In Re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1166

In Re the Marriage of:

Danielle Elizabeth Dressel, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Nathan David Dressel,
Respondent.

Filed April 28, 2025
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-19-2073

John T. Burns, Jr., Burns Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Nathan D. Dressel, Hutchinson, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for custody
modification, arguing that the district court violated her right to due process by refusing to
hold an evidentiary hearing on her motion. Because mother has not shown a due -process
violation and mother was not otherwise entitled to an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
2
FACTS
The marriage of appellant-mother Danielle Elizabeth Dressel and pro se respondent-
father Nathan David Dressel was dissolved by stipulated judgment and decree in October
2020. The stipulated decree awarded the parties temporary joint legal custody and
permanent joint physical custody of their two children: AUD, born in 2011, and BD, born
in 2014. It also established a 50/50 parenting -time schedule. The decree included the
parties’ stipulation that the children would participate in therapy and that the parties would
use a Parenting Consultant (PC) “to assist them with any custody and parenting time issues
they [were] unable to resolve on their own.”
In February 2021, the district court awarded father temporary sole legal custody and
temporary sole physical custody, subject to mother’s supervised parenting time, based on
its determination that father made a prima facie showing that a substantial change of
circumstances had occurred and that the children were endangered as a result. The district
court ordered an evidentiary hearing to further address custody, and held that hearing over
seven days in 2021.
After the evidentiary hearing, t he district court awarded the parties joint legal
custody, awarded father temporary sole physical custody for a period of one year, and
awarded mother parenting time “as provided by the Parenting Consultant.” The district
court found that mother “needs more targeted therapy to address her behaviors that have
negatively impacted the children” and that she “appears to be unwilling to acknowledge
that she has participated in this behavior, which is a concern going forward.” Th e district
court scheduled a review hearing one year from the date of its order.
3
Both parties challenged the district court’s custody determinations in an appeal to
this court. Dressel v. Dressel, No. A22-0603, 2022 WL 17959504, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec.
27, 2022). We held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making its custody
determinations. Id.
In May 2023, mother moved to modify custody and parenting time, and to remove
the PC. The district court held a hearing on mother’s motion in May and a subsequent
review hearing in July. In August, the district court denied mother’s request to remove the
PC. The district court ordered no change in custody or parenting time, but it provided that
those issues could be reviewed at a hearing in October 2023, which was subsequently
continued to November 15, 2023. The district co urt requested an update from the
children’s therapist regarding “the children’s thoughts on their school, and their general
situation during these contentious proceedings.”
The night before the scheduled review hearing , t he PC sent the parties and the
district court a “decision letter” suspending mother’s parenting time for 90 days, stating
that “[m]other shall have no contact with the children in person, by telephone, by text,
email, social media, or other electronic means, nor shall she cause any third -party to have
contact with the children on her behalf.” The PC’s decision was a result of her conclusion
that “[t]he current situation is the most concerning to date, in tha t [m]other has escalated
her tactics to influence [AUD] by engaging her in deceptive behaviors to hide their
communication from [f]ather.”
The district court held the review hearing the next day. At that hearing, mother
asked the district court to schedule an evidentiary hearing on the issue of permanent
4
physical custody at which the parties, the PC, and the therapist could testify. Father
opposed that request and asked the district court to adopt the PC’s recommendation to
temporarily suspend mother’s parenting time. The district court took the issue of whether
to hold an evidentiary hearing under advisement, noting that the issue of permanent
physical custody was still under advisement.
On November 17, 2023, the district court issued a temporary order that required
mother to have no contact with the children for 30 days, instead of the 90-day period that
the PC had imposed. The district court indicated it would review the no-contact order after
30 days. It also requested an update from the PC and the children’s therapist “as to how
the children are handling the no-contact period.” On December 21, 2023, the district court
filed an order indicating it had received an update from the parti es, the therapist, and the
PC, and the court ended the no-contact order effective the following day.
On February 13, 2024, the district court denied mother’s request for an evidentiary
hearing. It awarded mother and father permanent joint legal custody and awarded father
permanent sole physical custody. Throughout its order, the district court noted information
that it had received from the children’s therapist and the PC.
Mother moved for amended findings, requesting that the district court amend its
order to grant her previous request for an evidentiary hearing . She argued that “Due
Process requires a meaningful hearing where [mother] has an opportunity to be heard and
contest the evidence presented.” The district court held a hearing on mother’s motion and
denied it, rejecting mother’s assertion that the lack of a hearing resul ted in a denial of due
process.
5
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother contends that the district court erred by refusing to hold an evidentiary
hearing on her motion for custody modification.
In family court proceedings, the general rule is that “[m]otions shall be submitted
on affidavits, exhibits, documents subpoenaed to the hearing , memoranda, and arguments
of counsel except for contempt proceedings” or as otherwise provided in the rules. Minn.
Gen. R. Prac. 303.03(d)(1). Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 303.03(d)(2) authorizes a motion for leave
to present oral testimony at a hearing . But “[t]he prevailing practice in Minnesota courts
is for the submission of evidence relating to motions by written su bmissions, with sworn
testimony provided by affidavit, deposition, or other written submissions.” Minn. Gen. R.
Prac. 303.03 2012 advisory comm. cmt. “Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a
motion generally is a discretionary decision of the district court, which we review for an
abuse of discretion.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. App. 2007).
Mother generally agrees that no procedural rule, statute, or precedent required the
district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on her motion for custody modification .
Mother instead relies on her constitutional right to due process of law.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. “The due process protection provided under the Minnesota
Constitution is identical to the due process guaranteed under the Constitution of the United
States.” Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988).
6
Caselaw distinguishes between due -process claims based on procedural violations
and due-process claims based on violations of substantive due -process rights. See Boutin
v. LaFleur , 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 -18 (Minn. 1999) (separately addressing due-process
claims based on procedural violations and substantive rights). Substantive due process
bars “certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions, regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.” Id. at 716 (quotation omitted). Procedural du e
process requires fair procedures when depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property.
See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Whether due process is required
in a particular case is a question of law” reviewed de novo. C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343,
349 (Minn. 2008).
Mother’s argument sounds in procedural due process. We normally apply the three-
part test in Mathews v. Eldridge when analyzing a procedural due-process claim. 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976); see also In re Child of F.F.N.M., 999 N.W.2d 525, 542 (Minn. App. 2023)
(applying the Mathews test in a parental -rights termination case), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
5, 2024). The Mathews test considers:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government ’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Mother does not rely on the Mathews test. Instead, she relies
on two Minnesota Supreme Court cases from the 1970s as support for her due -process
claim.
7
First, mother relies on VanZee v. VanZee, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
explained that “a trial judge must make available to counsel for the parties any report from
the welfare department or a court agency in regard to custody matters, and that such report
may be used as a basis for cross -examination of those who have written the report. ” 226
N.W.2d 865, 867 (Minn. 1974).
Second, mother relies on Scheibe v. Scheibe , in which the supreme court cited
VanZee and stated:
The rule with respect to custody evaluation reports is
that, absent a waiver, an appellant in a custody case is entitled
to a new hearing if it appears that the trial court based its
custody decision in part upon such a report without first giving
the parties an opportunity to cross -examine the author of t he
report or to otherwise meet or answer adverse facts therein.

