State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1236

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Midwest Car Search, LLC, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed April 7, 2025
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-24-2122

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Alex K. Baldwin, Jason Pleggenkuhle, Madeline Ranum,
Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Aaron R. Thom, Samantha J. Ellingson, Thom Ellingson, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellants)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this interlocutory appeal, appellants ask this court to reverse the district court’s
grant of respondent’s request for temporary injunction because the order lacked sufficient
findings, was too vague to enforce, and the requirements imposed by the district court are

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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greater than what is required and allowed by statute with respect to used car sales. We
affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were obtained from the state’s petition for injunctive relief and
the record below. Tom Spiczka is the owner of appellant Midwest Car Search, LLC (MCS).
MCS is a used-car dealership in Fridley, Minnesota. In April 2024, respondent State of
Minnesota, filed a lawsuit against MCS and Spiczka, alleging that they engaged in
fraudulent practices by falsely advertising cars as “certified cars” and signing consumers
up for expensive “vehicle service contracts” without their consent.
1 The state’s complaint
further alleged that appellants targeted Spanish-speaking customers by exploiting language
barriers, refusing to honor warranties, failing to make proper disclosures, and operating
under the unregistered business name “Coches MN.” The complaint alleged that appellants
violated Minn. Stat. § 325F.622 (2024), which governs the sales of used cars, noting that
appellants sold “3,245 cars for more than $56 million to individual buyers between 2017
and 2022” and that MCS used Credit Acceptance Corporation (CAC) to obtain financing.
CAC, which charged MCS customers interest rates of up to 22%, has been the target of
significant legal action “for its role in originating subprime auto loans.”

1 We acknowledge the state’s withdrawal of its factual contention that MCA advertised its
vehicles as certified preowned on carsforsale.com. The withdrawal of this fact does not
impact our analysis. We note that the evidence the state presented to the district court in
support of its motion for injunctive relief included affidavits from investigators and former
customers of MCA that attest to MCA’s alleged marketing of its vehicles as certified
preowned on Facebook marketplace and other social media sites.

3
In May 2024, the state filed its notice of motion and motion for temporary
injunction. In its accompanying memorandum of law filed in June 2024, the state indicated
that it sought temporary injunctive relief under Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.43-.48 (2024), which
is the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA); Minn. Stat. § 325F.67 (2024),
which is the False Statement in Advertisement Act (FSAA); Minn. Stat. §§ 333.001-.01
(2024) (Commercial Assumed Names Law), which prohibits people from conducting a
commercial business under an assumed name without filing a certificate; Minn. Stat.
§ 325F.662 (2024) (Used Car Law), which is a provision of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud
Act (MCFA), Minn. Stat. §§ 325F.68-.945 (2024), that addresses the sale of used motor
vehicles; and Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965).
The state argued that a temporary injunction was necessary to protect consumers and
requested that MCS be required to disclose the proper warranty coverage required by law
and accurately disclose its buyer guides in Spanish and English. The state also requested
that the district court enjoin appellants from: charging consumers for vehicle service
contracts without making accurate, clear, and conspicuous oral and written disclosures; and
advertising or selling cars as certified during the pendency of the proceeding.
The state’s motion included an affidavit signed by counsel and another affidavit
from an investigator from the Attorney General’s office. The investigator’s affidavit
referenced several exhibits generated from his investigation of MCS, including the sales
data from January 1, 2017, through April 4, 2023; a review of appellants’ marketing and
public records; and affidavits from some of appellants’ former customers, which the
investigator translated from Spanish to English. The affidavits described instances during
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which employees of MCS pressured them into purchasing a car, did not fully explain the
terms of the purchase agreement including the interest rate, charged them for a vehicle
service contract without their consent, and assured them that the vehicle they purchased
had been inspected and certified when most of the vehicles had significant mechanical
damage.
In July 2024, appellants filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the state’s
motion for a temporary injunction. Appellants argued that the injunctive relief sought by
the state was too “broad” and that the state’s request for injunctive relief was moot because
appellants “never had any objection” to making the changes sought by the state and had
“already implemented the changes.” Appellants also argued that the state’s “assertions of
misconduct and deceptive business practices [fell] so flat,” that they never opposed the
state’s motion for injunctive relief, and that the injunction was unnecessary because they
agreed to voluntarily check the box on the buyer’s guide next to the service box and
“ceas[ed] to advertise or sell vehicles as ‘certified.’”
The district court granted the state’s motion for injunctive relief, finding that the
state had broad authority to request injunctive relief under the appliable statutes and
concluding the state would “likely prevail on the merits of its claims that [appellants] have
violated, are violating, or are about to violate the Used Car Law, [M]CFA, DTPA, FSSA,
and Commercial Assumed Names Law.” The district court further concluded that the
temporary injunctive relief would “fulfill the legislative purposes of the Used Car Law,
[M]CFA, DTPA, FSAA, and Commercial Assumed Names Law,” and that the temporary
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injunctive relief would “help protect consumers from further harm by [appellants] during
the pendency of [the] litigation.”
The district court order stated in part:
2. [Appellants] shall not make any false statement of
material fact, nor shall [they] omit any material fact, in
connection with [their] marketing and selling of used motor
vehicles to Minnesota consumers.

