State of Minnesota v. Kenneth Tyler Aschan

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1251

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kenneth Tyler Aschan,
Appellant.

Filed August 8, 2025
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-22-4750

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Segal, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his conviction of unlawful possession of
a firearm by an ineligible person on two grounds. He alleges that the district court erred
(1) in its pretrial ruling that an Iowa conviction of domestic abuse assault by strangulation
is equivalent to a Minnesota conviction of domestic assault by strangulation and that the
state therefore failed to prove that he had a prior conviction of a “crime of violence”; and
(2) by depriving appellant of his right to have a jury decide whether his Iowa conviction
constituted a “crime of violence.” We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Kenneth Tyler Aschan in 2022
with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and one count
of possession of a pistol without a permit. In its complaint, the state alleged that Aschan
was an ineligible person because he had been convicted in Iowa in 2016 of the felony
offense of “Domestic Abuse–Impeding Air/Blood Flow Causing Bodily Injury” under
Iowa Code § 708.2A(5) (2016) (the Iowa offense). The state alleged in the complaint that
his conviction of the Iowa offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” that rendered him
ineligible to possess a firearm under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)
(2020). The complaint cited Minnesota’s domestic-assault-by-strangulation statute, Minn.
Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2014) (the Minnesota offense), as the comparable Minnesota
crime.
3
Aschan filed a motion to dismiss the ineligible-person charge for lack of probable
cause. He argued that the Iowa conviction contains a lesser criminal-intent requirement
(“knowingly”) than the Minnesota offense (“intentionally”). He argued that, consequently,
his Iowa offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under Minnesota law.
The district court found that the Iowa offense is functionally equivalent to the
Minnesota offense and denied Aschan’s motion. The district court compared the two
statutes, noting that both require proof of an assault and the existence of a domestic
relationship. The district court also identified in its order the difference in wording between
the two offenses—that the Minnesota offense requires “intentionally impeding normal
breathing or circulation of the blood” of another, while the Iowa offense “is committed by
‘knowingly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another’” person.
The district court cited the Minnesota Criminal Jury Instruction Guides, stating that
“intentionally” means that the actor “either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
specified, or believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause the
result.” See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.32 (2015). The court noted that, while
knowingly is not defined in Iowa law, the Iowa courts have looked to the uniform criminal
jury instructions, which define having knowledge of something as having ‘“a conscious
awareness’” of that thing. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996)
(quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 200.3 ( 1988)). The district
court thus found no meaningful distinction between the two statutes because it could “see
no plausible way that [d]efendant could perform the conduct resulting in his Iowa
conviction without engaging in that conduct intentionally.”
4
At a subsequent hearing, the district court commented that, based on its
determination that the Iowa and Minnesota offenses were functionally equivalent, the court
planned to instruct the jury that Aschan’s Iowa offense is a “crime of violence” as a matter
of law under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). And when the case was assigned to a
different judge for trial, the judge confirmed that intent.
Instead of proceeding to a jury trial, Aschan entered into an agreement with the state
to submit the case to the court for trial based on stipulated evidence to preserve his right to
challenge the district court’s pretrial ruling. At the hearing concerning Aschan’s waiver of
his right to a jury trial, Aschan’s counsel provided the following explanation on the record
of the issues Aschan was seeking to preserve for appeal:
[O]ne of the confusing things is we kind of have one big issue,
but a few smaller issues that are also in play that . . . mak[e] a
contested trial unnecessary—all that stuff. There [are] three
different [kinds] of things that are going together.
. . . .
One is the pretrial ruling . . . denying [our motion to dismiss
for lack of probable cause.]
. . . .
Another is that that is a matter of law; that that makes
the Iowa conviction a matter of law conviction under
Minnesota law.
. . . .
And then the third being that the jury would be
instructed that it is a crime of violence under Minnesota law in
jury instructions?

