State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1214

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Eric Doan-Hanson,
Appellant.

Filed July 14, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion denied
Harris, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-22-430

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges his first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions and
sentences, arguing (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed the alleged
acts within the timeframes as charged in the criminal complaint; (2) the district court
2
abused its discretion by admitting hearsay statements; and (3) the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed permissive consecutive sentences totaling 688 months because
the sentence exaggerated the criminality of his conduct. We agree that the district court’s
sentencing decision was an abuse of discretion. But we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support appellant’s convictions and that the alleged evidentiary error did not
affect appellant’s substantial rights. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
for resentencing.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Steven Eric Doan- Hanson with
four counts of first- degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes sections
609.342, subdivision 1 a(e) (Supp. 2021) 1 and 609.342, subdivision 1(a) (2020 ). Doan-
Hanson was found guilty on all counts. 2 According to the amended complaint, count 4
occurred on or about August 1, 2019, to September 14, 2021. Counts 1 through 3 occurred
on or about September 15, 2021, to March 28, 2022.
The following relevant evidence was elicited at a three-day jury trial. The state
introduced the witness testimony of victim L.R.; his mother, J.Z.; Doan-Hanson’s husband,
J.D.H.; a deputy; an investigator; and a forensic interviewer. Doan-Hanson waived his

1 A 2021 session law amended the statute by changing the age of the victim from 13 to 14
and renumbered the relevant subdivision of section 609.342 from 1(a) to 1a(e). See 2021
Minn. Laws ch. 11, art. 4, § 16, at 2038-40.
2 Doan-Hanson was also charged and found guilty of four counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subds. 1(a), 1a(e) (Supp. 2021). The district court
did not adjudicate these counts because they were lesser-included offenses of counts 1
through 4.
3
right to testify and introduced the testimony of Dr. Robertson, who evaluated J.D.H. to
determine whether he qualified for civil commitment.
Testimony of L.R.
At the time of trial in February 2024, L.R. was 14 years old. L.R. and his mother,
J.Z., lived at Doan-Hanson’s home on two separate occasions, each time for a “few years.”
L.R. could not remember how old he was or when he first moved in with Doan-Hanson
and his husband J.D.H. When he was not living at Doan-Hanson’s home, he visited Doan-
Hanson “a lot,” sometimes going by himself and other times with his mother. When he
was not living with Doan-Hanson, L.R. would stay overnight “once or twice a week.” L.R.
liked visiting and hanging out with Doan- Hanson and saw him and J.D.H. “[k]ind of like
family.”
L.R. testified that while at Doan-Hanson’s home, he would sleep in Doan Hanson’s
room on the couch or on the bed. When he slept on the bed, Doan-Hanson and J.D.H.
would sometimes sleep in bed with him naked. L.R. testified that Doan-Hanson used his
mouth and hands to touch L.R.’s penis. L.R. did not recall how many times this happened
but testified that it happened “more than twice” and “several times.” L.R. also testified
that Doan-Hanson “put his fingers in [L.R.’s] butt.” L.R. remembered that this happened
“[m]ore than one time” but “[n]ot that often.”
L.R. testified that J.D.H. also touched him inappropriately “[i]n the same way.” He
explained that Doan-Hanson touched him when J.D.H. was and was not present, and that
J.D.H. touched him when Doan-Hanson was not present. L.R. additionally testified that
Doan-Hanson and J.D.H. would look after him when J.Z. was unavailable. For example,
4
L.R. recalled that Doan-Hanson and J.D.H. watched him for ten days when one of his
sisters was in the hospital. When asked what occurred during these ten days, L.R. answered
“[k]ind of the same thing as before.” L.R. added that both Doan-Hanson and J.D.H. told
him not to say anything about what occurred. L.R. testified that when his mother asked
whether he had been touched inappropriately, he answered “no.” He explained that his
mother “wouldn’t back down” and he eventually confirmed what happened.
