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Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1228**

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
J. I. G. and O. C., C. D. C., A. R. G., R. M. K., Parents.

**Filed March 10, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge**

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-24-550

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Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WHELOCK, Judge

In this appeal from the district court's termination of her parental rights to four
children, appellant mother argues that the district court erred by determining that
(1) termination was in the children's best interests, (2) the county made reasonable efforts

for reunification of mother and the children, and (3) termination was supported by at least one statutory basis. We affirm.

FACTS

On the day before Halloween in 2023, a gas-station and convenience-store employee in Steele County reported to law enforcement that two young children—eight and six years old—had come into the store twice that morning without warm clothes or a caregiver. Responding officers returned the children to their home, where they learned that appellant mother, J.I.G., had been asleep all morning with her youngest child, who was two years old, and did not know where her other three children were. It was discovered that her four-year-old child had found his way onto the bus and gotten himself to school. After the officers' visit to the home, the children were placed in emergency protective care.

Mother's history includes several traumatic events throughout her life, mental- and chemical-health concerns, and significant contact with child protective services in multiple states relating to several of her older children, who are not the subject of this proceeding. Mother has various mental-health diagnoses, including depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Records indicate that mother has received services for her mental and chemical health through child-welfare case plans in other proceedings, but that she will attend appointments sporadically or discontinue the services after a time. Although the facts of mother's "extensive" history with child-protective-services agencies in multiple states are not fully established in the record, it appears that all of her older children were removed from her custody before she moved to Minnesota. In May 2009 and May 2012, a child-protection agency in Georgia received

substantiated reports that mother was neglecting her children and using controlled substances. In April 2013, a Georgia report indicates that mother was arrested for child abandonment. In May 2014, mother gave birth to a child in Michigan, and the record shows that the State of Michigan took custody of that child shortly thereafter.

After mother moved to Minnesota, the county in which she was living at that time received reports of physical and verbal abuse and neglect of three of the children who are the subject of these proceedings. In those reports, two of the children disclosed that mother had hurt them, but mother insisted that the children had caused the harm to each other. The reports also stated that mother left the children unattended for hours at a time while mother slept during the day. In February 2020, the three children were removed from mother's care and remained out of the home until later that year.

At some point in 2020, while working on regaining custody of her three children, mother began dating A.G., whom she later married and with whom she shares her youngest child—the fourth child subject to these proceedings. A.G. testified that, during their yearlong marriage, mother behaved in an erratic manner on a daily basis, “going from being super happy to super angry . . . at the blink of an eye.” He testified that he witnessed mother abuse the older children, such as whipping one of them with a belt and screaming at them. During their marriage, A.G. believed that mother used controlled substances because he observed her shaking and having heavily dilated pupils. He also testified that mother would disappear without warning and he would be forced to find someone to take care of the children. On one occasion, mother was gone for a week.

Sometime in 2022, mother and A.G. moved to Steele County, where respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance (the county's human-services agency) is located. Beginning in April 2023, the county began receiving reports that mother was abusing the children. In May, one of the children's teachers reported to the county that she had received anonymous emails informing her that the children had been abused at home for years; the emails asserted that mother beat the six-year-old nearly to death when he was four and that she had kept one of the children out of school and hidden because there were visible marks on the child. Another report alleged that the children were seen with bruises and scratches on their bodies, that mother would hit the children with a belt and "smack" the children, that mother slept most of the time and did not provide the children with food, and that, in the winter months, mother would punish the children by making them stay outside in the cold, sometimes for days. In August, officers received a report that the children were found at a gas station and convenience store on their own, and in October, officers received the report that led to the four children being removed from mother's home.

At various points in 2023, the three oldest children were all identified as "emotionally disturbed" children for whom special services were recommended. In early October 2023, the oldest child was enrolled in Prairie Care, a program that provides outpatient services for children with behavioral issues. Shortly after starting Prairie Care, the child told a staff person that her mother would hit, slap, spank, and kick her and that she did not feel safe at home because she feared mother. The staff person reporting this to the county stated that they saw bruises all over the child's body. A week later, the county received a report that mother had not gotten out of bed and thus the children did not eat the

previous day; the report also stated that the oldest child had new bruising and a mark on her arm. Prairie Care reported to the county that mother had not been engaged in the oldest child's care because mother was missing appointments and not completing home assignments.

