State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1273

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andres Sanchez,
Appellant.

Filed July 14, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-28594

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Sharon E.
Jacks, Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Andres Sanchez was convicted of a controlled-substance crime based on evidence
that law-enforcement officers found 38.9 grams of methamphetamine in his home and 4.8
grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle. Sanchez moved to suppress the evidence on
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the ground that the warrant that authorized the searches of his home and his vehicle was
obtained with information derived from a warrantless ion-swab test of the knob and
deadbolt of the door to his apartment. The district court denied the motion. We conclude
that the district court erred because the warrantless ion-swab test was conducted in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
10, of the Minnesota Constitution. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
In September 2019, Officer Muro of the Minneapolis Police Department received a
tip from a confidential informant that Sanchez was selling methamphetamine in one-ounce
(approximately 28-gram) quantities and was keeping drugs in the trunk of his vehicle. An
investigation revealed that Sanchez was selling drugs between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and
2:00 a.m. at two restaurants in south Minneapolis. As part of the investigation, Officer
Muro entered the apartment building where Sanchez lived, used ion pads to swab
Sanchez’s door knob and deadbolt, and submitted the ion pads for testing, which led to a
positive result for trace amounts of methamphetamine and cocaine.1
Officer Muro then applied for a warrant authorizing searches of Sanchez’s home
and vehicle. Officer Muro’s warrant application described the tip received from the

1The district court record includes an affidavit of a forensic scientist stating that, as
a general matter, ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) is “an analytical technique for the
presumptive detection of various molecules or ‘analytes.’” The forensic scientist stated
that IMS technology “can be combined with confirmatory techniques, such as gas
chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC -MS) or l iquid chromatography-mass
spectrometry (LC- MS) techniques, to detect and identify controlled substances such as
cocaine, methamphetamine, fentanyl, etc.”
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confidential informant and the subsequent investigation. The warrant application
described the ion-swab test he performed on the knob and deadbolt of Sanchez’s apartment
door and stated that the test result was positive for trace amounts of methamphetamine and
cocaine.
A district court judge approved the application and signed a warrant. When police
officers e xecuted the warrant, they found 38.9 grams of methamphetamine, drug
paraphernalia, and approximately $8,000 in cash in Sanchez’s apartment, and they found
4.8 grams of methamphetamine and approximately $2,600 in cash in his vehicle.
In November 2019, the state charged Sanchez with a first-degree controlled-
substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2018), based on the
allegation that he possessed with intent to sell a mixture containing 17 grams or more of
cocaine or methamphetamine.
In April 2023, Sanchez moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the searches of
his apartment and his vehicle. Sanchez argued that the swab of his apartment door knob
and deadbolt was a search for purposes of federal and state constitutional law, that the
search was unconstitutional because it was not authorized by a search warrant, and that the
subsequent application for a warrant to search his home and his vehicle did not support a
finding of probable cause without the information derived from the ion-swab test. In
response, the state argued that the ion-swab test was not a search or, in the alternative, was
a less intrusive search that, under state constitutional law, requires only a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Sanchez filed eight exhibits with his motion
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memorandum. It appears that the parties submitted the probable-cause issue based solely
on the documents filed with the district court administrator, without a hearing.
In July 2023, the district court filed a thorough 38-page order denying Sanchez’s
motion to suppress. The district court reasoned that the ion-swab test of Sanchez’s
apartment door knob and deadbolt was not a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The district court reasoned that the ion-swab test was a
search for purposes of article I, section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution but that the search
was valid because Officer Muro had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
The district court concluded that the application for the search warrant was supported by
probable cause but expressly noted that, without the results of the ion-swab test, the warrant
application would not allow for a finding of probable cause.
In December 2023, Sanchez waived his right to a jury trial and his other trial rights,
and the parties agreed to a stipulated-facts trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. In
February 2024, the district court filed an order finding Sanchez guilty. In May 2024, the
district court imposed a sentence of 65 months of imprisonment but stayed execution of
the sentence and placed Sanchez on probation for five years. Sanchez appeals.
DECISION
Sanchez argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence.
A.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
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searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment further provides
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Id. The Minnesota Constitution contains nearly identical language. See Minn. Const. art.
I, § 10. In light of the Fourth Amendment ’s protections, a search of a home that is
performed without a warrant is presumed to be unreasonable and, thus, invalid, unless there
is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459
(2011); State v. Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Minn. 1984).