3. [Appellants] shall not advertise or market that any of
their used motor vehicles are “certified” and . . . shall not sell
any used motor vehicle as “certified.”

4. [Appellants] shall not sell any vehicle service
contracts to any Minnesota consumers unless they clearly and
conspicuously mark the box on the Buyer’s Guide . . . .

5. [Appellants] shall not sell any vehicle service
contract without first disclosing, in a clear and conspicuous
manner: (1) that the vehicle service contract is an optional
product that the consumer is not required to purchase in order
to buy a used motor vehicle; (2) that the vehicle service
contract is an additional charge . . .; and (3) the price of the
vehicle service contract if the consumer chooses to purchase a
vehicle service contract. [Appellants] shall make the written
disclosure provided for in this paragraph before a Minnesota
consumer agrees to purchase a used motor vehicle or otherwise
begins signing any forms related to the purchase of the used
motor vehicle. If [appellants] conduct a sale in Spanish,
[appellants] shall make the written disclosure provided for in
this paragraph in Spanish . . . .

6. [Appellants] shall clearly and conspicuously disclose
to a consumer in writing the price of any vehicle service
contract sold in connection with a used motor vehicle. If
[appellants] conduct a sale in Spanish, the written disclosure
provided for in this paragraph shall be provided to the
consumer in Spanish.

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7. [Appellants] shall comply with Minnesota Statutes
section 325F.662, subdivisions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 and:
(1) accurately disclose, in writing, the duration of the written,
express warranty that applies to the used motor vehicle in
accordance with Minnesota Statute section 325F.662,
subdivision 2(a)(1)-(3); (2) accurately disclose, in writing, the
parts covered by the written, express warranty that applies to
the used motor vehicle warranty in accordance with Minnesota
Statute section 325F.662, subdivisions 2(c) and 2(d); and
(3) honor the terms of the written, express warranty that applies
to the used motor vehicle in accordance with Minnesota Statute
section 325F.662, subdivisions 4, 5, 6, and 7. If [appellants]
conduct a sale in Spanish, the written disclosures provided for
in this paragraph shall be provided to the consumer in Spanish.

8. [Appellants] shall comply with Minnesota Statute s
section 325F.662, subdivision 6 and: (1) display a Buyer’s
Guide in the window of each used motor vehicle they make
available for sale; (2) provide a Buyer’s Guide for each sale of
a used motor vehicle; (3) accurately disclose that the vehicle
includes a warranty on the Buyer’s Guide when the warranty
is required by law; (4) accurately disclose the duration and
parts covered on the warranty on the Buyer’s Guide as required
by law; and (5) provide Buyer’s Guides in Spanish when the
sale is conducted in Spanish.

9. [Appellants] shall provide all documents in
connection with its sales of used motor vehicles to Minnesota
consumers in Spanish when the sale is conducted in Spanish,
or upon request.