During an interview with the county, the oldest child disclosed that mother slapped her and pulled her hair every day when she came home from school and that sometimes mother used a belt or hanger to hit her, the six-year-old, and the four-year-old. She also said that, at the beginning of October, mother had prevented her from coming inside, making her sleep outside without a mattress, for a "full week" and that sometimes mother made her do chores "all night long" so she could not sleep. The six-year-old's father testified at trial that his son had reported to him that mother had made him sleep outside also. The oldest child reported that she did not want to go home and that she sometimes wished she could live in a foster home.

During an interview the next week, the six-year-old admitted that mother hits his siblings with a belt or her hand and pulls the oldest child's hair. In the last week of October, the youngest, who was two years old, was reported to have a "goose egg" on her forehead and a gouge on her cheek, which mother blamed on the oldest of the four children. At the end of October, mother reported that the oldest child's behavior had worsened and that she wanted to put her in a residential care program; meanwhile, Prairie Care described the same child as a "model student." Mother also stated that her oldest child kept the six-year-old and four-year-old children awake at night, was hitting and pushing her siblings and had hit

the six-year-old with a hanger, had stopped showering and wearing clean clothes, and told mother that she would try to get mother in trouble by reporting that mother had hit her.

In the days following the incident at the gas station and convenience store that led to the children being removed from mother's home, mother texted county workers and told them that she did not want her oldest child back in her home and that she did not think she would ever get the children back. While in foster care, the three older children stated that mother hit them with hangers and belts and that they feared being returned to mother and hoped instead to remain in foster care. The county filed a petition for children in need of protection or services.

In December 2023, mother appeared before the district court and admitted that the children were in need of protection or services because she could not provide them with necessary care. The district court ordered mother to complete a parenting-capacity assessment and any recommendations, complete a mental-health evaluation and any recommendations, cooperate with chemical testing, demonstrate responsive parenting and converse with the children appropriately, participate in and attend all of the children's appointments, and remain in contact with the county.

During the months that followed, mother had supervised parenting time with the children. County workers intervened during many of these visits because mother was not engaging with the children and the children began climbing on furniture or on cabinets, posing a safety concern. Often, mother did not seem engaged with or concerned about the children or their emotions. Mother also spoke to the children about this case and, during one visit, told them that they needed to do their part to help her keep them. During another

visit, mother became upset with the children for not eating all of their food, shamed them, and later physically restrained her oldest child and would not let her escape; county workers ended the visit early after forcing mother to stop. Mother also missed many of her visits with the children despite the county assisting mother with transportation, and the county implemented a requirement that mother confirm the visit before noon on visit days to prevent the children from traveling nearly an hour to attend the visit when mother was not going to be present. Even when she confirmed visits, mother would miss them.

To address mother's chemical health, the case plan required mother to submit to chemical testing. The county attempted to administer urinalysis tests (UAs) on 17 different occasions, but mother refused to provide a sample on 14 of those occasions. Of the three UAs mother completed, the results were negative twice and the third was positive for fentanyl, morphine, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. Mother asserted that she had been in a car accident and that the hospital gave her these "medications," but county workers obtained the hospital records and none of the medications provided to mother contained fentanyl or methamphetamine. The county arranged to meet mother wherever she was located to administer the UAs, but she often refused to provide her location or ignored county workers when they appeared. On one occasion, the worker went to mother's home and mother ignored the worker until mother came out to collect a package. When the worker approached her, mother "was mumbling and slurring" and would not make eye contact. When it was explained that the report would be positive if she refused to submit to a test, mother responded that "it was what it was." During interactions with mother, workers observed mother pacing, talking very fast, struggling to hold

conversations, and not making eye contact. During mother's testimony on the first day of trial, the district court had difficulty keeping mother focused. After the district court repeatedly attempted and failed to help mother recall important information for this case, it asked her whether she was taking medications or was under the influence of substances. Mother admitted to taking prescription medications but denied taking any other substances.

