State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1286

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Danielle Marie Paschal,
Appellant.

Filed October 20, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-12815

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Wynn C. Curtiss, Hopkins City Prosecutor, Nicole J. Appelbaum , Andrew C. Case,
Assistant City Prosecutors, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant Danielle Marie Paschal appeals from her convictions for gross-
misdemeanor obstruction of legal process, fifth-degree assault, disorderly conduct, and
2

trespass arising out of an altercation at a bar. Paschal argues that the district court erred by
(1) denying her motion for the judge to recuse herself from the case; (2) denying her Batson
challenge to the state’s peremptory strike of a prospective juror on the panel; and
(3) convicting and sentencing her for gross- misdemeanor obstruction of legal process
without the jury finding that her underlying act was accompanied by force or violence or a
threat thereof. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
Law enforcement received a report of an altercation at a bar in Hopkins involving
Paschal, three bartenders, and a security guard. The altercation began as a disagreement
between Paschal and a bartender, which escalated in volume and intensity. Another
bartender and a security guard joined the conversation and asked Paschal to leave numerous
times. The altercation turned physical when Paschal tried to knee a bartender in the groin.
A struggle ensued, ending with several bar employees and patrons restraining Paschal on
the ground until police arrived. When police attempted to remove Paschal’s purse during
her arrest, Paschal elbowed an officer in the chest. As law enforcement was placing
Paschal into the back of a squad car, she kicked a different officer in the chest.
The state charged Paschal with eight crimes: fourth-degree assault of a peace officer
(Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1(b) (2022)) (count I); obstruction of legal process–
interference with a peace officer (Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2022)) (count II); three
counts of fifth-degree assault (Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2022)) (counts III-V); two
counts of disorderly conduct (Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(1), (3) (2022)) (counts VI and
VII); and trespass (Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(3) (2022)) (count VIII).
3

Before the start of Paschal’s jury trial, the court reporter asked the judge to be
excused from the case because, as the judge recalled on the record, “[they] had a prior
interaction with the defendant that made them uncomfortable and . . . they were scared.”
The judge disclosed the content of the conversation to the parties, instructed the court
reporter to provide no further details about the interaction, and replaced the original court
reporter with a new one. Paschal moved the judge to recuse herself, arguing that the court
reporter’s disclosure prejudiced the judge. The district court denied the motion.
During jury selection, the state exercised a peremptory strike against juror 9, the last
remaining African American prospective juror. Paschal raised a Batson 1 challenge,
alleging gender and race discrimination. The district court asked the state to respond. The
prosecutor asserted that juror 9 expressed a look of “[d]istaste or dislike” when defense
counsel asked a series of questions about law enforcement and “made some
comments . . . to the effect of police versus civilians[.]” The prosecutor explained that she
struck juror 9 because the state planned to call responding law enforcement officers as
witnesses during trial. The prosecutor also noted that Paschal peremptorily struck a
different African American prospective juror. The district court allowed Paschal to
respond, and she explained why she struck the other African American prospective juror.
She did not argue that the state’s explanation was pretextual. The district court denied the
Batson challenge.

1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 -98 (1986) (announcing a three-step test for
determining whether a peremptory strike violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
4

During trial, the jury heard testimony from bar employees and responding officers
and viewed videos of the altercation and Paschal’s arrest. The jury found Paschal not guilty
of fourth-degree assault on a peace officer (count I) and guilty of the seven remaining
counts. On the fifth- degree assault charges (counts III-V), the district court entered
misdemeanor convictions and sentenced Paschal to 90 days in custody with a one-year stay
of execution. On the obstruction of legal process charge (count II), the district court entered
a gross-misdemeanor conviction and sentenced Paschal to 364 days in custody with a
two-year stay of execution. The court also entered convictions on counts VI through VIII.
Paschal appeals.
DECISION
Paschal raises three arguments on appeal. First, she contends that the district court
erred by denying her motion for the judge to recuse from the case. Second, she argues that
the district court erred by denying her Batson challenge. Finally, Paschal argues that the
district court erred in convicting and sentencing her for gross-misdemeanor obstruction of
legal process without the jury finding that her underlying act was accompanied by force or
violence or a threat thereof. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not err by denying Paschal’s motion for recusal.

