State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1240

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nelson Randolph, III,
Appellant.

Filed August 18, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-22762

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A seven-year-old child of Nelson Randolph III died in Randolph ’s home after
ingesting fentanyl. A Hennepin County jury found Randolph guilty of second-degree
felony murder and second-degree manslaughter. We conclude that the district court did
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not err by denying Randolph’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found in his home
when police officers searched it six weeks after the child’s death. We also conclude that
the district court did not err in answering questions posed by the jury or in giving the jury
a supplemental instruction to continue its deliberations. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On August 17, 2022, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Randolph went to a bedroom of
his home to wake his seven-year-old son, A.N.R. The boy was nonresponsive, stiff, and
cold, with a white substance around his mouth. Randolph called 911. Paramedics arrived
at his home approximately ten minutes later but could not revive A.N.R. Randolph told
police officers at the scene that A.N.R. had been at his home since the prior evening and
that his behavior had been normal. Randolph said that A.N.R. fell asleep on the couch and
that Randolph moved him to a bedroom at approximately 10:00 p.m. Randolph did not
enter the bedroom again until the following morning. Paramedics believed that A.N.R. had
died of a seizure, and police officers did not consider the home to be a crime scene.
An autopsy was performed on A.N.R.’s body. On September 15, 2022, a police
investigator learned that toxicology tests revealed “a fatal amount of fentanyl in [A.N.R.’s]
body,” trace amounts of xylazine (a large- mammal tranquilizer), and “no other life-
threatening injuries.” The investigator then contacted A.N.R.’s mother, S.M., who had last
seen A.N.R. on August 15, 2022, as well as S.M.’s adult son, D.R.W. , and his girlfriend,
who had been with and cared for A.N.R. the day before his death.
On September 29, 2022, a police officer applied for a warrant to search Randolph’s
home. The application stated that A.N.R. had been found dead in Randolph’s home on
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August 17, 2022; that A.N.R. had been behaving normally the night before he was found
dead; and that a toxicology test determined that A.N.R.’s death was caused by a fentanyl
overdose. The application described a statement that S.M. had made to investigators that
Randolph was “more likely to be a [drug] supplier than a user” and noted that Randolph
and S.M. “are separated but cordially share custody of their children.”
A district court judge approved the application and issued a warrant, and police
officers executed it that same day. When police officers arrived at Randolph’s home, he
did not answer the door for five to six minutes and smelled like bleach when he did so.
Inside his home, officers found gray powder in a toilet bowl and in plastic baggies lying
on the bathroom floor. Officers also found $2,935 in cash, a strong smell of bleach in the
bathroom, and other drug paraphernalia. The plastic baggies later tested positive for
fentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and xylazine.
In November 2022, the state charged Randolph with second-degree manslaughter,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.205, subd. 5 (2022). The state later amended the complaint
to add a charge of second-degree felony murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subd. 2(1) (2022).
In May 2023, Randolph moved to suppress the evidence that officers found in his
home. The district court denied the motion in a seven-page order.
The case was tried to a jury in March 2023. Over four days, the state called 19
witnesses and introduced 113 exhibits, including videorecordings made by the body-worn
cameras of police officers who responded to Randolph’s 911 call. D.R.W. testified that he
dropped off A.N.R. at Randolph’s home at approximately 5:00 p.m. on August 16, 2022,
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and that A.N.R. was acting normally at that time and during the time that D.R.W. remained
at the home to socialize with Randolph. D.R.W. also testified that, while in Randolph’s
home, he saw a bowl on the dining-room table that contained a gray substance that “looked
like drugs.”
The jury found Randolph guilty of both charges. The district court sentenced him
to 195 months of imprisonment on the felony-murder conviction. Randolph appeals.
DECISION
I. Motion to Suppress
We begin by considering Randolph’s argument that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress evidence.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures” and states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. “Probable cause exists if the judge issuing a warrant determines that ‘there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’” State v. Yarbrough,
841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
Whether probable cause exists is a “practical, common-sense decision” based on the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 622-23. In reviewing an issuing judge’s probable-
cause determination, this court gives the issuing judge “ great deference” and seeks to
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determine whether there was “a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.” State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001).
Randolph challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress in two
ways.
A. Probable Cause
Randolph first argues that the search-warrant application lacked probable cause on
the ground that it did not give rise to a fair probability of the discovery of evidence of the
cause of A.N.R.’s death. He notes that officers did not see any drug -related items in hi s
home immediately after A.N.R.’s death. He also contends that S.M.’s statement that he
likely was a drug supplier held little weight because her statement was speculative, she did
not reveal any first- hand knowledge of drug-dealing, and her statement was not
corroborated.
In denying Randolph’s motion, the district court noted his statement that A.N.R.
appeared to be normal before he put him to bed at 10:00 p.m., which, the district court
reasoned, indicates that A.N.R. ingested fentanyl at Randolph’s home either shortly before
falling asleep or during the night. The district court also noted S.M. ’s statement that
Randolph was “more likely to be a supplier than a user.” The district court reasoned that
S.M.’s statement was reliable because she and Randolph cordially co-parented A.N.R.
Accordingly, the district court determined that the search warrant was supported by
probable cause.
The search-warrant application presented the issuing judge with undisputed
information that a young child had died of a fentanyl overdose in Randolph’s home after
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arriving at the home in good health. In addition, the application stated that A.N.R.’s other
parent, S.M., had said, in effect, that Randolph likely was a drug supplier. Together, these
two pieces of information make it reasonably likely that A.N.R. ingested fentanyl while in
Randolph’s home, which provided the issuing judge with “a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime” would be found in Randolph’s home. See Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d
at 622 (quotation omitted).
Randolph questions the value of S.M.’s statement concerning his potential drug-
dealing without more information about the basis of her knowledge. But the warrant
application described S.M.’s relationship to A.N.R. and Randolph, which makes it
reasonable to believe that she has known Randolph for a number of years and interacts with
him regularly. If a warrant application includes information provided by an informant, the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis may include “the credibility and veracity of the
informant.” State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W. 3d 138, 149 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). An
informant who identifies himself or herself to a police officer, and thus is in a position to
be held accountable for the information provided, is more likely to be deemed reliable. Id.;
State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Minn. 1990); State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d
179, 181 & n.1 (Minn. 1986). Here, S.M. identified herself to the police officer who
submitted the warrant application. Nothing in the warrant application indicates that S.M.
should be deemed unreliable. Thus, the district court did not err by considering S.M.’s
statement that Randolph likely was a drug supplier.

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B. Staleness
Randolph also argues that the information in the warrant application was stale. A
search-warrant application must include “facts so closely related to the time of the issue of
the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.” State v. Souto, 578
N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). In considering whether the factual
basis of a warrant is stale, a court may consider factors such as “whether there is any
indication of ongoing criminal activity, whether the articles sought are innocuous or
incriminating, whether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable, and whether
the items sought are of enduring utility.” Id.
The district court reasoned that the facts supporting a probable-cause determination
were not stale because it was reasonable to believe that, if Randolph was a drug supplier,
he likely was engaged in drug-dealing on an ongoing basis. The district court also reasoned
that it was reasonable for police to wait for the results of the autopsy and to interview S.M.
before seeking a warrant.
The search-warrant application sought drugs and drug paraphernalia generally, not
necessarily the specific drugs that caused A.N.R.’s death. S.M.’s statement that Randolph
likely was a drug supplier gives rise to a reasonable inference that Randolph was engaged
in supplying drugs on an ongoing basis. In the present circumstances, the passage of six
weeks of time is not excessive and does not compel the conclusion that the information
stated in the warrant application was stale. See State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 544
(Minn. 2005) (concluding that information was not stale because facts suggesting ongoing
criminal activity were obtained within three weeks of warrant application); cf. Souto, 578
8
N.W.2d at 750-51 (concluding that information was stale six to ten months after occurrence
of events described in warrant application).
Thus, the issuing judge had “a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed,” Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d at 804, and the district court did not err by denying
Randolph’s motion to suppress evidence.
II. Responses to Jurors’ Questions
Randolph also argues that the district court erred in its responses to questions
submitted to the court by the jury.
This issue first arose during the afternoon of the day after the case was submitted to
the jury. The jury foreperson sent two notes to the district court within a ten-minute period.
The first note referred to the felony-murder charge in count 1 and asked, “How do we
define ‘the defendant’s act’ in reference to [one of the elements of the offense]?” The
second note asked, “What do we do if we cannot come to a consensus on a count?”
The district court conferred with counsel on the record. With respect to the first
note, the district court stated that it would give the jury a supplemental instruction that
“they have all of the law necessary to decide the case” but that the court might later give a
different response if the jury were to “repeat[] that same question.” After the jury returned
to the courtroom, the district court responded to the first question by stating, “You do have
all the law necessary for you to decide this case in the jury instructions.”
With respect to the second note, the district court proposed to respond by repeating
an instruction that was given before the case was submitted, and neither party objected.
The district court implemented that plan by instructing the jury as follows:
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In order for you to return a verdict, whether guilty or not guilty,
each juror must agree with that verdict. Your verdicts must be
unanimous. You should discuss the case with one another and
deliberate with a view towards reaching agreement if you can
do so without violating your individual judgment. You should
decide the case for yourself but only after you have discussed
the case with your fellow jurors and have carefully considered
their views. You should not hesitate to reexamine your views
and change your view—or your opinion if you become
convinced they are erroneous. But you should not surrender
your honest opinion simply because other jurors disagree or
merely to reach a verdict.

The next day, at approximately 11:30 a.m., the jury submitted a third note to the
district court, stating: “We are unable to come to a unanimous decision on count 1 because
of different interpretations of the definitions & elements. We do have a unanimous
decision on count 2.” The district court conferred with counsel off the record. After the
jury returned to the courtroom, the district court responded to the third note by asking the
foreperson the following question: “Does this third question that the jury has posed relate
to the first question that the members of the jury sent out yesterday?” The foreperson
responded, “It is related; albeit, not solely the issue.” The district court then stated:
Okay. What I am going to do now is I am going to
answer the question that you posed yesterday in this manner:
When I gave you the original instructions in this case, I told
you that you should regard each instruction in light of the other
instructions. The defendant’s act that is referred to in subpart
2 of the felony-murder charge under the third element refers
back to any factual findings you have made regarding subpart
1 of that same section. So I will say it a different way. We
are—the question related to element 3 of felony murder.
Element 3 of felony murder says, “At the time of the act
causing the death of [ A.N.R.], the defendant was committing
felony child endangerment.” Your question from yesterday
related to the elements of felony child endangerment. So when
I say “the defendant’s act ” in subpart 2, refers back to any
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factual findings you have made related to subpart 1, I mean,
under . . . the portion of the instructions where it defines the
elements of felony child endangerment.

With that, I am going to reread the instruction that I gave
you yesterday, which is in order for you to return a verdict,
whether guilty or not guilty, each juror must agree with that
verdict. Your verdicts must be unanimous. You should
discuss the case with one another and deliberate with a view
towards reaching agreement if you can do so without violating
your individual judgment. You should decide the case for
yourself but only . . . after you have discussed the case with
your fellow jurors and have carefully considered their views.
You should not hesitate to reexamine your views and change
your opinion if you become convinced they are erroneous. But
you should not surrender your honest opinion simply because
other jurors disagree or merely to reach a verdict. I am,
members of the jury, gonna ask you to return to the deliberation
room and continue with deliberations.

After the jury left the courtroom, the district court noted for the record, “As I
mentioned earlier, I did go over this plan with the attorneys back in chambers.” The district
court also stated its intention to order a mistrial if the jury were to send “another note
indicating that they have not reached consensus.” The district court also gave the parties
an opportunity to make a record concerning the district court’s response to the third note.
The state did not object. Randolph’s attorney objected to the district court’s decision to
instruct the jury to continue deliberating. The jury returned its verdicts less than two hours
later.
Randolph challenges the district court’s responses to the jury’s notes in two ways.
A. Question Posed to Foreperson
Randolph first argues that the district court erred when, after receiving the jury’ s
third note, the district court asked the foreperson, “Does this third question that the jury
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has posed relate to the first question that the members of the jury sent out yesterday?”
Randolph contends that the district court’s question intruded upon the secrecy and privacy
of jury deliberations.
Randolph’s trial attorney did not assert an objection that aligns with Randolph’s
argument on appeal. Accordingly, this court applies the plain- error rule. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 31.02. Under the plain-error test, an appellant is entitled to relief on an issue to
which no objection was made at trial only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and
(3) the error affects the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736,
740 (Minn. 1998). If these three requirements are satisfied, the appellant also must satisfy
a fourth requirement: that the error “ seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the
judicial proceedings.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn. 2014); see also
Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022). If any requirement of the plain-
error test is not satisfied, this court need not consider the other requirements. State v.
Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn. 2012).
Randolph bases his argument on two supreme court opinions: State v. Mims, 235
N.W.2d 381 (Minn. 1975), and State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. 2011). In Mims,
the district court judge entered the jury room and asked about the jury’s progress toward
reaching a verdict. 235 N.W.2d at 383-84. On appeal, the supreme court reversed and
remanded for a new trial. Id. at 384-89. The supreme court expressed “concern . . . with
the influence this particular type of intrusive communication has upon the integrity of th e
proceedings and the independent role and function of a jury during its deliberations on its
verdict.” Id. at 384. The supreme court summarized the operative principle as follows:
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“When the trial judge in a criminal case enters the jury room and communicates with the
jury without any effort to secure the presence of the defendant or his counsel, the
defendant’s right to be present and represented at all stages of the proceeding has been
violated.” Id. at 389.
In Nissalke, the district court judge discovered errors in the verdict forms while
instructing the jury. 801 N.W.2d at 93. The judge immediately told the jury that the errors
would be corrected. Id. at 93-94. After the jury left the courtroom, the judge corrected the
verdict forms and reviewed them with counsel. Id. at 94. The judge then personally carried
the corrected verdict forms to the jury room and delivered them to the jury. Id. at 94. While
in the deliberation room, the judge answered two questions before departing. Id. On
appeal, the supreme court determined that the district court erred by entering the jury room
but concluded that reversal was not automatically required because the jury had not yet
begun its deliberations and that the error was harmless because the judge’s statements to
the jurors were accurate and appropriate. Id. at 97-98.
Mims and Nissalke are different from this case in one important respect: the judge
in this case did not enter the jury room. The judicial act about which Randolph complains
(which is entirely verbal in nature) occurred in open court, on the record, with Randolph
and counsel present. Randolph urges this court to apply Mims and Nissalke to a judge’s
oral questions in the courtroom on the ground that such questions also may improperly
intrude into a jury’s deliberations. Randolph asserts that the district court judge in this case
“invaded the jury’s sacred privacy in a different manner than Mims, but equally
wrongfully.” Specifically, Randolph contends that the district court intruded on the jury’s
13
secrecy and privacy by “ask[ing] a substantive question about the content and details of the
jury’s deliberations” and “by inquiring about the jury’s impasse, which interfered with their
decision-making authority and inserted the judge into the decision-making process.”
To reiterate, Randolph’s argument is focused on one question posed by the district
court to the foreperson: “Does this third question that the jury has posed relate to the first
question that the members of the jury sent out yesterday?” The district court asked the
question to clarify the meaning of the jury’s third note. Before the district court asked the
question, it was reasonable to believe that the third note related to the first note. The
foreperson confirmed that fact in her answer to the district court’s question. A district court
is expressly authorized by a procedural rule to “give additional instructions” to a jury “[i]f
the jury asks for additional instructions on the law during deliberation.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.03, subd. 20(3), (3)(a). The challenged question allowed the district court to understand
that jurors still were unclear about the issue referenced in the jury’s first note. After
receiving the foreperson’s answer, the district court proceeded to give a supplemental
instruction concerning the elements of count 1. Importantly, the district court’s question
was narrowly tailored and did not seek information from the foreperson about the jury’s
deliberations, such as the amount of time expected to reach a verdict, which was the nature
of the questions asked in Mims. See 235 N.W.2d at 382-84.
Randolph repeatedly states in his brief that the district court’s question was
“substantive” in nature. That description apparently invokes the supreme court’s comment
in its harmless-error analysis in Nissalke that, while in the jury room, “the court’s responses
to the juror’s questions provided cursory and substantively appropriate answers to the two
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questions.” 801 N.W.2d at 99 (emphasis added). We do not interpret that part of Nissalke
to categorically prohibit a district court from asking a question that may be deemed
substantive. If anything, Nissalke is permissive with respect to substantive questions or
statements because it suggests that they may be harmless, so long as they are “appropriate.”
See id. Even if we assum e without deciding that a district court may not ask a question
that is substantive in nature, the district court’s question in this case would not be deemed
“substantive” because it did not seek information central to the jury’s decision, such as the
jury’s perceptions of the evidence or its views about whether the state had proved its case.
Thus, the district court did not plainly err by asking the jury foreperson a question
after receiving the jury’s third note.
B. Coercion
Randolph also argues that the district court erred on the ground that the
supplemental instruction given after the jury’s third note coerced the jury into reach ing a
verdict.
“The jury may be discharged without a verdict if the court finds there is no
reasonable probability of agreement. ” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(4). A district
court has discretion in determining whether or not to discharge a jury and may consider
factors such as “the length of the trial, the nature or complexity of the case, the volume and
nature of the evidence, the presence of multiple counts or multiple defendants, and the
jurors’ statements to the court concerning the probability of agreement.” State v. Kelley,
517 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted). “If a trial court believes a jury is
unable to agree, it “may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or
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repeat an instruction . . . .” Id. (quoting A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-4.4(b)
(1986)). But a district court’s discretion to instruct a jury to continue deliberating is
limited. “The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an
unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.” Id. (quotation omitted). In
addition, “it is reversible error in Minnesota to coerce a jury towards a unanimous verdict,”
which means that a district court “can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided,
nor allow the jury to believe that ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” State v. Jones, 556
N.W.2d 903, 912 (Minn. 1996) (citations omitted). This court applies an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review to a district court’s decision to require a jury to continue
deliberating. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d at 909 (quotation omitted).
Randolph does not contend that the district court used coercive language in the
supplemental instruction given after the jury ’s third note. The language of the district
court’s supplemental instruction is identical to that of a commonly used pattern instruction
that has been cited approvingly by the supreme court. See 10 Minnesota Dist. Judges’
Ass’n, Minnesota Practice–Jury Instruction Guides § 3.02, at 45-46 (7th ed. 2024); State
v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 551-52 & n.7 (Minn. 2012); State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329,
337-38 & n.1 (Minn. 1998); Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 907-08 & n.2, 911; Kelley, 517 N.W.2d
at 907 & n.1, 910. Instead, Randolph contends that the supplemental instruction was
inherently coercive because it was given immediately after the jury had sent the district
court a note stating that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on count 1. Randolph
contends that, by instructing the jury to continue deliberating, the district court “made them
believe they had to reach a verdict and could not deadlock.”
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This case is fairly similar to Buggs, in which the jury sent a note asking that certain
testimony be read to them again and later sent a second note saying that it had reached an
impasse and that a verdict would be “impossible” without again hearing additional
testimony. 581 N.W.2d at 337. The district court instructed the jury to “continue
deliberations” and to “keep working.” Id. at 338. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed,
reasoning that the district court earlier had given a supplemental instruction conforming to
the pattern instruction, the supplemental instruction was “noncoercive” in nature, the jury’s
deliberations had not been excessively long, and the jury “was fully able to discern the
limits of its obligations.” Id. ; see also Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 911- 12 (concluding that
district court did not coerce jury to reach verdict by twice instructing jury to continue
deliberating, in part because district court “properly responded to the jury’s impasse by
reading [pattern instruction language] verbatim”).
In this case, the state called 19 witnesses over four days and introduced more than
100 exhibits. After approximately one and one-half days of deliberations, the jury
informed the district court that it was at impasse and, in doing so, referred to the issue for
which it earlier had sought clarification of the applicable law. The district court repeatedly
instructed the jury with appropriate language from the pattern instruction, both after the
first note and after the third note. The district court did more than simply instruct the jury
to continue deliberating; the district court also provided the jury with an explanation of the
elements of count 1, which the jury earlier had sought. That additional information about
the applicable law provided the district court with a reason to believe that continued
deliberations might be fruitful. Likewise, the additional information made it less likely
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that the jury was coerced into believing that they were required to reach a unanimous
verdict solely by compromising their honest opinions.
Thus, the district court did not coerce the jury into reaching a verdict.
Affirmed.