Mitchell David Schultz, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1208

Mitchell David Schultz, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Christine Marie Schultz,
Respondent.

Filed March 31, 2025
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HG-CV-24-1868

Scott M. Flaherty, Andrew Dosdall, Abby N. Sunberg, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Charles R. Shreffler, Dakota Law, P.L.L.C., Lakeville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Reyes , Judge; and Bond ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
Appellants initiated an eviction action against respondent. Respondent is
appellants’ sibling and the personal representative of the parties’ mother’s estate. The
district court dismissed appellants’ eviction action, determining that the issue of
respondent’s present right to possess mother’s residential property could be determined in
2
a pending probate proceeding. Appellants appeal the district court’s dismissal of the
eviction action. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Mitchell David Schultz and Linda L. Schultz and respondent Christine
Marie Schultz are siblings. In November 2023, the parties’ mother executed a transfer-on-
death deed (TODD) conveying her St. Paul home to appellants upon her death. Mother
died in March 2024. Shortly after mother died, respondent moved into the home. 1
In May 2024, respondent commenced a probate action by filing a petition for
adjudication of intestacy, determination of heirs, and appointment as special administrator
of mother’s estate. In the probate action, respondent challenged the validity of the TODD
on the basis that mother was legally blind at the time it was executed. The district court in
the probate action formally appointed respondent as special administrator of mother’s
estate.
In June 2024, appellants filed an eviction action against respondent, alleging that
respondent’s current possession of the home was unlawful. Appellants acknowledged that
the home was a subject of the probate action. But appellants claimed, both in their
complaint and at a later hearing before the district court, that regardless of the probate
court’s ruling on the validity of the TODD, respondent had no legal right to current

1 In the district court, respondent argued that she had lived in the home and cared for mother
for nearly ten years and was out of town when mother died. Appellants argued that
whether, and for how long, respondent lived in the home prior to mother’s death was a
disputed factual issue. Because the district court dismissed the complaint as improperly
brought in housing court, it made no findings on that issue.
3
possession of the home. Specifically, appellants argued that if the probate court found the
TODD to be valid, respondent would not have legal right to possess the home; if the probate
court found the TODD to be invalid, the home would pass to mother’s estate.
For her part, respondent argued that as special administrator, she was responsible
for caring for the estate’s assets. Respondent argued that the probate court was the proper
forum for determining both the validity of the TODD and respondent’s current possession
of the home. In response to questioning by the district court, appellants agreed that a
separate petition could be filed in the probate proceeding to contest respondent’s right to
possess the home.
The district court dismissed the eviction action without prejudice, concluding that
the pending probate proceeding was the appropriate forum for determining issues related
to ownership and possession of the home.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants contend that the district court erred by dismissing their eviction action
because the probate proceeding “will not resolve the question of the right to possess” the
home.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute the standard of review that we should apply
in reviewing the district court’s order dismissing the eviction action. Likening the district
court’s decision to a dismissal on the pleadings under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), appellants
argue for a de novo standard of review. Respondent does not contest that standard in her
brief, but at oral argument suggested that abuse of discretion may be the more appropriate
4
standard. Assuming without deciding that the district court’s order dismissing the eviction
action was a legal determination that we review de novo, we conclude that the district court
did not err for three reasons.
First, appellants’ claim that respondent is in unlawful possession of the home can
be litigated in the probate proceeding. Eviction actions are limited-scope summary
proceedings intended only to evict tenants and recover possession of real property. Minn.
Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2024); see also Amresco Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange ,
631 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Minn. App. 2001). Generally, if the owner of the real property “has
the ability to litigate . . . other claims and defenses in alternate civil p roceedings, it would
be inappropriate . . . to seek to do so in [an] eviction action.” Fraser v. Fraser, 642 N.W.2d
34, 40-41 (Minn. App. 2002). Claims are properly within an eviction action “only if the
eviction action presents the only forum for litigating” them. Id. at 41.
Appellants conceded in the district court that the home was a subject of the probate
proceeding and that the issue of respondent’s current right to possess the home could be
litigated in the probate proceeding. On appeal, appellants identify no reason why the
district court in the probate proceeding would be unable to determine the issue of
possession of the home and we discern none from the record. Minn. Stat. § 524.1- 302(b)
(2024) (providing that the district court in a probate proceeding “has full powe r to make
orders, judgments and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to administer
justice in the matters which come before it”); see also In re Est. of Sangren, 504 N.W.2d
786, 789 (Minn. App. 1993) (reiterating that the district court in a probate proceeding has
the “power to hear and finally dispose of all matters relevant to determination of the extent
5
of the decedent’s estate and of the claims against it” (quoting Unif. Prob. Code § 3- 105
cmt. d (1991))), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993). Because appellants can litigate
questions relating to the possession of the home in the pending probate proceeding, the
district court did not err by dismissing the eviction action.
Second, respondent is special administrator of mother’s estate. “A special
administrator appointed by order of the court in any formal proceeding has the power of a
general personal representative except as limited in the appointment and duties as
prescribed in the order.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-617 (2024). “[S]pecifically devised real
property is ‘subject to . . . administration’ by the personal representative.” In re Est. of
Zych, 983 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. App. 2022) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 524.3-101 (2022)).
2
During the administration of an estate, a personal representative “has a right to, and shall
take possession or control of, the decedent’s property.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3- 709 (2024).
Here, the district court in the probate proceeding is best suited to determine whether
respondent’s possession of the home in her capacity as special administrator is “reasonably
necessary for the management, protection and preservation of” the estate. Id.3

2 This language is unchanged in the most recent version of the statute. Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-101 (2024).

3 At oral argument, appellants argued for the first time that “possession” within the meaning
of section 524.3-709 is distinct from what appellants characterize as a personal
representative’s “rent-free occupancy without a lease.” Because appellants raised this issue
for the first time at oral argument, we decline to address it. In re Civ. Commitment of
Froehlich, 961 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Minn. App. 2021) (“We generally will not address an
argument raised for the first time at oral argument.”). We also observe that the record on
appeal contains no findings related to either the existence of a lease or payment of rent.
6
Third, the district court in the probate proceeding is tasked with determining the
validity of the TODD. Minn. Stat. § 507.071, subd. 26 (2024) (“[I]ssues of interpretation
or validity of the transfer-on-death deed . . . shall be determined in the probate division.”).
Validity of the TODD, in turn, will determine ownership of the home. Thus, appellants’
ability to bring an eviction action in the first instance may depend on the outcome of the
probate proceeding. Gallagher v. Moffet, 46 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn. 1951) (“An unlawful
detainer action merely determines the right to present possession and does not adjudicate
the ultimate legal or equitable rights of ownership possessed by the parties.”); see also
Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 1(a) (2024) (providing that “[t]he person entitled to the
premises may recover possession” of the property in an eviction action). Contrary to
appellants’ argument, ownership of the home and the right to possess the home are related
issues that can—and in the case of the TODD, must—be brought in the probate proceeding.
Because respondent’s right to possess the home is an issue that may be brought in
the pending probate proceeding, the district court did not err in dismissing the eviction
action.
4
Affirmed.

4 Appellants alternatively argue that, even if the probate action would determine current
right of possession, the district court should have stayed the eviction action rather than
dismiss it. But in the district court, appellants did not request a stay as an alternative to
dismissal. “A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record
shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.”
Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988); see also Hoyt Inv. Co. v.
Bloomington Com. & Trade Ctr. Assocs., 418 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1988) (“[A]n
undecided question is not usually amenable to appellate review.”). Therefore, this issue is
not properly before us and we decline to address it for the first time on appeal.