Paschal argues that the district court erred when it denied her motion for the judge
to recuse herself. Paschal contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the
circumstances surrounding the judge’s substitution of the court reporter would cause a
reasonable examiner to question the judge’s impartiality.
5

“A judge may not preside over any criminal proceeding if she is disqualified from
doing so under the Code of Judicial Conduct.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 712-13
(Minn. 2019). Rule of Judicial Conduct 1.2 requires that judges “act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary” and “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” A judge must
disqualify themselves “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A). We review de novo
whether a judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d at 713.
“Whether a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned is an objective
consideration that evaluates whether a reasonable examiner, with full knowledge of the
facts and circumstances, would question the judge’s impartiality.” State v. Malone,
963 N.W.2d 453, 464 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). When a party “rais[es] a
reasonable question about [a] judge’s impartiality,” Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d at 713, we
balance the three factors articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Powell v.
Anderson to determine whether reversal is required to correct any error: “(1) the risk of
injustice to the parties in the particular case, (2) the risk that denial of relief will produce
injustice in other cases, and (3) the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the
judicial process.” State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107, 120 (Minn. 2023) (citing Powell v.
Anderson, 660 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Minn. 2003)).
Paschal argues that the first Powell factor— the risk of injustice to the parties—
weighs in favor of reversal because the original court reporter’s fear of the defendant
influenced the judge’s decision to deny Paschal’s request for a self- defense jury
6

instruction.2 But the judge had no knowledge or context about the original court reporter’s
prior interaction with Paschal because the judge instructed the court reporter to not share
any details about the interaction. And, on appeal, we “presum[e] that a judge has
discharged . . . her judicial duties properly.” McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747
(Minn. 1998). The risk of injustice to Paschal based upon the court reporter ’s disclosure
was minimal. This factor weighs against reversal.
Under the second Powell factor—the risk that denial of relief will produce injustices
in other cases— Paschal argues that a ruling that endorses the judge’s decision would
increase the likelihood that other judges will choose to preside over trials in which they
learn prejudicial information. But , again, we presume that judges discharge their judicial
duties properly, including their duty to disqualify themselves from presiding over matters
in which their impartiality may reasonably be questioned. Id.; Minn. Code Jud. Conduct
Rule 1.2. We also note that Paschal’s circumstances present an unusual set of facts that is
unlikely to reoccur. The second Powell factor does not favor Paschal’s position.
As to the third Powell factor—the risk of undermining public confidence in the
judicial process—Paschal argues that affirming the judge’s decision would cast doubt on
the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. But our system relies upon
a presumption that judges “make decisions solely on the merits of the cases before them”

2 Paschal did not raise the lack of a self-defense jury instruction as an independent basis on
which she seeks reversal in this appeal. We note, however, that the record contains
considerable evidence suggesting that a self-defense theory was not available to Paschal,
which weighs against Paschal’s appellate arguments that the judge’s decision to deny
Paschal a self-defense jury instruction was motivated by bias.
7

and “set[] aside collateral knowledge they possess.” State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 247
(Minn. 2005). The judge’s collateral knowledge in this case was extremely limited —she
did not know any details about the prior interaction between Paschal and the original court
reporter beyond that it made the original court reporter uncomfortable and scared . And
there is nothing in the record suggesting that the judge and the original court reporter had
a longstanding or close personal relationship. This factor weighs against Paschal.
All three Powell factors weigh against reversal. The record demonstrates that the
district court judge properly removed the original court reporter, informed the parties of
the content of the conversation, set aside the collateral issue, and proceeded with trial.
II. The district court did not err by denying Paschal’s Batson challenge.
3

Paschal next argues that the district court erred when it overruled her Batson
objection to the state’s peremptory strike of juror 9, the last remaining African American
prospective juror on the jury panel. Paschal contends that she established a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination, that the state’s proffered reasons for the peremptory strike
were not race neutral, and that the district court should have analyzed whether the state’s
reasons were pretext for purposeful discrimination.
A party may use a peremptory challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party
believes will be less fair . . . [and] to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be

3 The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure were recently amended to provide a new
framework for these challenges. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure , No. ADM10-8049 (Minn. Dec. 20, 2024). But those rules were
not in effect at the time of Paschal’s motion, so we analyze this appellate argument under
the Batson framework and caselaw.
8

most fair.” State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 100 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). But
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party may not use a
peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror because of their race. Id. at 100-01;
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86. If an appellate court
determines that a peremptory strike was racially motivated, the defendant is automatically
entitled to a new trial. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 136-37 (Minn. 2012).
A. Since the district court’s ruling did not follow the Batson procedure, we
apply a de novo standard of review.

