State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1164

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Amon Linton Dixon, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge
Dissenting, Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-3836

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael Berger, Fourth District Public Defender, Sarah Anne Koziol, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction for unlawful possession
of a firearm, appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
2
evidence obtained from law enforcement’s search of his home. He argues that the
anticipatory warrant authorizing the search was not supported by probable cause and that
the information in the warrant affidavit did not establish a sufficient nexus between the
suspected crime, the evidence sought, and the place to be searched. We conclude, based on
the totality of the circumstances, that the search warrant was supported by probable cause
and that the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the home and suspected drug
activity. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Amon Linton
Dixon Jr. with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2023). Law enforcement recovered a gun from Dixon’s bedroom while
searching his home on Xerxes Avenue in Minneapolis pursuant to a warrant.
The challenged warrant application and accompanying affidavit concerned a parcel
intercepted at the airport. The accompanying affidavit attested to these facts: T he affiant
was a Minneapolis police officer who had served since 2015 and “has experience in street
level sales of narcotics, and undercover narcotics operations.” The parcel was sent from an
address in Glendale, Arizona, and was addressed to “Alexis Dickson” at a Xerxes Avenue
residence. The Minneapolis police officer received “information due to a previous warrant
obtained” by an airport police officer about a parcel at the airport. “In that warrant, a dog
sniff was conducted for the package” and the “dog gave a positive alert for the odor of
narcotics emitting from the parcel.” The “parcel was seized and brought to the Airport
Police Criminal Investigations Office.” The Minneapolis police officer also “received
3
information” from the airport police officer “that there was going to be a controlled delivery
of” the parcel to the Xerxes Avenue residence on February 15, 2024, and that “the package
contained approximately 20,000 pills of fe[n]tanyl.”
The warrant application requested a search warrant to enter the Xerxes Avenue
residence “after the controlled delivery has occurred and surveillance observes . . . the
specified package go into the address.” The warrant authorized a search for narcotics,
narcotics paraphernalia, electronic devices used to facilitate the communications of
narcotics dealings, documents, and other media that show a crime has been committed. A
district court judge signed the warrant at 3:28 p.m. on February 15, 2024, and it was
executed the same day at 5:45 p.m.
Dixon moved to suppress evidence of the firearm found in his bedroom during the
search. Dixon argued that the search-warrant application lacked probable cause and did not
establish a sufficient nexus between the home and suspected drug activity.
The state opposed the motion to suppress. The state argued that the warrant affidavit
stated the parcel addressed to the Xerxes Avenue residence contained 20,000 fentanyl pills
and that the “warrant application was conditional on the package containing the 20,000
fentanyl pills being delivered and brought inside the” Xerxes Avenue residence. The state
reasoned that, once the package entered the Xerxes Avenue residence, “there was a fair
probability that evidence would be found at this specific site to be searched.” The state
4
attached to its opposition the warrant application and affidavit from the previous search
warrant referenced in and issued before the challenged warrant.1
After a hearing, the district court issued an order that first addressed the record
before the court, stating that it would base its decision on “the four corners” of the warrant
application. As to probable cause, the district court stated that “it is clear that the reason
the [Minneapolis police officer] knows there are approximately 20,000 pills of fentanyl in
the box is because after a dog sniff, police obtained a search warrant to open the box, and
the warrant was executed where the 20,000 pills were seen.” The district court observed
that the affidavit “does not specifically say the words that ‘the warrant was executed and
the 20,000 pills of fentanyl were seen,’” but the Minneapolis police officer averred that he
knew “this information due to a previous warrant obtained.”
The district court also determined that “there is a clear nexus between the [home]
and the drugs being sought.” The district court reasoned that the parcel was specifically
addressed to the Xerxes Avenue residence. The district court also emphasized that “this
was an anticipatory warrant meaning that the warrant would not be executed until after the
controlled delivery had occurred . . . meaning that the warrant would be executed at the
specific address when the 20,000 fentanyl pills were observed going into the specific
address.”
The district court denied the motion to suppress, determining that “the totality of the
circumstances in the search warrant application and supporting affidavit support a fair