In State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018), the supreme court considered
“whether a warrantless narcotics-dog sniff in the hallway outside [a suspect’s] apartment
violated [his] right to be free from unreasonable searches under the United States or
Minnesota Constitution.” Id. at 514. The supreme court reasoned that, for purposes of
federal constitutional law, a dog sniff “immediately outside” a suspect’s apartment door
was not a search because the dog’s sniff did not occur within the curtilage of the suspect’s
apartment and because the dog sniff did not invade the suspect’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. at 517-23. Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that no search occurred
for purposes of federal constitutional law. Id. at 523. The supreme court further reasoned
that, for purposes of state constitutional law, the dog sniff was a search, but, “because of
the minimally intrusive nature of a dog sniff,” an officer may conduct the procedure based
on a “reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity . . . , provided they are lawfully
present in the place where the sniff is conducted.” Id. (citing State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d
173, 180-82 (Minn. 2007)). Because officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
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criminal activity, the supreme court concluded that the dog- sniff procedure was valid for
purposes of state constitutional law. Id. at 524.
In June 2024, approximately one month after Sanchez ’s sentencing, this court
applied Edstrom to an ion-swab test of an apartment door but reasoned that ion-swab tests
are different from dog- sniffs. In State v. McNeal, 7 N.W.3d 837 (Minn. App. 2024), we
held that an officer’s warrantless ion-swab test of the handle and lock of the door to a
suspect’s apartment was a search for purposes of both federal and state constitutional law
because the apartment door handle and lock were within the curtilage of the suspect’s
home. Id. at 839, 842-43. We reasoned that the door handle and lock were “physical ly
attached to and indivisible from appellant’s home” and noted that “the officer’s search . . .
required a physical contact by swab of the apartment door handle and lock, the entry
mechanism to the home.” Id. at 842. We further reasoned that, “[a] lthough members of
the public and law-enforcement officers generally have an implied license to approach a
home, physically knock on the front door, and wait briefly to be received, they have no
implied license to remove material from the door handle and lock for laboratory testing.”
Id. at 843 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013)). As a consequence , we
concluded that the officer’s ion-swab test was invalid without a search warrant. Id.
On appeal in this case, Sanchez naturally cites and relies on McNeal. He argues that
the district court erred by reasoning that the ion-swab test is not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes and by reasoning that a warrant is not required for purposes of either
federal or state constitutional law. Sanchez also argues that, without the results of the ion-
swab test, the warrant authorizing searches of his home and vehicle lacked probable cause.
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Sanchez argues further that his conviction must be reversed because the district court, in
its order finding him guilty, relied on the evidence that should have been suppressed.
In response, the state acknowledges the precedential McNeal opinion, respectfully
asserts that McNeal was wrongly decided, and preserves its argument that an ion-swab test
is not a search that requires a search warrant. To the extent that the state is asking the court
to reconsider McNeal or to issue an opinion that is inconsistent with McNeal, we decline
the invitation to do so because the facts of this case are indistinguishable from those of
McNeal, we are bound by McNeal, and we adhere to the well-established doctrine of stare
decisis. See State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 689-90 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 10, 2021); State v. Peter, 825 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 27, 2013); State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
B.
The state argues in the alternative that Officer Muro’s ion-swab test is justified by
the consent of the property manager of Sanchez’s apartment building. The district court
did not consider the issue of consent because the state did not present the argument to the
district court. But in a criminal case, the respondent may “raise alternative arguments on
appeal in defense of the underlying decision when there are sufficient facts in the record
for the appellate court to consider the alternative theories, there is legal support for the
arguments, and the alternative grounds would not expand the relief previously granted.”
State v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003). In his reply brief, Sanchez does not
8
argue that Grunig does not apply or that the state’s consent argument is forfeited . Thus,
we will consider the merits of the state’s alternative responsive argument.
As stated above, a search of a home that is performed without a warrant is presumed
to be unreasonable and, thus, invalid, unless there is a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. King, 563 U.S. at 459; Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d at 610. “The state bears the
burden of establishing the applicability of an exception.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243,
250 (Minn. 2003).
One exception to the warrant requirement is the consent of a person with actual
authority to give consent to the search. Id. at 249-50. “[A] third party has actual authority
to consent to a search if she ‘ possess[es] common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.’” Id. at 250 (quoting United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)). In Licari, the supreme court concluded that
the manager of a storage facility did not have actual authority to consent to a search of the
interior of a person’s rented storage unit. Id. at 252. Similarly, in State v. Dotson, 900
N.W.2d 445 (Minn. App. 2017), this court concluded that the property manager of an
apartment building did not have actual authority to consent to an officers’ search of the
interior of an occupied apartment. Id. at 449-52. In State v. Luhm, 880 N.W.2d 606 (Minn.
