State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1175

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Rodney Schertner,
Appellant.

Filed July 28, 2025
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-11447

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion by permitting a forensic interviewer to testify as
an expert at his trial. We affirm.
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FACTS
On June 2, 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charg ed appellant James Rodney
Schertner with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct; the victim was his minor
granddaughter, AS. The charges were tried to a jury. Prior to trial , the state moved the
district court to allow expert testimony from a forensic interviewer from CornerHouse who
twice interviewed AS regarding the sexual abuse.1
Schertner objected to the interviewer testifying as an expert witness regarding
common grooming behaviors, the circumstances surrounding delayed and incremental
disclosures, and common characteristics of child sex-abuse victims. Schertner also argued
that the interviewer’s testimony would not contribute anything “that the jury will not
already be able to glean themselves as it relates to whether or not [AS is] testifying or
speaking credibly.”
The district court ruled that the interviewer could testify as an expert, reasoning:
Well, obviously, we shouldn’t have testimony that tells the jury
who to believe and who not to believe, right? I think [the
interviewer] can testify as an expert forensic interviewer. I
think you all agree on that. She has been through the training.
She has the qualifications, and she’s employed as such at
Cornerhouse. I think it is fair game for any opinion that she
gives or any procedure that she’s talking about for you,
[defense counsel], to ask her about her personal experience and
training in that particular area, whether it be delayed report or
whatever.

1 “CornerHouse is a private independent agency that interviews victims of alleged child
abuse who are referred from child protection and law enforcement.” State v. Goldenstein,
505 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993).
3
At trial, the state presented evidence that on December 31, 2022, AS reported to her
brother that Schertner had abused her. In January 2023, AS’s brother reported the abuse
to their parents, who then asked AS about the abuse. AS disclosed the abuse directly to
her mother, who later explained what had happened to AS’s father. AS’s parents then
reported the abuse to police, and in February 2023, AS participated in two forensic
interviews at CornerHouse.
AS testified regarding the abuse. She also testified about her participation in the
two CornerHouse interviews:
Q: Okay. Why did you go to CornerHouse more than once?
A: So, the first time, I told them basically everything that
happened. But, after telling them what happened, more stuff
came up that I didn’t really remember because I was just—you
know when your brain, like, just has a really bad memory? It
just tries to push it to the back; so you don’t really remember
it. And that’s kind of what happened.

Q: And so you went back to tell—to tell more about what you
remember?
A: Yes.

Q: Do you know how you ended up there a second time?
A: I asked my mom if we could go because I was . . . starting
to remember more stuff. And I wanted to actually, like, say
more.

The CornerHouse interviewer testified about her credentials, about CornerHouse,
and about the forensic -interview process. She explained the different ways in which
children disclose abuse and factors that influence delayed reporting . She also explained
the concepts of script and episodic memory and their impacts on the forensic -interview
process.
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During trial, Schertner objected to the interviewer’s testimony about ways in which
children disclose abuse, factors that affect delayed reporting, and script and episodic
memory. He argued that the interviewer was “trying to testify as an expert as it relates to
things like memory —how memory works” and that although the interviewer cited to
studies in her testimony, she had “done no research” that he was aware of. He argued that
he had “not received an expert summary of any kind that got into any of thes e details or
any of these topics or any of the things that she’s testifying to, any of these studies she’s
reviewed to form these opinions —things like that.” The district court overruled
Schertner’s objection.
The jury found Schertner guilty of both counts of first -degree criminal sexual
conduct. The district court entered judgment of conviction for one count and sentenced
Schertner to 144 months’ imprisonment.
Schertner appeals.
DECISION
Schertner contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
CornerHouse forensic interviewer to testify as an expert.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony.
State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 2011). The rule states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The
opinion must have foundational reliability. In addition, if the
opinion or evidence involves novel scientific theory, the
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proponent must establish that the underlying scientific
evidence is generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.

Minn. R. Evid. 702.
“Under this rule, expert testimony is admissible if: (1) the witness is qualified as an
expert; (2) the expert’s opinion has foundational reliability ; (3) the expert testimony is
helpful to the jury; and (4) if the testimony involves a novel scientific theory, it must satisfy
the Frye-Mack standard.” Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 289. “The basic consideration in
admitting expert testimony under [r]ule 702 is the helpfulness test —that is, whether the
testimony will assist the jury in resolving factual questions presented.” State v. Grecinger,
569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn. 1997).
“The admission of expert testimony is within the broad discretion accorded [to] a
[district] court, and rulings regarding materiality, foundation, remoteness, relevancy, or the
cumulative nature of the evidence may be reversed only if the [district] court clearly abused
its discretion.” State v. Ritt , 599 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 1999) (quotation and citation
omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Garland , 942
N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). “A defendant claiming that the district
court erred in admitting evidence must demonstrate that the admission was both erroneous
and prejudicial.” State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 292 (Minn. 2002).
Expert Disclosure
Schertner argues that the state did not provide expert disclosures as required under
Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c), which provides:
6
A person who will testify as an expert but who created
no results or reports in connection with the case must provide
to the prosecutor for disclosure to the defense a written
summary of the subject matter of the expert’s testimony, along
with any findings, opinions, or conclusions the expert will
give, the basis for them, and the expert’s qualifications.