At the close of the hearing, the district court found that Aschan sufficiently waived his
jury-trial right.
5
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the state submitted eleven exhibits to the district
court as the trial evidence. The exhibits included certified records from the Iowa courts
related to Aschan’s Iowa offense.
The district court found Aschan guilty of both being an ineligible person in
possession of a firearm and possessing a firearm without a permit. The district court
entered convictions on both charges and sentenced him on the ineligible-person charge to
60 months’ imprisonment.
DECISION
In our analysis, we address first Aschan’s argument that his conviction must be
reversed because his Iowa conviction is not the equivalent of the Minnesota offense. We
then address Aschan’s argument that the district court violated his jury-trial right by
deciding as a matter of law that Aschan had committed a “crime of violence” under the
ineligible-person statute.
I. The district court did not err in determining that the Iowa conviction was the
equivalent of a conviction of the Minnesota offense.

Aschan contends that the district court erred when it determined that he was
ineligible to possess a firearm because of his Iowa conviction. We review de novo
questions of whether an out-of -state conviction is equivalent to a Minnesota offense.
See State v. Martin, 941 N.W.2d 119, 124- 25 (Minn. 2020) (treating the issue of whether
an out-of-state offense is equivalent to a Minnesota offense as a “sufficiency- of-the-
evidence” challenge subject to de novo review).
6
Minnesota’s ineligible-person statute makes it a felony for a person to possess a
firearm if the person has been convicted, “in this state or elsewhere,” of a “crime of
violence.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Subdivision 1(2) of the statute expressly
provides that, for the purposes of the offense, a “crime of violence includes crimes in other
states or jurisdictions which would have been crimes of violence as herein defined if they
had been committed in this state.” Id. The Minnesota offense is identified as a “crime of
violence” in the ineligible person law. See Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2020) (“‘Crime
of violence’ means: felony convictions of the following offenses: . . . 609.2247 (domestic
assault by strangulation) . . . .”).
The test for determining whether a crime in another state would have been a “crime
of violence” if committed in Minnesota turns on whether “proving the elements of the out-
of-state offense would necessarily prove a violation of [the] Minnesota law.” Martin, 941
N.W.2d at 124 (analyzing whether a person was required to register as a predatory offender
based on an out-of- state conviction). Conversely, “if the elements of the out-of-state
offense could be proven without proving a violation of Minnesota law, then the out-of-state
conviction would not be a violation of a Minnesota offense.” Id.
The Iowa Code provides that a person commits a felony “domestic abuse assault . . .
by knowingly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another by
applying pressure to the throat or neck of the other person or by obstructing the nose or
mouth of the other person and causing bodily injury.” Iowa Code § 708.2A(5). The phrase
“domestic abuse assault” is further defined in the Iowa Code as “an assault, as defined in
section 708.1, which is domestic abuse as defined” in a section of Iowa’s domestic abuse
7
statute, Iowa Code § 236.2(2) (2016). Iowa Code § 708.2A(1) (2016). An “assault” is then
defined, as relevant here, as an act, “without justification,”
which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is
intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or
offensive to another, . . . [or] which is intended to place another
in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful,
injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent
ability to execute the act.