The state also introduced the deputy who responded to J.Z.’s call reporting that L.R.
had been abused by Doan-Hanson. The deputy testified that when he spoke with J.Z. on
April 6, 2022, J.Z. indicated that “there was something that occurred recently in the past
week or so, but she did not have an ultimate timeline of when it started.”
Testimony of J.D.H. and Hearsay Statements
The state called J.D.H. as a witness. When asked about conversations he had with
J.Z.—specifically admitting that he and Doan-Hanson had molested L.R.—J.D.H. could
not remember the conversation because of psychological treatment he was receiving at the
time. J.D.H. also could not remember speaking with the investigator or J.Z.
Because of J.D.H.’s inability to recall these conversations, the state moved to allow
J.Z. and the investigator to testify about what J.D.H. told them in past conversations. The
state argued that the proffered testimony by J.Z. and the investigator were admissible as
statements against interest made by an unavailable declarant under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 804(b). Defense counsel objected, arguing that J.D.H.’s mental illness rendered
his statements unreliable. Notably, defense counsel did not object to J.D.H. being an
“unavailable” declarant. The district court admitted J.D.H.’s statements to J.Z. and the
5
investigator, and it limited the statements “to [J.D.H.’s] own involvement and sexual
assault of [LR].” In supporting its ruling, the district court noted:
The first question -- the foundational question is whether the
witness making the statement is unavailable. Um, in this case
Rule 804(a)(3) is the definition there that answers that
question. A witness is unavailable if they testify to a lack of
memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s statement. So,
as a foundation matter Mr. [J.D.H.’s] statements meet the first
qualification of that exception.

The district court later clarified that J.D.H. was “unavailable” because “he’s
testified today [and] he can’t remember any of the statements at all.”
Testimony of J.Z. and Hearsay Statements
The state called J.Z. who initially testified that she and her children lived with L.R.’s
father “on and off” since 2009. 3 J.Z. testified that she and her children also lived with
Doan-Hanson on two occasions for “six months” each time. She could not remember
L.R.’s age the first time they lived with Doan-Hanson, but she stated that “[h]e was
younger.” When asked whether it was “one year or a few years” between the two
occasions, J.Z. answered, “a few years.”
In early April 2022, J.Z. learned that L.R. had been sexually abused. When she
asked L.R. about it, he “kept telling [her] no.” J.Z. asked him again the next day and
received the same response. Then, on April 6, L.R. “admitted [the sexual touching]
happened,” and J.Z. made a report to law enforcement.

3 J.Z. testified at the beginning of the trial and then was later recalled to provide additional
testimony at the end of the state’s case-in-chief.
6
On the third day of trial, the state recalled J.Z. to testify about her conversations
with J.D.H. in April 2022 (L.R. would have been approximately 12 years old at the time).
J.Z. testified that J.D.H. called her and confessed that he sexually abused L.R. She
explained that J.D.H.’s demeanor during the call was “just like talking to a friend. Just
nonchalant.” According to J.Z., “[J.D.H.] was just trying to get everything off of his chest
so that he could start fresh and not be with [Doan-Hanson] anymore.”
After the phone call, J.Z. asked L.R. if it was true that he had been sexually abused;
L.R. said “no mom” and that he “[did not] want to talk about it.” When she asked the next
day, L.R. again said “no.” Three days after the first phone call, J.Z. spoke with J.D.H. on
the phone again and put him on speakerphone to speak with L.R. According to J.Z., J.D.H.
told L.R. “it’s okay, [L.R.], you can tell the truth. I told you[r] mom everything.”
Afterwards, L.R. admitted that “he had been touched.”
J.Z. testified that from her conversations with J.D.H., L.R. would have been “[e]ight
[or] nine” years old when the abuse first started.
Testimony of the Investigator
The investigator testified that he spoke with J.D.H. over the phone on two occasions.
During the first conversation on April 15, 2022, “[J.D.H.] talked about using his hands and
his mouth on [L.R.’s] penis.” The investigator added that J.D.H. “said that it happened
numerous times.” J.D.H. also admitted to the investigator that he inserted his finger into
L.R.’s anus.