After mother's continued failure to engage in the case plan, the county petitioned in April 2024 for involuntary termination of mother's parental rights. In the petition, the county asserted that the children had been out of the home for 514 days within the last five years, including the days since their removal on October 30, 2023. In the district court's order granting the county's petition for involuntary termination, it found that the three older children had been out of the home for 590 days between February 10, 2020, and June 11, 2024, and that the youngest had been out of the home for 226 days between October 30, 2023, and June 11, 2024.¹

At trial, two of the children's fathers testified in support of the petition, as did two county workers, the guardian ad litem, and the parenting-assessment provider. The district court found all of their testimonies credible. Mother testified on her own behalf, and the

¹ During trial, the district court received testimony that all four children were much improved outside of mother's care. The oldest child had been running away from school and wandering around looking for food, and now she can self-regulate and participate in activities with her friends. The six-year-old child has shown that he is moving on from the worry and fear he felt, particularly after mother failed to show up for his birthday when she promised him, and he is beginning to feel settled. The four-year-old child had been stealing food, destroying property, and staying awake all night, and now he can sleep through the night, play with his siblings, and sit with family at dinner. And the youngest child now lives with her father, and he testified that she is no longer jumpy and scared like she was when she first came to live with him.

district court found her testimony not credible because her testimony conflicted with evidence in the record and she did not provide records or evidence to support her assertions. The district court found in its order that mother frequently diverted her answers away from the best interests of the children to discuss the effect that termination would have on her. The district court granted the county's petition, determining that termination was in the children's best interests, services will not remedy the circumstances that led to the out-of-home placement within the reasonably foreseeable future, and several statutory grounds supported the termination.

Mother appeals.

DECISION

A district court must make three determinations before granting a county's petition to terminate parental rights, including that "(1) at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family or reasonable efforts to do so are not required, and (3) termination is in the child's best interests." *In re Welfare of Child of J.H.*, 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), *rev. denied* (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); *accord* Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b),

7-8(1) (2024);² *see* Minn. Stat. § 260C.012(a) (2024). Mother challenges the district court’s determinations on each of these points.³

Appellate courts review an order for involuntary termination of parental rights to “determine whether the district court’s findings (1) address the statutory criteria and (2) are supported by substantial evidence. [Appellate courts] must closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” *In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T.*, 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (citation and quotation omitted). Appellate courts review the factual findings for clear error and whether a statutory basis supported termination for an abuse of discretion. *Id.* “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” *Woolsey v. Woolsey*, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

When reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, (2) do not find their own facts, (3) do not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. *In re Civ.*

² Section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b), was amended in 2024. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 115, art. 18, § 38, at 1742-44. The amendment did not change the substance of the applicable subsections but removed a subsection that does not apply here and renumbered the subsections. Therefore, we cite the most recent version of the statute. *See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs*, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”).

³ Mother also argues that the district court denied her right to due process, but because she does not identify how she was deprived of this right, we do not address this argument. *See In re Welfare of Child of P.T.*, 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (explaining that an inadequately briefed argument is forfeited).

Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); *see Ewald v. Nedrebo*, 999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing *Kenney* in a family-law appeal), *rev. denied* (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). Thus,

an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate court's duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably supports the decision.

Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); *see Vangsness v. Vangsness*, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear-error standard of review in a similar fashion).

With these standards of review in mind, we address each of mother's arguments using the order in which the parties' briefs addressed them.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination was in the children's best interests.

Mother first argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. She asserts that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous because the children's stories of abuse are inconsistent, multiple people testified that they never saw mother abuse the children, and the county failed to provide evidence of physical harm. She argues that the children are not better off without her because they struggled in foster care and in the care of others and that her interests and the children's interests are aligned against termination because the

children love her and have a relationship with her. The county asserts that, although there is a bond between mother and the children, a bond is not enough to overcome the evidence supporting termination. The county specifically argues that there is a pattern of absence as a parent and that mother's noncompliance with the case plan demonstrates that she cannot meet the children's needs, notwithstanding her love for them. The county also points to the district court's credibility determinations that support the allegations that mother physically abused the children.