10. If the sale . . . is primarily conducted in Spanish,
[appellants’] presentation of any third- party financing
agreements and associated documentation shall take place in
Spanish.

11. [Appellants] shall cease conducting business under
the unregistered trade name “Coches MN” or any other
unregistered trade name without first filing with the Office of
the Secretary of State . . . .

This appeal follows.
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DECISION
Appellate courts review a district court’s grant of temporary injunctive relief for an
abuse of discretion. See Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 314, 321. The district court abuses its
discretion when it grants a temporary injunction based on an erroneous interpretation of
the law. DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Minn. 2020). In deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief, a district court typically considers: the relationship between the parties,
the relative harm to the parties if injunctive relief is granted or denied, the party’s likelihood
of success on the merits, any public interest or public policy that may be involved, and the
administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision and enforcement. Dahlberg, 137
N.W.2d at 321-22. “But when injunctive relief is explicitly authorized by statute, proper
exercise of discretion requires the issuance of an injunction if the prerequisites for the
remedy have been demonstrated and the injunction would fulfill the legislative purposes
behind the statute’s enactment.” State ex rel. Hatch v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 703
N.W.2d 562, 572 (Minn. App. 2005) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also
Wadena Implement Co. v. Deere & Co., 480 N.W.2d 383, 389 (Minn. App. 1992) . 2
Importantly, the DTPA states:

2 Although this standard has generally been applied in the context of statutory injunctions,
see, e.g., Hatch, 703 N.W.2d at 572-74, this court has also recognized that a district court
may be required to apply the Dahlberg factors in some circumstances when a party seeks
a statutory temporary injunction. See State by Ulland v. Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of
Am., 527 N.W.2d 133, 137 (Minn. App. 1995) (explaining that application of Dahlberg is
required when there is a dispute over the applicability of the statute authorizing injunctive
relief), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1995). Although the district court in this case made
some findings pertinent to a Dahlberg analysis, it also determined that Dahlberg did not
apply. Appellants do not argue that the district court erred by not applying Dahlberg.

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Injunctive relief. A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive
trade practice of another may be granted an injunction against
it under the principles of equity and on terms that the court
considers reasonable. Proof of monetary damage, loss of
profits, or intent to deceive is not required.

Minn. Stat. § 325D.45, subd. 1.

Additionally, the law allows a district court to grant injunctions when certain
claims are brought under the MCFA:
Injunction. The attorney general or any county attorney may
institute a civil action in the name of the state in the district
court for an injunction prohibiting any violation of sections
325F.68 to 325F.70. The court, upon proper proof that
defendant has engaged in a practice made enjoinable by section
325F.69, may enjoin the future commission of such practice. It
shall be no defense to such an action that the state may have
adequate remedies at law.

Minn. Stat. § 325F.70, subd. 1.

Here, the district court determined that injunctive relief was appropriate because:
(1) the state showed that appellants had “violated, are violating, or are about to violate the
Used Car Law, [M]CFA, DTPA, FSSA, and Commercial Assumed Names Law”; and
(2) issuance of the injunction would fulfill the legislative intent of protecting consumers
from deceptive practices. See State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d
888, 892 (Minn. App. 1992), aff’d, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993) (stating that consumer
protection laws are intended for the protection of consumers by balancing disproportionate
bargaining power present in consumer transactions). Appellants argue that the district
court’s order granting the temporary injunction did not contain sufficient findings and is
9
“too vague to be understood or enforced,” and that the district court’s order exceeds what
it is authorized to order. For reasons explained below, these arguments are unavailing.
A. The district court made sufficient factual findings regarding the reasons
for issuance of injunctive relief requested by the state.

