State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1248

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Robert Voeller,
Appellant.

Filed August 4, 2025
Reversed
Slieter, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-23-1676

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction of third-degree assault,
appellant argues that his conviction must be reversed because his right to a speedy trial was
denied when the state dismissed and refiled the complaint. Because appellant’s
speedy-trial right was violated, we reverse.
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FACTS
In May 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Daniel Robert
Voeller with third-degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2020).
Voeller’s trial was originally scheduled for February 13, 2023. On February 14, 2023,
Voeller indicated his willingness to accept the state’s offer and plead guilty. Although a
plea petition was not submitted, nor was a plea offered on the record, the state informed
the victim that the case had resolved. A few days later, Voeller, through new counsel,
informed the state that he would be exercising his right to proceed to trial. The parties
agreed to schedule trial for June 5, 2023.
On April 11, 2023, Voeller demanded a speedy trial. The state made several
unsuccessful attempts to subpoena the victim, including on April 24, April 26, May 1, May
3, and May 12. When the parties appeared for trial on June 5, the state requested a
one-to-two-month continuance to allow it additional time to serve the victim. The district
court stated that it “d[id] not see good cause to extend the trial date beyond the speedy
demand” and granted a one-week continuance.
On June 12, the parties appeared for trial. The state noted that “there has been no
contact between [the county attorney’s] office and the alleged victim within th[e] one-week
period, nor has the alleged victim been served with the updated subpoena for a trial setting
this week.” Voeller requested that the district court “dismiss the matter with prejudice
under [Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure] 30.02.” The district court denied Voeller’s
request, and the state dismissed the complaint pursuant to rule 30.01.
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On August 7, the state refiled the complaint. On August 11, Voeller demanded a
speedy trial. The case was scheduled to go to trial on November 6.
On September 27, Voeller moved to dismiss the case as a remedy for a speedy-trial
violation. On October 20, the district court held a hearing on Voeller’s motion and later
denied it.
The case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2024. The jury found Voeller guilty
of the charged offense. The district court later stayed imposition of the sentence for three
years and placed Voeller on probation.
Voeller appeals.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “The nature of the
speedy trial right ‘places the primary burden on the’ State to bring the case to trial because
the ‘defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial.’” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 244
(Minn. 2021) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527, 529 (1972)).
In Minnesota, “trial is to commence within 60 days from the date of the demand
unless good cause is shown . . . why the defendant should not be brought to trial within that
period.” State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 29-30 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted), rev.
denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b) (requiring trial within
60 days of demand “unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date”). “There is no
fixed rule for all cases that defines how long is too long to wait for a trial. Rather, we must
ask a series of commonsense questions in a particular case to determine whether the values
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embedded in the speedy trial right were protected . . . .” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 244-45.
“When a defendant’s speedy trial right is violated, the only possible remedy is dismissal of
the indictment.” State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 190 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Whether a defendant’s “right to a speedy trial is violated is a constitutional question subject
to de novo review.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Minnesota courts use a four-factor balancing test to determine whether a delay in a
case violates a defendant’s speedy-trial right. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315
(Minn. 1999). We must evaluate “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay;
(3) whether the defendant asserted his . . . right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay
prejudiced the defendant.” Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33). “None of these factors
is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the findin g of a deprivation of the right of
speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant.’” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015)
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533); see also Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 244 (explaining that “the
central question” is whether the state brought “the accused to trial quickly enough so as not
to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects”). That is, “we must ‘engage
in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.’” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting Barker,
407 U.S. at 533).
A. Length of Delay
In Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days from the speedy-trial demand presumptively
satisfy the first factor. See Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16.
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Voeller demanded a speedy trial on April 11, 2023. His trial was scheduled for
November 6 but did not occur until January 2024.
The state concedes that Voeller’s trial began over 60 days from the date of the
speedy-trial demand, triggering review of the remaining factors. See State v. Johnson, 811
N.W.2d 136, 144 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Under Minnesota law, a delay of more than 60 days
from the date of the speedy-trial demand is presumptively prejudicial, triggering review of
the remaining three factors.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012). We therefore turn to the
remaining factors.
B. Reason for Delay
In assessing the reason-for-delay factor, “the key question is whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d
at 19 (quotation omitted). We first consider which party caused the delay. See id. at 19-20;
State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 629 (Minn. 2017). Next, we evaluate the reason for that
delay, assigning “different weights . . . to different reasons.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). “For instance, a deliberate delay to hamper the defense
weighs heavily against the prosecution, while neutral reasons such as negligence or
overcrowded courts weigh less heavily.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court found, and the state maintains on appeal, that Voeller is partially
to blame for the delay because he had expressed a willingness to accept the state’s offer to
plead guilty and later exercised his right to go to trial.
In the speedy-trial context, the delay period begins when a defendant demands a
speedy trial. See Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 -16 (“In Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days
