State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1264

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jill Diane Tucker,
Appellant.

Filed June 23, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-23-9157

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Renee N. Courtney, St. Cloud City Attorney, Courtney J. Petruzates, Assistant City
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Schmidt ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by admitting into
evidence a photo of a receipt identifying allegedly stolen items when the prosecutor failed
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to lay sufficient foundation for its admission and (2) committed reversible plain error
because its admission violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 14, 2023, appellant Jill Diane Tucker used the self -checkout at the
Sartell Walmart and attracted the attention of Amanda Gohman, a member of the store’s
asset-protection team. Gohman noticed that appellant failed to scan nine items via the
store’s surveillance cameras and an application on her phone that allowed her to watch
items scanned on the register in real time. Gohman confronted appellant as she exited the
store. Because the items amounted to more than $25, Gohman called the police per
Walmart’s policy. Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with misdemeanor
theft.
At a jury trial, appellant’s counsel objected to the state’s introduction of exhibit 5,
a photo of a receipt of the items for which Tucker allegedly did not pay, for a lack of
foundation. Appellant’s counsel voir dired Gohman regarding the exhibit, but the district
court ultimately overruled the objection and admitted it into evidence.
The jury found appellant guilty of misdemeanor theft, and the district court
sentenced her to a stayed 90-day jail term, placed her on probation for one year, and
imposed a $50 fine. This appeal follows.

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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted exhibit 5 into
evidence.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted exhibit
5 into evidence over defense counsel’s objection because the state did not lay sufficient
foundation. We are not persuaded.
Minn. R. Evid. 901(a) requires “authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility,” which “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) provides
that evidence may be authenticated by the testimony of a witness with knowledge that the
evidence is what its proponent claims it to be.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and
[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
Photo evidence can be authenticated by a witness who observed what is depicted in
the photo and attests that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. In re Welfare
of S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d 162, 164, 167 (Minn. 1997). Exhibit 5 is a photo of a receipt that
lists nine items that were in appellant’s cart as she exited Walmart for which Gohman
testified that appellant did not pay. Before moving for the exhibit’s admission, the
prosecutor asked Gohman whether she recognized the photograph. Gohman stated that she
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did and that it was “the receipt for the total of the unpaid merchandise.” Gohman stated
that she was not present when her manager took the photograph “[a]t customer service
when she did the transaction”; agreed that the “photograph accurately reflect[s] the receipt
that was created to document the unpaid merchandise”; and that there were no “material
alterations to the receipt.” Gohman also confirmed that the photograph was “kept within
the normal course of business for Walmart as part of the case file.”
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting exhibit 5 because
Gohman’s testimony, based on her personal knowledge and observations that the photo
“accurately reflect[ed]” the receipt of the nine items stolen, provided sufficient foundation
for its admission.
II. The district court did not commit reversible plain error by violating appellant’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause when it admitted exhibit 5 into evidence.

Appellant argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting exhibit 5 because
its admission violated her rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause given
that it was testimonial, admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and she could not cross-
examine the declarant. We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. am. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-
54 (2004), the Supreme Court held “that testimonial statements by witnesses who do not
testify at trial could not be admitted unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” State v. Ahmed, 708
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N.W.2d 574, 580 (Minn. App. 2006). There are three general categories of testimonial
statements. Relevant to appellant’s argument is the third category, “statements that were
made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d
304, 308 (Minn. 2006). “[T]he critical determinative factor in assessing whether a
statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Id. at 309.
Appellant correctly acknowledges that, because she did not raise this argument
before the district court, this court applies a plain-error standard of review. An error that
is unobjected to at trial is reviewed on appeal for plain error. See S tate v. Horst, 880
N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016). Under the plain-error standard, relief is available only if
there was (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected a party’s substantial rights.
Id. Only if all three prongs are met do appellate courts “consider whether reversal is
required to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial process.” Id. It is the appellant’s
burden to establish that there is “a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would
have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotations omitted). We need not
decide whether there was error that was plain because the admission of exhibit 5 did not
affect appellant’s substantial rights.
In State v. Jackson, despite determining that the admission of a firearm-trace report
did not constitute plain error, this court went on to “consider the persuasiveness” of the
evidence and address appellant’s argument that the report “significantly affected the
verdict.” 764 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Minn. App. 2009). In considering the persuasiveness of
the evidence, this court considered the factors articulated in Caulfield: (1) the manner in
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which the state presented the evidence; (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive;
(3) whether the state used the evidence in closing argument; and (4) whether the defendant
effectively countered the evidence. See id. at 120-21; Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 314-16.
Under the first Caulfield factor, the trial was short, with all the evidence presented
in one day. Like in Caulfield, “[t]here is no chance that the [exhibit] was lost among a
plethora of other evidence” as exhibit 5 was one of just six exhibits admitted at trial, and
one of just two nonvideo exhibits. Id. at 314. This weighs in favor of finding for appellant.
Under the second factor, exhibit 5 is not highly persuasive. While it identifies the
items that appellant did not pay for, the more persuasive evidence is the surveillance video
that shows appellant not scanning all of her items while checking out, and Gohman’s
accompanying testimony based on her direct observation through the surveillance video
and her phone application. This factor weighs strongly against finding for appellant.
Under the third factor, the state reference d exhibit 5 during closing argument but
only in a way that tied together Gohman’s testimony and the video exhibits. This factor
weighs against finding for appellant.
Under the fourth factor, appellant countered exhibit 5 both during cross-examination
of both Gohman and the state’s other testifying witness and at closing argument. This
weighs against finding for appellant.
A review of these factors, with an emphasis on the fact the surveillance videos and
testimony from Gohman are more persuasive than exhibit 5, establishes that any assumed

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erroneous admission of the exhibit did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. See id. at
317; Jackson, 764 N.W.2d at 620-21. Accordingly, appellant’s plain-error argument fails.
Affirmed.