1 The district court signed the prior warrant at 10:51 a.m. on February 15, 2024. The prior
warrant was not attached to the challenged warrant.
5
probability that the evidence sought would be found at the Xerxes Avenue address.” The
district court held a stipulated-evidence trial, found Dixon guilty of unlawful possession of
a firearm, and imposed a stayed 60-month sentence.
Dixon appeals.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures and provide that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; accord Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 (stating that “no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause”). “Generally, a search is valid, with a few
exceptions, only if conducted pursuant to a valid warrant.” State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d
349, 355 (Minn. App. 2002). “A search warrant must be supported by probable cause and
be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.” Id. Probable cause is based on a “totality
of the circumstances test.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985) (quotation
omitted). “The issuing [magistrate’s] task is to make a practical, common-sense decision”
as to whether “ there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found.” State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts reviewing search warrants must determine “if the issuing judge had
a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d
138, 145 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted). A substantial basis means a “fair probability”
under the totality of the circumstances “that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995) (quotation
omitted). “When [appellate courts] perform a totality of the circumstances analysis on a
6
warrant application, [appellate courts] defer to the issuing magistrate, recognizing that
doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded
to warrants.” Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d at 145-46 (quotation omitted).
To determine whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause supported the search warrant, an appellate court “review[s] only the
warrant application and supporting affidavits.” Id. at 145. In other words, when a
“search-warrant application is clear and unambiguous, ” appellate courts “do not look
beyond the four corners of the document.” State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Minn.
App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006).
Dixon argues that the district court erred by determining that the challenged search
warrant was supported by probable cause because (1) the district court improperly relied
on information outside the warrant affidavit and unsupported assertions in the warrant
affidavit and ( 2) the warrant affidavit did not establish a sufficient nexus between the
suspected criminal activity and his home. The state argues that the issuing magistrate had
a substantial basis to conclude that evidence of a crime would likely be found at the Xerxes
Avenue residence and, in the alternative, that this court should adopt the
“contemporaneous-warrant doctrine” and consider the affidavit submitted for the prior
search warrant executed by the airport police. We address these arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not err by relying on the facts set out in the warrant
affidavit along with reasonable inferences from those facts.
First, Dixon argues that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion
because the district court’s probable-cause determination relied on facts that are not stated
7
in the warrant affidavit. Specifically, Dixon contends that the affidavit does not assert that
“20,000 fentanyl pills” were inside the parcel. Dixon maintains that, while the Minneapolis
police officer refers to “a previous warrant” and “a dog sniff” with “a positive alert,” these
facts are insufficient because “dogs cannot count.” The state counters that the “information
contained in the four corners of [the officer’s] affidavit was more than sufficient to support
[the district court’s] conclusion that there was a fair probability of discovering contraband
at the [home].”
When determining whether an executed search warrant is supported by probable
cause, a district court may consider affidavits and materials that are “physically attached”
to the warrant and incorporated by reference in the warrant application. State v. Bonynge,
450 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 1990). 2 A district
court also may consider reasonable inferences drawn from the information in the warrant
affidavit. See Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622 ( stating that “direct observation of evidence
of a crime at the place to be searched is not required” and “nexus may be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances” based on the facts in the warrant affidavit); Novak v. State,
349 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1984) (determining that a “magistrate was justified in issuing
[a search] warrant” based on “all the information contained in the [warrant] affidavit and
reasonable inferences therefrom”).

2 A magistrate issuing a search warrant may receive oral testimony to supplement an
otherwise deficient warrant application to determine whether probable cause supports the
warrant. State v. Meizo, 297 N.W.2d 126, 127-28 (Minn. 1980). No oral testimony was
received here.
8
The record does not support Dixon’s first argument because the district court
referred only to facts in the accompanying affidavit along with common-sense inferences
derived from those facts. The district court ’s memorandum specifically noted that it
“relie[d] on the four corners” of the warrant application and declined to consider other
information submitted by the state. And the district court also explicitly inferred that the
Minneapolis police officer knew that the parcel contained 20,000 fentanyl pills because the
parcel “was opened.”
Second, Dixon argues that the warrant affidavit did not explain how the officer knew
the pills were illegal drugs, specifically fentanyl. While the dog sniff resulted in “a positive
alert for the odor of narcotics emitting from the parcel,” Dixon points out that this fact
“cannot illustrate identity and measurement of a substance.”
We disagree because Dixon appears to assume that the previous warrant was for a
dog sniff—a position reiterated during oral argument to this court. But the district court
inferred that the airport police obtained the prior warrant to open the parcel after the dog
alerted to the parcel. The district court explained that Dixon’s argument asked it to “set
common sense aside and pretend” that the Minneapolis police officer “believed” 20,000
fentanyl pills were in the parcel “due to a dog sniff.” The district court rejected Dixon’s
argument as “an incorrect reading” of the affidavit, which “makes it clear that the 20,000
pills were discovered upon execution of the previous warrant.”
The record supports th e district court’s inference. The Minneapolis police officer
averred that, (1) in the “previous warrant,” “a dog sniff was conducted for the package”
and that, (2) “[a]fter the parcel alert, the parcel was seized and brought to the Airport Police
9
Criminal Investigations Office.” (Emphasis added.) It is reasonable to infer, as the district
court did, that the airport police opened the parcel pursuant to “the previous warrant,”
which allowed the airport police to investigate the parcel’s contents. See Yarbrough,
841 N.W.2d at 622 (upholding the validity of a warrant to search a home based on
reasonable inferences from the warrant affidavit); Novak, 349 N.W.2d at 833 (affirming a
probable-cause determination based on the facts in a warrant affidavit and reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts).3
Although Dixon is correct that the warrant application “did not describe any other
investigation such as . . . testing the drugs,” this does not persuade us that the search
warrant lacks support for the reasonable inference that the parcel contained 20,000 fentanyl
pills. The Minneapolis police officer attested that he “has experience in street level sales
of narcotics” and that he “received information that the package contained approximately
20,000 pills of fentanyl.” This establishes a fair probability that the pills were illegal drugs.
See State v. Anderson , 439 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. App. 1989) (concluding that an
“officer’s experience” with drug cases supported probable cause), rev. denied (Minn.
June 21, 1989).
Third, Dixon argues that the district court’s decision was based on “bare bones
assertion[s].” To the contrary, t he affidavit stated that the Minneapolis police officer