The investigator spoke with J.D.H. again on April 27, 2022. The investigator
testified that “[J.D.H.] said that [J.D.H. and Doan-Hanson] both knew that[] [L.R.] was
7
twelve-years-old at the time when th[ese] allegations were going on.” When asked how
long the abuse had been going on based on his conversation with J.D.H., the investigator
stated, “[s]ince the fall before, so 2021 into the point where they moved out.” The
investigator also testified that J.D.H. told him that there was sexual touching at “[L.R.’s]
house and also at the Doan-Hanson residence in the basement.”
The state introduced the investigator’s interview with Doan-Hanson at his residence.
During this interview, Doan-Hanson did not admit to engaging in any sexual contact with
L.R.
Testimony of Forensic Interviewer
The state also introduced a forensic interviewer, who interviewed L.R. on two
occasions in April 2022. According to the forensic interviewer, L.R. reported that the
abuse “happened multiple times and started when he was younger” but that “he wasn’t sure
what younger was.” In the second interview L.R. indicated that he and his family lived
with Doan-Hanson “two times.” “[T]he first time was two to three . . . or four to five years
prior” and “the second was more recent.” To get a better idea of timeframes, the
interviewer “asked if it had happened the first time that he had lived there. And [L.R.]
indicated that it had, and the second time.” The interviewer also testified that L.R. had
“indicated that it was before COVID had started” and, when asked how old he was at the
time, L.R. said “twelve.”
According to the interviewer, L.R. said that “he had been touched by two guys and
described, . . . [J.D.H.] and [Doan-Hanson].” L.R. also said that “he had been touched in
a private area . . . and the behind . . . with fingers, and he also mentioned mouth by both of
8
them.” L.R. also indicated that “he had been asked to touch [J.D.H. and Doan-Hanson] as
well in their private area . . . with his mouth and his hand.”
L.R. also mentioned that the abuse happened at Doan-Hanson’s house and at a trailer
that had been converted into a camper. L.R. described two specific places within Doan-
Hanson’s home: “one was on the bed” and the other was in an “entertainment area.” When
asked whether anyone else was in the house during these times, the interviewer testified
that L.R. “indicated that no one else was downstairs, but he did indicate that . . . his mother
and . . . [Doan-Hanson’s] mom and dad who were owners of the house . . . were upstairs.
And maybe his sister, too, at some point.”
Defense’s Case-in-Chief
After the state rested its case, Doan-Hanson, through defense counsel, moved for a
directed verdict on all counts. Doan-Hanson explained that counts 1 through 3 alleged a
timeframe of September 15, 2021, to March 28, 2022; and count 4 alleged a timeframe of
August 1, 2019, to September 14, 2021. He argued that there was never “any solid time
given for any of these acts as far as whether or not they fell into these date ranges or not.”
Doan-Hanson added, “nobody seems to have any real memory or could give any concrete
answers to when and where any of these acts might have happened.” The state argued that
there was testimony that the abuse “happened during the first period of time that the victim
was living in [Doan-Hanson’s] home, and it happened the last time when [L.R.] was living
in the defendant’s home the second time.” The state added that there was reference to L.R.
being between the ages of nine and twelve, which fits the date ranges listed in the
complaint.
9
The district court denied the directed verdict, finding that there was enough “facts
for the jury to decide whether or not [the allegations] occurred.”
Doan-Hanson waived his right to testify at trial. His only witness was Dr. Michael
Robertson, a licensed psychologist, who evaluated J.D.H. in April 2022 to determine if he
qualified for civil commitment. Dr. Robertson testified generally about his evaluation of
J.D.H. and concluded that he met the criteria for civil commitment, but believed there
“might be less restrictive alternatives.”
The jury found Doan- Hanson guilty on all counts. Prior to sentencing, Doan-
Hanson moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that he was amenable to
probation because he has the support of family and friends. At sentencing, the state asked
the district court to impose permissive consecutive sentences for each count, resulting in a
total of 688 months. The district court denied Doan-Hanson’s departure motion.
