In re the Guardianship of Ahmed Elfatih-Ahmed Tawil.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1235

In re the Guardianship of Ahmed Elfatih-Ahmed Tawil.

Filed March 31, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-PR-23-16755

Jason L. Schellack, Autism Advocacy & Law Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant Rand Aliebeid)

Gregory P. Seamon, Gregory D. Dittrich, Oakdale, Minnesota (for respondent Elfatih
Tawil)

Christopher Morris, Wornson Goggins, New Prague, Minnesota (for respondent Ahmed
Tawil)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the appointment of herself and respondent -father as
joint guardians of their son, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in not
appointing appellant as sole guardian because respondent ’s procedural errors made him
ineligible to be a guardian and it is not in their son’s best interests for the parents to be
appointed as co-guardians. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant Rand Aliebeid and respondent Elfatih Tawil are respectively the mother
and father of Ahmed Tawil, now 19. They are currently engaged in divorce proceedings.
Ahmed was diagnosed as autistic when he was three years old , and he was determined to
need a guardianship upon turning 18 years old and becoming an adult. R ecently, Ahmed
has also been determined to be incapacitated; to have a diagnosis of autism spectrum
disorder, seizure disorder, and developmental disorder; to have limited communications
skills; to require assistance to meet his daily needs; to have self-injurious behaviors; to lack
understanding of his personal safety and the safety of others; to be unable to make decisions
regarding appropriate medical treatment; to be in the severe range for persons with adult
cognitive disabilities; and to be unable to give informed consent. The district court noted
that, until Ahmed turned 18, the “ [p]arties were certainly able to raise [him] together and
cooperate in [his] best interest.”
Until July 25, 2025, an Order for Protection (OFP) on behalf of appellant against
respondent will be in effect. The OFP, which includes no admission or finding of domestic
abuse, was issued with Stipulated Findings of Fact. It permits the parties to text each other
to discuss Ahmed and respondent’s work schedule as it relate s to Ahmed’s care and to
communicate in person only for mediation of their divorce .1 It also provided for a period
of supervised visitation for respondent with Ahmed, and the parties selected L.F., who was

1 In a criminal matter involving an alleged incident of domestic abuse by respondent, the
criminal court filed a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order (DANCO). That DANCO was
in effect when the OFP was filed, but expired in November 2024.
3
an alternative-dispute-resolution neutral and a parenting-time supervisor, to supervise that
visitation.
About two months before Ahmed turned 18, appellant petitioned for appointment
as his sole guardian. Respondent objected and petitioned for appointment of co-guardians,
but later withdrew the petition and petitioned to be appointed as sole guardian himself. At
a contested two-day evidentiary hearing in February 2024, both parents testified. Appellant
also called as witnesses her sister and a teacher who had not had Ahmed in class for six
years; respondent called L.F.
Following the hearing, the district court issued an order appointing both parents as
Ahmed’s co -guardians. Appellant challenges that order , arguing that the district court
abused its discretion in disregarding respondent’s procedural errors and appointing him as
a co-guardian and in concluding that having the parties as co-guardians is in Ahmed’s best
interests.2
DECISION
“The appointment of a guardian is a matter within the discretion of the district court
and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion” and “ [t]he best interests
of the [person subject to guardianship] should be the decisive factor in making any choice
on his behalf.” In re Guardianship of Autio, 747 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. App. 2008)
(quotation omitted) . “A reviewing court is limited to determining whether the district

2 Appellant also challenges the district court’s determination that the DANCO then in effect
did not preclude respondent’s appointment as co-guardian. Because the DANCO has
expired, that issue is now moot.