3 Our caselaw has recognized that a warrantless search of a package at the airport may be
constitutionally valid. See State v. Eichers, 840 N.W.2d 210, 220 (Minn. App. 2013),
(concluding “that the narcotics dog sniff” of a package at the airport “was a search that
required reasonable, articulable suspicion that the package contained contraband”), aff’d
on other grounds, 853 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 2014).
10
learned about the parcel contents from a named airport police officer who obtained a
previous warrant after a positive dog-sniff alert for narcotics “emitting” from the parcel
and that the parcel was seized and brought to the investigations office. The airport police
officer also informed the Minneapolis police officer that the “package contained
approximately 20,000 pills of fe[n]tanyl.” And the parcel was addressed to the Xerxes
Avenue residence. These statements in the affidavit, and the reasonable inference that the
airport police officer opened the parcel pursuant to the prior warrant, are more than bare
assertions. It would have helped this court’s review if the affidavit had expressly stated that
the airport police opened the parcel and counted or field-tested the pills. Still, the facts in
the affidavit and the reasonable inferences from those facts establish ed probable cause for
the warrant.
Finally, Dixon argues, with reference to the dog sniff, that the “affidavit must
explain a dog’s qualifications in order to support probable cause,” relying on federal
caselaw. Dixon points out that the warrant affidavit fails to satisfy this federal caselaw.
Some federal caselaw indicates that a search warrant resting on an affidavit about a
dog-sniff alert is supported by probable cause if the affidavit avers that the dog is trained
to detect narcotics. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013) (“If the State has
produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting
drugs . . . the court should find probable cause.”); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371,
1376-77 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]s a general rule, a search warrant based on a narcotics canine
alert will be sufficient on its face if the affidavit states that the dog is trained and certified
11
to detect narcotics.”). But Dixon does not provide Minnesota authority establishing that a
dog’s “qualifications” are required to support probable cause.
Also, the dog-sniff alert described in the affidavit did not itself establish the
substantial basis for probable cause that the search warrant would yield evidence of drug
activity at the Xerxes Avenue residence. Information about the dog-sniff alert was included
as background in the affidavit. But probable cause to search for drugs and related evidence
at the Xerxes Avenue residence was based on fact s that the parcel contained 20,000
fentanyl pills and was specifically addressed to the Xerxes Avenue residence. In other
words, the reliability of the dog-sniff alert is not consequential because the specific quantity
and type of illegal drugs inside the parcel, along with the specific address, are independent
facts that together show a fair probability that evidence of a drug crime would be found at
the Xerxes Avenue residence.
II. The warrant affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the evidence of a
drug crime and the Xerxes Avenue residence.
A valid search warrant must have “a direct connection, or nexus, between the
alleged crime and the particular place to be searched, particularly in cases involving the
search of a residence for evidence of drug activity.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744,
747-48 (Minn. 1998). This nexus does not require “direct observation of evidence of a
crime at the place to be searched” and “may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances.” Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622. For example, the Minnesota S upreme
Court concluded that a warrant was supported by a sufficient nexus when the affiant
12
attested that a controlled drug purchase from the defendant occurred at the home to be
searched. State v. Cavegn, 356 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1984).
Dixon argues that there is no authority stating “that a package from an unknown
source which police suspect may contain drugs, amounts to probable cause to search that
package’s entire address.” The state argues that the “nexus here was clear: a parcel with a
wholesale-amount of narcotics was being delivered to [Dixon’s] address,” pointing out that
law enforcement “applied for an anticipatory warrant,” meaning “the officers would not
execute the search warrant unless or until a resident inside the [home] accepted the parcel
and brought it inside.”
As a preliminary matter, Dixon contends that an “unknown package sender is akin
to an anonymous tipster” and relies on caselaw related to anonymous tipsters. 4 The state
argues that anonymous-tipster caselaw is “a poor comparison” because “the incriminating
evidence that [law enforcement] had in their possession was not an uncorroborated report”
from an anonymous person, but “rather corroborated proof that a large amount of narcotics
were travelling through the mail system to [Dixon’s] house.”
We agree with the state. The sender of the parcel is unknown, but the facts in the
warrant affidavit come from known sources—the airport police officer and the Minneapolis