The district court convicted Doan-Hanson of all four charges and imposed
consecutive sentences of 172 months each, totaling 688 months in prison. It explained that
it imposed consecutive sentences because the four individual counts were “separate
incidents against a child,” and “[t]he child will have it as part of his experience for the rest
of his life.”
Doan-Hanson appeals.
DECISION
I. The state presented sufficient evidence to sustain Doan-Hanson’s conviction.

Doan-Hanson argues that the state failed to prove one element beyond a reasonable
doubt—that he penetrated L.R. on “three separate incidences” between September 15,
10
2021, to March 28, 2022 (counts 1 through 3), or that a single incident occurred between
August 1, 2019, to September 14, 2021 (count 4). For the reasons set forth below, we are
not persuaded.
Because the state presented direct evidence as to these elements, both parties agree
that the direct-evidence standard of review applies to one element of each of the charges
that Doan-Hanson challenges. Under the direct-evidence standard, we examine “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider whether the evidence was
sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict they did.” State v. Moore, 10 N.W.3d
676, 682 (Minn. 2024). We affirm if “the jury, acting with proper regard for the
presumption of innocence and regard for the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.”
State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
First, there is sufficient evidence in the record that Doan-Hanson engaged in sexual
penetration on at least three separate instances. Sexual penetration is “any intrusion
however slight into the genital or anal openings . . . of the complainant’s body by any part
of the actor’s body.” Minn. Stat. § 609.34 1, subd. 12(2)(i) (2020). L.R.’s testimony
indicates that Doan-Hanson committed an act of sexual penetration “more than one time”
when he “put his fingers in [L.R.’s] butt.” L.R. also testified that Doan -Hanson used his
“mouth and his hands” to touch his penis and confirmed that it happened “more than twice”
and “several times.” Additionally, L.R. testified that Doan-Hanson touched his penis or
his butt when J.D.H. was and was not present. These incidents concerned Doan-Hanson,
not J.D.H., and occurred “more than twice” and “several times” while at Doan -Hanson’s
11
residence. Although L.R. did not testify that Doan-Hanson touched him inappropriately
exactly on three separate incidences, his testimony is sufficient to conclude that it happened
more than twice and several times.
To be sure, L.R. also testified that Doan -Hanson and J.D.H. touched him
inappropriately while they watched over him at L.R.’s home when his mom was at the
hospital with his sister for ten days. When L.R. was asked about the abuse that occurred
while at his home, he testified “[k]ind of the same thing as before,” referencing the use of
“mouth and hands” to touch his penis and putting fingers in his anus. This is a separate
incident. While L.R. did not testify about specific dates or timeframes, his testimony is
sufficient to conclude that the abuse that occurred while at his (L.R.’s) home was a separate
incident.
Second, there was sufficient evidence to support that counts 1 through 3 occurred
within the offense-date range—September 15, 2021, to March 28, 2022. The investigator
testified that during his phone call with J.D.H. on April 27, 2022, J.D.H. said that he and
Doan-Hanson “both knew that[] [L.R.] was twelve-years -old at the time when th[ese]
allegations were going on.” Based on L.R.’s date of birth, he would have been 12 years
old during the timeframe alleged in counts 1 through 3. The investigator also testified that
J.D.H. indicated that the abuse had been going on “[s]ince the fall before, so 2021 into the
point where they moved out.” J.Z. and L.R. moved out sometime before April 6, 2022.
4

4 When J.Z. was asked whether J.D.H. reported the abuse in person or over the phone on
April 6, 2022, J.Z. testified that J.D.H. “said it in person a couple times . . . right before we
had moved out.” From this testimony, we can discern that J.Z. and L.R. moved out
sometime before April 6, 2022.
12
On this record, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Doan-Hanson
committed the charged offenses between September 15, 2021, to March 28, 2022.
As to count 4, there is sufficient evidence that Doan-Hanson engaged in sexual
penetration between August 1, 2019, to September 14, 2021. J.Z. testified at trial that from
her conversations with J.D.H. on April 6, 2022, L.R. would have been eight or nine years
old when the abuse first started. And based on L.R.’s date of birth, he would have been
nine years old during the timeframe alleged in count 4.
