In the Matter of the Trust Created Under Agreement by and Between Janet E. Johnson, Settlor, and Paul Johnson, ...

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A24-1189

Court of Appeals Gaïtas, J.

In the Matter of the Trust Created Under
Agreement by and Between Janet E. Johnson,
Settlor, and Paul Johnson, Successor Trustee,
dated July 15, 1998;

In the Matter of the Trust Created Under
Agreement by and Between Carroll A.
Johnson, Settlor, and Paul Johnson,
successor Trustee, dated July 15, 1998;

Nancy Patock and Susan Gerhardt,
Beneficiaries,

Respondents,

and Filed: September 24, 2025
Office of Appellate Courts
Paul Johnson, Successor Trustee,

Appellant.

________________________

Cletus J. Frank, Frank Law Office, P.A., Willmar, Minnesota, for respondents.

Richard C. Landon, Amy Erickson, Kiralyn Locke, Lathrop GPM LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________

1
 SYLLABUS

1. The district court’s order requiring the trustee to restore real property to two

family trusts is not an order that “grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an

injunction” under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03(b), and therefore it

is not immediately appealable under that rule.

2. The district court’s order removing the trustee from two family trusts and

appointing a successor trustee is not an order that “grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to

dissolve, an injunction” under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03(b), and

therefore it is not immediately appealable under that rule.

Affirmed.

OPINION

GAÏTAS, Justice.

This case requires us to determine whether actions the district court took under

Minnesota’s Trust Code, Minnesota Statutes chapter 501C (2024), are immediately

appealable under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03(b), which allows

for an interlocutory appeal “from an order which grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to

dissolve, an injunction.” Appellant Paul Johnson served as trustee of two family trusts that

were established for the benefit of Johnson and his sisters, respondents Nancy Patock and

Susan Gerhardt. In 2023, Patock and Gerhardt filed a petition in the district court seeking

a declaratory judgment that Johnson breached his duties as trustee, requesting his removal

as trustee, and demanding the return of disputed real property to the trusts. No formal

injunction was sought. After an initial order granting Patock and Gerhardt’s request for a

2
declaratory judgment, the district court issued an order removing Johnson as trustee,

naming Patock as successor trustee, and ordering Johnson to restore the disputed property

to the trusts. The district court also ordered Patock, the successor trustee, to investigate

whether Johnson made any transactions that should be reimbursed to the trusts and to

submit any reimbursement requests to the district court for approval; determined that

Patock and Gerhardt were entitled to reimbursement for costs, disbursements, and attorney

fees in bringing this action, and ordered them to submit those reimbursement requests for

approval; and ordered ongoing review hearings until the trusts are terminated. Johnson

appealed this interlocutory order, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal as

premature. We conclude that because the district court’s order is neither an injunction nor

the functional equivalent of an injunction, it is not immediately appealable under Rule

103.03(b), and the court of appeals did not err by dismissing the appeal as premature. We

therefore affirm.

FACTS

In 1998, Carroll A. Johnson and Janet E. Johnson, husband and wife, executed

separate trust agreements in their respective names. Carroll A. Johnson, the last surviving

settlor of the trusts, died in March 2016. Son Paul Johnson and daughters Nancy Patock

and Susan Gerhardt were the surviving adult children and the beneficiaries of the trusts.

The trust agreements contained identical directions for what to do following the

death of the last surviving parent: son Paul Johnson1 would become the sole trustee of the

1
All references to Johnson hereinafter are to son Paul Johnson.

3
trusts. As trustee, Johnson would be required to divide the trusts into three equal shares,

one for each surviving child, and to distribute the income evenly among the children for

seven years. Seven years after the death of the last surviving parent, the trusts would

terminate,2 and Johnson would be required to “distribute to [each] child their share of the

entire remaining principal.” Johnson could “make no distribution of principal prior to this

date.”

The siblings’ father and last surviving parent, Carroll A. Johnson, died on March 10,

2016. At that time, Johnson became the sole trustee of his parents’ trusts, and he assumed

the responsibility of managing the trusts until March 10, 2023, when the trusts would

terminate under the trust agreements.