4 Dixon cites State v. Gabbert, in which this court affirmed a district court’s order
suppressing evidence obtained from a search warrant issued without probable cause.
411 N.W.2d 209, 212-13 (Minn. App. 1987). This court reasoned that it must “look first to
the credibility of the informant” who provided information recited in the warrant affidavit.
Id. at 212. We concluded that, “[b]ecause the anonymous tipster’s information was
insufficiently corroborated, the issuing judge did not have probable cause to issue the
search warrant.” Id.
13
police officer. And the affidavit recites corroboration for the information that the parcel
contained a large amount of illegal drugs . Therefore, the fact that the parcel’s sender is
anonymous does not impact our analysis.
As to nexus, our analysis focuses on three facts averred in the warrant affidavit:
(1) the large quantity of fentanyl in the parcel; (2) the parcel was addressed and delivered
to the Xerxes Avenue residence; and (3) the condition precedent that the “specified
package” must be received by someone who “go[es] inside the address.” 5 We examine
each fact in turn.
First, the parcel contained 20,000 fentanyl pills. Although the warrant affidavit did
not state that 20,000 pills of fentanyl is indicative of trafficking, Minnesota caselaw
instructs that possession of a “large quantity of drugs” is evidence of an intent to distribute
drugs. State v. White, 332 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn. 1983); see also Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subd. 2(a)(3) (Supp. 2023) (“A person is guilty of a controlled substance crime in the first
degree if . . . the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures of a total weight of 25
grams or more, or 100 dosage units or more, containing heroin or fentanyl.”). In Novak,
the supreme court concluded that a search warrant for Novak’s home was supported by
probable cause because the warrant affidavit averred that Novak possessed a large amount
of marijuana outside of his home and sold it to an undercover officer. 349 N.W.2d at

5 The warrant affidavit states: “Your affiant, and or other Minneapolis Officers under your
Affiant’s control, will execute the warrant after the controlled delivery has occurred and
surveillance observes Case, or someone else with the specified package go inside the
address.” Nothing in the record explains to whom “Case” refers. This does not alter our
analysis, however, because the condition precedent is that the parcel must be received by
someone who then takes the parcel inside the Xerxes Avenue residence.
14
832-33. The supreme court reasoned that the “fact that [Novak] dealt in large quantities
increased the likelihood that police would find marijuana in a search of his residence.” Id.
Here, the large quantity of fentanyl in the parcel suggested that evidence of criminal
drug activity would be found at the Xerxes Avenue residence. The warrant affidavit
attested that the parcel contained about 20,000 pills of fentanyl. The quantity of drugs was
not an inference drawn by the reviewing district court, but a fact established by the affidavit
from which a reasonable inference of criminal activity may be drawn.6 See also Yarbrough,
841 N.W.2d at 623 (stating that “it may be reasonable to infer that drug wholesalers keep
drugs at their residences, but such an inference, without more, is unwarranted for casual
users” and upholding a search warrant on the inference that the appellant was a drug
wholesaler based on, among other things, the fact that he had possessed “a large amount of
crack cocaine”).
Second, the parcel was addressed and delivered to the Xerxes Avenue residence.
The supreme court considered similar facts and upheld a search warrant in State v. Braasch,
in which a warrant affidavit averred that “customs officials . . . lawfully opened a letter
which . . . was addressed to” Braasch at a post-office box along a rural route and discovered
that it contained hashish. 316 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Minn. 1982). Customs officials brought
the envelope to the local sheriff’s department, which gave the envelope to the U.S. Postal