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from the date of demand raise a presumption that a violation has occurred.”). Voeller
demanded a speedy trial in April 2023. In February 2023, two months before his demand,
Voeller expressed willingness to plead guilty and, only a few days later, informed the state
that he would be exercising his right to proceed to trial. Because this happened before
Voeller demanded a speedy trial, it does not impact the reason-for-delay factor. Therefore,
the district court erred in determining that Voeller is partially to blame for the delay.
The delay was instead caused entirely by the state’s inability to secure the victim’s
presence for the June 2023 trial. On June 5, the state told the district court that, although
it had attempted to subpoena the victim, “the alleged victim [had] told the sheriff’s office
that he didn’t want to be served[] [and that] he didn’t want to participate because of his
frustrations” after the state informed the victim that the case had resolved in February 2023.
According to the state, the victim was “not avoiding service” and was “in contact,” but “he
just [did not] want to come testify.” On the continued trial date of June 12, the state
acknowledged that there had been no communication with the victim during the preceding
week. The state therefore sought to continue Voeller’s trial because it needed additional
time to persuade the victim to cooperate. Thus, the state is to blame for the delay.
The record shows that the state attempted to subpoena the victim several times
before trial. See id. at 317 (“Normally, the unavailability of a witness constitutes good
cause for delay. . . . However, a prosecutor must be diligent in attempting to make
witnesses available and the unavailability must not prejudice the defendant.”). This factor
therefore weighs against the state but less heavily than a deliberate attempt to hamper the
defense. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20
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C. Assertion of the Right
Under this factor, a defendant’s assertion of the speedy-trial right “is entitled to
strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the
right.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32. We consider “the frequency and intensity of a
defendant’s assertion” as evidence of the seriousness and potential prejudice at play. Hahn,
799 N.W.2d at 32 (quoting Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318); see also State v. Paige, 977
N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2022) (“[T]he strength of the demand is likely to reflect the
seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.” (quotation omitted)).
Voeller did not demand a speedy trial until April 2023, which is after his case was
originally scheduled to go to trial. However, on June 5, Voeller objected to the state’s
continuance request and he again reasserted his speedy-trial right on June 12, noting that
he “continue[d] to assert his speedy trial rights . . . so the record [was]clear that he[] [had]
been diligent in asserting those rights if the case were to ever be recharged.” Voeller again
demanded a speedy trial after the state refiled the charge following its dismissal of the case
under rule 30.01. Therefore, this factor weighs in Voeller’s favor.
D. Prejudice
We consider three interests when assessing prejudice: “(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit
the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; see also
Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318-19. The third interest is the “most serious,” as “the inability
of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system ,” id.,
but a defendant need not prove that the delay actually impaired their defense to show
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prejudice, see Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 254 (explaining that a court may consider speculative
harm to a defendant because “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability
of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify” (quotation
omitted)).
Under this factor, “the prejudice a defendant suffers must be due to the delay,”
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 631, and “must be more than minimal to weigh in favor of a
defendant,” Paige, 977 N.W.2d at 841.
Regarding the first interest, Voeller was not held pending trial, nor does he claim
that he suffered prejudice due to oppressive pretrial incarceration.
Turning to the second interest, Voeller claims that the delay increased his stress and
anxiety because it impacted “significant life events for his family, including moving his
son into college.” “Voeller originally demanded a speedy trial to get the matter resolved
in anticipation of the last summer he would have with his 18-year-old son before he headed
off to Iowa State for college.” Voeller noted that the charges were refiled on August 7,
which coincided with when his son was moving. He claimed that he “checked the criminal
complaint website daily, even hourly during June and July, to make sure that he would
know immediately if the refiled charges came to fruition and so that he could try to avoid
having a warrant issued for his arrest.” After charges were refiled, Voeller received a
booking order that stated that his failure to comply may result in a warrant being issued for
his arrest. Voeller asserted that he made an appointment for booking immediately after
charges were filed but was twice turned away because the computer system did not indicate
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that he needed to be booked. Voeller claims that the contradictory information and fear of
a potential warrant being issued for his arrest increased his stress and anxiety.
Lastly, Voeller’s motion to dismiss also claims that his defense was impaired by the
delay because memories fade and witnesses’ willingness to testify decreases over time. He
does not, however, point to a witness with a diminished memory or one that is unwilling
to testify due to the lapse of time.
Voeller suffered some stress and anxiety due to the delay. But, because the
prejudice suffered “must be more than minimal to weigh in favor of a defendant,” Paige,
977 N.W.2d at 841, we conclude that this factor is neutral.
E. Balancing the Factors
The length of delay requires additional inquiry into the remaining Barker factors.
The state was solely to blame for the delay, but it attempted to subpoena the victim before
trial, so the reason- for-delay factor weighs slightly against the state. Voeller asserted his
right to a speedy trial in April 2023, objected to the state’s June 5 continuance request ,
reasserted the right on June 12, and, in August, renewed his demand for a speedy trial
within days of the state refiling charges. This factor therefore weighs in his favor. And
the prejudice factor is neutral because Voeller suffered minimal increased stress and
anxiety due to the delay. This is a close case, but the factors balance in Voeller’s favor.
And this is particularly so by these facts in which the state’s reason to dismiss the original
complaint, and later refile the complaint, was to secure its case for trial. This procedure is
not permissible when it conflicts with a defendant’s speedy-trial rights. See Mikell, 960
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N.W.2d at 249 (suggesting that dismissal cannot be used as means of defeating a
speedy-trial demand).
We therefore conclude Voeller was deprived of his right to a speedy trial.
Reversed.