State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1221

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antoine Kenneth James Adkins,
Appellant.

Filed July 7, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-15108

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this direct appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm,
appellant Antoine Kenneth James Adkins argues that the district court erred in failing to
suppress the evidence against him because police unlawfully seized him without reasonable
suspicion. We conclude that the police had a particularized and objective basis to suspect
Adkins of criminal activity based on the totality of the circumstances. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
The following factual summary is derived from the evidence and testimony admitted
at a contested omnibus hearing. On the morning of July 18, 2023, a Brooklyn Center 911
dispatcher received a tip about a man with a gun at a Speedway gas station. The 911 caller
reported seeing a gun in the man’s pocket and said that the man was walking in and out of
the gas station. He was described as a Black man wearing gray clothing and red tennis
shoes. The GPS location of the caller was about a block away from the Speedway. The
caller did not identify themself.
Two Brooklyn Center police officers responded within minutes.1 Officer S testified
that the reported behavior was concerning because it could mean that the man was
“thinking of robbing” the store. He described how there were “multiple shootings and also
homicides at that location, so it’s a very high-crime area.”

1 We refer to the testifying police officers as Officer S and Officer X instead of their real
names in accordance with our rules of public access. See Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of
Jud. Branch 8, subd. 2(b)(5) (recommending that appellate opinions limit disclosure of
witness identities “to what is necessary and relevant”).
3
Officer X arrived at the gas station first, but he saw no one matching the description.
Officer S then advised him over the radio that a person matching the description was
walking northbound half a block away. As Officer X drove his marked squad car
northbound on the street, he saw a “party matching the description of the call” with red
tennis shoes and “dingy” black pants walking northbound on the east side of the sidewalk.
He drove north past the man (who was later identified as Adkins), drove his car onto the
sidewalk a short distance in front of the man, activated his emergency lights, exited his car,
and advised the man to keep his hands up. As Officer X was exiting his vehicle, he saw
Adkins “reaching for his right pocket.” In that moment, Officer S drove his squad car next
to Adkins and said, “Get your hand out of your pocket.” As he opened the door to his squad
car, Officer S saw the butt or handle of a handgun. He removed the handgun from Adkins’s
pocket. Officer S later asked Adkins if he had a permit to carry the handgun, and Adkins
said no.
The state charged Adkins with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2022). Adkins requested
an evidentiary hearing to present a motion to suppress the firearm.
At the evidentiary hearing, Adkins argued that evidence of the firearm should be
suppressed because the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and the arrest lacked
probable cause. The state argued that the tip was sufficiently reliable because it included a
location and description of the individual and the officers located him within six minutes.
The state also argued that Officer S had probable cause to arrest Adkins because he
observed the firearm in plain view before Adkins was detained.
4
The district court denied the motion. It determined that the officers had a
“reasonable[,] articulable suspicion” to make a brief investigatory stop because Adkins
appeared to match the description provided by the 911 caller, he was located a mere block
away, and “there was suspicious activity of walking in and out of the gas station with a gun
visible from his pocket.” The court also decided that the officers were justified in further
detaining Adkins because he was reaching for the gun in his pocket and that the officers
ultimately had probable cause to arrest Adkins when he admitted that he did not have a
permit to carry the firearm.
The parties proceeded with a stipulated-evidence trial under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, after agreeing that the pretrial ruling was
dispositive. The district court found Adkins guilty of one count of possession of a firearm
by an ineligible person. It convicted Adkins and sentenced him to 60 months’
imprisonment.
Adkins appeals.
DECISION
Adkins seeks review of the pretrial order denying his motion to suppress evidence
of the firearm he was convicted of being ineligible to possess. He argues that the district
court erred by determining that the police had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct
an investigatory stop because the anonymous 911 call was unreliable. The state argues that
Adkins forfeited any argument about the legality of the investigatory stop. And even if that
issue is properly before the court, the state maintains that the tip was sufficiently reliable
to render the stop constitutionally permissible.
5
In considering a pretrial order on a suppression motion, this court reviews the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. State v.
Wilde, 947 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2020). One
of the legal conclusions reviewed de novo is “a district court’s determination of reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). “A factual
finding is clearly erroneous if it does not have evidentiary support in the record or if it was
induced by an erroneous view of the law.” State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 403 (Minn.
2020) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “may independently review facts that are not
in dispute, and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.”
State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
I
We first address whether Adkins preserved his challenge to the stop. The state
argues that, before the district court, Adkins only noticed and argued the issue about
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him and did not seek to suppress evidence
based on the illegality of the initial stop. Adkins contends that he preserved his challenge
to the stop because it was argued by both parties and decided by the district court. We are
persuaded that Adkins’s arguments on appeal are properly before this court.
A defendant may appeal a “dispositive, pretrial ruling” by agreeing to proceed with
a stipulated evidence trial. State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 2016); see also
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Appellate review “is expressly limited to the pretrial
ruling by the district court.” State v. Marsh, 931 N.W.2d 825, 829 (Minn. App. 2019), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019).
6
At the pretrial hearing, the district court ruled that the information provided by the
911 caller, combined with Officer X’s observation of Adkins near the Speedway, provided
“reasonable[,] articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring . . . that would
justify an initial investigatory stop.” In reaching that decision, the court considered
arguments presented by both parties on the reasonable-suspicion issue and analyzed
reasonable-suspicion caselaw.
Nevertheless, the state maintains that it did not have adequate notice of the
reasonable-suspicion argument that Adkins raises on appeal. It relies on State v. Needham,
in which the supreme court stated, “[A] pretrial motion to suppress should specify, with as
much particularity as is reasonable under the circumstances, the grounds advanced for
suppression in order to give the state as much advance notice as possible as to the
contentions it must be prepared to meet at the hearing.” 488 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn. 1992).
In that case, the district court suppressed a confession on a basis that the defendant raised
for the first time in simultaneous briefing following an omnibus hearing. Id. The supreme
court determined, in that circumstance, that the state did not have an adequate opportunity
to respond. Id. Here, in contrast, Adkins’s motion to suppress argued that an unreliable
anonymous tip cannot support an investigatory stop and that “[t] he sole basis of the
officers’ seizure of [Adkins] was a 911 call with an anonymous caller.” The state did not
file any responsive briefing, but it argued at the hearing that “the anonymous information”
supplied the officers with reasonable suspicion to frisk Adkins. The state also referenced
several reasonable-suspicion cases. Thus, unlike in Needham, the record here shows that
the state had sufficient notice of the issue of the legality of the stop at the time of the
7
omnibus hearing. And because the district court considered those arguments and decided
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Adkins, we conclude that issue is fairly
before this court.2
II
Adkins argues that the police officers seized him based on an anonymous tip that
was not sufficiently reliable to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion under the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions. He therefore contends that evidence of the firearm
should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149,
161 (Minn. 2020). The state maintains that the tip was reliable and that the officers had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Adkins.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10.3 “Searches and seizures conducted without warrants are presumptively
unreasonable,” but an officer may “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has