6 The district court inferred that airport police opened the package pursuant to the prior
warrant, examined the contents, and identified the quantity of fentanyl. As discussed above,
a district court may make reasonable inferences from facts averred in a search-warrant
application. Id. at 833. But, here, the facts supporting nexus were directly stated and not
inferred.
15
Service for delivery and then conducted surveillance of the rural post-office box listed on
the envelope. Id. Officers saw “a young female remove[] the envelope from the box and
return[] to the northerly portion of a green duplex.” Id. at 579. Law enforcement obtained
a search warrant for Braasch’s duplex based on the delivery of the envelope and
information from a confidential informant about meeting Braasch at the duplex. Id. at
578-79. The supreme court concluded that “the affidavit was adequate to establish probable
cause to believe that the substance in the envelope was hashish and that the hashish would
be found in the described premises.” Id. at 579. Here, similarly, the parcel containing
20,000 fentanyl pills was addressed and delivered to the Xerxes Avenue residence, which
established a nexus between the residence and evidence of illegal drugs.
Third, the execution of the anticipatory warrant was contingent on the controlled
delivery and receipt of the parcel. “An anticipatory warrant is a warrant based upon an
affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain
evidence of crime will be located at a specified place.” United States. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S.
90, 94 (2006) (quotation omitted). “Most anticipatory warrants subject their execution to
some condition precedent other than the mere passage of time —a so-called ‘triggering
condition.’” Id.
The warrant affidavit stated that law enforcement “will execute the warrant after the
controlled delivery has occurred and surveillance observes” someone “with the specified
package go inside the address.” Accordingly, the condition precedent to the executed
search was someone bringing the parcel into the Xerxes Avenue residence. Once the parcel
entered the home, someone in the home possessed a large quantity of illegal drugs—itself
16
a crime and also evidence of an intent to distribute. See Minn. Stat. §§ 152.02,
subd. 2(b)(75), .021, subd. 2(a)(3) (possession of 25 grams or 100 dosage units of fentanyl
constitutes the crime of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance) (Supp. 2023); see
White, 332 N.W.2d at 912 (“Evidence tending to show such intent [to distribute] includes
evidence as to the large quantity of drugs possessed, evidence as to the manner of
packaging, and other evidence.”).
We conclude that these three facts—the parcel contained 20,000 fentanyl pills, the
parcel was addressed to the Xerxes Avenue residence, and the anticipatory warrant would
not be executed until after someone brought the parcel into the home— provided a sufficient
nexus between the home and suspected drug activity.
Dixon points out, and we acknowledge, that the package was addressed to “Alexis
Dickson,” not Amon Dixon, and that the affidavit did not attest that the Xerxes Avenue
residence or its occupants had been involved in illegal drug sales. Dixon relies on Souto,
in which the s upreme court affirmed the suppression of evidence because the warrant
application did not include facts showing a sufficient nexus between Souto’s home and
illegal drug activities. 578 N.W.2d at 749-51. There, the record showed that (1) a package
containing illegal drugs was sent to Souto’s residence, (2) Souto never received the
package, which was returned to the postal inspector, (3) “an informant stated that [a]
suspected drug dealer” —not Souto—received methamphetamine in packages that were
mailed to “other friends,” (4) Souto bought illegal drugs from an informant, who also stated
that Souto used illegal drugs, and (5) Souto’s home phone made “numerous” calls to a
17
suspected drug dealer. Id. at 746, 748 (quotation marks omitted).7 Dixon argues that, “[if]
Souto demanded suppression, [then] the weaknesses here emphasize the same result.” And
he specifically stresses that the warrant affidavit does not include controlled drug buys or
any witnesses to drug transactions at the Xerxes Avenue residence and that there is “zero
corroborative effort by the police.”
We disagree with Dixon’s conclusion. It is correct that the warrant in Souto was
supported by contextual information about illegal drug purchases and use by Souto in her
home and that this warrant application has no similar facts about the Xerxes Avenue
residence. But there is a key difference between the facts in Souto and the facts attested to
in this warrant application. Here, police knew that the parcel was addressed to the Xerxes
residence and contained 20,000 fentanyl pills , and police had to see someone take the
parcel into the Xerxes Avenue residence before executing the search warrant. This
difference makes this warrant similar to a search warrant based on a controlled drug
purchase at a home or a large drug supply outside the home, both of which the supreme
court has held provide a sufficient nexus. Cavegn, 356 N.W.2d at 674 (stating that “the
objects-place nexus is clearer ” with facts showing a controlled drug buy at the home
“where there is direct information . . . to connect the [drug] items to the place”); Novak,
349 N.W.2d at 832-33 (stating that the appellant’s known “deal[ing] in large quantities” of

7 The warrant affidavit in Souto also stated that the affiant knew “through information
received” from informants and law-enforcement officers that Souto was “involved in the
possession and/or distribution of methamphetamine, and/or marijuana on a wide scale.” Id.
at 746. The supreme court held that this statement “was too vague and conclusory to bolster
the state’s position that Souto was a drug dealer.” Id. at 749.
18
illegal drugs outside his home “increased the likelihood that police would find marijuana
in a search of his residence”).8
We conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the challenged warrant
application established a sufficient nexus between the suspected drug activity and the
Xerxes Avenue residence. Because the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis to
determine both that probable cause existed and that there was a sufficient nexus between
the suspected crime and the place to be searched, the district court did not err by denying
Dixon’s motion to suppress evidence obtained through the warrant.9
Affirmed.