Moreover, the forensic interviewer testified that based on her conversation with
L.R., which took place in April 2022, L.R. indicated that the abuse first started “two to
three . . . or four to five years prior.” Given that the interview took place in April 2022,
two to three years prior would mean that the abuse first started around 2019 or 2020, which
falls within the timeframe alleged in count 4 (August 2019 to September 2021). Four to
five years prior, however, would mean that the abuse first started in 2017 or 2018, before
the timeframe alleged in count 4. The interviewer also testified that L.R. reported that “the
second [time he lived with Doan-Hanson] was more recent.” L.R. testified, however, that
the abuse did not happen the first time he lived at Doan-Hanson’s house. Overall, this
testimony is not clear because, evidently, “two to three years” and “four to five years”
makes a difference for purposes of the timeframes charged.
However, “our review is limited to ascertaining whether under the evidence
contained in the record the jury could reasonably find the accused guilty of the offense
charged.” State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). And
viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict and assuming
13
“that the jury disbelieved any testimony in conflict with the result reached,” State v.
Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted), there is sufficient
evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that Doan-Hanson was guilty of the charged
offenses during the charged offense-date range.
II. Any error in admitting J.D.H.’s hearsay statement did not affect Doan-
Hanson’s substantial rights.

Doan-Hanson asks us to reverse and remand for a new trial, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting J.D.H.’s hearsay statements under the statement-
against-interest exception to the hearsay rule because J.D.H. was not an unavailable
witness. The state argues that we should apply the plain-error standard of review, rather
than the abuse-of-discretion standard, because Doan-Hanson’s objection at trial is different
from his argument on appeal. We agree.
We begin with the general hearsay rule. Hearsay statements are out-of-court
statements that are “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn.
R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay statements are inadmissible at trial unless an exception applies.
State v. Usee, 800 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Minn. App. 2011). One such exception is when the
declarant makes a statement against interest under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3),
which “allows the admission of a hearsay statement by an unavailable declarant if the
statement would so expose the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person would
not have made it unless it were true.” State v. Jackson, 655 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Minn. App.
2003). This exception rests “on the ‘commonsense notion that reasonable people, even
reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory
14
statements unless they believe them to be true.’” Usee, 800 N.W.2d at 198. (quoting
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994)).
At trial, Doan-Hanson based his objection to the admission of the hearsay statements
on the ground that J.D.H.’s statements were unreliable, not that he was “unavailable.”
Because of the “complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule and its
exceptions . . . it [is] particularly important that a full discussion of admissibility be
conducted at trial.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006). Here, there was
no full discussion on the record. Because he objected on a different basis before the district
court, we review the admission of that evidence for plain error. See State v. Vazquez, 912
N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018) (“A defendant’s objection to the admission of evidence
preserves review only for the stated basis for the objection or a basis apparent from the
context of the objection.”). Under the plain-error test, the defendant must show “(1) error,
(2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Manthey, 711
N.W.2d at 504. If all three elements are met, we “may correct the error only when it
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).
Assuming without deciding that admission of the hearsay statements was plain
error, we conclude that such error did not affect Doan-Hanson’s substantial rights. An
error affects a defendant’s substantial rights when the defendant establishes that “there is a
reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on
the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
To determine whether the error affected the verdict, we consider non-exclusive factors
15
including, “the manner in which the evidence was presented, its persuasive value, its use
in closing argument, and [the defendant’s] counter of the evidence.” State v. Bigbear,
10 N.W.3d 48, 56 (Minn. 2024). We also consider strong evidence of guilt because
“[s]trong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted
evidence.” Id. at 59 (quotation omitted).
Doan-Hanson argues that the erroneous admission of J.D.H.’s hearsay statements
significantly affected the verdict because the statements were presented in a prominent
manner, used in the state’s closing argument, highly persuasive, not effectively countered,
and because the evidence of guilt was not strong.