2 In a footnote in the facts section of its response brief, the state questions whether a seizure
even occurred when Officer X pulled his squad car in front of Adkins and activated the
emergency lights. In the state’s view, there is “nothing in the record to support the
proposition that [Adkins] did not feel free to leave.” Typically, arguments not adequately
briefed are forfeited. Meriwether Minn. Land & Timber, LLC v. State, 818 N.W.2d 557,
564, 570 (Minn. App. 2012). In any event, because we ultimately determine that Officer X
had a particularized and objective basis to suspect Adkins of criminal activity at the time
he pulled his squad car in front of Adkins and activated the emergency lights, we assume
without deciding that a seizure occurred at that moment.

3 Adkins does not argue that there is any daylight between the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions with respect to the issues on appeal. We therefore consider his arguments
under the presumption that the legal rules are the same under both constitutions.
8
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Lugo, 887
N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted).
Reasonable suspicion is “‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). In assessing reasonable suspicion, an officer must consider “the
totality of the circumstances,” and a trained police officer may draw inferences and
deductions “that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). “The reasonable-suspicion
standard is not high.” Id. at 486 (quotation omitted).
Officer X testified that he stopped Adkins based on the anonymous tip, so we turn
to whether the tip provided reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure at the time Officer X
pulled in front of Adkins and activated the emergency lights. State v. Hunter, 857 N.W.2d
537, 543 (Minn. App. 2014) (noting that reasonable suspicion “ must be present at the
moment a person is seized” (quotation omitted)).
“[P]olice can base an investigative stop on an informant’ s tip if it has sufficient
indicia of reliability.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). This
inquiry considers two nondispositive factors. Cf. Rose v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 637
N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that the reasonable-suspicion inquiry in the
context of traffic stops based on informant tips focuses “on two factors: (1) identifying
information provided by the informant; and (2) the facts supporting the informant ’s
assertion that a driver is [engaged in criminal activity]”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19,
2002).
9
First, law enforcement may consider whether the informant provided identifying
information about themself that would allow the officers to follow-up on the tip. City of
Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890-91 (Minn. 1988) (holding that informant’s
disclosure that they work at specific gas station enhanced their reliability). When the
informant provides police with information that police could use to identify them, the tip
is presumed to be reliable. Id. at 890. But, even if the informant did not give identifying
information, reliability may also be enhanced if the informant uses the 911 emergency
system. “[A] reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before
using such a system” given the potential criminal consequences of misuse. Navarette v.
California, 572 U.S. 393, 399-401 (2014).
Second, law enforcement may consider whether the facts that were provided support
the informant’s belief that the suspect is engaging in unlawful activity. Rose, 637 N.W.2d
at 328; see also Olson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985)
(noting that even an anonymous tip may be reliable if it provides “specific and articulable
facts to support the bare allegation of criminal activity”). These facts may include
predictions about a person’s movements that police could corroborate, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990), a claim of personal observation of criminal activity, or a roughly
contemporaneous report, Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399-401. But a tip that merely identifies a
specific person without providing police with any means to corroborate the accusation of
wrongdoing may not bear sufficient indicia of reliability. Florida v. J.L. , 529 U.S. 266,
272, (2000).
10
Applying these considerations to the facts of this case, we first note that the
911 caller provided no identifying information about themself. As a result, the tip is not
presumptively reliable. Cf. State v. Davis , 732 N.W.2d 173, 182-83 (Minn. 2007)
(presuming reliability where informant reported where they worked); Balenger, 667
N.W.2d at 138 (holding that anonymous face- to-face tip was presumptively reliable). We
must therefore determine whether the tip otherwise contained sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify the seizure. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397-98.
The 911 caller’s tip has several indicia of reliability. To begin, the caller reported
that they personally saw Adkins walking in and out of the Speedway with a gun in his
pocket.4 That constitutes an eyewitness report of criminal activity, because possession of a
firearm in a public place without a permit is a crime. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a
(2024); see also State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 394-95 (Minn. 2008) (holding that
police officers have reasonable suspicion to stop a person if a reliable informant has alleged
that the person has a firearm). Further, the report was roughly contemporaneous with the
caller’s observation of criminal activity. Only about six minutes passed between the call