Ordinarily, we afford a district court’s Batson ruling “great deference” and “will not
reverse the ruling unless it is clearly erroneous.” State v. Wilson, 900 N.W.2d 373, 378
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). But if the district court applies the wrong legal standard,
we give no deference to its ruling. State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 811 (Minn. 2019).
The supreme court has stated that it is “optimal procedure” for a district court to “make its
rulings sequentially at the conclusion of its consideration of each prong[.]” State v.
Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 347 n.11 (Minn. 2016) (citing State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d
717, 725 (Minn. 2007)).
The district court here did not follow that “optimal procedure. ” Instead of
immediately ruling on whether Paschal established a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination, the district court asked the state to respond to Paschal’s challenge. After
the state responded, the court allowed Paschal to rebut the state’s explanation. After the
parties made their entire arguments, the district court then overruled Paschal’s Batson
objection on the basis that she failed to make a prima facie showing.
9

In similar circumstances, the supreme court has determined that a failure to follow
the “optimal procedure” in a Batson analysis means the district court’s decision is entitled
to no deference. In Pendleton, the district court heard the defendant’s prima facie
argument, allowed the state to respond, and— without any substantive discussion —ruled
that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.
725 N.W.2d at 724-25. The s upreme court concluded that the district court’s Batson
analysis was improper and conducted a de novo Batson analysis. Id. at 725.
Like in Pendleton, instead of immediately ruling on whether Paschal established a
prima facie showing, the district court turned to the state for a response, allowed Paschal a
rebuttal argument, and then ruled—without any substantive discussion—that Paschal failed
to establish a prima facie showing. Accordingly, we review the district court’s denial of
Paschal’s Batson challenge de novo. Id. at 811.
B. Paschal is not entitled to a new trial under our de novo Batson analysis.
The Batson analysis first requires Paschal to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing “(1) that a member of a protected racial group has been
peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an
inference that the exclusion was based on race.” State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 365
(Minn. 2005). If Paschal establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the second
step of the Batson analysis shifts the burden to the state to proffer a race-neutral
explanation. Id. at 364. “If a race-neutral explanation is tendered,” the third step requires
consideration of whether Paschal has proved purposeful discrimination. Id. at 364-65
(quotation omitted). We address each step in turn.
10

1. Step 1: Paschal met her burden to make a prima facie showing of
racial discrimination.

Under step one of the Batson analysis, “the defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor executed a peremptory challenge on the basis of race[.]”
Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101. The burden to establish a prima facie showing is low.
State v. Black, 919 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn. App. 2018). “[A] defendant need only
produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
After objecting to the state’s peremptory strike of juror 9, Paschal argued that the
strike was discriminatory. She stated that juror 9 “did not say anything that would provide
the [s]tate a reason” to use a peremptory strike “outside of the fact that she is a black woman
like Ms. Paschal.” Paschal demonstrated “that a member of a protected racial group ha[d]
been peremptorily excluded from the jury[.]” Blanche, 696 N.W.2d at 364-65.
The record does not reflect that Paschal directly connected the circumstances of the
particular case to demonstrate that this case raised an “inference that the exclusion was
based on race.” Id. But in the light most favorable to Paschal’s argument, we determine
that Paschal made the inference given that she is African American and juror 9 was the last
remaining African American person on the jury panel. Paschal met her low burden to make
the prima facie showing that the state used a peremptory strike on the basis of race.
11