The trusts included a variety of assets. The principal asset was a parcel of

agricultural land in Sacred Heart, Minnesota. The trust agreements granted Johnson an

option to purchase the property after the death of the last surviving parent. According to

the trust agreements, “[u]pon the death of the Settlor and Settlor’s spouse, the Trustee shall

offer the. . . real property for sale to Paul Johnson,” and the option would “cease upon

[Johnson’s] death or in the event of his failure within sixty (60) days to purchase the

property after a written offer by the Trustee.” Johnson moved into a residence on the

property after his father’s death in 2016, but he did not seek to exercise the option to

purchase the property for several years.

2
“[A] trust terminates to the extent the trust is revoked or expires pursuant to its
terms, no purpose of the trust remains to be achieved, or the purposes of the trust have
become unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve.” Minn. Stat.
§ 501C.0410(a) (2024).

4
 In December 2022, about three months before the trusts were to terminate, Johnson,

in his capacity as trustee, gave himself, in his individual capacity, notice of the option to

purchase the property. Shortly thereafter, Johnson purchased the property from the trusts

for $2,384,649. To fund the purchase, Johnson secured several mortgage loans against the

property.

About one month after Johnson purchased the property from the trusts, Patock and

Gerhardt filed a petition under Minnesota Statutes section 501C.0202 seeking various

forms of relief related to the administration of the “Janet E. Johnson Revocable Trust dated

July 15, 1998.” Later that year, Patock and Gerhardt filed an amended petition joining the

“Carroll A. Johnson Revocable Trust dated July 15, 1998.” In their petition and a related

motion, Patock and Gerhardt asked the district court to, in relevant part: (1) determine that

the purchase option granted to Johnson by the trusts terminated 60 days after the death of

the last living settlor; (2) remove Johnson as trustee and appoint an independent trustee;

and (3) order Johnson to return the agricultural property to the trusts, free of encumbrances,

or to reimburse the trusts for the value of the property.3

On March 13, 2024, the district court issued an order addressing the purchase

option. The district court found that “[t]he purchase option granted to Paul Johnson in the

3
The petition and motion also asked the district court to order Johnson to provide a
complete accounting of his actions as trustee and to reimburse the trusts for costs related
to the maintenance of the residence on the agricultural property; to order the trustee to
distribute the trust property and incomes to the beneficiaries in equal shares; to allow all
beneficiaries to access and divide the tangible personal property of the trusts; to directly
supervise the administration, distribution, and termination of the trusts; and to approve
payment of attorney fees from the trusts.

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trust agreements lapsed sixty days after the death of Carroll Johnson in 2016” and, as a

result, “Paul Johnson did not have a right to exercise the purchase option and purchase the

trust property . . . in 2023.” It further found that Johnson “breached his duty as trustee by

acting outside the terms of the trusts and engaging as trustee in the sale of trust property

for his own personal benefit.” The district court reserved all other requests for relief and

scheduled a status conference for the following month.4

Following an attempted mediation that did not resolve the outstanding issues, the

district court held several status conferences, including one on July 16, 2024, during which

Patock and Gerhardt reasserted their requests to remove Johnson as trustee, appoint a

successor trustee, and restore the agricultural property to the trusts. The next day, July 17,

2024, the district court issued an order that addressed Patock and Gerhardt’s requests for

relief. In relevant part, the order (1) removed Johnson as trustee; (2) appointed Patock as

successor trustee; and (3) directed Johnson to return “all real property deeded to himself

from the trusts on or about January 12, 2023” and to take all “necessary actions to return

the real property, unencumbered, to the trusts within 14 days” of the order.5 Several

4
Johnson filed a notice of appeal to the court of appeals from the district court’s
March 2024 order. The court of appeals dismissed Johnson’s appeal as premature because
there were still outstanding issues for the district court to resolve. Johnson’s attempt to
appeal the March 2024 order is not at issue here.
5
The district court also addressed Patock and Gerhardt’s other requests for relief.
Specifically, the district court ordered Johnson to “immediately turn over all other trust
assets in his possession to [Patock],” who would be responsible for distributing the trust
assets pursuant to the trust agreements; ordered Johnson to “provide a complete accounting
of all actions taken by him while trustee”; ordered Patock to “review trust records and
investigate whether . . . Johnson made any transactions” requiring reimbursement to the