District courts are afforded broad discretion in determining whether to grant a
temporary injunction and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.
Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979). The district court must make
sufficient findings to permit meaningful appellate review. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n
v. Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.
4, 2022); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Appellate courts review the “facts alleged in the
pleadings and affidavits” in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
See Bud Johnson Constr. Co. v. Metro. Transit Comm’n, 272 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 1978)
(reviewing an injunction granted under the Dahlberg factors, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22).
“When findings are insufficient to permit appellate review, the temporary injunction will
be reversed and remanded to the district court for findings.” Minn. Twins, 638 N.W.2d at
220.
Appellants argue that the district court did not make sufficient factual findings to
support the relief granted. In particular, appellants argue that the district court’s order “does
not contain any Findings of Fact section” and that it “consists only of Conclusions of Law
and various directives.” While the district court’s findings are not distinguished under a
designated “facts” section, the district court’s findings are apparent from the reading of the
order. For instance, the district court found “good cause to believe the S tate will likely
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prevail on the merits it claims that [appellants] have violated, are violating, or were about
to violate the Used Car Law, [M]CFA, DPTA, FSSA, and [the] Commercial Assumed
Names Law.” The district court found that the evidence presented by the state showed that
appellants:
(1) falsely advertised and misrepresented that their used cars
were certified; (2) misrepresented the cost and optional nature
of vehicle service contracts; (3) misrepresented and failed to
honor the warranty coverage consumers were entitled to under
Minnesota law; (4) failed to follow Buyer’s Guide
requirements; and (5) conducted business under an
unregistered assumed name.

Those findings led the district court to conclude that the relief the state sought would “fulfill
the legislative purposes of the Used Car Law, [M]CFA, DTPA, FSSA, and Commercial
Assumed Names Law,” which, the district court explained, aim to provide “the best
protection possible for consumers” from deceptive practices and unequal bargaining power
in consumer transactions. 3 See Liabo v. Wayzata Nissan, LLC , 707 N.W.2d 715, 724
(Minn. App. 2006) (“Consumer-protection statutes are remedial in nature and are liberally
construed in favor of protecting consumers.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).
Therefore, we conclude that the district court made sufficient findings to support the
temporary injunction.

3 Appellants also contend that there is no indication the district court considered their
submissions, arguments, or disputed facts. This is contradicted by the record. The first page
of the district court’s order states it “considered the pleading, exhibits, files, records,
arguments, submissions of the State, and the affidavits and declarations submitted to the
Court.” Additionally, the colloquy between appellants’ counsel and the district court during
the hearing on the temporary-injunction motion demonstrates that it had read and
considered appellants’ submissions, as the district court asked additional questions about
issues appellants raised in their opposition to the state’s motion for injunctive relief.
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B. The district court’s order for temporary injunction contained clear
directives that explained to appellants what conduct they were
prohibited from engaging in.

Appellants argue that the district court’s injunction directives were too vague to be
understood and enforced. We disagree.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P 65.04, an injunction “shall be specific in terms; shall describe
in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or
acts sought to be restrained.”
Appellants contend that various provisions of the order are “blanket, follow-the law-
injunctive provisions of limitless breadth” which “fail to give [appellants] the guidance and
reasonable detail regarding acts restrained or mandated that the law requires.” However,
when the provisions are read in their entirety, the order from the district court clearly
identifies the conduct appellants are to refrain from and the statutes appellants are required
to abide by. As an example, provision seven of the district court’s order states:
[Appellants] shall comply with Minnesota Statutes
section 325F.662, subdivisions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 and:
(1) accurately disclose, in writing, the duration of the written,
express warranty that applies to the used motor vehicle in
accordance with Minnesota Statute section 325F.662,
subdivision 2(a)(1)-(3); (2) accurately disclose, in writing, the
parts covered by the written, express warranty that applies to
the used motor vehicle warranty in accordance with Minnesota
Statute section 325F.662, subdivision 2(c) and 2(d); and
(3) honor the terms of the written, express warranty that applies
to the used motor vehicle in accordance with Minnesota Statute
section 325F.662, subdivisions 4, 5, 6, and 7. If [appellants]
conduct a sale in Spanish, the written disclosures provided for
in this paragraph shall be provided to the consumer in Spanish.

