State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1289

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tami Lee Feldhake,
Appellant.

Filed June 9, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Ede, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-23-260

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota, and

Matthew D. Haugen, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s restitution order following a criminal-
vehicular-operation conviction, appellant argues that the court abused its discretion
because (1) respondent did not provide adequate evidentiary support for two of the victim’s
claimed out-of-pocket expenses and (2) the court did not consider appellant’s ability to
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pay. Because the district court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to pay restitution
for an amount that lacks sufficient evidentiary support and by failing to expressly state that
it considered appellant ’s ability to pay, we reverse the restitution order and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tami Lee Feldhake with several
criminal offenses arising from a vehicle collision that Feldhake caused on September 25,
2022. Feldhake entered a plea agreement with the state and pleaded guilty to one count of
criminal vehicular operation resulting in great bodily harm, a violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.2113, subdivision 1(6) ( 2022). As part of her sentence, the district
court ordered Feldhake to pay restitution, which is the subject of this appeal. The following
recitation of facts is based on the record of the plea, sentencing, and contested restitution
hearings.
Plea Hearing
At the plea hearing, Feldhake admitted that she used a mixture of cocaine and
fentanyl before operating her vehicle during the underlying incident on September 25,
2022. While driving, Feldhake swerved into an oncoming lane and collided with the victim
(D.J.K.) and his vehicle. Feldhake did not dispute that the crash left D.J.K. with serious
injuries, including “a collapsed lung, broken ribs, and other broken bones.” After finding
there was a sufficient factual basis to support Feldhake’s plea of guilty to the charge of
criminal vehicular operation resulting in great bodily harm, the court accepted the plea
agreement and ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).
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Sentencing
At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that there was a PSI and
sentencing worksheet “in the file.” The PSI generally outlined Feldhake’s education and
employment history. But the PSI did not otherwise include information on Feldhake’s
financial prospects, assets, debts, or whether she currently had a steady income. Among
several suggestions for treatment, the PSI recommended that Feldhake “pay restitution as
certified by the [district c]ourt.”
The district court heard from D.J.K., who presented a victim impact statement.
D.J.K. explained that, on the day of the crash, he was headed to a job for his self-owned
and operated trucking business. Because of the crash, D.J.K. suffered significant injuries
including a collapsed lung, sternal fracture, eighteen rib fractures, and various other broken
bones. D.J.K. stated that, after his hospital stay, he could not walk for three months and
could not live independently for six months.
The district court stayed the imposition of sentence and placed Feldhake on
supervised probation for five years, ordering her to pay restitution to D.J.K. “as certified”
by the state. And the district court required that “[a]ll payments . . . be applied to restitution
and then to fines and fees,” with “all financial obligations due six months from” the date
of the sentencing hearing.
The state later filed a certificate for restitution, requesting that Feldhake pay $63,668
for out-of-pocket costs incurred by D.J.K. Feldhake filed a timely objection and affidavit,
asserting that the requested restitution amount was “excessively unreasonable” and that she
“[did] not have the ability to pay this amount.” She also claimed the state failed to
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sufficiently describe or itemize the amounts requested and did not prove that D.J.K. ’s
losses were directly related to her crime. The district court set the matter for a contested
restitution hearing.
Contested Restitution Hearing
At the contested restitution hearing, the state introduced into evidence an itemized
spreadsheet of D.J.K.’s costs. The spreadsheet and its figures were prepared by K.K., who
is D.J.K.’s wife and the person who handled the family’s finances. The spreadsheet listed
D.J.K.’s “total paid out-of-pocket” costs as $219,273.05. Among other items contributing
to that total amount was D.J.K. ’s “lost wages,” which he claimed were $200,000. The
$219,273.05 in “total paid out-of- pocket” costs was offset by a civil settlement D.J.K.
received in the amount of $155,605.05, which left D.J.K. with $63,668 in uncovered costs
that he sought in restitution.
Although the state’s certificate of restitution did not include a request that Feldhake
pay $10,000 in rental- home construction costs, K.K. added that amount to the bottom of
the itemized spreadsheet that the district court received at the hearing. D.J.K. testified that
the $10,000 request stemmed from costs for work on a rental home that he had purchased
before the crash. He said that, before the incident, he had personally worked on the home
and that, afterward, he had to hire M&M Construction to finish the job. D.J.K. also
discussed a $5,300 invoice that he had received from M&M Construction, which the
district court admitted into evidence. The invoice provides that D.J.K. owed M&M
Construction for the labor and materials they used in finishing his rental home. But the
invoice neither states whether the $5,300 amount had been paid nor distinguishes between
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labor and material costs. D.J.K. testified that he had “already bought” the materials for the
home and that he was seeking reimbursement only for the cost of labor by M&M
Construction.
The district court found that the state satisfied its burden in certifying restitution and
ordered Feldhake to pay $73,668 to D.J.K. This amount encompassed the state’s original
request for $63,668— which included D.J.K.’s lost wages—and the previously “unnoticed
request for $10,000 for labor and materials to complete the work on D.J.K.’s rental home.”
The district court also instructed the parties to determine a restitution repayment
schedule among themselves, leaving that section of the restitution order blank. And the
district court concluded the hearing by saying:
If the restitution isn’t paid by the . . . time the probation is
completed, the balance may simply be reduced to a civil
judgment. The idea is that the defendant is required, and
whether it’s $30,000 or $73,000, the schedule of payments may
not vary. I mean, it isn’t really dependent on the total amount,
it’s dependent on ability to pay.