6
outstanding issues remained. The district court reserved ruling on whether Johnson would

be required to reimburse the trusts for any transactions. The district court also concluded

that Patock and Gerhardt were entitled to reimbursement from the trusts for reasonable

attorney fees and costs in bringing this action, and ordered reimbursement requests to be

submitted to the district court for approval. Additionally, the district court ordered a review

hearing and stated that it would retain in rem jurisdiction until the trusts are terminated.

Johnson appealed the July 2024 order to the court of appeals.6 The court of appeals

questioned jurisdiction and ordered the parties to submit briefing to address whether the

appeal was premature. Relevant to this appeal, Johnson argued that the July 2024 order is

appealable under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03(b), which

authorizes an appeal “from an order which grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve,

an injunction.”7 The court of appeals determined that the July 2024 order is not appealable

trusts; declared that Patock and Gerhardt are entitled to reasonable attorney fees; and
asserted the court’s continuing “jurisdiction in a supervised administration” until the trusts
terminate.
6
On the same day that Johnson filed his appeal, Johnson also filed an alternative
petition for discretionary review under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure
105.01, which authorizes the court of appeals to “allow an appeal from an order not
otherwise appealable” in the interests of justice. The court of appeals denied Johnson’s
request for discretionary review on the same day that it dismissed his appeal. That order
is not at issue here.
7
Johnson argued that the July 2024 order was appealable on two other grounds. First,
Johnson asserted that the order was appealable under Minnesota Statutes
section 501C.0204, subdivision 1 of the Trust Code, which allows any party, in a case in
which there has been a hearing of a petition, to appeal “an order which, in effect, determines
the petition.” Second, Johnson argued that the order was appealable under Minnesota Rule
of Civil Procedure 103.03(g), which authorizes an appeal “from a final order, decision or

7
under Rule 103.03(b) as an order that grants an injunction, reasoning that Patock and

Gerhardt had not requested temporary or permanent injunctive relief and the order did not

grant such relief. In re Tr. Created Under Agreement by & Between Johnson & Johnson,

dated July 15, 1998, No. A24-1189, 2024 WL 4003155, at *2 (Minn. App. filed Aug. 27,

2024) [hereinafter In re Johnson Trusts].

Johnson petitioned for further review in this court, seeking review of whether the

district court’s order requiring him to transfer property to the trusts and removing him as

trustee are immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b), even though the district court did

not name the order an “injunction” and even though the order granted permanent rather

than temporary relief. We granted review.

ANALYSIS

In this case, we are asked to determine whether the district court’s order granting

various relief under the Trust Code is immediately appealable under Minnesota Rule of

Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03(b), which allows for an appeal from “an order which

grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction.” The court of appeals

determined that the district court’s order is not immediately appealable under

Rule 103.03(b). In re Johnson Trusts, 2024 WL 4003155, at *2. The court of appeals

reasoned that the order “d[id] not involve a request for temporary relief pending the result

judgment affecting a substantial right made in an administrative or other special
proceeding.” The court of appeals determined that the order was not appealable on either
ground because it did not resolve the outstanding reimbursement and attorney fees issues
and therefore was not a final order that effectively determined the petition. The denial of
appellate jurisdiction on those grounds was not raised in the petition for review and is not
before us.

8
of a proceeding” but instead “granted requests for permanent relief” that “[t]he trust statute

expressly allows the district court to grant.” Id. The court of appeals also observed that

Patock and Gerhardt “did not request a temporary or permanent injunction, and the July 17,

2024 order did not grant such relief.” Id. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the

order is not an injunction or the functional equivalent of an injunction. Id.