Manner Presented and Persuasive Value
Here, the hearsay statements were admitted through testimony of the investigator
and J.Z. on two different days of a three- day trial. Notably, J.Z. had already testified and
thus appears to have been recalled solely to testify about J.D.H.’s hearsay statements. The
challenged statements were also highly persuasive. Indeed, the state noted at trial, outside
the presence of the jury, that J.D.H.’s statements corroborated L.R.’s testimony and went
“a long ways to proving the matter to the jury.” Moreover, J.D.H.’s hearsay statements
were the strongest evidence corroborating L.R.’s testimony; the only witnesses to the abuse
were L.R., J.D.H., and Doan-Hanson , and the only exhibit presented at trial was a body-
worn camera interview of Doan-Hanson at his residence. And even in that video, Doan-
Hanson maintained his innocence and claimed not to have remembered any abuse to L.R.
Critically, J.D.H.’s hearsay statements support the distinct timeframes for counts 1 through
16
3 and count 4. In sum, the persuasiveness and the manner in which the statements were
presented favors determining that Doan-Hanson’s substantial rights were affected.
Use in Closing Argument
During closing argument, the state briefly referenced J.D.H.’s hearsay statements.
He stated that “those experiences of [L.R.] . . . is largely corroborated by what you heard
[J.D.H.] tell [L.R.’s] mother, and what [J.D.H.] told [the] [i]nvestigator.” The state again
referenced J.D.H.’s “statements coming in through [L.R.’s] mother and coming in through
[the investigator] where he admits to touching [L.R.], and the circumstances surrounding
that.” However, this only consisted of 2 out of 14 pages of the prosecutor’s closing and
rebuttal argument. We conclude this factor indicated that the challenged testimony did not
affect Doan-Hanson’s substantial rights.
Effectively Countered
Doan-Hanson contends that he did not effectively counter the inadmissible evidence
because he chose to challenge the “admissibility” of the hearsay statements rather than
counter the evidence before the jury. However, defense counsel reminded the jury that Dr.
Robertson, a licensed psychologist, recommended that J.D.H. be given medications and be
civilly committed. Additionally, the record shows that Doan-Hanson, through defense
counsel, cross-examined the investigator and asked questions attempting to undermine
J.D.H.’s credibility and mental state at the time he made the hearsay statements. Defense
counsel also cross-examined J.Z. the second time she was called to testify about her
conversations with J.D.H. And during closing argument, Doan-Hanson’s defense counsel
continued to challenge his credibility, stating:
17
[J.D.H.] was hospitalized against his will for a psychotic
episode. He was suffering from delusions. He was suffering
from paranoia. You heard a lot of specifics about the sort of
things that were going on with him. He kept trying to leave the
hospital. He believed there was a conspiracy that the hospital
had to keep him there against his will. He claimed to be God.
He claimed to be Beyonc[é]. He claimed to be CEO of Disney.
There was a murder that happened, and he was the one that was
investigating it.

On this record, it appears Doan-Hanson effectively countered the hearsay evidence.
This factor weighs in favor of concluding the error did not affect Doan-Hanson’s
substantial rights.
Strong Evidence of Guilt
The final factor to consider is the strength of the state’s evidence. Although L.R.
testified that Doan-Hanson touched him inappropriately “more than twice” and “several
times,” his testimony does not clearly distinguish counts 1 through 4 as occurring within
their respective timeframes as charged by the amended complaint. On the other hand, J.Z.
testified that based on her conversation with J.D.H., she believed that the abuse started
when L.R. was eight or nine years old, which supports count 4. And the investigator
testified that based on his conversation with J.D.H. in April 2022, he gathered that Doan-
Hanson abused L.R. within the past year, from fall 2021 to when L.R. and J.Z. moved out
in the spring of 2022. This testimony by the investigator supports counts 1 through 3 as
occurring within the charged offense-date range.
