In the Matter of Betsy Meredith Baldwin and On Behalf of Minor Child(ren), petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1229

In the Matter of Betsy Meredith Baldwin and
On Behalf of Minor Child(ren), petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Stephen Eric Baldwin,
Respondent.

Filed June 30, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-24-2230

Michael D. Schwartz, Brandon M. Schwartz, Schwartz Law Firm, Oakdale, Minnesota (for
appellant)

David C. Gapen, Gapen, Larson & Johnson, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of her petition for an Order for Protection (OFP)
against respondent arguing that the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the
law concerning the criteria for domestic abuse. We reverse and remand.
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FACTS
Appellant Betsy Meredith Baldwin and respondent Stephen Eric Baldwin were
married; a petition for dissolution was filed in 2022. The parties have two minor children,
one born in 2007, and one born in 2009. The children lived primarily with appellant and
spent parenting time with respondent when the children wished. The parties’ divorce was
pending in 2024.
In April 2024, appellant filed a petition for an OFP for herself and the children
against respondent, describing four incidents in February, March, and April of 2024 in
support of the petition . The district court issued an ex parte OFP for appellant and the
children, and respondent requested an evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, at which both
parties were represented, the district court dismissed appellant’s petition and vacated the
ex parte OFP. Appellant challenges the dismissal of her OFP petition, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law to the facts.1
DECISION2
Appellate courts review the decision whether to grant an OFP for an abuse of
discretion. Thompson v. Scrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018). “A district court

1 Appellant does not challenge the district court’s findings that the children were not
involved in the February 16 incident or the March 26 incident or its determination that
appellant “did not meet the burden of proof necessary for an [OFP] . . . as to the minor
children.” These incidents involved only allegations concerning appellant.

2 Respondent did not file a brief. W e nevertheless review the appeal on the merits under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A petition for an OFP “shall allege the existence of domestic abuse, and shall be
accompanied by an affidavit made under oath stating the specific facts and circumstances
from which relief is sought.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4(b) (2024). “Domestic abuse”
means, in relevant part, “(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault”; or “(2) the infliction
of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault committed against a family
member by a family member.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) (1), (2) (2024).
There were two relevant incidents reflected in the record. The first was on February
16 and the second on March 26. As to the February 16 incident, appellant testified that
respondent came to her house to pick up the parties’ dogs, which were waiting for him in
the car so that the parties would not need to interact. But he rang the doorbell; she answered
the door; they had a verbal exchange about which she testified: “[A]s he walked away, he
said, I hope you f ---ing die.” She later testified, “ I’ve never had anyone say that to me
. . . . [I]t was terrifying. I realized things were turning really dark.” When asked how the
incident had impacted her, she answered, “Severely. . . . I just don’t feel comfortable.”
When asked what she was afraid of, or how she was going to be harmed, appellant said:
If someone tells you they hope that you f ---ing die . . . and
they’re acting extremely errati c . . . you start to get a little
concerned that you’re not sure exactly what they are going to
do, what they’re capable of doing, when they might show up
again or why they feel so darkly about you . . . .

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Respondent testified that he immediately apologized. As to this incident, the district
court stated, “[t] his is not domestic abuse. It is bad behavior that is sadly common in
situations between adults involved in prolonged litigation.”
As to the March 26 incident, appellant testified that she was getting ready to leave
on a business trip, respondent wanted to take the dogs, and she “didn’t want [respondent]
to come over again [be]cause of what happened in February.” Although appellant had said
respondent could pick up the dogs after she left, he
drove up the driveway, rang the doorbell over and over again,
pounded on the back glass door . . . [a]nd blocked the driveway.

. . . .

. . . So, the only way to . . . get to my car would be to
leave through the back door where he was parked blocking the
driveway and in order to get to my garage to get my car to leave
my house, I wouldn’t have been able to [leave] because he was
blocking the driveway.

. . . .

I ended up calling 911 because I actually didn’t know
what else to do.

When asked how long appellant was blocking her driveway, she said, “probably 35 to 40
minutes,” although she asked him to leave “multiple times.” She testified that respondent
came to the house about 9:00 a.m. and her flight was “probably within the next half hour,
45 minutes.” When asked if respondent made any threats to harm her before he left, sh e
answered, “Yes. That he was going to stay in the car and not leave . . . demanding that I
come out and when you’re blocked in your one-way driveway and you need to leave . . . ”
When asked what harm respondent threatened, appellant said, “[i]n your own house when
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you’re taking a shower and getting ready to leave for the airport and you’ve asked someone
not to come over , and they’re blocking your driveway so you can’t leave your house, I
think that’s extremely threatening. I was terrified.” Appellant’s testimony at the hearing
indicated that, on March 26, she had suffered domestic abuse as defined by Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 2(a) . Additionally, w hen asked if she was fearful of respondent and
fearful for her own safety, appellant answered, “Yes”; when asked to explain, she said that
the situation with respondent “ha[d] turned into something that I don’t have any control
over, and it’s pretty scary.”
As to this incident, the district court stated, “the [c]ourt is persuaded that [appellant]
was frightened. However, this behavior is not domestic abuse.” We disagree for two
reasons. First, in explaining her fear of respondent, appellant testified that “[i]t has turned
into something that I don’t have any control over, and it’s pretty scary” given respondent’s
conduct of blocking the driveway and telling her “I hope you f ---ing die.” She also
explained that she did not want respondent to come to her ho use on March 26 because of
the incident on February 16 . Second, the district court explicitly found both parties’
testimony credible. Because the district court found appellant’s testimony on these matters
credible, we conclude that t he district court abused its discretion in concluding that
appellant had not experienced domestic abuse, i.e. , “the infliction of fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” as defined in Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd 2(a) (2).
Specifically, o n March 26, 2024, respondent appeared uninvited at appellant’s
house, repeatedly called, texted, and rang the doorbell. Respondent blocked her driveway
so that she could not leave. Appellant felt so threatened by this behavior that she called
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the police tw ice. “An overt physical act is not necessary to support the issuance of an
OFP.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009). We reverse and
remand for a correct application of the law.
Reversed and remanded.