Before us, Johnson contends that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his appeal

because the district court’s July 2024 order, which compels him to transfer property and

removes him as trustee, “has the unmistakable characteristics of an injunction” and

therefore is immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b). We begin with a brief overview

of the Trust Code and appellate jurisdiction over injunctions before turning to the district

court’s order.

Under the Trust Code, an “interested person,” such as a trustee or a beneficiary, may

petition the district court to resolve matters related to the administration of a trust.

Minn. Stat. § 501C.0201; see Minn. Stat. § 501C.0202 (specifying the matters to which a

petition may relate). Following a hearing on a trust petition, the district court has

authority to “make an order it considers appropriate” under the Trust Code. Minn. Stat.

§§ 501C.0203-.0204, .1001–.1004 (explaining the procedural requirements of hearings and

orders and the remedies available to the district court).8 When, as here, a district court

determines that a trustee has violated a duty that the trustee owes a beneficiary, the Trust

Code allows for specific relief, including the restoration of property to the trust, the

8
The common law of trusts and the principles of equity supplement the Trust Code.
Minn. Stat. § 501C.0106.

9
removal of the trustee, and the appointment of a successor trustee. Minn. Stat.

§ 501C.1001(b)(3), (7), (10) (authorizing the court to compel a trustee who has committed

a breach of trust to redress the “breach of trust by paying money, restoring property, or

other means;” to “remove the trustee as provided in [Minnesota Statutes] section

501C.0706;” and to “order any other appropriate relief”). Explicitly included among the

statutory remedies for breach of trust—but not specifically ordered here—is that the court

may “enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust.” Minn. Stat. § 501C.1001(b)(2).

A party may appeal a district court’s decision under the Trust Code to the court of

appeals. In such cases, an order is appealable only if it “in effect, determines the petition.”

Minn. Stat. § 501C.0204. To the extent Johnson argued to the court of appeals that the

July 2024 order is appealable under this statute, that issue was not raised to this court and

is not before us.

The Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure govern the appealability of

district court decisions (including decisions under the Trust Code) and provide the

procedures that apply on appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 101.01; see Minn. Stat.

§ 501C.0204. Generally, under these rules, only final judgments are appealable. Reichel

v. Wendland Utz, LTD, 11 N.W.3d 602, 609 (Minn. 2024).

Here, Johnson no longer presses as he did before the court of appeals that the

July 2024 order is a final order. And it is undisputed that the district court did not decide

all the issues before it. Following the July 2024 order, several issues remained before the

district court—reimbursement of the trusts for any transactions made by Johnson and

10
requests for costs, disbursements, expenses, and attorney fees. The district court set a

future review hearing for the case.

Interlocutory appeals from decisions made before the district court has issued a final

judgment resolving all claims by all parties are permitted only under limited circumstances.

Reichel, 11 N.W.3d at 609. Such appeals “are disfavored because they ‘may cause

disruption, delay, and expense for litigants . . . .’ ” Id. (quoting Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc.,

418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 1988)). Interlocutory appeals “also burden appellate courts

by requiring immediate consideration of issues which may become moot or irrelevant by

the end of trial.” Emme, 418 N.W.2d at 179. For this reason, the “thrust” of the Rules of

Civil Appellate Procedure “is that appeals should not be brought or considered piecemeal.”

Id.

Nonetheless, our appellate rules allow interlocutory appeals under limited

circumstances. As noted, Rule 103.03(b) permits an appeal “from an order which grants,

refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b).

We have held that this rule also allows interlocutory appeals from “orders that grant or

deny injunctions in effect but not in name.” In re Estate of Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d 225, 232

(Minn. 2022) (citing Howard v. Svoboda, 890 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn. 2017)).

To resolve this case, we must decide whether the district court’s July 2024 order

requiring Johnson to restore the agricultural property to the trusts, and removing Johnson

as trustee and appointing Patock as successor trustee, is an injunction or the functional

equivalent of an injunction that may be appealed under Rule 103.03(b). This requires us

to interpret and apply the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, which present questions of

11
law that we review de novo. See Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d at 231. Likewise, issues of

appellate jurisdiction are questions of law subject to de novo review. Howard, 890 N.W.2d

at 114.