Even without the challenged hearsay statements, the testimony from the forensic
investigator also supported the offense-date range. The forensic interviewer testified that,
in her April 2022 interview, L.R. reported that the abuse started two to three or four to five
18
years prior when his family first lived with Doan-Hanson. She added that the second time
L.R. lived with Doan- Hanson “was more recent.” Further, there was testimony of the
deputy, who explained that, when he spoke with J.Z., she indicated “there was something
that occurred recently in the past week or so ,” which the deputy used to establish the
timeframe of the abuse to inform his investigation. Overall, the state’s evidence was
strong.
In sum, we conclude that even if the error was plain, it did not affect Doan-Hanson’s
substantial rights.
III. The district court abused its discretion when it imposed permissive consecutive
sentences totaling 688 months because the sentence exaggerates the criminality
of Doan-Hanson’s conduct.5

Doan-Hanson argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing four
consecutive sentences totaling 688 months because that sentence exaggerates the
criminality of his conduct. He asks us to reverse his sentence and remand to the district
court for resentencing.

5 In his reply brief, Doan-Hanson argues for the first time that Minnesota Statutes sections
609.035 and 609.04 prohibited the district court from adjudicating and sentencing each of
counts 1, 2, and 3, and he seeks a remand to vacate two of those three
convictions/sentences. The state moved to strike or disregard this portion of Doan-
Hanson’s reply brief. The motion was referred to this panel to determine whether to strike
portions of Doan-Hanson’s reply brief. In general, issues not raised or argued in
appellant’s principal brief cannot be raised in a reply brief. See State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d
539, 558 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that a matter raised for first time in reply brief is waived
and should be stricken); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 128.02, subd. 3. But we deny the states
motions to strike as unnecessary because we did not rely on the challenged portions of the
state’s brief to reach our decision. See Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233
n.2 (Minn. 2007) (denying motion to strike as moot after not considering challenged
portions of brief).
19
Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, consecutive sentences are permissible
where the defendant is being sentenced for multiple first-degree criminal sexual conduct
convictions. Minn. Sent’g. Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(ii) (Supp. 2021). “We review a district
court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion.” State v.
McInnis, 962 N.W. 2d 874, 892 (Minn. 2021). We will not disturb the district court’s
imposition of permissive consecutive sentences “unless the resulting sentence unfairly
exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Minn.
Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2020) (stating that we may review sentences to “determine
whether the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable,
inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact
issued by the district court.”). In determining whether the district court abused its
discretion, “we look to past sentences received by other offenders.” McInnis, 962 N.W.2d
at 892 (quotation omitted). In so doing, we rest our determination “on our collective,
collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial
districts.” State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 146-47 (Minn. 1982). We also have the
discretion to modify a sentence in the interests of fairness and uniformity. State v. Vazquez,
330 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Minn. 1983)
Here, the district court convicted Doan-Hanson of four counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct and imposed four consecutive sentences at the top range of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines range of 172 months each, resulting in a total aggregate
sentence of 688 months. The district court explained that counts 1 through 4 were “separate
20
incidents against a child,” and “[t]he child will have it as part of his experience for the rest
of his life.”
Doan-Hanson argues, and the state does not contest, that J.D.H. received a 172-
month sentence for the same conduct. 6 The only difference, Doan -Hanson argues, is that
Doan-Hanson chose to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial and J.D.H. pleaded
guilty.7 Although Doan-Hanson is not entitled to a reduced sentence merely because his
co-defendant received a lesser sentence, see State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn.
App. 2009), we find his argument convincing, particularly in comparison to other similar
offenders.
Doan-Hanson does not dispute that consecutive sentences are permissive under the
sentencing guidelines. Instead, Doan-Hanson argues that his aggregate sentence of 688
months exaggerated the criminality of his conduct when compared to sentences received
by other offenders. Based on our collective experience and review of the case law, we
agree with Doan-Hanson that his sentence of 688 months for convictions of four counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving multiple counts of sexual conduct against a
child is excessive and exaggerates the criminality of his conduct.
One comparator can be found in State v. Suhon, 742 N.W.2d 16, 19-20 (Minn. App.
2007), where the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct and one count of third- degree criminal sexual conduct for abusing his daughter

6 The details of J.D.H.’s convictions, plea agreement, and sentence are not included in this
record. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.