8 Even if we were to assume that the nexus was marginal between the drug evidence sought
and the Xerxes Avenue residence, “marginal cases should be largely determined by the
preference to be accorded to warrants.” Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d at 145-46 (quotation omitted).

9 Given that the district court signing the warrant had a substantial basis to conclude that
the challenged warrant was supported by probable cause, we need not address the state’s
alternative argument that we “should adopt the contemporaneous- warrant doctrine.” We
also observe that this issue was not raised during district court proceedings, and we
“generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court.” Roby v.
State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). And the state asks us to adopt a new doctrine,
which is more properly addressed to the supreme court. See State v. Thomas, 890 N.W.2d
413, 420 (Minn. App. 2017) (“The task of extending existing laws falls to the supreme
court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 28, 2017).
D-1
HARRIS, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. I believe that even though, as a reviewing court, we must pay
great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, the affidavit
supporting the warrant in this case provided insufficient facts to support a nexus between
the drugs and Dixon’s home and is the sort of bare bones, conclusory document which the
Fourth Amendment does not permit. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). The
factual allegations of a search warrant application must “establish a direct connection
between the alleged criminal activity and the site to be searched.” State v. Souto, 578
N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 1998). Review of whether a search warrant application contained
a “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed” is appropriate. State v.
Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Minn. App. 2002). On the facts presented here, I do not
believe that the search warrant application and supporting affidavit establish the required
“sufficient nexus” between drug activity and Dixon’s home. See Souto, 578 N.W.2d at
749. Moreover, the factual allegations contained in the affidavit would not lead a
reasonable person to believe that there was a “fair probability” that evidence of the crime
would be found in Dixon’s home. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
The state and federal constitutions protect an individual’s right “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV . It is well settled that a search warrant
may not be issued unless the district court finds probable cause. Id. To determine whether
probable cause exists, a judge must look at the totality of the circumstances and “‘make a
practical, common- sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
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affidavit before [the judge] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.’” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn.
1985) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). The Minnesota Supreme Court has historically
required a direct connection, or nexus, between the alleged crime and the particular place
to be searched, particularly in cases involving the search of a residence for evidence of
drug activity. See, e.g., State v. Cavegn, 356 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1984) (holding that
clear “objects-place nexus” between drug dealing and residence searched was established
by the fact that the sale actually occurred at the residence). The nexus between the crime
and the place to be searched is clear where direct information connects an item to a location.
See id. (stating that nexus was clear that drugs would be found in an apartment where there
was direct information that a drug sale occurred there).
The state argues that there was a nexus between the criminal drug activity and the
place to be searched because (1) there were 20,000 fentanyl pills in the parcel and
(2) someone at the Xerxes Avenue residence received the package and went inside. The
affidavit in support of the application for a warrant here provided, in relevant part:
• Officer Spee was assigned as an Investigator to the Minneapolis Police
Department Gun Investigations Unit.

• Officer Spee received information from Officer Irvin of the airport police
that there was going to be a controlled delivery of a package (parcel) to 1831
Xerxes Ave. N., Minneapolis, MN 55411.

• The delivery would occur any time before 7:00 p.m. on 02/15/2024.

• Officer Spee received information that the package contained approximately
20,000 pills of fentanyl.

• The name on the package was Alexis Dickson.
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• The sender’s address was 9524 W . Camelback Rd., Glendale, AZ 85305-
3112.

• The address on the package was 1831 Xerxes Ave. N., Minneapolis, MN
55411.

• Officer Spee knew this information due to a previous warrant obtained by
Officer Irvin of the airport police signed on 02/15/2024 by a magistrate.1

Officer Spee requested the search warrant “to search the above-described premises
for the described property and thing(s).” 2 On February 15, the magistrate signed the
warrant.
The district court concluded that the connection or “nexus” is the address on the
package. The district court drew a reasonable inference that the package contained 20,000
fentanyl pills, which provides a further nexus. I agree that a judge may “draw common-
sense and reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances set forth in an affidavit.”
State v. Brennan, 674 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 20, 2004). But the law requires something more than an inference to support
a nexus between the alleged crime and the place to be searched. We do not have that here.