The district court determined that it was in the children's best interests that mother's rights be terminated because "the children can only achieve safety and stability away from Mother," finding that mother is unable to provide for the children's mental or emotional health, for their proper supervision, or for their education. It also found, among other things, that mother "is impulsive and has no insight into how her choices and behaviors negatively impact the children," "is unwilling or unable to prioritize the children's needs over her own," and is "unable to manage her own mental health needs" and that "this has rendered Mother unable to meet the children's mental education, developmental, and safety needs."

"We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court's conclusion that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests." *In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C.*, 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018). We defer to the district court's credibility determinations. *Vangness*, 607 N.W.2d at 472.

In considering the best interests of the child, the district court balances three factors: "(1) the child's interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent's interest

in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” *In re Welfare of R.T.B.*, 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); *accord* Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). A child’s competing interests include the need for a stable environment, their health, and their preferences. *Id.* “During this balancing process, the interests of the parent and child are not necessarily given equal weight.” *Id.* A district court must consider the circumstances of the particular case when employing this balancing test. *Id.* And ultimately, if a statutory basis to terminate parental rights is present, “the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration. . . . Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.

Here, the county established, via testimony from several witnesses whom the district court credited, that the children’s needs were not being met while in mother’s care and that mother was abusing and neglecting the children. The parenting-assessment provider testified that mother’s infrequent visits with the children after they were removed from her care demonstrate that mother does not prioritize the children’s needs. The six-year-old’s father testified that he believed his child’s statement that mother made him and his siblings stay outside for long periods of time, including overnight, without proper clothing and during the winter. The youngest child’s father testified that he witnessed mother whipping a child with her belt and using physical discipline with the children and that she would disappear, sometimes for days at a time, and leave the children alone. A child-protection worker testified that the child-welfare proceedings that began in a different Minnesota county involved substantiated allegations of abuse and neglect of the children by mother that were similar to the facts that led to the proceedings here and that the oldest child once

told the worker that mother had caused all the bruises on her body. In addition, the county presented evidence of multiple reports from the children about mother's abuse and their fear of being returned to her. Because the district court's factual findings are supported by evidence in the record, we conclude that they are not clearly erroneous. We further note that we defer to the district court's credibility determinations when weighing best interest factors, *Vangness*, 607 N.W.2d at 472, and that the district court found the county's witnesses credible and did not credit mother's testimony.⁴

Because substantial evidence supports the district court's determination that the children's needs cannot be met while in mother's care, and because it addressed the relevant factors, made credibility determinations, and weighed the interests of the children and mother, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification of mother and the children.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the county made reasonable efforts because the law does not require that she comply with the reunification plan, the plan did not comply with the statutory requirements, and the county did not act in good faith when making efforts to support mother in reunifying with the

⁴ Mother argues that the children's best interests are served by remaining with their parent, and she relies on *In re Termination of Parental Rts. of Tanghe*, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003), but mother misinterprets the rule in *Tanghe* to assert that the children's interests in remaining with their mother outweigh anything else. Rather, *Tanghe* reiterates the principle that, even if there are statutory grounds for termination, the district court must make specific findings that termination is in the children's best interests, 672 N.W.2d at 626, which the district court did here.

children. The county highlights that mother makes general assertions and does not identify how the plan should have been different or how it failed to comply with the statutory requirements. The county argues that the evidence supports the district court's finding that mother never engaged with the plan, and thus the plan could not be further tailored to mother's circumstances. It also asserts that mother cannot demonstrate that the county did not act in good faith or that the plan was punitive in nature.

