State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1223

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Royce James Stute,
Appellant.

Filed June 16, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CR-23-1032

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Olson, Hubbard County Attorney, Anna M. Emmerling, Assistant County Attorney,
Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Isaiah P. Volk, Thorwaldsen & Malmstrom, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.∗

∗Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Royce James Stute was convicted of refusing to submit to a chemical test and
carrying a pistol while under the influence of alcohol. We conclude that the district court
did not err by denying Stute’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
During the evening of September 14, 2023, Deputy Sheriff Kiessel was at the scene
of an accident on a county road in Hubbard County. The deputy was sitting in his squad
vehicle, which was parked on the right side of a two-lane highway, partially on the shoulder
and partially in a traffic lane, with its emergency lights activated.
Deputy Kiessel saw a vehicle pull up behind him and stop. He got out of his squad
vehicle and approached the driver of the vehicle, Stute, to let him know that the road was
clear and that he could pass. Stute’s driver’s-side window was rolled down approximately
four to six inches. While speaking with Stute, Deputy Kiessel observed that his speech
was slow and slurred and that his eyes were watery, bloodshot, and glossy. Deputy Kiessel
asked Stute how many drinks he had consumed that evening. Stute said that he had
consumed only one and that he lived nearby.
Deputy Kiessel asked Stute to shift his vehicle into park and to step out of his
vehicle. Stute rolled up his window and stared forward with both hands on the steering
wheel. Stute put his vehicle in park only after Deputy repeatedly asked him to do so. As
Deputy Kiessel continued to ask Stute to step out of his vehicle, Stute asked several times,
“Why?” Deputy Kiessel responded that he wanted Stute to perform field sobriety tests.
3
Deputy Kiessel saw Stute’s right hand leave the steering wheel and reach for the
gearshift. Deputy Kiessel opened the door to Stute’s vehicle and grabbed his right wrist to
prevent him from driving away. Deputy Kiessel smelled alcohol when he opened the
vehicle door. Deputy Kiessel held onto Stute’s right wrist while he continued to ask Stute
to exit his vehicle. After approximately 11 seconds, Deputy Kiessel let go of Stute’s wrist,
turned off the vehicle, and removed the keys from the ignition. Stute eventually stepped
out of his vehicle after multiple requests to do so. Deputy Kiessel arrested Stute shortly
thereafter.
The state charged Stute with four offenses: (1) refusal to submit to a chemical test,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2022); (2) operation of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (Supp.
2023); (3) obstructing legal process and interfering with a peace officer, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2023) ; and (4) carrying a pistol while under the
influence of alcohol, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd. 1(4) (Supp. 2023).
In November 2023, Stute moved to suppress evidence and to dismiss all charges on
the ground that Deputy Kiessel violated his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable seizures. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing in January
2024. Deputy Kiessel was the only witness. The parties submitted memoranda of law after
the hearing. Stute argued that Deputy Kiessel violated his rights by opening the door to
his vehicle. In March 2024, the district court filed an order denying Stute’s motion.
In May 2024, the parties agreed that the state would dismiss counts 2 and 3, that
counts 1 and 4 would be tried to the court on stipulated evidence, that appellate review
4
would be limited to the ruling on state’s pre-trial motion, and that the pre-trial ruling would
be dispositive. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court filed a 13-page
order in which it found Stute guilty on both counts. The district court imposed jail
sentences of 364 days and 90 days, of which 45 days must be served, with the remainder
stayed for probation.1 Stute appeals.
DECISION
Stute argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
and to dismiss the charges.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
Fourth Amendment also protects the right of the people to be secure in their motor vehicles.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653-55 (1979); State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
A law-enforcement officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, briefly stop
or detain a person in a motor vehicle for investigative purposes if the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person might be engaged in criminal activity.

1The commissioner of public safety revoked Stute’s driver’s license after he was
arrested on September 24, 2023. In November 2023, Stute petitioned the district court to
rescind the revocation of his driver’s license. That civil case proceeded separately from
this criminal case. The district court conducted an implied -consent hearing in Dec ember
2023, approximately one month before the evidentiary hearing on Stute’s motion in this
case. The district court denied Stute’s petition to rescind the revocation, and this court
affirmed. See Stute v. Commissioner of Public Safety, No. A24- 0517, 2024 WL 5036720
(Minn. App. Dec. 9, 2024).
5
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40; (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)); State v. Diede,
795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011). A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if “the
police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at
21. The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be more than a
“mere hunch” and must be based on “specific and articulable facts.” State v. Taylor, 965
N.W.2d 747, 751-52 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). A court must consider the totality
of the circumstances in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. Id. at 752.
Article I, section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution requires that an investigative
stop be reasonable in both duration and scope. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363,
366 (Minn. 2004) (concluding that officer who made stop for minor traffic violation acted
unreasonably by confining driver in squad car solely for officer’s convenience). To
determine whether an investigative stop is reasonable in duration and scope, a Minnesota
court must conduct a two-step analysis. Id. at 364. First, the court must determine
“whether the stop was justified at its inception.” Id. Second, the court must determine
whether “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [is] tied to and justified by one of
the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable
cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” Id. at 365; see also State v. Smith, 814
N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). The third condition is present if an objective test is
satisfied: “‘would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant
a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.’”
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). The reasonableness of
6
an officer’s action “is based on a balancing of the government’s need to search or seize and
the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference.” Id. at 365
(quotation omitted).
In this case, the district court determined that “Deputy Kiessel’s initial contact with
Mr. Stute was not a seizure” because the deputy approached Stute’s vehicle merely “to
figure out why Mr. Stute parked behind his squad vehicle.” The district court determined
that “Deputy Kiessel had reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Stute was an impaired
driver” after the deputy perceived Stute’s slurred speech, watery eyes, and the odor of
alcoholic beverages. The district court further determined that Deput y Kiessel’s requests
for Stute to shift his vehicle into park and to exit the vehicle were “justified by Deputy
Kiessel’s continuing reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Stute was an impaired
driver.” The district court concluded that Deputy Kiessel’s “seizure of Mr. Stute and
expansion of the seizure were lawful.” Stute challenges the district court’s decision in two
ways.
A.
Stute first argues that Deputy Kiessel did not have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity when he opened the driver’s door of Stute’s vehicle.
To resolve this argument, we first must determine exactly when Stute was seized by
Deputy Kiessel. A person is seized “if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was neither free to
disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” State v. Harris, 590
N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). General ly, it is not a seizure for a law-
7
enforcement officer “to simply walk up and talk to a person standing in a public place or
to a driver sitting in an already stopped car.” State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757
(Minn. 1980). Given Deputy Kiessel’s initial purpose of encouraging Stute to proceed
along the highway, Stute was not seized when Deputy Kiessel approached him and first
spoke with him. See id. But Stute was seized when Deputy Kiessel asked him to step out
of his vehicle. See State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 693 (Minn. App. 2012).
The next question implicated by Stute’s first argument is whether it was reasonable
for Deputy Kiessel to request that Stute step out of his vehicle. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d
at 364. Generally, if an officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity,
the officer may, as a matter of course, ask the driver to step out of the vehicle while the
officer conducts a brief investigation. Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 109-11
(1977); State v. Ortega , 770 N.W.2d 145, 152 (Minn. 2009). The incremental intrusion
arising from such a request is justified by concerns of officer safety. Mimms, 434 U.S. at
109-11. Such a request is “reasonable” so long as, viewed objectively, the request is
appropriate in light of “a balancing of the government’s need to search or seize and the
individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference.” Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d at 364-65 (quotation omitted).
Deputy Kiessel testified that, when he approached and first spoke with Stute, he
observed that Stute had “slow and slurred speech, along with glossy eyes.” Based on those
observations, Deputy Kiessel “believed that [Stute] may have been drinking or consuming
alcohol.” The district court specifically found Deputy Kiessel ’s testimony to be credible.
Based on Deputy Kiessel’s observations of indicia of impairment, as well as Stute’s
8
unusual behavior in stopping rather than driving around Deputy Kiessel’s squad vehicle,
Deputy Kiessel had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Stute was driving while
impaired. See Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 694; State v. Lopez, 631 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Minn.
App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001).
Given Deputy Kiessel’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that Stute was driving
while impaired, it was reasonable for Deputy Kiessel to ask Stute to step out of his vehicle.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the intrusion into the driver’s personal
liberty” arising from the incremental step of asking a driver to exit his or her vehicle “can
only be described as de minimis” because the driver “is being asked to expose to view very
little more of his person than is already exposed” and the officer has “already lawfully
decided that the driver shall be briefly detained” so that “the only question is whether he
shall spend that period sitting in the driver’ s seat of his car or standing alongside it.”
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has acknowledged that,
under the Minnesota Constitution, “a police officer may order a driver out of a lawfully
stopped vehicle without an articulated reason.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 367. In Klamar,
in which an officer approached a vehicle that was already stopped on the shoulder of a
highway and perceived that the driver was impaired, we reasoned that there is “no
constitutionally significant distinction between ordering Klamar out of her vehicle for
further investigation and continuing the investigation at the driver’s window” because
“[t]he degree of intrusion occasioned by directing her to exit her vehicle was not so
significant as to render the seizure constitutionally offensive. ” 823 N.W.2d at 692, 695.
Thus, it was reasonable for Deputy Kiessel to ask Stute to step out of his vehicle.
9
The final question raised by Stute’s first argument is whether it was reasonable for
Deputy Kiessel to open the driver’ s door of Stute’ s vehicle. The supreme court has
recognized that “there is little practical difference between ordering a driver to open his
door and get out of his car, on the one hand, and opening the door for the driver and telling
him to get out, on the other.” State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1978). Even
if an officer’s opening of a driver’s door must be justified by additional facts, such facts
are present in this case. Deputy Kiessel testified that, after he asked Stute to step out of his
vehicle, Stute did not comply but, rather, rolled up his window, stared forward with both
hands on the steering wheel, and repeatedly asked “why” Deputy Kiessel wanted to
perform field sobriety tests. In addition, Deputy Kiessel saw Stute’s right hand leave the
steering wheel and reach for the gearshift, which caused Deputy Kiessel to believe that
Stute might attempt to drive away.2 At that point in time, Deputy Kiessel had a reasonable
basis for believ ing that Stute might try to flee. The videorecording created by Deputy
Kiessel’s body-worn camera confirms that Deputy Kiessel gave Stute a reasonable amount
of time—approximately 90 seconds—in which to comply with his requests to exit the
vehicle before Deputy Kiessel opened the door. Accordingly, it was reasonable for Deputy
Kiessel to open the driver’s door of Stute’s vehicle.

2The state points out that, in this respect, the evidentiary record in this case is slightly
different from the evidentiary record in the implied-consent case. Cf. Stute v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, 2024 WL 5036720, at *1-2.
10
Thus, Deputy Kiessel had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity
when he opened the driver’s door of Stute’s vehicle, and it was reasonable for him to do
so.
B.
Stute also argues that, even if Deputy Kiessel was justified in opening the driver’s
door of his vehicle, the investigative seizure was unreasonable on the ground that Deputy
Kiessel grabbed his wrist, held it “for a long period of time ,” and “jerked” his wrist and
body toward vehicle’s door.
The district court did not make any findings of fact concerning whether Deputy
Kiessel acted unreasonably by grabbing and holding Stute’s wrist or whether Deputy
Kiessel “jerked” Stute’s wrist. Likewise, the district court did not make any conclusions
of law as to whether the investigative seizure was, as Stute argues, “‘intolerable’ in its
‘intensity or scope.’” (Quoting Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 363.) It appears that the district
court did not make such findings or conclusions because Stute did not clearly present an
argument to the district court that Deputy Kiessel acted unreasonably by grabbing, holding,
and “jerking” his wrist. In the memorandum that he filed after the evidentiary hearing,
Stute focused on Deputy Kiessel’s act of opening of a door to his vehicle. Stute mentions
in passing the fact that Deputy Kiessel grabbed his wrist, but he made no argument
whatsoever that Deputy Kiessel held it too long or “jerked” it. Thus, Stute forfeited the
argument that Deputy Kiessel acted unreasonably by grabbing, holding, and jerking his
wrist. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.02(a), (b), (g); State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457
11
(Minn. 1989); State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3, 14 (Minn. 1965); State v.
Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. App. 1996).
Even if we were to consider Stute’s second argument, we would conclude that it is
without merit. Deputy Kiessel testified that he grabbed Stute’s wrist after Stute did not
exit the vehicle after multiple requests and reached for the gearshift, which caused Deputy
Kiessel to believe that he might attempt to drive away. The videorecording created by
Deputy Kiessel’s body-worn camera shows that he held Stute’s wrist while Stute remained
in the driver’s seat for approximately 11 seconds and that he let go of Stute’s wrist after
Stute stepped out of the vehicle. The videorecording does not indicate that Deputy Kiessel
jerked Stute’s wrist or that Stute gave any indication of pain or discomfort. Deputy
Kiessel’s actions appear reasonable in light of Stute’s noncompliance with Deputy
Kiessel’s requests, the possibility that Stute might drive away, and the state’s strong interest
in preventing impaired persons from driving on public roads. See State v. Bernard, 859
N.W.2d 762, 773 (Minn. 2015) (recognizing “the severe threat that impaired drivers pose
to the public’s safety” (quotation omitted)); see also Boude v. City of Raymore, Missouri ,
855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that officer acted reasonably by reach ing
into car, turning off ignition, and physically removing intoxicated driver from vehicle after
driver did not comply with orders and placed car into gear).
Thus, Stute is not entitled to appellate relief on the ground that the investigative
seizure was intolerable in intensity or scope. See Stute v. Commissioner of Public Safety,
2024 WL 5036720, at *7-8 (rejecting similar argument in Stute’s implied-consent case).

12
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Stute’s motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.