1 The application states that in the previous warrant a dog sniff was conducted for the
package and the package number was 1Z2R0390134558939. The dog gave a positive alert
for the odor of narcotics emitting from the parcel. After the parcel alert, the parcel was
seized and brought to the criminal investigations office of the airport police.

2 In addition to a number of typographical errors, the affidavit notes that law enforcement
would enter the property after the delivery of a package, and surveillance observed an
individual named “Case” or someone else with the package going into the address. The
affidavit does not identify the individual named “Case.”
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Dixon argues that the lack of nexus between drug activities and his residence is
comparable to the circumstances in Souto, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded the search warrant lacked a nexus between the defendant’s residence and the
suspected criminal activity. 578 N.W.2d at 751. I agree. Souto involved a home where
police had already established the presence of drugs. Id. And in Souto, the affidavit
supporting the warrant described: (1) a large package of known drugs that was mailed to
the defendant’s home ten months earlier; (2) numerous phone calls between Souto’s
residence and the residence of known drug dealers; and (3) police and informants both
knew she was a drug dealer. Id. at 748. The supreme court held, however, that the affidavit
“did not indicate that [defendant] ever arranged drug deals, sold, or distributed drugs, much
less that she performed such acts from her home.” Id.
In contrast, the district court here granted the search warrant based on the following
limited facts prior to the execution of the search warrant : a package containing drugs was
mailed from Glendale, Arizona, addressed to “Alexis Dickson” at the Xerxes Avenue
North, Minneapolis address and was intercepted by the airport police, which is significantly
less than what was contained in Souto. And unlike Souto, the affidavit here never
established the presence of drugs or drug activity at the residence.
The majority cites Novak v. State, 349 N.W.2d 830,
832-33 (Minn. 1984), noting
that “[t]he fact that [Novak] dealt in large quantities increased the likelihood that police
would find marijuana in a search of his residence.” The majority’s analysis, however,
extends Novak beyond its holding. While the fact that Novak dealt in large quantities of
drugs may have “increased the likelihood” that police would find evidence in his home,
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the court did not decide that possession alone provided conclusive evidence for a probable
cause determination. Id . at 833. Moreover , the warrant application in Novak provided
significantly more evidence linking Novak’s drug activity on the street to his home. For
example, the affidavit in support of the warrant noted that Novak was involved in the drug
business as a wholesaler; that police had recorded his telephone conversation from his
home with an undercover narcotics agent; that during the conversation, Novak agreed to
deliver six pounds of marijuana to the agent; and that officers observed him leave his house,
drive around Austin, and drive to Albert Lea to make the sale. Id. at 832. In contrast, the
affidavit here did not indicate that Dixon or anyone at the Xerxes Avenue North,
Minneapolis address ever arranged drug deals, sold, or distributed drugs, much less that
Dixon performed such acts from his home.
The majority also cites State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Minn. 2014)
to support its contention that the large quantity of fentanyl in the parcel is evidence of an
intent to distribute drugs. The majority’s reliance on Yarbrough is misplaced. Yarbrough
discusses the nexus between drug wholesalers and their residences that was developed in
Harris and Novak. Id. at 623-24; see also State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 789 (Minn.
1999) (noting that under certain circumstances probable cause can be permissibly found in
home of “drug wholesaler”); Novak, 349 N.W.2d at 832-33 (concluding that an affidavit
established defendant as drug wholesaler due to drug transaction and known drug
suspicion, which significantly contributed to likelihood of finding drugs at his residence).
Dixon’s case is easily distinguished from Yarbrough. First, the warrant application
in Yarbrough stated that the appellant “previously had been arrested for possession of a
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controlled substance with intent to distribute.” Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 623-24. By
comparison, the warrant application in this case presents no information about the drug-
wholesaler status of Dixon, Alexis Dickson, or any resident of the Xerxes Avenue North,
Minneapolis address. Second, in Yarbrough, a confidential informant had reported that the
appellant “was a crack cocaine dealer.” Id. at 624. Again, by comparison, the warrant
application in this case presents no case for drug-wholesaler status as it provided no
information about Dixon or any resident of the Xerxes Avenue North, Minneapolis address
engaging in any drug activity. Third, in Yarbrough, the warrant application stated that the
appellant previously had possessed “a large amount of crack cocaine.” Id . The warrant
application in this case provided no information that Dixon or any resident of the Xerxes
Avenue North, Minneapolis address was selling fentanyl. In short, Yarbrough’s drug-
related activities had already been established when the reasonable inference was made
that drug wholesalers keep drugs at their residences; thus, the presence of a large amount
of drugs is not what identified him as a drug wholesaler and subjected his home to a search
warrant. Id. at 623.
The majority also relies on State v. White, 332 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn. 1983) for
the proposition that possession of a large quantity of drugs is evidence of an intent to
distribute drugs. However, White noted “[i]ntent to sell or distribute is usually proved