In any proceeding for termination, a district court must make specific findings that "reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child and the parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family" or that "reasonable efforts for reunification are not required." Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8. Determining whether the county made reasonable efforts requires the district court to consider whether the services were (1) chosen "in collaboration with the child's family," (2) tailored to the child's and family's individual needs, (3) relevant to the child's "safety, protection, and well-being," (4) "adequate" to meet the child's and family's individualized needs, (5) "culturally appropriate, (6) available and accessible[,] (7) consistent and timely[,] and (8) realistic under the circumstances." Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). To make reasonable efforts, the county must "provide those services that would assist in alleviating the conditions leading to" the termination proceeding. *In re Welfare of M.A.*, 408 N.W.2d 227, 235-36 (Minn. App. 1987), *rev. denied* (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). We review the district court's findings of fact regarding reasonable efforts for clear error, *J.H.*, 968 N.W.2d at 601, and the district court's determination of whether the reunification efforts were

reasonable for an abuse of discretion, *In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D.*, 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015), *rev. denied* (Minn. July 21, 2015).

When crafting mother's case plan, the county identified three categories of concern that led to placement of the children outside of the home: mother's mental health, mother's controlled substance use, and mother's parenting, including her failure to supervise the children and her physical abuse of them. The case plan addresses these concerns, but mother never engaged with the county to provide input to the case plan, nor did she meet with the county to sign the case plan despite having received it. Although mother did not sign the case plan, the county submitted "recommendations" to the district court that were consistent with it, mother agreed to follow the county's recommendations as part of her admission that the children were in need of protection or services, and the district court ordered her to comply with the recommendations.

The district court determined that the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification of mother and the children. Specifically, it found that the county identified relevant concerns, drafted a plan to address the concerns and work toward reunification, and consistently attempted to offer assistance to mother—even when she responded with "rude or mean-spirited comments"—and mother refused to engage with the county to discuss or change her plan. The district court also found that there were no additional or alternative services that the county could have provided to avoid termination of mother's parental rights. Finally, the district court found that mother refused to accept any responsibility for her "consistent pattern of neglect and unpredictable behavior that has frightened, hurt, and confused the children" and, without that acknowledgement, mother

could not take steps to address the conduct that led to these proceedings. We review in turn each identified condition that led to these proceedings—mental health, chemical health, and parenting—and the efforts the county made to address each concern.

In light of mother's mental-health needs, which include diagnoses of depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder, the district court required mother to complete a mental-health assessment and follow its recommendations. There are no records that mother completed such an assessment, but the parenting-assessment recommendations, which mother was also required to follow, included that she receive psychiatric medication consultations, obtain a mental-health case worker, receive individual therapy, and complete a dialectical behavioral therapy course. Mother claimed to have received individual therapy, obtained a mental-health case manager, signed up for a dialectical behavioral therapy course, and obtained a psychiatrist, but the district court found mother's testimony not credible. Mother never submitted records to the county or the district court to support her assertions.

To address mother's use of controlled substances, the county required mother to submit to random UAs. Of the 17 tests attempted, mother refused 14, and one of the three she completed was positive for fentanyl, morphine, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. Mother testified that she understood the county would travel to her to administer the tests, and the record demonstrates the willingness of the county to meet mother at her location to administer the tests, as well as mother's frequent refusal to provide her location or acknowledge the county worker when they arrived. Mother also completed a chemical-health assessment, but the district court credited a county worker's testimony that

the assessment was not reliable because mother was not forthright with the assessor about her previous controlled-substance use.

As to concerns about mother's parenting, the county required mother to, among other things, complete a parenting-capacity assessment and follow any recommendations, develop appropriate discipline methods, and demonstrate responsive parenting and emotionally safe and supportive interactions with the children. Mother completed a parenting-capacity assessment in February 2024, and the resulting recommendations were consistent with her case plan. Although mother completed one eight-hour parenting course immediately after the petition for children in need of protection or services was filed, she failed to consistently demonstrate knowledge of improved parenting skills during her supervised visits. Instead of observing improvement, county workers were forced to intervene during several visits to stop mother from physically restraining a child or to protect the children from harm due to mother's failure to supervise them. Workers reported that, during some visits, mother had inappropriate conversations with the children, such as telling them that they have to "do their part" to help mother be with them, and secretly recorded the children. Despite the county's efforts to facilitate visitation, mother missed so many visits that the county placed her on a plan to confirm her visits ahead of time to avoid disruption to the children, and yet she continued to miss visits even after confirming that she would be present.