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court’s findings are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the district court’s
determinations regarding witness credibility .” In re Guardianship of Wells , 733 N.W.2d
506, 510 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007).
I. Respondent’s Procedural Errors
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by appointing
respondent as co-guardian because, as respondent admits, “procedural notice and petition
requirements which led up to the initial hearing and following evidentiary hearing were not
met by [r]espondent during the period that [r]espondent acted pro se.” But appellant does
not allege any harm caused by respondent’s failure to meet the notice and other procedural
requirements, and the district court responded to appellant’s argument t hat respondent
should be deprived of a hearing on his objection to appellant’s petition by pointing out that
respondent, despite the procedural flaws, had a legal right to file an objection to appellant’s
petition, saying, “That’s what we’re here for today.” Appellant cites no legal support for
her implied views that the appropriate remedy for procedural error is deprivation of a
hearing and that it is an abuse of discretion to proceed with a hearing if one party has failed
to meet all the procedural requirements. Inadequately briefed issues are not properly before
an appellate court and are forfeited. See Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn.
1982).
II. Appointment of Co-guardians
The district court found that appellant and respondent “are both qualified to be
Ahmed’s guardian” because both have “knowledge and understanding of [their] son’s
condition and needs”; they “demonstrate an ability and willingness to provide the necessary
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care for their son”; and “a co -guardianship remains in the best interest of Ahmed .”
Although appellant argues that respondent has not been actively involved in Ahmed’s life
or in making decisions about him, respondent’s testimony supports the district court’s
finding that respondent knows and understands Ahmed’s condition and needs. Respondent
testified that Ahmed is not completely nonverbal and can read books out loud, that he likes
to be outside and run, about a quarter of a mile, with respondent; that respondent can adapt
his work schedule to care for Ahmed because he has a lot of seniority at his workplace,
having been continuously employed there since 2005 as an airplane mechanic, which has
been his job since 1993; that respondent was Ahmed’s primary caregiver when appellant
was training for her new job; that respondent has always been the primary wage earner for
the family; that, when respondent and appellant had a dispute over Ahmed’s medication,
appellant to ld respondent that Ahmed’s medication was “no longer any of [his, i.e.,
respondent’s] business”; that respondent did not agree with appellant’s testimony that she
was not obliged to keep him informed about Ahmed’s medication as a wife but might be
obliged to do that as a guardian; that respondent would be willing to share all information
with appellant if he were a co-guardian; and that respondent thinks Ahmed needs to spend
more time with other children and more time outside, running, and playing.
Some of respondent’s testimony concerned Ahmed’s diet. Respondent testified that
Ahmed doesn’t like the food appellant allows him to eat, so during respondent’s supervised
visitation and, at L.F.’s suggestion, respondent went to a restaurant where he could get
Ahmed’s favorite food, and Ahmed ate almost all of it by himself; that appellant insists on
an unnecessary gluten-free diet for Ahmed, who has had no testing for gluten or caffeine
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or lactose intolerance; that respondent thinks Ahmed is often “hangry, ” or “hungry and
angry,” because Ahmed doesn’t like or eat the food appellant gives him; that Ahmed likes
pancakes but not the sugar-free syrup appellant permits, so respondent got him honey; and
that Ahmed has experienced no ill effects from eating what respondent gives him.
Respondent also testified that, although appellant loves Ahmed, she restricts him
too much, and that respondent’s greatest fear if appellant were Ahmed’s sole guardian is
that she would restrict respondent’s access to Ahmed, as happened after May 2023, when
he did not see Ahmed until January 2024. He testified further that Ahmed now has a routine
for being at respondent’s apartment and is comfortable there; that because respondent
understands that autistic people thrive on routine , he developed a routine that facilitates
Ahmed’s personal hygiene ; that respondent bases everything he does with Ahmed on
Ahmed’s response or feedback ; and that respondent’s primary concern about who is
awarded the homestead is Ahmed’s comfort . As to the supervised visitation, respondent
testified that he enjoyed his sessions with Ahmed, it was “[g]ood to see [Ahmed] smiling
again” after a few supervised visits, and respondent thought L.F. would understand the
needs of an autistic child after he met her on Zoom . Finally, respondent testified that he
could not get information about Ahmed when he asked for it because respondent was not
listed as one of those to whom information was supposed to be released and that respondent