This appeal follows.

DECISION
Feldhake argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered her to
pay $73,668 in restitution because (1) the state did not adduce sufficient evidence to
support D.J.K.’s claim for (a) lost wages and (b) construction costs relating to his rental
home and (2) the court did not consider her ability to pay. Although the state did not submit
a responsive brief, we nonetheless determine the case on the merits. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
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142.03 (providing that, when a “respondent fails or neglects to serve and file its brief, the
case shall be determined on the merits”).
Except under circumstances not relevant here, a district court may stay imposition
of sentence and place a defendant on probation with supervision on terms the court
prescribes, including intermediate sanctions such as restitution. Minn. Stat. § 609.135 ,
subds. 1(a)(2), (b) (2022). Appellate courts generally review a restitution order for an abuse
of the district court’s broad discretion. State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.
2015). And “[a]ppellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations.” State v.
Alexander, 855 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2014).1
But a district court’s discretion is not unfettered—instead, it is “constrained by the
statutory requirements” set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045 (2024), which
outlines the procedure for issuing restitution orders. State v. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d 657,
662 (Minn. 2021). Section 611A.045 requires district courts to consider two factors in
determining whether to order restitution and the appropriate amount to award. Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1), (2). First, district courts must analyze “the amount of economic
loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense,” and second, courts must consider
“the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.” Id. “[D]etermining whether an
[order] meets the statutory requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully
reviewable by the appellate court.” State v. Ramsay, 789 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. App.

1 Cf. State v. Olson, 982 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn. App. 2022) (explaining that, in the
context of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a guilty verdict based solely on direct
evidence, “[t]he appellate court defers to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations and
will not reweigh the evidence on appeal”).
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2010) (quotation omitted). Whether the district court has the authority to order restitution
or whether it fulfilled its statutory obligations are therefore questions of law that we review
de novo. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 913; see also Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 662.
By contending that the district court abused its discretion and improperly awarded
D.J.K. $73,668 for expenses that were not directly caused by the offense (i.e., lost wages
and rental-home construction costs), and by asserting that the district court did not consider
her ability to pay, Feldhake challenges both of the section 611A.045 factors. Below, we
address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Feldhake to pay
restitution for D.J.K. ’s lost wages, but did abuse its discretion by ordering
Feldhake to pay D.J.K.’s rental-home construction costs.