2. Step 2: The state proffered race-neutral reasons for the strike.

When an objecting party establishes a prima facie showing, under step two of the
Batson analysis, “the burden then shifts to the prosecution to articulate a race- neutral
explanation for striking the juror in question[.]” Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101. The
explanation must be “clear and reasonably specific” and “relate[d] to the particular case to
be tried.” State v. Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). “The
reason offered will be deemed race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor’s explanation.” Id. at 210 (quotation omitted).
The state’s proffered reason for the strike was that the prosecutor saw the juror make
a look of “[d]istaste or dislike” when defense counsel asked questions related to law
enforcement. Under supreme court precedent, juror 9’s “demeanor can be [a] valid, race-
neutral explanation[] for a peremptory strike.” Id. The state also offered the reason that
juror 9 “made some comments . . . to the effect of police versus civilians.”
The state connected the proffered reasons to Paschal’s case by noting its intention
to call several police officers—some of whom were allegedly assaulted by Paschal—as
witnesses during trial. The state’s proffered reasons were specific and related to Paschal’s
case. We, therefore, conclude that the state articulated a valid race-neutral explanation.
3. Step 3: Paschal did not carry her burden of proving purposeful
discrimination.

In considering step three of the Batson analysis, Paschal must prove that the strike
was motivated by “racial discrimination” and that the reasons proffered by the state were
“merely a pretext for the discriminatory motive.” State v. Diggins, 836 N.W.2d 349, 355
12

(Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The record reflects that the district court gave Paschal
the opportunity to respond to the state’s explanation for its peremptory strike. Paschal did
not argue that the state’s explanation was pretextual. Since Paschal did not present a pretext
argument to the district court, Paschal cannot prevail on her Batson challenge “unless the
record on appeal clearly establishes as a matter of law that the prosecutor’s neutral
explanation was pretextual and that the striking of the juror was racially motivated.”
State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. 1992).
On appeal, Paschal asserts that the state’s proffered explanation was pretextual on
its face and that juror 9’s verbal responses to questions demonstrated that she could be fair
and neutral. But the state explained the concern with juror 9’s verbal responses related to
“police versus civilians.” The state’s intention to call law enforcement officers—including
some who were alleged victims of assault —adds support to the prosecutor’s race-neutral
reason for the strike. The state also noted the juror’s demeanor as a reason for the strike,
which is a valid, race-neutral explanation for exercising the strike. Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d at
210. Paschal has not clearly established, as a matter of law, that the state’s explanation
was pretextual and that its peremptory strike of juror 9 was racially motivated. The district
court did not err by denying Paschal’s Batson challenge.
13

III. The district court exceed ed its authority when it sentenced Paschal for gross-
misdemeanor obstruction of legal process.

Paschal argues that the district court erred when it sentenced her for gross-
misdemeanor obstruction of legal process without submitting to the jury a special verdict
question about whether Paschal’s underlying act was accompanied by force or violence or
a threat of force or violence. We agree.
A criminal defendant has a right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000); State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692, 695
(Minn. 2015) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is incorporated by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). This right “entitle[s] a criminal
defendant to a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 ( second
alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
The authority of a district court to sentence a defendant “derives wholly from the
jury’s verdict.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). “[A]ny fact,” other than
the fact of a prior conviction, “that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
The state charged Paschal with violating Minnesota Statutes section 609.50,
subdivision 1(2), which criminalizes “obstruct[ing], resist[ing], or interfer[ing] with a
peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties.” This
offense is classified as a misdemeanor. See Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 2(3) (2022). When
14

the defendant’s underlying act of obstruction, resistance , or interference is “accompanied
by force or violence or the threat thereof,” the offense may be sentenced as a gross
misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 2(2) (2022).
In this case, the jury was never asked whether Paschal’s act of obstruction,
resistance, or interference was accompanied by force, violence, or a threat of force or
violence. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the state requested a jury instruction
or special verdict form on the question of force, violence, or a threat of force or violence.
The record reveals that the district court neither gave the jury such an instruction, nor
submitted the question to the jury on a special verdict form. As such, the jury only found
Paschal guilty of a misdemeanor obstruction of legal process. The district court exceeded
its authority by imposing a gross-misdemeanor sentence without any finding that Paschal’s
act was accompanied by force, violence, or a threat of force or violence. We, therefore,
reverse Paschal’s gross-misdemeanor obstruction-of-legal -process sentence and remand
for resentencing on that count for imposition of a misdemeanor sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.