court found only that the case manager “had concerns” about medication
misuse. These concerns were based on the case manager’s personal observation of mother
slurring her words, operating slowly, and consistently struggling to remember
conversations about visitation schedules, even when mother had taken only prescribed
medications. Thus, the case manager’s concerns were “rationally based on the perception
of the witness,” which is permissible lay opinion testimony under the rules of evidence.
Minn. R. Evid. 701; see Trail v. Village of Elk River, 175 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn. 1970)
(holding that “nonexperts can give their opinion concerning another’s intoxication” if the
nonexpert observed the intoxicated person). The district court’s finding about the case
manager’s concern was not clearly erroneous or otherwise improperly considered.
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urinalysis. Moreover, mother testified that when she missed appointments, it was not
because of gas but because “[i]t was hard for [her] to remember to call[,]” and she had
“anxiety about driving .” Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the record
supports the district court’s finding that the county assisted with transportation costs.
Third, mother argues that it was clear error for the district court to find that the
county “extensively assisted [mother] in following through with the recommendations
from [the] psychological evaluation” because the case manager only reminded mother
about a recommended parenting program once. We understand this argument to be a
challenge to the district court’s finding that “[m]other’s progress on the case plan was
minimal. . . . [She] never followed the recommendations of the psychological evaluation,
despite the [county’s] efforts to assist her in setting up recommended services.” That
finding is supported by the record. The county employees testified extensively regarding
their efforts helping mother access services in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The case manager
testified that she made phone calls with mother, checked in on services, and independently
spoke with county employees about getting ARMHS services after mother moved to
Wisconsin. When mother returned to Minnesota, the case manager met with mother
“multiple times a month from February until May . . . to try to get her insurance in place
so that she could get services set up.” In light of this testimony, which relates to a wide
array of coordination efforts, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in
finding that the county made efforts to help her set up services that were recommended in
the psychological evaluation.
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In sum, based on a careful review of the record, we discern no clear error in the
challenged factual findings that support the district court’s determination that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite J.D.H. with his family.
II
Mother next challenges the district court’s determination that there are statutory
grounds to terminate her parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301 (2022).
To satisfy the statutory -basis prong of the termination of parental rights test, the district
court needs to conclude that only one statutory ground exists, J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600; but
here, it identified three. We address mother’s arguments relating to two of those grounds:
neglecting parental duties under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), and failure to
correct conditions leading to the child’s out-of -home placement under section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(5). Because our consideration of those grounds is dispositive of this factor
of the termination analysis, we do not reach the district court’s determination that a third
ground for termination exists under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), which relates
to palpable unfitness.
A
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), allows for termination if,
among other things, “reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct
the conditions that formed the basis of the petition” and “the parent has substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed . . . by
the parent and child relationship.” Those duties include providing food, shelter, and “other
care and control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and
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development,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), and the neglect of those duties must
be found to “continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period,” In re Welfare of Child of
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 90 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The district court determined that this ground for termination was proved by
mother’s prolonged inattention to J.D.H.’s needs and her failure to demonstrate that her
parenting will change in the future:
The history of child protection reports, along with the
report that formed the basis for the Petition in this case,
demonstrate that Mother has continuously neglected [J.D.H.’s]
needs for food, shelter, and supervision.

. . . .

Mother never demonstrated insight into the child
protection concerns and did not make progress on the elements
of the case plan that would improve her ability to meet
[J.D.H.’s] needs in the future. Mother’s lack of consistency in
attending visits and participating in phone calls with [J.D.H.]
demonstrates her overall instability and inability to meet
[J.D.H.’s] needs.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that mother
refused or neglected to comply with parental duties because the district court “put too much
focus on the history . . . and discounted the recent progress and track she was on[,]”
including that she “now has consistent housing and . . . a stable support system.” But even
if mother has made recent progress, that does not negate the relevance of her history of
parenting. To the contrary, consideration of history is appropriate so that the district court
may determine whether a parent has “continuously” or “repeatedly” neglected parental
duties. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). The record of child-protection intervention
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supports the district court’s determination that mother continuously neglected J.D.H.’s
needs while he was under her care. And although the district court recognized that mother
was now living in a supportive environment, it found that mother has not demonstrated
insight into the child-protection concerns that resulted in the initial removal of J.D.H. from
her care. The district court also determined that mother has not demonstrated a present-day
ability to care for J.D.H, as evidenced by mother’s frequent lack of attendance or lack of
engagement at scheduled visitations and her failure to obtain recommended chemical and
mental-health treatment. Ultimately, the district court considered both mother’s parenting
history and her current ability to care for J.D.H., and we discern no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s determination that this ground for termination is satisfied by clear and
convincing evidence.
B
A district court may also terminate parental rights if it determines, among other
things, “that following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 subd. 1(b)(5). There is a presumption that reasonable
efforts failed if the petitioner shows: (1) the child under the age of eight “has resided out
of the parental home under court order for six months,” (2) “the court has approved the
out-of-home placement plan,” (3) the “conditions leading to the out -of-home placement
have not been corrected,” and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the social services
agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id. The presumption does not
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apply if the parent has been in regular contact with the child and the parent is complying
with an out-of-home placement plan. Id.
In determining that termination was warranted under this subdivision, the district
court explained:
Mother’s progress on the case plan was minimal. She
never completed the outpatient chemical dependency treatment
program as recommended and is not engaged in chemical
dependency services. She continues to test positive for non -
prescribed substances, as recently as April 2024. Mother never
followed the recommendations of the psychological
evaluation, despite the Agency’s efforts to assist her in setting
up recommended services. Mother only inconsistently
participated in visits with [J.D.H.]