7 The state argues that J.D.H. pleaded guilty to fewer counts and, therefore, is not similarly
situated for sentencing purposes.
21
three times per week over a ten-year period (approximately 832 acts of sexual abuse). The
defendant received permissive consecutive sentences totaling 278 months, sentence s that
we upheld and which we discerned no abuse of discretion by the district court. Id. at 25.
In contrast, the record shows that the sexual abuse that Doan-Hanson inflicted here—while
still reprehensible—occurred far less frequently over a much shorter timespan than the
abuse in Suhon.
In State v. Perleberg, 736 N.W.2d 703, 704- 05 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 16, 2007), the defendant was convicted of six counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. The district court imposed three consecutive sentences of 144 months ,
resulting in a total of 432 months, followed by five years of conditional release. Id. at 705.
In its order, the district court explained that the consecutive sentences were justified
because the “victim reported that the sexual assaults occurred on at least 250 occasions.”
Id. Here, Doan-Hanson was convicted of four counts of first- degree criminal sexual
conduct. Moreover, there were fewer instances of abuse here.
In State v. Kellogg, No. A03-16, 2004 WL 422703, at *4 (Minn. App. March 9,
2004), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2004),
8 the defendant was convicted of three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct and three counts of second- degree criminal sexual
conduct, ten counts of use of a minor in a sexual performance and one count of possession
of child pornography. The district court determined that the defendant’s acts were 17
separate behavioral incidents involving multiple victims, and it imposed consecutive

8 The state relies on this nonprecedential case, which we cite only as persuasive authority.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
22
sentences for each count, for a total of 717 months. Id. On appeal, while acknowledging
the great deference afforded to district courts for sentencing decisions, we modified the
defendant’s sentence to reflect an aggregate of 537 months. Id. at 5.
And in State v. Senske , 692 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Minn. App. 2005), the defendant
pleaded guilty to two counts of first- degree criminal sexual conduct for acts inflicted on
his stepdaughter and son. Id. The district court found several aggravating factors,
including victim vulnerability, planning and manipulation, which included “blindfolding
the children, posing them, and requiring them to have sex with each other,” threats, abuse
of a position of trust, and multiple incidents of abuse. Id. The district court imposed two
consecutive sentences of 216 months, both upward durational departures, totaling 432
months. We concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed
consecutive sentences of 216 months for each count. Id.
Comparing Doan-Hanson’s sentence involving multiple counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct to cases involving both findings of aggravating factors and upward
durational departures further demonstrates that Doan-Hanson’s aggregate sentence of 688
months exaggerated the criminality of his conduct. All of these examples demonstrate the
disparity between Doan-Hanson’s aggregate sentence and the sentences imposed in other
first-degree criminal- sexual-conduct cases against children. They show a range of
sentences between 218 months and 537 months. In each of these cases, the defendant was
convicted of egregious sexual abuse of one or more children on numerous occasions, often
over many years. However, in each case, the defendant ultimately received a se ntence
much shorter than Doan-Hanson’s 688-month aggregate sentence. Notably, in the cases
23
that involved aggravating factors and upward departures, those defendants still received a
significantly lesser sentence that Doan-Hanson.
The state urges us to uphold Doan-Hanson’s aggregate sentence, arguing that there
is no “hard ceiling for cases involving long-term sexual abuse of a child.” However, the
state does not identify any cases in which an aggregate sentence based on multiple counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct came close to 688 months. The one case the state
does cite had an aggregate sentence of 537 months, which is 151 months shorter than Doan-
Hanson’s sentence. See Kellogg, 2004 WL 422703, at *5.
We recognize that Doan Hanson’s actions against L.R. were horrendous and warrant
a harsh sentence. Nonetheless, the aggregate 688-month sentence imposed by the district
court was excessive when compared with other similar cases and exaggerates the
criminality of Doan -Hanson’s conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed permissive consecutive sentences totaling 688
months. Thus, we reverse Doan-Hanson’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion denied.