State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1209

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Henry Wellner,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Aitkin County District Court
File No. 01-CR-21-577

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James P. Ratz, Aitkin County Attorney, Lisa Roggenkamp Rakotz, Assistant County
Attorney, Aitkin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that he must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea for failure to
register a secondary address as a predatory offender. Appellant maintains that he is entitled
to withdraw his plea under the manifest -injustice standard because his plea is inaccurate
and under the fair-and-just standard because he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Shawn Henry Wellner with one
count of felony failure to register a secondary address in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. (5)(a)(1) (2020).1 According to the complaint, appellant was required to register as
a predatory offender and had previously registered a primary address as required by statute.
The complaint further alleges that an officer stopped at appellant ’s primary residence on
Loon Avenue in Turner Township to complete a predatory-offender registration check on
April 8, 2021. The officer did not make contact with appellant. The officer left his business
card with a note informing appellant that he was listed as noncompliant with the Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension (BCA). When the officer returned four days later, his business
card was still in appellant’s door. The officer returned to appellant’s residence on May 1,
May 5, May 13, May 26, and June 13, but did not locate appellant. Deputies in the sheriff’s

1 The district court dismissed Count I of the complaint.
3
office were told by members of the community that appellant had been living at another
residence.
In August 2022, the state reached an agreement with appellant in which he would
plead guilty to failing to register his secondary address. Later that month , the parties
appeared for a plea hearing . Appellant testified that he understood the proceedings and
that he had gone over the plea agreement with his counsel. When questioned by his
counsel, appellant admitted that he (1) was required to register as a predatory offender ;
(2) had stayed at an address different from the primary address that he had previously
registered from May 2021 to June 2021; and (3) knew that he was required to register that
secondary address.
The district court accepted appellant’s guilty plea. The district court ordered a
presentence investigation and placed appellant on conditional release. It also required
appellant to remain in the state, make his court appearances, and keep his counsel apprised
of his whereabouts at all times. Appellant assured the district court that he would comply
with the conditions of release, despite him being bound to a wheelchair.
Appellant failed to appear at his sentencing hearing in October 2022. Appellant’s
counsel at the time requested a continuance on behalf of appellant and conveyed that
appellant had told his counsel that “he cut himself and needs a continuance.” Appellant’s
counsel also told the district court that appellant missed multiple appointments at his
counsel’s office to review the presentence investigation report and that it was “unfortunate”
because the state “offered [appellant] an opportunity to get on with his life and that hasn’t
happened.” Id. The district court issued a body-only warrant at the state’s request.
4
After being taken into custody on the warrant, appellant appeared for his sentencing
hearing in May 2024. Appellant’s newly appointed counsel asked the district court to allow
him to withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel because appellant
believed his counsel had been sanctioned by the board of professional responsibility for
practicing law without a license. The district court denied appellant’s motion because his
counsel was licensed to practice at the time the district court accepted his guilty plea, and
it found that his counsel “adequately advised” appellant at the plea hearing.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
to withdraw his guilty plea under the manifest-injustice standard because he
entered an accurate plea.

