State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1244

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jodi Linn Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed June 9, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-VB-23-102160, 27-VB-23-102164, 27-VB-23-181448,
27-VB-23-191901, 27-VB-23-225273

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Calvin T. Lee, Campbell Knutson, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Allison F. Eklund, Eklund Law, PC, Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges her five petty-misdemeanor adjudications for violating a city
nuisance ordinance prohibiting habitually barking dogs, arguing that (1) the ordinance is
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preempted by state law, (2) the right-to-farm statute precludes prosecution for violating the
ordinance, and (3) insufficient evidence supports the adjudications. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jodi Linn Anderson lives on an approximately five-acre property located
in the City of Minnetrista. The property is zoned “agricultural,” and Anderson describes
herself as a “full-time farmer.” Anderson’s farming activities include keeping a variety of
animals and selling the animals and their products. To protect the animals from predators,
Anderson keeps Great Pyrenees guard dogs.1 According to Anderson, the dogs protect by
barking “if they perceive a threat.” After barking, they “stop and they listen.” They
continue to bark if the threat proceeds but stop doing so when the threat abates.
Two of Anderson’s neighbors repeatedly complained to police about the dogs
barking. Police reports show that officers visited Anderson’s property approximately 34
times beginning in 2020 in response to these complaints. For example, on May 4, 2023,
police heard a dog barking for approximately seven to eight minutes. While they listened,
there were no noises coming from neighboring properties and there were no vehicles or
pedestrians on the road. Three days later, police heard a dog bark for approximately 30
minutes. On August 13, police heard “multiple dogs barking” for more than five minutes.
On August 27, police heard a dog barking for approximately 11 minutes. Finally, on
October 6, police heard a dog barking for approximately 11 minutes. On each of those

1 It is unclear how many dogs Anderson kept during the relevant period. Anderson testified
inconsistently at trial, at one point asserting she had two guard dogs and later stating she
had three.
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occasions, officers parked approximately 100 yards away from Anderson’s residence and
listened for barking.
The city has an ordinance providing:
It is unlawful for any person to keep or harbor a dog which
habitually barks or cries. Habitual barking shall be defined as
barking for repeated intervals of at least five minutes that are
audible from any neighboring property. A dog that violates
this subdivision three or more times in a three month period is
a public nuisance.

Minnetrista, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 1110.17, subd. 1 (2009).
Based on the complaints and police investigations, the police cited Anderson for
seven ordinance violations covering the period of April through November 2023.
Anderson moved to dismiss the citations, arguing that her agricultural activities and the
barking of her dogs “are protected by and immunized” by Minnesota’s right-to-farm
statute, Minn. Stat. § 561.19 (2024), and by a statute allowing guard animals to protect
against wolves, Minn. Stat. § 97B.645, subds. 1, 12(b) (2024) (wolf -protection statute).
The district court denied the motion, concluding that if the right-to -farm statute applies
there are fact issues as to whether Anderson’s activities amount to an “agricultural
operation” and “whether the dog barking . . . was protected activity or a nuisance.”
At the bench trial, respondent State of Minnesota presented testimony from two
police officers and a neighbor, who testified consistent with the facts above. The neighbor
also testified about the impact the dog barking has had on his quality of life. He explained
he has “[n]o peaceful enjoyment” and that, when he tries to do yardwork, all he can hear is
barking. Anderson testified in her own defense. She explained that the property has been
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farmed for approximately 50 years. A nd she described, in detail, the type and number of
animals she raises, the equipment she uses, and her sales of various farm animals and
products.
The district court found Anderson guilty of five ordinance violations. It adjudicated
them as petty misdemeanors and imposed a total fine of $640.2
Anderson appeals.
DECISION
I. Anderson forfeited her preemption arguments.
Anderson first contends that the ordinance is preempted by the right-to-farm statute,
Minn. Stat. § 561.19, and the wolf- protection statute, Minn. Stat. § 97B.645, subds. 1,
12(b). Anderson did not present these arguments to the district court. Accordingly, we do
not consider them. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (arguments raised
for the first time on appeal are generally forfeited); Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union
Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 707 n.11 (Minn. 2012) (declining to consider federal
preemption argument raised for the first time on appeal).
II. The right-to-farm statute does not preclude this prosecution.

The right-to-farm statute provides:
(a) An agricultural operation is not and shall not become
a private or public nuisance after two years from its established
date of operation as a matter of law if the operation:
(1) is located in an agriculturally zoned area;

2 The city prosecuted Anderson for misdemeanor violations of the ordinance. It is unclear
from the record why the district court adjudicated her for petty misdemeanors.
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(2) complies with the provisions of all applicable
federal, state, or county laws, regulations, rules, and ordinances
and any permits issued for the agricultural operation; and
(3) operates according to generally accepted
agricultural practices.