4 The district court found that the caller reported a gun “in the right pocket.” Adkins argues
that this finding was clearly erroneous because the 911 recording reveals that the caller
stated the gun was in the man’s “front” pocket. We cannot consider the transcript of the
911 call, however, because it was not presented at the suppression hearing, and a ruling on
a suppression motion may be based only “[u]pon the record of the evidence elicited at the
time of such hearing[.]” State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Minn. 1965).
And, at the suppression hearing, Officer X testified that the 911 dispatcher reported the gun
was in the individual’s “right” pocket. Therefore, reasonable evidence supported the
district court’s finding. State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008) (noting that
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by “reasonable evidence”
(quotation omitted)). That said, we would reach the same conclusion regardless of whether
the caller specified the front pocket or the right pocket.
11
and the officers’ response to the gas station. The caller’s GPS coordinates also placed them
near the Speedway (one block away) and, in turn, relatively close to where the officers saw
a person matching the description provided by the caller. Finally, the caller used the 911
emergency system, which, as we explained above, enhances the reliability of the tip
because the caller exposed themself to consequences of placing a false tip. Together, these
factual findings support a determination that the tip was reliable and established reasonable
suspicion to stop Adkins. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399- 401 (holding that a claim of
eyewitness knowledge, use of the 911 emergency system, and a contemporaneous report
are indicia of an anonymous informant’s reliability).
Adkins argues that the caller’s description of the gun-carrying man was not reliable
because it lacked additional descriptive details. He notes that the caller did not describe the
person’s weight, height, or age; did not identify other items of clothing that Adkins was
wearing, such as the hat and sagging pants; did not describe the firearm; and did not say
whether the person was carrying a brown paper bag, as Adkins was. The state responds
that the caller provided adequate details.
We are not persuaded that the caller’s description of Adkins’s physical appearance
undermines our conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Adkins. In
J.L., the U.S. Supreme Court noted that reasonable suspicion “requires that a tip be reliable
in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. ” 529
U.S. at 27 2 (emphasis added). Here, the caller stated that the person was a Black man
wearing gray clothing and red tennis shoes. Those details, and particularly the emphasis on
the red tennis shoes, were sufficient to identify a specific person who was at or near the
12
Speedway gas station at the time of the call. Considering the totality of the circumstances,
including the specific and articulable facts that supported the allegation of criminal activity,
Olson, 371 N.W.2d at 556, the omission of additional descriptive details did not weaken
the existence of reasonable suspicion.
Adkins also argues that the 911 caller was unreliable because the caller purportedly
“lied” about being at the Speedway when the 911 location data suggested the caller was a
block away. Adkins maintains that from the caller’s location, their view of the Speedway
was “potentially obstruct[ed]” by several trees. But the record before the district court at
the suppression hearing does not support Adkins’s factual challenge. The officers’
descriptions of the 911 call did not represent that the caller was at the Speedway gas station
when making the call.
5 Nor was there testimony from the officers that the view from where
the call was made was blocked by trees. Officer X affirmed only that there were “some
trees” between the locations.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the caller’s anonymous
tip provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop. The district court therefore did
not err in suppressing the evidence obtained from the stop.6
Affirmed.

5 Adkins may be referring to the recording of the 911 call. As we explained in a prior
footnote, the 911 call recording was not part of the record at the pretrial hearing. Because
our review is limited to the pretrial ruling, Marsh, 931 N.W.2d at 829, we may not consider
matters that were not “elicited at the time of such hearing.” Tahash, 141 N.W.2d at 6.

6 Because we conclude that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the
tip, we do not reach the state’s arguments relating to the plain-view and inevitable-
discovery doctrines.