241 N.W.2d 100, 100 (Minn. 1976) (emphasis added).
We note that in VanZee and Scheibe, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not cite or
discuss due process as the basis for its decisions. See, e.g., VanZee, 226 N.W.2d at 866 -
68; Scheibe, 241 N.W.2d at 100-01. And, the right to cross-examine the author of a custody
evaluation is now provided by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 518.167, subd s. 1, 3 ( 2024)
(stating that in a custody proceeding, “the court may order an investigation and report
concerning custodial arrangements for the child” and that “[a] party to the proceeding may
call the investigat or and any person whom the investigator has consulted for cross -
examination at the hearing”).
Mother concedes that the reports from the PC and therapist are not custody
evaluations. Nonetheless, mother argues that if a PC and a therapist provide the district
8
court “custody -determining opinions,” then “the [c]ourt must provide the parent with
adequate means to determine the basis of those opinions.” Mother further argues that she
“had no means of challenging these unsubstantiated opinions without cross examining the
reporters,” and that “[t]his was a denial of due process.” For the two reasons that follow,
we disagree.
First, VanZee and Scheibe are inapplicable here because the reports of the PC and
therapist are not akin to court -ordered custody evaluations, and the district court did not
treat them as such. Indeed, the district court rejected mother’s characterization of the PC’s
report as a custody evaluation and stated that the therapist’s “updates did not form an
opinion on custody nor recommend a certain custody arrangement.”
Second, mother had an opportunity to address adverse facts contained in the reports
that are at issue. The district court ’s order denying mother’s motion to amend explained
that it had
held numerous hearings and received hundreds of pages in
affidavits and memorandums in connection to [mother’s]
Motion to Modify Custody and Parenting time. The [c]ourt’s
[order granting father permanent sole physical custody] was
the product of a careful consideration of all affidavits and
memorandums received, and oral arguments heard, in
connection to [mother’s] request. [Mother] has had ample
opportunity to argu e her case. The [c]ourt finds [mother’s]
Due Process rights were not violated because the [c]ourt
declined to award an evidentiary hearing.

The district court also noted , in its February 2024 order, that it had “all the
information it need[ed] to decide the issues still before it.” The district court recognized
that mother wanted to “appeal” the PC’s decision and to “remove” the PC from the case.
9
The district court explained that it had “carefully considered” mother’s affidavit in support
of her request to appeal the PC’s decision, that the court had “read through the text
messages [that mother] alleges were taken out of context,” and that the “full picture does
not change the [c]ourt’s decision.”
Finally, in denying mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court
explained:
This matter has already had a seven -day evidentiary hearing
before this [district court]. The [district court’s] [temporary
physical custody order], which ordered a review hearing
approximately a year following the Order, was not an
invitation to relitigate the issue of custody. Rather, the [district
court] provided [mother] an opportunity to address her
behaviors and show [the district court] that joint physical
custody is in the best interest of the children. Having received
hundreds of pages in affida vits from the parties, updates from
the children’s therapist, . . . and decision letters and updates
from the [PC], the [district court] does not feel it necessary to
hold an evidentiary hearing. The [district court] has ample
information on this case; information sufficient for this [district
court] to make an informed d ecision regarding permanent
custody.

In sum, if the rule from Scheibe were to apply here, the record would show that
mother had an opportunity to “otherwise meet or answer adverse facts” in the reports from
the PC and that therapist. Scheibe, 241 N.W.2d at 100.
In conclusion , mother has not shown that she had a due -process right to cross-
examine the PC and therapist at an evidentiary hearing on her custody motion , or that the
district court otherwise erred by denying her request for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.