Minn. Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2(a). An “agricultural operation” is “a facility and its
appurtenances for the production of crops, livestock, poultry, dairy products or poultry
products.” Id., subd. 1(a). And “generally accepted agricultural practices” are defined as
“those practices commonly used by other farmers in the county . . . in which a nuisance
claim is asserted.” Id., subd. 1(c).
By its terms, the right-to-farm statute does not apply “to any prosecution for the
crime of public nuisance as provided in section 609.74 or to an action by a public authority
to abate a particular condition which is a public nuisance.” Id., subd. 2(c)(2). Minn. Stat.
§ 609.74(1), (3) (2024) broadly defines as a misdemeanor nuisance offense the
maintenance or permission of “a condition which unreasonably annoys, injures or
endangers the safety, health, moral, comfort, or repose of any considerable number of
members of the public” and “any other act or omission declared by law to be a public
nuisance and for which no sentence is specifically provided.”
Anderson generally argues that, because she kept the guard dogs as part of her
agricultural practices, the right-to-farm statute immunizes her from prosecution for
violating the ordinance. We are not convinced. It is undisputed that the ordinance is a law
declaring that the act of keeping habitually barking dogs constitutes a public nuisance. And
Anderson does not contest the city’s authority to enact such an ordinance under Minn. Stat.
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§ 412.221, subd. 23 (2024). Because the right-to-farm statute does not apply to
prosecutions for maintaining a public nuisance, it does not preclude this prosecution.
III. Sufficient evidence supports Anderson’s convictions.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we carefully review the record “to
determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was
sufficient to permit the fact-finder to reach its verdict.” State v. Olson, 982 N.W.2d 491,
495 (Minn. App. 2022). The same standard of review is used in bench trials and jury trials.
State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). Under this standard, we view the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict” and assume that the fact -finder
“disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d
257, 263 (Minn. 2016).
Anderson’s sufficiency challenge does not focus on the evidence supporting the
ordinance violations— that there were five instances in which her guard dogs habitually
barked “three or more times in a three month period.” Rather, Anderson contests the
district court’s implicit rejection of her defense under the right-to-farm statute. We are not
persuaded by Anderson’s sufficiency argument for three reasons.
First, our review of the record reveals ample support for the district court’s finding
that Anderson violated the ordinance five times. At trial, the state presented evidence that
police officers responded to complaints of barking dogs approximately 34 times. When
responding, officers parked about 100 yards from Anderson’s property and listened to see
if the dogs barked for longer than five minutes. This evidence is sufficient to support all
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five of Anderson’s petty-misdemeanor adjudications for violating the habitually- barking-
dog provision of the nuisance ordinance.
Second, we discern no error by the district court in failing to expressly reject
Anderson’s right-to-farm defense. 3 In cases tried without a jury, the district court must
make a finding as to guilt within seven days of the trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 2(a). When a district court’s more detailed findings “omit[] a finding on any issue[s]
of fact essential to sustain the general finding, it must be deemed to have made a finding
consistent with the general finding.” Id., subd. 2(e); see also State v. Li, 948 N.W.2d 151,
154 (Minn. App. 2020) (deeming finding on element of petty misdemeanor offense
implicitly made based on finding of guilt). That is the situation here.
As previously noted, the district court denied Anderson’s motion to dismiss the
citations, determining, in part, that whether the right-to -farm statute applies is a question
of fact. At trial, Anderson testified and presented other evidence regarding the historic use
of her property for farming, the nature of her current farming operations, and her use of
guard dogs to safeguard her livestock. The district court’s seven-page verdict included
findings that (1) the property is zoned agricultural, (2) Anderson raises a variety of farm
animals and sells them or their products, (3) Anderson owns two tractors and other farm

3 Anderson’s reliance on the wolf-protection statute is unclear. The statute permits a person
to use a guard animal to “harass, repel, or destroy wolves to protect a person’s livestock.”
See Minn. Stat. § 97B.645, subds. 1, 12(b). It does not define how a dog or other guard
animal may be used or describe any such use as a “generally accepted agricultural practice”
or otherwise reference the right-to -farm statute. See id. Anderson does not explain the
significance of this statute, other than asserting her use of guard dogs is allowed to protect
livestock. We do not consider inadequately briefed issues. See Melina v. Chaplin , 327
N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (concluding an issue not briefed is deemed forfeited).
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equipment, and (4) Anderson keeps guard dogs that protect the other animals by barking
when they perceive a predatory animal approaching. Anderson presented no evidence, and
the district court made no findings, that Anderson’s use of guard dogs is a “generally
accepted agricultural practice” as the right-to-farm statute requires. Minn. Stat. § 561.19,
subd. 2(a)(3). While the district court’s reference in the verdict to having already found
that the right-to-farm statute does not protect Anderson may be inaccurate, we are satisfied
that rejection of the defense may be inferred from the findings the court did make and its
guilty verdict.
Finally, Anderson does not point us to precedential authority, and we have found
none, that establishes a defendant who is prosecuted for violating a nuisance ordinance
may assert the right-to-farm statute as an affirmative defense. But see Wendinger v. Forst
Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 553 (Minn. App. 2003) (concluding that prior version of
statute did not create affirmative defense to private nuisance claim when operation was “in
compliance with generally accepted agricultural practices”). Indeed, recognition of such a
defense would be inconsistent with the legislature’s decision that the protection of the right-
to-farm statute does not apply “to any prosecution for the crime of public nuisance.”
4 See
Minn. Stat. § 561.19, subd. 2(c)(2).

4 We also note that Anderson cites no apposite authority for the proposition that her keeping
of guard dogs is itself an “agricultural operation” that would be protected under the right-
to-farm statute. See Hiebert Greenhouses of Minn., Inc. v. City of Mountain Lake, No.
A23-1870, 2024 WL 3407697, at *3 (Minn. App. July 15, 2024) (noting that the “threshold
determination” under the statute is whether property constitutes an agricultural operation),
rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 19, 2024); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)
(stating nonprecedential cases may be cited for persuasive authority).
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Because the right-to-farm statute does not preclude Anderson’s prosecution for
violating the ordinance, and the record supports the district court’s verdict, we affirm.
Affirmed.