Feldhake asks that we reduce the restitution award because the state failed to prove
that the $200,000 it requested for D.J.K.’s lost wages—an amount on which the ultimate
award of $73,668 was based—was accurate. And Feldhake maintains that D.J.K.’s claim
for $10,000 in rental-home construction costs was improperly included in the restitution
order because it was not supported by the record.
Restitution is proper so long as it is not “so attenuated in its cause that it cannot be
said to result from the defendant’s criminal act.” State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662, 667
(Minn. 2007); see also State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Minn. 2019) (explaining
that “a district court may order restitution only for losses that are directly caused by, or
follow naturally as a consequence of, the defendant’s crime” (footnote omitted)). In other
words, a district court’s decision to order restitution is appropriate when a victim’s losses
are a “reasonably foreseeable result of, and were directly caused by, [the defendant’s]
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actions.” State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 26, 2011). Disputes surrounding the appropriateness and “proper amount or type of
restitution must be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.” Minn.
Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). It is the state’s burden to prove the amount of the victim’s
losses and the appropriateness of a restitution award. Id. Even when a district court finds
that the state has met this burden, the court’s decision to award restitution “must be
supported by facts on the record.” State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. App. 2014),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2014).
A. Lost Wages
Feldhake’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by basing the
restitution award in part on D.J.K.’s request for $200,000 in lost wages is unavailing.
In her appellate brief, Feldhake concedes that “parts of the restitution request, such
as . . . D.J.K.’s lost wages, follow naturally from [her] offense.” And the record establishes
that D.J.K.’s lost wages were a “reasonably foreseeable result” of Feldhake’s conduct the
day of the underlying incident. See Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d at 853. Consistent with
subdivision 3(a) of section 611A.045, the state supported its restitution request at the
restitution hearing by adducing evidence, including the testimony of D.J.K. and K.K., as
well as the itemized spreadsheet that K.K. prepared. Based on the record before it, the
district court made detailed findings, including credibility determinations, and explained
its decision—both orally at the end of the hearing and in its written restitution order—that
the state had met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
At the hearing, the district court stated:
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THE COURT: All right. I find the State has sustained
its burden of proving the amount of restitution claimed.

I order restitution in the amount of $73,668 and I make the
finding based on these things.

. . . I’ll talk about the wage lost first. . . . [F]irst of all, [K.K.]
was a very credible witness. She testified . . . generally about
the receipts of [D.J.K. ] The translation . . . of tax filings to
actual income, obviously, involves questions of . . . the timing
of taking of certain income and deductions, depreciation as a
non-cash expense must be factored in. In just rough terms,
when I look at the 2022 Schedule C[,] there’s gross income . . .
of about $84,000 for half a year. In 2021, there’s gross income
of $144,500 approximately for a full year. And . . . if you
consider that [D.J.K.] would have continued in 2022 to earn at
the same rate, there would’ve been considerably greater gross
income, perhaps even double that . . . or even more . . . and so,
if you take even double that number, add it to the gross income
in 2021, and then subtract depreciation taken for both years of
close to $200,000, you get an average of a little over $100,000
of net cash income each year. And, obviously, this
methodology is really imperfect. It doesn’t directly track what
went into [D.J.K. and K.K.’s] personal . . . checking account,
. . . but I think it’s probably more accurate than just looking at
the net income or net profit from the Schedule Cs. So, when I
take that, I get a little over $150,000 for a one -and-a-half-year
period. I credit [K.K.’s] testimony that the income was higher
than that. It’s corroborated by [D.J.K.’s] testimony. And . . . in
fact, [D.J.K.] has limited earning capacity on a continuing basis
and so . . . the wage loss really is a continuing thing. So, . . . all
of that supports the calculations.

The district court also made the findings below regarding D.J.K.’s $200,000 claim for lost
wages in its written restitution order:
• D.J.K. “made $144,500.00 gross income for the full year of
2021”;

• “The crime occurred on or about September 25, 2022”;

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• D.J.K. “could not work after September 25, 2022, due to
his substantial injuries”;

• D.J.K. “made $84,000.00 in gross income for half the year
in 2022”;

• D.J.K. “would have made more income in 2022 than in
2021 if he had been able to work the full year”;

• D.J.K. “makes $150,000.00 [per each] one-and-[a]-half
year period[,]” which the district court determined “by
doubling the amount of gross income earned in 2022,
adding it to the gross income in 2021, and subtracting
depreciation taken for both years of $200,000.00,” a
calculation that the court acknowledged “does not reflect
actual deposits into a personal checking account, but is
more accurate than examining net income or profit from
schedule C’s”; and

• D.J.K.’s “earning capacity is diminished on a continual
basis going forward due to his injuries[,]” such that “[w]age
loss will be a continuing factor in the future.”