Mother first argues that the district court did not adequately consider the periods of
negative drug tests and that it erred by considering a positive April 2024 sweat patch test.
Mother denies that she used methamphetamine at that time and argues that the test was not
properly authenticated. But even setting aside that test result, other unchallenged facts
sufficiently support the district court’s determination that the “conditions leading to the
out-of-home placement have not been corrected,” id., including mother’s failure to
complete chemical- dependency treatment, follow the recommendations of her
psychological evaluation, and consistently participate in visits with J.D.H.
Mother next challenges that “reasonable efforts have been made by the social
services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id. She argues that the
district court “discounted the significant difficulty in navigating the insurance issues” that
mother faced in obtaining appropriate services. But the case manager testified that mother
“did get insurance quickly in Wisconsin,” and the district court found that the case manager
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“attempted to assist [m]other in setting up . . . services in Wisconsin,” including by making
phone calls to locate an individual therapist and independently contacting Polk County,
Wisconsin, about setting up mental-health case management and AHRMS services. Once
mother was back in Minnesota, “[the case manager] met with [mother] multiple times per
month to assist her in getting Medical Assistance so her services could begin again.” The
district court noted that, at the time of trial, mother “still needed to provide some additional
financial verifications to Hennepin County so that Medical Assistance would be approved.”
And finally, the case manager testified that she presented housing options —including
apartments and residential outpatient treatment—that would allow mother to stay in
Minnesota and comply with the case plan more easily, but mother’s rental application to
an apartment was denied and mother declined to move to a residential treatment facility or
outpatient treatment facility with lodging. There is clear and convincing evidence
supporting the district court’s determination that the county provided reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate and reunite the family and, despite those efforts, mother has failed to correct
the conditions leading to J.D.H.’s placement.

III
Mother’s final challenge is to the district court’s determination that termination was
in J.D.H.’s best interests. If there is a statutory basis to terminate parental rights, the
paramount consideration in determining whether parental rights should be terminated is the
child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. “The ‘best interests of the child’
means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated,” including the impact on “the
relationship between the child and relatives.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511 (2022). The district
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court must explain its rationale for determining that termination is in the child’s best
interests after balancing three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and
(3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
App. 1992); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (enumerating the best-interests
factors outlined in R.T.B.). “Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests
of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.
Mother argues that the district court erred by determining that termination was in
J.D.H.’s best interests because it “placed minimal weight on other familial relationships
that would be severed,” specifically her own relationship with J.D.H. and J.D.H.’s
relationship with his brother.
The district court acknowledged that J.D.H. “has a relationship with his adult
brother” and that termination of mother’s parental rights may impact that relationship, but
it concluded that “[J.D.H.’s] interest in having his needs met and being in a safe, stable
home outweigh the interest in preserving the relationship with” his brother. Likewise, the
district court concluded that J.D.H.’s interests in safety and stability outweigh “the interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship.” The district court considered J.D.H.’s need to
access services such as speech and individual therapy, as well as mother’s inability to meet
J.D.H.’s needs, in part, because of her inability to manage her own chemical and mental
health. And as to J.D.H.’s placement, the guardian ad litem observed J.D.H. in his foster
placement and explained that he has “really opened up,” that he “fits in really well” there,
and that he “gets along really well with the other children in the home.” Given the record
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evidence that supports the district court’s best-interests conclusions and the “considerable
deference” afforded to district courts in conducting a best- interests analysis, J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d at 92, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.