App. 2016), this court concluded that a property-management company of a secured, multi-
unit condominium building had actual authority to consent to officers’ entry into the
common areas of the building, including the hallways. Id. at 610, 613-15.
The state argues that the consent exception applies to Officer Muro’s ion-swab test
on the ground that “the door knob and the deadbolt of [Sanchez ’s apartment] were
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contained in, and accessible by, a common hallway” such that Officer Muro “only needed
to enter the common hallway” and “did not need to enter the apartment itself. ” The state
argues that the property manager of Sanchez’s apartment building had common authority
over the door knob and deadbolt of the door to Sanchez’s apartment “because they are part
of the common areas that landlords and property managers have a duty to maintain,”
because a property manager “can repair, replace, or refurbish those items without the
tenant’s consent,” and because a property manager may “use those items to enter the
apartment, even without the tenant’s consent” for purposes permitted by a lease or by law.
In his reply brief, Sanchez opposes the state’s alternative argument by arguing that
the knob and deadbolt of his apartment door are not part of the building’s common area
but, rather, are within the curtilage of his home. Sanchez also argues that the state did not
satisfy its burden of proof on the consent exception because it presented no evidence in the
district court concerning the scope of the property manager’s authority.
As stated above, a property manager’s authority to consent is limited to that for
which the manager “‘possess[es] common authority’” or has some “‘other sufficient
relationship.’” See L icari, 659 N.W.2d at 250 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171) .
“Common authority exists if there is ‘mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes,’ which makes it reasonable to believe that
one person among several persons ‘has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched.’” Luhm, 880 N.W.2d at 614 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7).
Common authority is “not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has
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in the property . . . but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes.” Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. In general,
a property manager does not have actual authority “to consent to a warrantless police search
of the premises occupied by a tenant” because, even if the property manager “might reserve
rights of access,” the property manager “typically does not have rights of use” of those
premises. Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 251.
As noted by Sanchez , the state did not introduce any evidence in the district court
concerning the property rights of the property manager of Sanchez’s apartment building or
any evidence as to whether the property manager had mutual use of the knobs and deadbolts
of apartment doors. In the absence of such evidence, we cannot conclude that the property
manager’s use of Sanchez’s door knob and deadbolt was broad enough to give the property
manager authority to consent to an ion-swab test. See id. at 251-52 (analyzing evidence of
“access rights reserved by [property manager] under appellant’s rental agreement”); Luhm,
880 N.W.2d at 614-15 (analyzing evidence of “condominium building’s written rules and
regulations” concerning use of common areas).
Our consent analysis is informed in significant part by McNeal, even though consent
was not at issue in that case. The McNeal opinion reasoned that the handles and locks of
the door to the suspect ’s apartment were within the curtilage of the apartment and, thus,
were “so intimately tied to the home itself that they should be accorded constitutional
protection.” 7 N.W.3d at 842 (quotation omitted). Because Sanchez had the same
constitutionally protected interest in the privacy of the knob and deadbolt of the door to his
apartment, we must assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that Sanchez had sole use of
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those items such that the property manager did not have actual authority to consent to
Officer Muro’s ion-swab test. See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 251 (reasoning that “a landlord
is not seen as having actual authority to consent to a warrantless police search of the
premises occupied by a tenant”); Dotson, 900 N.W.2d at 450 (reasoning that “landlords do
not have actual authority to consent to a warrantless search of an area occupied by a
tenant”).
We note the state’s argument (based solely on Officer Muro’s warrant application)
that Officer Muro “obtain[ed] permission from property management to conduct an ion
swab of [Sanchez’s] door,” which suggests a more specific and direct form of permission
than in McNeal, in which the officer entered the common area of the suspect’ s apartment
building by using a security code, which he had acquired from “another officer who had
obtained it from the building’s landlord.” See McNeal, 7 N.W.3d at 839. Sanchez did not
have an opportunity to cross-examine Officer Muro about that statement. In any event, the
difference is immaterial. The question is not whether the property manager purported to
give consent to an ion -swab test of Sanchez ’s apartment door knob and deadbolt; the
question is whether the property manager had authority to give such consent. Without
evidence of the property manager’s use of the door knobs and deadbolts in Sanchez’s
apartment building, we cannot conclude that the property manager had such authority.
Thus, the consent exception to the warrant requirement does not justify Officer
Muro’s warrantless ion-swab test of Sanchez ’s apartment door knob and deadbolt.
Consequently, the district court erred by denying Sanchez’s motion to suppress. The state
does not dispute that the invalid ion-swab test led to the admission of inadmissible evidence
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at the stipulated-facts court trial or that Sanchez was prejudiced by the district court’s
reliance on inadmissible evidence. Therefore, Sanchez is entitled to a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.