State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1188

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mickela Joy Vredenburg,
Appellant.

Filed July 14, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CR-23-1421

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stephen F. O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorney, Elizabeth M.S. Breza, Assistant County
Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Schmidt ,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges her conviction of disorderly conduct,
arguing that her Alford plea is invalid.1 Because appellant’s Alford plea was not supported
by a strong factual basis and therefore is inaccurate, we reverse and remand to allow
appellant to withdraw her plea.
FACTS
In July 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Mickela Joy
Vredenburg with four offenses: fifth-degree assault, misdemeanor domestic assault, felony
threats of violence, and disorderly conduct. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.224, subd. 1(2), .2242,
subd. 1(2), .713, subd. 1, .72, subd. 1(3) (2022). She pleaded not guilty. On the day that
trial was to begin, Vredenburg entered into a plea agreement with the state. Consistent
with the agreement, Vredenburg entered an Alford plea to the offense of disorderly conduct,
and the state dismissed the remaining charges.
After Vredenburg pleaded guilty to the offense, Vredenburg’s counsel questioned
her to establish a factual basis for the plea as follows.
Q: And it’s an Alford plea which means that you’re not saying,
I was disorderly, I committed disorderly conduct; instead what
you are saying is you understand that there’s evidence in this
case, and you understand that there’s police reports, there
would be testimony of some police officers and at least two
other people, . . . and you are saying, yep, if we were to go
ahead and have a jury trial there’s a substantial likelihood that

1 An Alford plea refers to a plea in which the defendant pleads guilty but continues to
maintain their innocence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
3
I could be found guilty of that disorderly conduct charge; is
that right?
A: I think that with the circumstances to the case, that yes.

. . . .

Q: And specifically you made that decision because you know
that disorderly conduct includes behavior such as shouting and
yelling and swearing and could include things like pushing
things over or throwing things around; do you understand that?
A: Yes.

Q: And do you understand that if we were to have a trial that
there would be testimony from witnesses that included you
performing those kinds of activities; is that right?
A: I think there could be; correct.

Q: Yeah, and you know that that was at least what the plan
was for the evidence that the State would provide; is that right?
A: I don’t doubt it, that’s right.