Although the district court issued just one order, Johnson points out that the order

as relevant to this appeal granted two different types of relief—it required him to return

real property to the trusts, and it removed him as trustee and appointed a successor trustee.

Because Johnson contends that these two separate actions effectively constitute two

injunctions, we address them separately. We first address Johnson’s arguments related to

the return of the real property, and then we consider Johnson’s arguments regarding the

removal of a trustee and the appointment of a successor trustee.

I.

Johnson contends that the district court’s order requiring him to restore the

agricultural property to the trusts is immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b) because

the order is the functional equivalent of an injunction. He also asserts that the order is

immediately appealable under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Forgay v.

Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848), which created an exception to the final judgment rule for

interlocutory orders mandating the immediate transfer of real property. Johnson urges us

to adopt the “Forgay doctrine” by holding that an interlocutory order mandating the

immediate transfer of real property is immediately appealable. We consider whether the

order requiring Johnson to restore the property to the trusts is immediately appealable under

Rule 103.03(b) before addressing Johnson’s arguments related to Forgay.

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 A.

Johnson first argues that the district court’s July 2024 order requiring him to restore

the agricultural property to the trusts is immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b) as

the functional equivalent of a mandatory injunction. He contends that the order commands

him to take affirmative action—restoring the property to the trusts—to preserve the status

quo until the district court reaches a final decision in the case. Johnson observes that this

feature is a hallmark of a mandatory injunction.

Just because a court order “directs one party to affirmatively act . . . does not create

an injunction.” Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d at 233. To determine whether the district court’s

order requiring Johnson to restore the agricultural property to the trusts is the functional

equivalent of an injunction, we must “examin[e] the key features” of both injunctions and

the district court’s order. Id. at 232.

We begin with the key features of injunctions. Injunctions may be equitable or

statutory. See State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., 899 N.W.2d 467, 471–72 (Minn. 2017). To

obtain an equitable injunction, a party must establish that the available legal remedy is

inadequate and that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and irreparable harm.

Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979) (citations

omitted). There are certain fundamental factors that a court considers when determining

whether to grant injunctive relief. When deciding whether a temporary equitable injunction

is warranted, a court considers the nature and background of the parties’ relationship; the

balance of the harms between the parties; each party’s likelihood of success on the merits;

public policy considerations; and the administrative burden of awarding temporary

13
injunctive relief. Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 321–22

(Minn. 1965). Separately, statutory injunctions are provided for by statute, and “[t]he

conditions that must be met to grant a statutory injunction are determined by the text of the

statute authorizing the injunction.” Minn. Sch. of Bus., 899 N.W.2d at 471–72.

Injunctions may also be preventative or mandatory. Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d at 232.

But in either instance, “the preservation or restoration of the status quo . . . is generally a

key feature of injunctions.” Id. at 233. A preventative injunction prohibits a party from

acting and preserves the status quo until the district court determines the respective rights

of the parties. Id. at 232. On the other hand, “a mandatory injunction requires a party to

act, which sometimes may change the status of the parties, but still very often with the goal

and effect of restoring the original status quo.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bellows v.

Ericson, 46 N.W.2d 654, 658–59 (Minn. 1951)).

Johnson contends that the district court’s July 2024 order is the functional

equivalent of a mandatory equitable injunction. Thus, we next examine whether the order

has features of a mandatory equitable injunction. This requires is to consider “whether the

[district] court analyzed the motion or petition as one requesting an injunction, whether it

reviewed any of the equitable factors for injunctive relief, or whether it considered the

merits of the underlying action when addressing the requested relief.” Id. at 233; see also

Howard, 890 N.W.2d at 114–15; City of Rochester v. Kottschade, 896 N.W.2d 541, 545

n.1 (Minn. 2017). “[W]e need not mark the precise boundary of what orders are, and are

not, injunctions.” Howard, 890 N.W.2d at 114. Instead, we need only evaluate the relevant

14
considerations to determine whether the district court effectively granted injunctive relief

that is appealable under Rule 103.03(b). Id. at 114–15.