has looked into schools and thinks a different school would be better for Ahmed.
The district court also relied on L.F.’s testimony. She testified that the district court
ordered her to first observe Ahmed at his school without either parent present and that she
spent about 80 minutes talking with staff , who explained that Ahmed had been expelled
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because his behavior deteriorated after his parents’ separation, and he had injured several
employees. She also spent 20 minutes observing Ahmed, who had been reenrolled under
maximum restriction and was in a very large room with no other children and two providers
in body pads; he was withdrawn and silent—“absent”—while L.F. observed him.
L.F. testified further that the relationship between respondent and Ahmed was very
“positive” and intimate. When she first saw Ahmed with respondent, Ahmed squeezed
close to respondent and tears came to his eyes, which L.F. interpreted as Ahmed’s being
glad and a bit overwhelmed to see respondent after seven months. She said Ahmed’s
behavior “expanded” over the course of the visits; Ahmed’s gestures and expressions of
happiness increased, he used words much more frequently and would indicate agreement
or make requests; he wanted to interact with respondent, and he was fully engaged with
respondent and not with L.F.
One issue that affected Ahmed’s mood and happiness concerned food. L.F. testified
that respondent explained to her that appellant’s preferences for Ahmed’s diet are gluten
free, dairy free, no red meat, and no variation from her limited menu , which Ahmed does
not want to eat. In fact, during one of L.F.’s observations, Ahmed bolted from the
restaurant table. L.F. testified that she asked respondent if a primary -care physician had
ordered the restrictions; respondent said no, and L.F. suggested they buy a different lunch
and see if that solved the problem. L.F. testified further that, because respondent was very
reluctant to do anything that would upset appellant, L.F. told respondent that she would
take responsibility for Ahmed trying a different meal. L.F. said that, when Ahmed ate it,
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she realized that not liking the food appellant insists he eat is “what the [bolting] behavior
was about.”
L.F. testified that , although she had been told that Ahmed was nonverbal, she
watched him read a children’s book to his father and noticed “how he expressed himself
more fully with each visit, that he really had a capacity to communicate some things. . . .
[Respondent] had a better understanding of it than I did.” L.F. also said she realized that
Ahmed could read when they were waiting in a place where there was a Bud Lite ad on the
table; Ahmed looked at it and said “light,” although there was nothing in the ad to suggest
that word. And respondent said, “yes, he can read.” Ahmed later read the children’s book
to her, each word on each page.
L.F. chose the word “attunement” to describe respondent’s relationship with
Ahmed, saying respondent encouraged Ahmed to express himself but could quickly react
to what Ahmed enjoyed or didn’t enjoy and said there was “a very secure attachment
between father and child.” She also said the attachment of Ahmed to respondent “was
something in existence prior to [her] involvement. It wasn’t anything that [she] brought
about. And in fact, [she] never had to intervene or redirect other than that one suggestion
about [the restaurant].”
When asked if she had an opinion about who would be in the best position to serve
Ahmed’s needs as guardian, L.F. answered:
My opinion is that if guardianship were to remain solely
with [appellant], that Ahmed might never be allowed time with
[respondent] in his residence, you know the usual kind of
parenting time split plan with parents who are divorced. And
I would be really afraid that he would deteriorate once again to
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the point where he . . . was at [the school], withdrawn and
unable to have a bigger life.

L.F. was then asked whether Ahmed has a better chance at reaching his full potential with
respondent or appellant as guardian and said, “I can’t speak to what [appellant] would do”
because, “during the nine weeks that we worked together, [ appellant] never once greeted
me, waved at me . . . . So . . . we didn’t form any kind of exchange that involved
communications.” As to respondent, L.F. said she felt
confident that [respondent] wants Ahmed to have as big a life
and as big a world as he is capable of. And I concur [with
respondent] that Ahmed has potential that could and should be
explored, and I think [respondent] is able to move from the
parent role to incorporate a guardian r ole where the job is to
elicit and respect the choices that th at individual is able to
make. . . . [ And] he may want to eat [the food at his favorite
restaurant].

We believe this testimony supports the district court’s decision that a co -
guardianship was in the best interest of the parties’ child. Our decision is governed by our
standard of review; as previously stated, it is an abuse of discretion. We are not allowed
to reweigh the evidence. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221
(Minn. 2021). Based on this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in appointing both parties as Ahmed’s co-guardians.
Affirmed.