circumstantially. Evidence tending to show such intent includes evidence as to the large
quantity of drugs possessed, evidence as to the manner of packaging, and other evidence.”
Id. at 912 (citing 28 C.J.S. Supp., Drugs and Narcotics § 211 (1974)). In White, law
enforcement officers found over 100 pounds of marijuana after searching White’s farm.
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332 N.W.2d at 911. The court noted that the quantity far exceeded what was “needed for
personal use.” Id. at 912. The mere presence of large amounts of marijuana did not create
the intent to distribute. White was already known to be connected to the drugs because
they were found on his property and bore his first name or initial. Id. at 911-12. His intent
to distribute was established “[u]nder all these circumstances” and not mere presence of
large quantities of drugs alone. Id. at 912.
What is missing here is the existence of any evidence that Dixon’s residence was
used for drug transactions, or any known or historical drug suspicion. This affidavit
completely lacked any police corroboration that drug activity was linked to Dixon or the
Xerxes Avenue North, Minneapolis address. The warrant affidavit made no effort to
identify the sender of the suspected drugs. The warrant affidavit made no effort to identify
the package recipient as Alexis Dickson or if Alexis Dickson lives at the address. The
affidavit does not identify any information that Dixon or the other occupant of the home,
his grandmother, was involved in drug trafficking. The warrant affidavit also did not
include any observations about the home to be searched to suggest ongoing evidence of
drug activity or sales. It includes no information about people involved in drug trafficking
surveilled at the home. There were no facts or investigation about the package’s address
at all. Finding probable cause due to the mere presence of large quantities of drugs is not
consistent with the facts found in White, Novak, or Yarbrough.
Next, the majority cites State v. Braasch, 316 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Minn. 1982) to
support the proposition that the parcel containing drugs addressed to the Xerxes Avenue
address establishes a nexus between the residence and evidence of illegal drugs. In
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Braasch, a letter was addressed by name to Braasch at her father’s home and was found to
contain hashish while still in transit. Id. The letter’s delivery was lawfully observed,
whereupon Braasch drove up to retrieve the letter and then drove back to her residence. Id.
An affidavit for a search warrant included these details as well as information from a
confidential informant with information about Braasch’s drug activity. Id. at 578 -79.
Dixon’s case is distinguishable from Braasch for three reasons found in the affidavit:
(1) the package was not addressed to Dixon, (2) Dixon did not travel to retrieve the
package, and (3) there was no information from a confidential informant’s information
regarding drug suspicions included in the affidavit. Id. at 578. The affidavit had adequate
probable cause and directly connected the resident and residence to the drug-related
activity. Id. at 579. The evidence of drug suspicion in Braasch’s affidavit is missing in
Dixon’s affidavit. Unlike Braasch, no nexus was created between the residents and
residence, and package, beyond the address. Id.
Finally, I agree with the majority that the district court analyzed Dixon’s argument
to suppress as if an anticipatory search warrant had been issued. “An anticipatory warrant
is a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but
not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specific place.” U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006) (quotation omitted). “Most anticipatory warrants subject their
execution to some condition precedent . . . a so-called ‘triggering condition.’” Id. The
most important feature of an anticipatory search warrant is that when the anticipatory
warrant is signed by a magistrate, “by definition, the triggering condition which establishes
probable cause has not yet been satisfied.” Id. The triggering event here is the package
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being delivered and taken into the home. The Fourth Amendment specifically protects the
sanctity of the home: “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86, (1980)
(quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). The
right to be secure in one’s own home is a fundamental right. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-
90. Given the significance of this right, the privacy of the home should only be invaded if
the police have a warrant issued by a neutral judge upon a finding of probable cause. See
State v. Nolting, 254 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Minn. 1977). Because there are considerable
shortcomings in the search warrant application discussed above, the totality of the
circumstances alleged did not establish the required connection, and to allow a full search
of a private home on so little would directly contradict the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions. Even deferring to the signing judge as we are required to do, there was not
a substantial basis to conclude that the search warrant application satisfied the nexus
requirement.
The state requested that we should adopt a contemporaneous-warrant doctrine. I
agree with the majority that given that this was not raised during district court proceedings
and because we generally do not address arguments that were not presented to the district
court, I would decline to adopt the contemporaneous-warrant doctrine argument.
There are not sufficient facts in the affidavit connecting drugs, drug paraphernalia,
or drug activity to Dixon’s home. Because the affidavit supporting the search warrant was
devoid of information establishing a nexus between the alleged illegal activity and Dixon’s
home, I believe that the district court erred in issuing the search warrant.