Evaluating those considerations, we conclude that the district court’s July 2024

order is not the functional equivalent of an injunction. Two considerations clearly weigh

against determining that the order granted injunctive relief. First, Patock and Gerhardt did

not expressly seek an injunction in their petition filed under the Trust Code. Patock and

Gerhardt alleged that Johnson breached his duties as trustee and requested relief provided

by the Trust Code for Johnson’s breach of the trusts. Second, the district court did not

analyze the petition as a request for injunctive relief. Specifically, the district court did not

consider whether an injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable harm, whether Patock

and Gerhardt had an adequate remedy at law, or whether injunctive relief was appropriate

considering the equitable factors that courts weigh when deciding a motion for a temporary

injunction. See Cherne Indus., 278 N.W.2d at 92; Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321.

As to the last consideration, the district court’s July 2024 order likely did consider

the merits of the underlying petition because it incorporated the district court’s March 2024

order, which concluded that Johnson “breached his duty as trustee by acting outside the

terms of the trusts and engaging as trustee in the sale of trust property for his own personal

benefit.” A district court’s consideration of the merits of the underlying action may weigh

in favor of determining that an order is appealable as the functional equivalent of an

injunction. See Howard, 890 N.W.2d at 115 (citing Int’l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d

403, 406 (2d Cir. 1963) (explaining that appealable injunctions provide “some or all of the

substantive relief sought by a complaint” but do not include “restraints or directions in

15
orders concerning the conduct of the parties or their counsel, unrelated to the substantive

issues in the action, while awaiting trial”)). Here, however, we conclude that this

circumstance weighs against determining that the July 2024 order is the functional

equivalent of an injunction.

We reach this conclusion because, contrary to Johnson’s assertion that the July 2024

order merely preserved the status quo until the district court could reach a final decision,

the district court did reach a decision as to whether Johnson breached his duties as the

trustee in its March 2024 order. Again, the district court found that Johnson breached his

duties as the trustee. Then, the district court’s July 2024 order imposed a statutory

remedy—not to preserve the status quo—but to address the breach of the trusts. See

Minn. Stat. § 501C.1001(b)(3) (stating that a district court may compel a trustee to

restore property to a trust as a remedy for breach of trust). The July 2024 order directed

Johnson to restore the property to the trusts, as authorized by the Trust Code, while

reserving a decision on Patock and Gerhardt’s other requested remedies. Under these

circumstances, the district court’s consideration of the merits of the underlying action,

which led the district court to grant some of Patock and Gerhardt’s requested relief, indicate

that the district court’s July 2024 order is not the functional equivalent of an equitable

injunction to preserve the status quo, but instead, a nonfinal decision on the merits.

This conclusion is further supported by our case law. In Figliuzzi, we considered

whether a constructive trust is an injunction for purposes of Rule 103.03(b), and we

concluded that “[a]lthough a constructive trust directs one party to affirmatively act by

conveying property to another, it does not create an injunction.” 979 N.W.2d at 232–33.

16
We emphasized in reaching this conclusion that imposing a constructive trust does not

relate “to the preservation or restoration of the status quo, which is generally a key feature

of injunctions.” Id. at 233. As noted here, the district court’s July 2024 order directing

Johnson to restore the agricultural property to the trusts was not an attempt to restore the

status quo pending a decision on the merits. It was an attempt to “right a wrong” under the

Trust Code. Id. (stating that a constructive trust does not preserve the status quo, but rather,

it attempts to “right a wrong”). Moreover, as in Figliuzzi, the district court here “did not

analyze the request . . . as one for injunctive relief[,]” and it “did not review the equitable

factors for injunctive relief.” Id. Thus, the district court’s order is not the functional

equivalent of an injunction that is immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b).