Such a summary “must be disclosed in time to afford counsel the opportunity to make
beneficial use of it.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 2(a).
Although Schertner objected to the content of the interviewer’s testimony during
trial and complained that he had “not received an expert summary of any kind that got into
any of these details or any of these topics or any of the things that she’s testifying to, any
of these studies she’s reviewed to form these opinions —things like that ,” he did not cite
rule 9.03 as a basis for relief. Schertner raises the alleged rule violation as a basis for relief
for the first time on appeal.
“A defendant may preserve a claim of evidentiary error by making a pretrial motion
to exclude the challenged evidence or by objecting at trial when the evidence is
introduced.” State v. Vasquez , 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018). Such an objection
“preserves review only for the stated basis for the objection or a basis apparent from the
context of the objection.” Id. Because Schertner did not cite the alleged rule violation as
a basis for relief when he objected to the content of the forensic examiner’s testimony at
trial, the issue is forfeited. See id. at 650 (stating the defendant forfeited review of the
district court’s determination that he waived privilege as to certain evidence because the
defendant did not make a timely claim of privilege).
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“[W]e review forfeited issues for plain error.” Id. “In order to meet the plain error
standard, a criminal defendant must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was
plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Myhre , 875
N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016) . Under the substantial-rights prong, Schertner “bears the
burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error
would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24,
38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Schertner makes no attempt to meet his burden under the plain -error standard. He
does not cite or apply the plain-error standard, and he does not argue that the alleged lack
of disclosure affected his counsel’s ability to defend him at trial. Thus, he is not entitled
to relief under the plain-error standard.
Foundational Reliability
Schertner argues that the district court abused its discretion because the state did not
establish foundation for the CornerHouse interviewer to provide expert testimony
regarding anything other than CornerHouse interview protocols and because the record did
not demonstrate that the interviewer’s testimony was foundationally reliable. When
determining foundational reliab ility under rule 702, “the district court must analyze the
proffered testimony in light of the purpose for which it is being offered” and “consider the
underlying reliability, consistency, and accuracy of the subject about which the expert is
testifying.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 167-68 (Minn. 2012).
In overruling Schertner’s trial objection to the content of the forensic interviewer’s
testimony, the district court reasoned:
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[S]he has indicated that she’s been through the CornerHouse
protocol training. She has many years dealing with children in
a professional capacity. What I am hearing her explain is how
she does her job and why she does her job the way she does.
I don’t think she’s testifying as an expert in memory like
a Ph.D[.] would. I don’t think she’s testifying as an expert in—
certainly, not in veracity; right? She’s just explaining to us
how she does her job and why she does her job the way she
does it and how she alters her job, depending on what the
person she’s talking to tells her.

Schertner asserts that the interviewer improperly testified “about memory and how
it related to delayed reports and memory script,” that the interviewer’s CV does not reflect
any “trainings or classes related to children’s memory,” and that the interviewer referenced
research and studies, but did not testify about the type of research and studies she had
reviewed. But as the district court reasoned, the interviewer’s testimony was not like that
of a “Ph.D[.]” expert in memory . Although she generally expl ained concepts regarding
memory in the context of disclosures by child -sex-abuse victims, she testified regarding
her training and background, and in ruling on the issue, the district court cited the
interviewer’s CornerHouse protocol training and experience working with children in a
professional capacity.
Schertner does not persuade us that the forensic interviewer’s testimony lacked
foundational reliability.
Helpful to Trier of Fact
Schertner also argues that the district court abused its discretion because the
interviewer’s testimony was not helpful to the trier of fact. Specifically, he claims that the
9
interviewer’s testimony regarding delayed and incremental reporting was vague and
imprecise, and did not add precision or depth.
“Expert opinion testimony is not helpful if the subject of the testimony is within the
knowledge and experience of a lay jury and the testimony of the expert will not add
precision or depth to the jury’s ability to reach conclusions about that subject whic h is
within their experience.” State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578-79 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Minnesota courts have recognized the usefulness of expert opinion testimony
regarding delayed and incremental reporting of sexual abuse. For example, in State v.
Myers, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in admitting
expert testimony regarding characteristics of sexually abused children, including those
observed in the seven-year-old victim in that case:
The nature . . . of the sexual abuse of children places lay jurors
at a disadvantage. Incest is prohibited in all or almost all
cultures, and the common experience of the jury may represent
a less than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility of
a young child who complains of sexual abuse. . . . Because of
the child’s confusion, shame, guilt, and fear, disclosure of the
abuse is often long delayed. . . . By explaining the emotional
antecedents of the victim’s conduct and the peculiar impact of
the crime on other members of the family, an expert can assist
the jury in evaluating the credibility of the complainant.

359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated, “we do not intend to establish a
categorical rule that expert testimony concerning all characteristics typically displayed by
adolescent sexual assault victims is admissible,” but “in cases where a sexual assault victim
10
is an adolescent, expert testimony as to the reporting conduct of such victims . . . is
admissible in the proper exercise of discretion” of a district court . State v. Hall , 406
N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 1987); see State v. Reyes , 890 N.W.2d 406, 41 3 (Minn. App.
2017) (“Because the opinion testimony was limited to whether certain characteristics were
common in cases dealing with the sexual abuse of adolescents , we conclude that the
testimony was within Hall’s parameters and that the district court did not err in admitting
it.”); see also State v. Garden , 404 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing Myers in
reasoning that “admission of an expert’s opinion . . . obviously would assist a jury”), rev.
denied (Minn. June 25, 1987).
Schertner does not persuade us that the forensic interviewer’s testimony was not
helpful to the jury.
In conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
CornerHouse interviewer to testify as an expert at trial.
Affirmed.