After questioning Vredenburg, her counsel offered, and the district court received,
a plea petition signed by Vredenburg. In the petition, Vredenburg stated that she had
reviewed the “evidence that the State has against [her] including the police reports
containing the statements of J.V. and R.O.” and she “underst[ood] that if this matter were
to go to trial, there is a substantial likelihood that [she] would be found guilty of Disorderly
Conduct.” She also added that there was a substantial likelihood that she would be
determined to have “engaged in noisy, objectionable language and conduct (knocking over
a table and shouting at R.O. and J.V.) in such a way that would tend to alarm, disturb,
offend or anger other people.” No other evidence was offered by Vredenburg or the state
to support the factual basis for Vredenburg’s Alford plea.
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The district court accepted the plea, entered judgment of conviction on the
disorderly conduct charge, dismissed the other charges, and sentenced Vredenburg to
90 days’ imprisonment.
Vredenburg appeals.
DECISION
Vredenburg argues that her Alford plea is constitutionally invalid because the plea
is not supported by a strong factual basis. The validity of a guilty plea presents a question
of law, which we review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To
be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v.
Bell, 971 N.W.2d 92, 100 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 27, 2022). It is the defendant’s burden to show that the plea is invalid. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 94.
Vredenburg does not dispute that her plea to disorderly conduct was voluntary or
intelligent. She challenges only the accuracy of her plea. “The accuracy requirement
protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which
[s]he could be convicted if [s]he insisted on [her] right to trial.” Id. “A proper factual basis
must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716
(Minn. 1994). More specifically, “a factual basis must be established on the record
showing that the defendant’s conduct meets all elements of the charge to which [s]he is
pleading guilty.” Barnslater v. State, 805 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. App. 2011). The
sufficiency of the factual basis for a guilty plea is determined “from the record established
5
when the plea was tendered.” State v. Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn. App. 1987)
(emphasis omitted).
Typically, the accuracy of a plea is established “by asking the defendant to express
in [her] own words what happened.” Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn.
App. 2021) (quotation omitted). A district court “need not personally interrogate the
defendant prior to acceptance of a guilty plea if defense counsel and the prosecutor have
established an adequate factual basis.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. But the district court
has the responsibility “to ensure that an adequate factual basis has been established in the
record.” Id. “The [district court] must be particularly attentive to situations in which a
defendant is pleading guilty and is asked only leading questions by counsel.” Id. And
before a guilty plea can be accepted, “the [district court] must make certain that facts exist
from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.”
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
However, when a defendant enters an Alford plea, she pleads guilty while
maintaining her innocence. 400 U.S. at 37-38. As a result, there is an inherent conflict in
an Alford plea between a defendant’s decision to plead guilty and her continued insistence
on her innocence. See id. at 32 (stating that a defendant’s assertion of innocence could be
viewed as negating their admission of guilt). Consequently, an Alford plea requires a
“strong factual basis,” and the defendant must clearly express “[her] desire to enter the plea
based on [her] belief that the State’s evidence would be sufficient to convict [her].”
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 38).
6
Further, the United States Supreme Court left it to the individual states to decide whether
to accept Alford guilty pleas. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11.
In State v. Goulette, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether an Alford
plea is permissible under state law. 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977). The Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that a district court may accept an Alford plea when “the
[district] court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual
basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which
would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly entered.” Id. at 760 (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court
emphasized that a district court “should not cavalierly accept the plea” and must ensure
“there is a sufficient factual basis to support it.” Id. at 761.
In Ecker, the Minnesota Supreme Court reiterated the requirement for a sufficient
factual basis in an Alford plea. 524 N.W.2d at 717. In that case, Ecker pleaded guilty to,
among other crimes, felony murder but asserted that he was innocent because he could not
remember shooting the victim. Id. at 715. Ecker was “questioned . . . extensively during
his guilty plea” by the prosecutor and his attorneys and admitted that he remembered
committing a robbery of a convenience store before and after the murder and that he was
responsible for the death of the victim. Id. And he agreed “several times” that the state’s
evidence was sufficient to convict him. Id. This evidence included, among other evidence,
surveillance photos of the robbery committed by Ecker, Ecker’s written confession, and
the murder weapon which was recovered from the car that Ecker was in. Id. at 714-15.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Ecker’s plea, concluding that an adequate factual
7
basis had “[c]learly” been established, and reiterated the importance of district court
interrogating the defendant when they enter an Alford plea. Id. at 717.
In Theis, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that “[s]everal guiding principles are
drawn” from Alford, Goulette, and Ecker regarding Alford pleas, including that there must
be “careful scrutiny of the factual basis for the plea.” 742 N.W.2d at 648. In discussing
how the requisite “strong factual basis” for an Alford plea can be established, the Minnesota
Supreme Court emphasized “that the better practice is for the factual basis to be based on
evidence discussed with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing, as it was in both
Goulette and Ecker.” Id. at 649. The supreme court noted that the “discussion may occur
through an interrogation of the defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence
that would likely be presented at trial,” “introduction at the plea hearing of witness
statements or other documents,” or “presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses
likely to testify at trial.” Id. at 649.
Together, Theis, Goulette, and Ecker instruct that, to establish a strong factual basis,
the record must allow the district court to determine that the state’s evidence is sufficient
to convict, despite the defendant maintaining their innocence. Id.; Goulette, 258 N.W.2d
at 761; Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. In other words, the factual basis must include sufficient
information regarding evidence indicating guilt for the district court to “independently
conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the
charge to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.
Vredenburg argues that the record lacks the necessary strong factual basis to support
her Alford plea of guilty to disorderly conduct. Vredenburg was charged with disorderly
8
conduct under Minnesota Statutes Section 609.72, subdivision 1(3) (2022). A person is
guilty of disorderly conduct under this statutory provision if the person engaged in
“offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct, or in offensive, obscene, or
abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3). In addition, the person must do so “knowing[] or having
reasonable grounds to know that ” the conduct or language “ will, or will tend to, alarm,
anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or breach of the peace.” Id., subd. 1 (2022).2
“[W]hether particular conduct is disorderly ‘must at all times be dependent upon the facts
of each particular case and the circumstances that surround the incident.’” State v. Janecek,
903 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. App. 2017) (quoting State v. Reynolds, 66 N.W.2d 886, 890
(Minn. 1954)).
Vredenburg argues that the factual basis for her plea to disorderly conduct is too
vague to meet the strong-factual-basis requirement for an Alford plea. We agree.
We begin by noting that Vredenburg’s plea colloquy was presented entirely through
Vredenburg’s responses to leading questions by Vredenburg’s attorney, a practice that is
disfavored for traditional guilty pleas as well as Alford pleas. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at