Johnson contends that “the fact that certain forms of relief are outlined in the

Minnesota Trust Code does not negate their injunctive effect.” However, we are not

persuaded by this argument. We have already concluded that the district court’s July 2024

order did not have an “injunctive effect.” Moreover, the Legislature knows how to

explicitly provide for a statutory injunction when it wants to do so. See In re Benson,

12 N.W.3d 711, 717 (Minn. 2024) (explaining that the Legislature could have made the

right to counsel unwaivable, as it did in other statutes). One of the remedies for a breach

of trust under the Trust Code is that a court may “enjoin the trustee from committing a

17
breach of trust.” Minn. Stat. § 501C.1001(b)(2). But that is not the relief that the district

court ordered here, and Johnson does not argue otherwise.9

Finally, Johnson cites Bellows for the proposition that an injunction lies any time

the district court “commands the doing of some positive act.” See 46 N.W.2d at 658.

Johnson reads Bellows too broadly. Johnson is correct that Bellows describes “[a]

mandatory injunction” as an injunction that “commands the doing of some positive act by

the defendant.” Id. But this statement merely clarifies that “command[ing] the doing of

some positive act by the defendant” is necessary for an order to be considered a mandatory

injunction; it does not establish that this feature is sufficient to create a mandatory

injunction. In other words, an order may “command[] the doing of some positive act”

without being an injunction, as we since clarified. See Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d at 233

(“Although a constructive trust directs one party to affirmatively act by conveying property

to another, it does not create an injunction.”). Moreover, extending the right to appeal to

any order that “commands the doing of some positive act” risks opening the floodgates to

interlocutory appeals and conflicts with our policy against considering piecemeal appeals.

See Emme, 418 N.W.2d at 179 (“[T]he thrust of the rules governing the appellate process

is that appeals should not be brought or considered piecemeal.”). We decline to interpret

Rule 103.03(b) as allowing interlocutory appeals in such wide-ranging circumstances.

9
The Legislature also expressly provided for injunctive relief under a related chapter,
the Charitable Trust Code. See Minn. Stat. ch. 501B (2024). The Charitable Trust Code
authorizes the Attorney General to request and obtain injunctive relief to remedy a breach
of a charitable trust. Minn. Stat. § 501B.41, subd. 7(1). But the Trust Code contains no
such provision.

18
 In sum, the July 2024 order requiring Johnson to restore the agricultural property to

the trusts is not the functional equivalent of an injunction. Thus, the order is not

immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b) as an order “which grants . . . an injunction.”

B.

Johnson next argues that allowing an immediate appeal of the district court’s order

requiring him to restore the agricultural property to the trusts would be consistent with the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848).10 In

Forgay, the Supreme Court created a common law procedural rule that allows a party to

appeal an interlocutory order mandating the immediate transfer of property from one

party to another. 47 U.S. at 204–05.11 The Supreme Court determined that a party could

immediately appeal such an order because, without a right to an immediate appeal, the

party faced “irreparable injury”—namely, the permanent deprivation of their property

without an opportunity to be heard in defense of their rights. Id. at 204. Johnson contends

10
We note that Johnson did not raise any issues related to Forgay, 47 U.S. at 201, in
his petition for further review. “Generally, we do not address issues that were not raised
in a petition for [further] review.” In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 699 N.W.2d 749, 757
(Minn. 2005). Because Johnson argues that we should interpret Rule 103.03(b) to be
consistent with Forgay, and Johnson’s arguments under Rule 103.03(b) are properly
preserved, we address Johnson’s argument related to Forgay, even though it is arguably
forfeited.
11
Forgay was decided before slavery was abolished in the United States, and it centers
on a dispute over real property and enslaved persons. See 47 U.S. at 202. As such, the
facts of Forgay are a blunt reminder of a dark period in our nation’s history. See HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the facts of
Forgay “starkly remind the reader that times have changed”).

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that he “faces the precise hardship and irreparable injury identified in Forgay” and that

allowing him to appeal the district court’s order would be consistent with this decision.

We are not convinced. Initially, we emphasize that we have never adopted the

Forgay doctrine. But even if we had, it would not apply under the circumstances of this

case. Johnson overlooks a key exception to the Forgay doctrine. In Forgay, the Supreme

Court stated that the doctrine “does not extend to cases where money is directed to be paid

into court, or property to be delivered to a receiver, or property held in trust to be delivered

to a new trustee appointed by the court, or to cases of a like description.” Forgay, 47 U.S.

at 204 (emphasis added). Therefore, contrary to Johnson’s argument, allowing Johnson to

appeal the order requiring him to restore the agricultural property to the trusts would be

inconsistent with Forgay, and that case does not help him here.