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This directive, like the other directives in the order, provides appellants with clear
directions on how they are to proceed with any other used auto sales from their dealership.
Additionally, the district court’s order specifies that the relief ordered will remain in effect
“during the pendency of the litigation.” In our view, the district court’s order leaves no
room for appellants to be confused about the specific conduct they are ordered to refrain
from or what actions the district court ordered them to complete to comply with the law.
Therefore, we discern no basis to reverse the district court’s temporary injunction
on this ground.
C. The district court’s injunction fulfilled the legislative purposes of the
statutes by protecting consumers from further harm from appellants.

Appellants argue that the district court’s injunction did not fulfill the legislative
purpose of the statutes because they “voluntarily modif[ ied] their practices to make
litigation unnecessary.” This position is inconsistent with the record.
Consumer-protection statutes are remedial in nature and are liberally construed in
favor of protecting consumers. See State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 935 N.W.2d 124, 133
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted) (discussing the MCFA and DPTA).
Appellants provide no persuasive authority from any court that supports the
proposition that voluntary compliance with the law forecloses the right to a temporary
injunction because the injunction no longer fulfills the legislative purpose of the statutes.
Regardless, the United States Supreme Court has said that “a defendant’s voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a [] court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
13
528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). The Minnesota Supreme Court has also adopted this approach,
stating the “defendant . . . bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
Snell v. Walz, 985 N.W.2d 277, 288 (Minn. 2023) (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190).
Appellants have taken no such action here.
Despite their argument that the temporary injunction is no longer necessary,
appellants did not provide the district court, or this court, with any evidence other than its
averment that its business practices have been remedied and are not expected to recur. But
even if appellants had provided proof that it had remedied its business practices, the district
court is still permitted to issue a temporary injunction. See id. Because the temporary
injunction fulfills the legislative purposes of the relevant statutes, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in issuing it to protect the public and ensure they are afforded the
protections provided by the consumer-protection statutes.
D. The district court’s injunctive relief is a permissible remedy under
Minnesota law.

Appellants additionally argue that the district court exceeded its authority by
requiring appellants to take additional actions beyond what is required under
Minn. Stat. § 325F.662, which governs the sale of used cars. We are not persuaded.
The MCFA and the DPTA “are remedial in nature and are to be liberally construed
in favor of protecting consumers.” Minn. Sch. of Bus., 935 N.W.2d at 133 (quotation
omitted). The MCFA “reflect[s] a clear legislative policy encouraging aggressive
prosecution of statutory violations” and thus should be generally very broadly construed to
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enhance consumer protection.” Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2000)
(quotation omitted). Minnesota Statutes section 8.31, subdivision 3 (2024), “broadly
authorizes the Attorney General to seek equitable relief to stop conduct that harms
consumers.” Minn. Sch. of Bus., 935 N.W.2d at 134. “The essence of equity jurisdiction
has been the power of the [district court] to do equity and to [fashion] each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished [this
remedy].” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quotation omitted).
Appellants argue that the district court’s order requiring them to provide all
documents related to the sale of a car in Spanish if the sale is conducted primarily in
Spanish is not a specific requirement of the used car statute. While that may be true, the
district court is afforded great equitable power in injunctive proceedings to ensure the
public is protected, particularly in consumer protection cases. See Minn. Sch. Of Bus., 935
N.W.2d at 134; Eakman, 285 N.W.2d at 97. In light of the evidence presented by the state,
including but not limited to the affidavits from appellants’ former customers, who are
primarily Spanish speakers, the district court’s order requiring appellants to provide the
appropriate documentation to Spanish speakers when the sale is conducted in Spanish is an
appropriate exercise of the district court’s equitable authority to protect the public from the
harms alleged by respondent. Likewise, the district court’s order prohibiting appellants
from “making any false statement of material fact” during the marketing and selling of a
used motor vehicle serves to protect all consumers from appellants’ alleged deceptive
conduct. Thus, these requirements satisfy the legislature’s intent of protecting consumers
from deceptive practices and fraudulent conduct. In sum, the temporary injunction’s
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requirements were appropriately tailored to enjoin appellants from engaging in conduct
that the district court had good cause to believe violated various consumer protection
statutes based on the evidence submitted by the state. We therefore discern no abuse of
discretion by the district court.
Affirmed.