2 Vredenburg argues that disorderly conduct includes a third element, that the language
was used, or conduct occurred, in a “public or private place.” The statute defining
disorderly conduct does state that the individual who engages in the prohibited conduct “in
a public or private place . . . is guilty of disorderly conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1.
However, Vredenburg provides no precedential authority, and we are aware of none, that
concludes that this language creates a separate element of the crime of disorderly conduct.
And because it is difficult to conceive of a location that is neither pu blic nor private, this
language appears to be a clarification that disorderly conduct can occur both in public and
in private, rather than a required element.
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94-95 (addressing traditional pleas); Ecker , 524 N.W.2d at 716-17 (discussing Alford
pleas). And the factual basis for Vredenburg’s Alford plea was presented in summary form
by Vredenburg’s attorney, another practice that is disfavored when entering an Alford plea.
Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761. Additionally, the colloquy was very brief, providing no
substantive details about what the state’s evidence would show. And, significantly, the
state offered no witness testimony, exhibits, or other evidence to support the factual basis,
leaving only Vredenburg’s agreement with her attorney’s leading questions and her plea
petition to establish the factual basis for her Alford plea.
Based on our review of Vredenburg’s limited plea colloquy and the plea petition,
we can only conclude that Vredenburg’s Alford plea lacks the necessary strong factual
basis. Vredenburg’s colloquy and plea petition, even taken together, would not allow a
district court to determine that there is a strong probability that a jury would find that she
“engage[d] in offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct or in offensive,
obscene, or abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in
others.” Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3).
In her plea colloquy, Vredenburg answered affirmatively to her attorney’s leading,
summary questions on whether she understood (1) “that there’s evidence in this case,
and . . . that there’s police reports, there would be testimony of some police officers and at
least two other people ”; (2) “that disorderly conduct includes behavior such as shooting
and yelling and swearing and could include things like pushing things over or throwing
things around”; and (3) if there was a trial “there would be testimony from witnesses that
included [her] performing those kinds of activities.” (Emphasis added.) These general
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statements discuss the elements of disorderly conduct, but they do not provide any
meaningful information about the state’s evidence. For example, Vredenburg did not
indicate, and the state did not inquire into, the identity of the “witnesses.” Nor did she
provide any specific details regarding the “activities” to which the unknown witnesses
would testify. Vredenburg’s vague statements lack sufficient detail for a district court to
conclude that there is a strong probability that Vredenburg would be foun d guilty of
disorderly conduct based on the state’s evidence. See Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3).
Vredenburg’s plea petition is only slightly more specific. In the petition,
Vredenburg states that she “understand[s] that if this matter were to go to trial, there is a
substantial likelihood that” she would be determined to have “engaged in noisy,
objectionable language and conduct (knocking over a table and shouting at R.O. and J.V.)
in such a way that would tend to alarm, disturb, offend or anger other people.” But
Vredenburg’s plea petition does not indicate what evidence the state has that supports her
understanding. And, without knowing what evidence the state has to support its case, it is
unclear how a district court could determine whether the conduct referenced in her plea
petition rises to the level of disorderly conduct.
Because the plea petition lacks any discussion of the state’s evidence and her plea
colloquy is similarly vague, we conclude that her plea colloquy and petition, even taken
together, are insufficient to establish a strong factual basis for the Alford plea. In reaching
this conclusion, we are mindful that the determination of whether an individual engaged in
criminal disorderly conduct requires a consideration of “the facts of each particular case
and the circumstances that surround the incident.” Janecek, 903 N.W.2d at 430 (quotation
11
omitted). In sum, Vredenburg’s plea lacks a strong factual basis because the plea colloquy
and plea petition do not support an “independent[] conclu[sion] that there is a strong
probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which [s]he pleaded
guilty, notwithstanding [her] claims of innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (emphasis
omitted).
We are not persuaded otherwise by the state’s argument that Vredenburg’s plea is
specific enough to establish a strong factual basis because Vredenburg agreed that she
reviewed the state’s evidence, including the complaint and police reports, and she agreed
that the state’s evidence is sufficient for a jury to find her guilty of disorderly conduct. In
entering an Alford plea, the district court may not rely on documents “such as a complaint”
unless the defendant expressly admits to the accuracy of the document. Rosendahl,
955 N.W.2d at 301. That did not happen here. Vredenburg did not expressly admit to the
accuracy of either the complaint or the police reports. Nor did the state present the police
reports, the complaint, or any of the underlying evidence at the plea colloquy. The state
also did not examine Vredenburg regarding any facts therein. Instead, the record is limited
to Vredenburg’s answers to her attorney’s leading questions and the plea petition, which,
as discussed above, fail to establish a strong factual basis. See Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d at 69
(stating that the factual basis for the plea is determined “from the record established when
the plea was tendered” (emphasis omitted)).
In sum, the district court erred when it accepted Vredenburg’s Alford plea of guilty
to disorderly conduct because the plea lacked the requisite strong factual basis. We
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therefore reverse the judgment of conviction and remand to allow Vredenburg to withdraw
her guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded.