State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1245

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Adam Peter Flores, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-7417

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on its
conclusion that the destruction of a body-worn camera video did not violate his rights under
the Due Process Clause. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 2018, corrections agents entered the home of appellant, Adam Peter Flores,
Jr., to conduct a routine inspection. The agents discovered a woman, S.S., unconscious in
a bed. When S.S. awoke, she became “hysterical” and “threatened to kill herself.” The
corrections agents called police officers to check on S.S. and she was later taken to a local
hospital. Shortly after this incident, S.S. entered chemical-dependency treatment. S.S.
disclosed to her counselor that appellant had sexually assaulted her. S.S. explained that
while she stayed with appellant, he anally or vaginally penetrated her at least twenty times
while she was intoxicated or unconscious from alcohol consumption.
A St. Paul police investigator viewed body- worn-camera video from the officers
who checked on S.S. the day she was discovered at appellant’s home. The investigator did
not reclassify the body-worn-camera video for preservation, and it was deleted pursuant to
the police department’s retention policy.
Respondent State of Minnesota initially charged appellant with one count of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(ii) (2016)
and one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
3
Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d) (2016). On the day of trial, the state filed an amended
complaint alleging an additional count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The
parties then agreed to a court trial on stipulated evidence and the state dismissed the counts
of first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court found appellant guilty
of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. This appeal follows.
DECISION
The Due Process Clause protects a criminal defendant’s right to present a complete
defense. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 225 (Minn. 2010). In a criminal case, the state
must disclose any evidence within its possession or control that “tends to negate or reduce
the defendant’s guilt.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(6). Thus, th e destruction of two
categories of evidence can give rise to a due-process violation: (1) evidence that has
apparent and material exculpatory value, and (2) evidence that is only potentially useful.
State v. Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. 2013). Whether a due-process violation
occurred is a question of law, which appellate courts review de novo. State v. Beecroft,
813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012).
A. The evidence had no apparent and material exculpatory value.
Appellant argues that the body-worn-camera video had apparent and material
exculpatory value because it would have impeached S.S.’s credibility with regard to her
sexual-assault allegations. In a destruction-of -evidence claim, appellate courts consider
whether the exculpatory value of lost or destroyed evidence was apparent and material
before the evidence was destroyed. Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d at 372. “Evidence is material
‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
4
the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294,
299 (Minn. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
Appellant contends that the district court could have acquitted appellant because the
video would have shown that S.S. did not report any sexual assault on the day she was
discovered at appellant’s home and that she acted affectionately toward appellant.
Appellant’s contention is not supported by the record. The district court reviewed the
stipulated evidence and found that S.S. was credible and appellant’s “denials and
minimizations of his conduct” were not credible. Even if the district court had viewed the
body-worn-camera video, the court likely would not have found S.S.’s demeanor to be
convincing impeachment evidence because S.S. also made credible statements that she was
extremely intoxicated the entire month of May 2018. Thus, the body-worn-camera video
was only potentially useful evidence, and the district court did not err when it concluded
that the body-worn-camera video did not have apparent and material exculpatory value.
B. The evidence was not destroyed in bad faith.
Having concluded that the evidence was only potentially useful, we next consider
whether the state destroyed the evidence in bad faith. “[B]ad faith requires an intentional
act.” Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d at 373. The state acts in bad faith if it either (1) purposefully
destroys evidence favorable to a defendant so as to hide it, or (2) fails to follow standard
procedures when it destroys the evidence. Id. “The defendant carries the burden of
demonstrating bad faith.” Id.
Neither indicia of bad faith are present in this case. First, there is no evidence in the
record that the state had any motive to destroy the body-worn-camera video in order to hide
5
beneficial evidence from appellant. Rather, the body-worn-camera video appeared to
contain inculpatory evidence, which the state would likely be motivated to preserve. The
investigator reported that the video shows that officers asked S.S. if she was staying at
appellant’s home by choice, and she replied, “No, I don’t want to be here.” An agent then
asked S.S. if appellant was keeping her there, and S.S. replied, “I hate this life,” and “Please
God, just let me f---ing die.” The investigator’s summary of the body-worn-camera video
suggests that S.S. was distressed and not at appellant’s home voluntarily, so the state likely
would have been motivated to preserve the video rather than destroy the video to hide
evidence favorable to appellant.
Second, appellant contends that the body-worn-camera video was destroyed in bad
faith because the investigator failed to properly reclassify the video to prevent its
destruction. However, there is no evidence that the investigator intentionally or
maliciously failed to reclassify the video. Rather, the investigator’s attempt to retrieve the
video to share with a paralegal indicates that she believed she had preserved the video and
that her failure to reclassify the video was an inadvertent mistake. Thus, the district court
did not err by determining that appellant failed to prove that the body-worn-camera video
was destroyed in bad faith.
In conclusion, the district court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to dismiss
based on its conclusion that destruction of the body-worn-camera video did not violate
appellant’s rights under the Due Process Clause.

6
Appellant made additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We conclude
that these arguments are without merit. See State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn.
2019) (noting that an appellate court need not provide a detailed discussion of pro se claims
that lack merit).
Affirmed.