Based on this record, we discern no clear error in the district court's factual findings about the efforts the county made, and we conclude that the district court's determination that the county made reasonable efforts to support reunification is amply supported by the

record. The record demonstrates that the county developed a case plan for mother that identified mother's needs and would alleviate the conditions that led to the children being placed out of mother's home. The record also supports that the county made extensive efforts to work with mother by arranging transportation for supervised parenting visits, traveling to her for UAs, and continually reaching out to schedule meetings with mother to assess her case plan progress and tell her about the children's well-being. Because the record supports the determination that the county provided mother a case plan that was tailored to the needs of mother and the children, relevant to the facts of the case, accessible, and realistic under the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county made reasonable efforts to support reunification.

III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that at least one statutory basis supported the termination of mother's parental rights.

Before a parent's rights may be involuntarily terminated, the district court must determine that at least one of several potential statutory bases exist. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b). Here, the district court concluded that four statutory bases supported the termination of mother's parental rights: (1) mother has substantially, continuously, and repeatedly failed to comply with duties imposed upon her by the parent and child relationship, *id.*, subd. 1(b)(2); (2) mother is palpably unfit to be a parent, *id.*, subd. 1(b)(3); (3) the county made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to the children's placement out of the home and these efforts have failed, *id.*, subd. 1(b)(4);

and (4) the children are neglected and in foster care, *id.*, subd. 1(b)(7).⁵ Because only one basis is required to support termination, we do not address all four and instead address only the first basis.

Mother argues that the county provided insufficient evidence to show that she did not meet the children's needs while they were in her care. The county asserts that it provided evidence of neglect and mother's refusal to engage with the case plan, which demonstrates that the children's needs are not being met. The district court determined that the county had proved by clear and convincing evidence that mother substantially, continuously, and repeatedly failed to comply with her parental duties, which is a statutory basis to terminate her parental rights. *See id.*, subd. 1(b)(2). The district court's findings include that mother has not "provided for or participated in the children's educational or therapeutic programming since the children were removed from the home," except for attending one meeting for her oldest child; did not have consistent contact with the children; and had inappropriate conversations with them during visits. The district court determined that any further efforts at reunification would be futile because mother refused to engage with the services offered and did not acknowledge the effect her actions had on the children's mental and emotional well-being.

⁵ Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that grounds for termination existed under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivisions 1(b)(1) and (7), which are related to abandonment and paternity, respectively, and requests that we correct the record. However, the district court mentions these subdivisions in relation only to the termination of the parental rights of the purported father of the four-year-old child and did not analyze these bases relative to mother. Therefore, there is nothing for us to correct.

The statute provides that parental rights may be terminated upon a showing

that the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but not limited to providing the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development, if the parent is physically and financially able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable.

Id. “[A] parent’s failure to comply with a reasonable case plan may constitute evidence of neglect of parental duties.” *J.H.*, 968 N.W.2d at 603. When reviewing evidence of neglect, “we address conditions at the time of the termination hearing and whether they are expected to continue for the foreseeable future.” *Id.*

The district court’s finding of continuing neglect is supported by the record. During supervised visits, county workers intervened on multiple occasions because mother neglected to supervise the children properly, putting them at risk of harm. While the children were out of mother’s care, mother attended only one meeting regarding the children’s care and education and consistently avoided meeting with county workers to discuss her progress on the case plan and receive updates on the children. Finally, as set forth above, the record supports the determination that the county made reasonable efforts to support the reunification of mother and the children and that these efforts were unsuccessful in all areas of concern. Because the district court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, the district court did not misapply the law, and its decision is not

contrary to logic or the facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that this statutory basis for termination was met.

In sum, the record supports the district court's determinations that termination was in the best interests of the children, the county made reasonable efforts to support reunification of mother and the children, and at least one statutory basis supports termination of mother's parental rights. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating mother's parental rights.

Affirmed.