Appellant challenges the accuracy of his plea because he contends that the factual
basis did not establish that he “understood the law regarding registering secondary
addresses at the time of the violation or whether he knowingly failed to follow the law .”
We disagree.
Once a defendant enters a guilty plea, they do not have an absolute right to withdraw
it. Shorter v. State, 511 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. 1994). But a defendant may withdraw a
guilty plea when it “is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 1. “M anifest injustice occurs when a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, or
intelligent.” Perkins v. State , 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). The accuracy
requirement protects the defendant from pleading guilty to a charge more serious than one
they could have been convicted of at trial. State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn.
5
1994). For a guilty plea to be accurate, a “proper factual basis must be established.” State
v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007).
A defendant may also withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing under the fair- and-
just standard. State v. Townsend, 872 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2015) (citing Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). “The fair and just standard requires district courts to give due
consideration to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support withdrawal
and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the state given its reliance on the plea.”
State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010) (quotations omitted). Under either
standard, the defendant “bears the burden of establishing the facts that support his claim
that the guilty plea is invalid and advancing reasons to support withdrawal.” Id. at 97.
Appellate courts review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d
686, 689 (Minn. 2015).
To be convicted under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a), the state must show that a
person who is required to register as a predatory offender and has been given notice
“knows, or reasonably should know they are required to register” and “knowingly commits
an act or fails to fulfill a requirement that violates any provision of this section .” Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a). The requirements include providing law enforcement with their
primary address and any secondary addresses. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(a) (2020).
“Knowingly” is an adverb that modifies “violates.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603
(Minn. 2017). Under the plain language of the statute, the defendant must know that they
had to register a secondary address, and the state must prove that the defendant knowingly
failed to do so. Id. at 603-04.
6
At his plea hearing, appellant admitted that he knew that he had to register as a
predatory offender and that he had to register a secondary address because he had lived
there for more than five days. Although the state did not explicitly ask appellant if he knew
that he had to register the secondary address within five days, see Minn. Stat. §243.166,
subd. 4a(b) (2020), the state did ask appellant if he lived at another address from May 31
to June 16, 2021, which appellant admitted. Based on appellant’s admissions, the district
court could infer that he regularly stayed at a secondary address for more than five days
and that he knew that he had to register his secondary address but failed to do so . See
Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. App. 2021) (stating that district court can
draw inferences from facts admitted by defendant even if defendant does not verbalize an
element of offense.).
Appellant attempts to analogize his case to State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d at 600. In
that case, the supreme court held that Mikulak, a predatory offender, did not knowingly
violate the predatory -offender statute because he did not know that he was required to
register within twenty-four hours of relocating. Id. at 605. At his plea hearing, Mikulak
stated that he “assumed he had a week” to register. Id. The supreme court concluded that
Mikulak’s statement negated the knowledge requirement of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd.
5(a) (2017). “[A] factual basis is inadequate when the defendant makes statements that
negate an essential element of the charged crime because such statements are inconsistent
with a plea of guilty .” State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003) (quotation
omitted). This case is distinguishable from Mikulak . Here, appellant never made a
statement negating either knowledge requirement.
7
We conclude that appellant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under the
manifest-injustice standard because his plea is accurate.
II. Appellant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under the fair -and-just
standard based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his oral motion to withdraw
his guilty plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that
“(1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
(2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for
counsel’s errors.” Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013) (referencing two -
part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) when analyzing
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.). We assume reasonable representation by
counsel. State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (Minn. 2014). In reviewing the prejudice
prong of the test, this court considers the totality of the evidence the parties presented to
the fact-finder. Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10. Appellate courts review a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo because it is a mixed question of fact and law. State v.
Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).
First, appellant claims that his counsel’s representation to the district court about his
missed court appearances due to him cutting himself and him having car trouble “cast him
in a bad light to the court” because his release was predicated in part on whether he advised
his counsel of his whereabouts . However, his counsel, as an officer of the court, had a
continuing duty of candor to the court. This obligation existed whether the district court
8
required his counsel to disclose if appellant stayed in contact with him as a condition of his
release. Moreover, his counsel’s disclosure of appellant’s inability to appear at the hearing
and discuss the presentence investigation likely cast him in a positive light because it
showed that appellant had been communicating with his attorney in compliance with the
district court’s order and helped justify his nonappearances due to his ambulatory and
medical issues. Because appellant’s counsel had an obligation to inform the district court
about his compliance with the order, appellant has failed to show that his counsel’s
performance fell below the standard to warrant relief under Strickland.
Second, appellant appears to argue that his counsel’s failure to ensure that his plea
was accurate prejudiced him . The record shows that his first counsel asked appellant
several questions to clarify some of his responses to ensure that his plea was accurate.
Notably, appellant’s counsel asked appellant several times during the timeframe referenced
by the state whether he lived at another residence, and appellant admitted that he did not
identify the other residence, despite having an affirmative duty to do so. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s presentence plea -
withdrawal motion because appellant did not meet his burden to establish a fair- and-just
reason for withdrawal.
Affirmed.