Iowa Code § 708.1(2) (2016).
The Minnesota Statutes provide that “whoever assaults a family or household
member by strangulation is guilty of a felony.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2.
Strangulation is defined as “intentionally impeding normal breathing or circulation of the
blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of
another person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 1(c) (2014). “Intentionally” is defined in
the Minnesota Statutes to mean that “the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause
the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause
that result,” and “the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make
the actor’s conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word ‘intentionally.’”
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2014).
Aschan argues that proving the elements of the Iowa offense would not prove a
violation of the Minnesota offense because the Iowa offense only requires proof that the
offender “knowingly” impeded the victim’s breathing or blood circulation, while the
Minnesota offense requires proof that the offender “intentionally” impeded the victim’s
8
breathing or blood circulation. He maintains that proof that an act was “knowing” does
not establish the requisite level of intent to be found guilty of the Minnesota offense.
But Aschan’s argument fails to take into account all of the required elements of the
Iowa offense. Specifically, he ignores the fact that the Iowa offense requires proof not only
that the actor “knowingly imped[ed ]” the victim’s breathing or circulation, but that the
actor also committed an “assault.” An assault under the Iowa Code requires proof, as
relevant here, of an intent “to cause pain or injury,” “physical contact which will be
insulting or offensive,” or the “fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful,
injurious, insulting, or offensive.” Iowa Code § 708.1(2). Thus, when all elements of the
Iowa offense are considered, we agree with the district court’s assessment that there is “no
plausible way” that an actor could knowingly impede a person’s breathing or circulation
with the intent to cause pain or injury, offensive physical contact, or the fear of such
contact, without also acting to “intentionally imped[e]” the person’s breathing or
circulation.
Because proof of intent is a required element of the Iowa offense, we conclude that
proof of the required elements for a conviction of the Iowa offense would “necessarily
prove a violation” of the Minnesota offense. Martin, 941 N.W.2d at 124. The district court
thus correctly determined that the Iowa and Minnesota offenses are equivalent for purposes
of the ineligible-person statute.
But Aschan also claims that, even if the offenses are functionally equivalent, the
district court erred in its analysis because it looked to the allegations set out in the complaint
in the Iowa case in analyzing whether the Iowa conviction is equivalent to the Minnesota
9
offense. Specifically, the district court quoted an allegation contained in the Iowa
complaint in its “Statement of Facts” section of the memorandum accompanying its order.1
If the district court relied on factual allegations in the complaint in its analysis, we agree
with Aschan that this would constitute an error. See id. (stating that the determination of
whether an out-of-state conviction would be a violation of Minnesota law depends on an
analysis of the elements of each offense); Erlinger v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 1840, 185
(2024) (stating that “a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than
determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of” (quotation
omitted)). Any such error, however, would be harmless because the district court’s
determination that the Iowa and Minnesota offenses are equivalent is subject to de novo
review. See Martin, 941 N.W.2d at 122 (applying de novo review); Minn. R. Crim. P.
31.01 (stating that harmless error must be disregarded).
II. Aschan was not deprived of his jury-trial rights.

Aschan contends that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial on the issue of
whether the Iowa offense constitutes a “crime of violence” for the purposes of the
ineligible-person statute. He points to the district court’s pretrial statements that the jury
would be instructed that the Iowa offense qualifies as a “crime of violence.” The state
argues that Aschan forfeited this argument when he waived his right to a jury trial and
agreed to submit the case to the court based on stipulated evidence.

1 The quote is set out in the following sentence in the district court’s memorandum:
“According to the complaint filed in the Iowa case, Defendant choked the mother of his
child ‘for long enough she felt as though she was going to pass out.’”
10
At the outset, we note that the record is not clear concerning the terms upon which
Aschan agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial and which issues were properly preserved for
appeal. But we need not address this issue because we conclude that any error by the
district court would be harmless for the following reasons: (1) Aschan does not dispute
that he was convicted of the Iowa offense; (2) the district court correctly determined as a
matter of law that the Iowa conviction is equivalent to the Minnesota offense; and (3) given
(1) and (2), a jury could not answer the question of whether the Minnesota offense is a
“crime of violence” for the purposes of the ineligible-person statute in any way but in the
affirmative—it is uncontroverted that the Minnesota offense is contained in the list of
offenses defined as “crimes of violence” under the statute, Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5.
Because it is incontrovertible that the Minnesota offense constitutes a “crime of violence”
under the ineligible-person statute, we conclude that any error by the district court would
be harmless. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (ruling that a failure
to include an element of an offense in a charge to a jury could be a harmless error when
the “omitted element is supported by uncontroverted evidence”).
Affirmed.