* * *

We are not persuaded by Johnson’s arguments that the district court’s July 2024

order requiring him to restore the agricultural property to the trusts is appealable under

Rule 103.03(b). The order is not an injunction or the functional equivalent of an injunction.

And the order is not appealable under the Forgay doctrine, even if we assume without

deciding that the doctrine applies in Minnesota.

II.

Johnson next contends that the district court’s order removing him as trustee and

naming Patock as successor trustee “has the characteristics of a mandatory injunction”

because it “restrains Johnson from continuing his duties as [t]rustee and instead compels

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Patock to take on those responsibilities.” Johnson asserts that these “characteristics” make

the order “akin” to an injunction that is immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b).

We disagree. As with the district court’s order requiring Johnson to restore the

agricultural property to the trusts, the district court’s order removing Johnson as trustee

and appointing Patock as successor trustee is not the functional equivalent of an equitable

injunction. Again, Patock and Gerhardt did not seek an injunction, and the district court

did not analyze their petition as a request for injunctive relief. Moreover, the district court

did not address any of the equitable factors that courts consider when determining whether

an injunction is appropriate. Instead, the district court granted relief under the Trust Code

based on its previous determination that Johnson committed a breach of trust. And based

on that determination, the district court’s order did not preserve the status quo but instead

removed Johnson as trustee and appointed a new successor trustee. For these reasons, the

district court’s order removing Johnson as trustee is not the functional equivalent of an

equitable injunction. See Figliuzzi, 979 N.W.2d at 232–33.

Likewise, the district court’s removal of Johnson as trustee is not a statutory

injunction. Instead, it is other legal relief that the Trust Code authorizes when a trustee

commits a breach of trust. The Trust Code empowers the district court to remove a trustee

in two ways. Minn. Stat. §§ 501C.1001(b)(7), 501C.0706(b)–(c). First, the court may

permanently remove a trustee for certain enumerated reasons, including “a serious breach

of trust.” Minn. Stat. § 501C.0706(b). Second, the court may temporarily remove a trustee

“as may be necessary to protect the trust property or the interests of the beneficiaries.” See

Minn. Stat. § 501C.0706(c) (authorizing the court to “order such appropriate relief under

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section 501C.1001, paragraph (b)” pending a final decision on whether to remove the

trustee); Minn. Stat. § 501C.1001(b)(7) (authorizing the court to “remove the trustee as

provided in section 501C.0706”). Here, the district court permanently removed Johnson

as trustee under section 501C.0706(b). In doing so, the district court granted permanent

relief based on Johnson’s breach of trust—it did not provide provisional relief pending a

final decision on the merits. Because the district court’s removal of Johnson as trustee

under section 501C.0706(b) is not a statutory injunction in name or in nature, it is not

appealable under Rule 103.03(b) as an order “which grants . . . an injunction.” See Minn.

Sch. of Bus., 899 N.W.2d at 471–72.12

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed.

12
As discussed above, in dismissing Johnson’s appeal as premature, the court of
appeals explained that the district court’s July 2024 order is not an injunction because it
“granted requests for permanent relief” under the Trust Code, not requests “for temporary
relief pending the result of a proceeding.” In re Johnson Trusts, 2024 WL 4003155, at *2.
Johnson argues that the court of appeals improperly distinguished between permanent and
temporary injunctions, because both are appealable under Rule 103.03(b). Johnson points
to our decision in City of Waconia v. Dock, where we held that an order granting a
permanent injunction is immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b). 961 N.W.2d 220,
228 (Minn. 2021).
We discern no error in the court of appeals’ reasoning. As we conclude above, the
district court granted legal relief under the Trust Code based on Johnson’s breach of trust;
it did not grant an equitable or statutory injunction or the functional equivalent thereof.

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