Feldhake nonetheless claims that “the state failed to meet its burden to prove the
amount of the victim’s loss and the appropriateness of the restitution award” because “[t]he
only evidence offered to prove the amount of D.J.K.’s lost wages were his tax forms from
2021 and 2022,” “these forms . . . [indicate that] D.J.K. suffered net losses in 2021 and
2022,” and the evidence thus suggests that D.J.K. “did not make any income after business
expenses.” But this argument ignores the district court’s decision to credit K.K.’s testimony
and its assessment that D.J.K.’s testimony was corroborative, which are determinations to
which we must defer. See Alexander, 855 N.W.2d at 344. And without explaining why the
methodology the district court applied to determine D.J.K.’s lost wages was erroneous,
Feldhake unpersuasively urges us to reweigh the evidence in contradiction to our general
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deference to the fact-finder’s broad discretion to consider the evidence in the first instance.
See Olson, 982 N.W.2d at 495.
We therefore conclude that the district court’s decision to consider D.J.K.’s
$200,000 lost-wages claim in awarding restitution was well within the court’s broad
discretion and is supported by the facts in the record. See Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 913;
see also Miller, 842 N.W.2d at 477.
B. Rental-Home Construction Costs
Feldhake also contends that the district court abused its discretion by granting
D.J.K.’s restitution request for $10,000 in rental-home construction costs because that
claim is not supported by the evidence. We agree.2
The record fails to support the district court’s decision to include D.J.K.’s claim for
$10,000 in rental-home construction costs in the restitution award. Although the state
offered into evidence an invoice from M&M Construction, the amount listed in the exhibit
was only $5,300—not $10,000— and the document did not indicate whether D.J.K. ever
paid the charge. The invoice also contradicts D.J.K.’s testimony that he had “already

2 The state did not include the $10,000 payment to M&M Construction in its initial $63,668
certificate of restitution. Instead, it appears from the record that Feldhake only learned of
D.J.K.’s restitution request for the $10,000 purportedly owed to M&M Construction when
the state offered K.K.’s itemized spreadsheet into evidence at the contested restitution
hearing. By failing to provide Feldhake timely notice of this additional $10,000 restitution
claim, the state did not comply with the procedure set forth in the applicable statute and
deprived Feldhake of the ability to file a separate affidavit challenging the state’s increased
request. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). But because Feldhake’s challenge to the
$10,000 rental-home construction cost was nevertheless preserved for appeal and we agree
with Feldhake that the district court abused its discretion in awarding that amount to D.J.K.
in restitution, we need not reach that issue.
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bought” the materials for the rental home and that he was seeking reimbursement only for
the cost of labor by M&M Construction. This is because the invoice itself does not explain
how much of the $5,300 cost was attributable to labor versus materials and instead merely
provides the following description for the $5,300 cost: “Labor and Materials to repair Soffit
and Fascia, Caulk house and garage . . . .”
At bottom, Feldhake convincingly argues that the state did not explain how the
evidence—including D.J.K.’s testimony and the $5,300 invoice —was sufficient to prove
the $10,000 in restitution that the district court ordered in relation to D.J.K.’s purported
M&M Construction costs. Given this record, we conclude that the state failed to meet its
burden and that the facts do not support the district court’s decision to include the $10,000
amount in the restitution award. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a); see also Miller,
842 N.W.2d at 477. Because of this abuse of discretion by the district court—and given the
court’s failure to consider Feldhake’s ability to pay, as discussed below—we reverse the
restitution order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II. The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Feldhake’s ability
to pay restitution.

Finally, Feldhake asserts that the district court abused its discretion by neglecting to
consider her “income, resources, and obligations” before ordering her to pay $73,668 in
restitution to D.J.K. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(2). This argument has merit.
In Wigham, the Minnesota Supreme Court held “that a district court fulfills its
statutory duty to consider a defendant’s income, resources, and obligations in awarding
and setting the amount of restitution when it expressly states, either orally or in writing,
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that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay.” 967 N.W.2d at 664 (footnote omitted).
And “while [the supreme court did] not require that the district court make specific findings
about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to support a court’s express
statement that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay,” the supreme court did rule “that
the record must include sufficient evidence about the defendant’s income, resources, and
obligations to allow a district court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the amount of
restitution ordered.” Id. at 665 (footnote omitted).
In reaching that conclusion, the supreme court reviewed its “decisions, and
decisions by the court of appeals,” for “useful examples of the type of ability-to-pay
evidence that meaningfully informs a district court’s decision to order restitution.” Id. at
665–66. This evidence may include: specific, concrete evidence of a defendant’s income,
resources, and obligations; a PSI that includes information about the defendant’s income,
resources, and obligations; a defendant’s express concession that they could pay the
amount of restitution awarded; and the inclusion of a restitution payment schedule or
structure that reflects the defendant’s ability to make the periodic payments. Id. (citations
omitted); see also Miller, 842 N.W.2d at 479–80 (affirming in part, but reversing and
remanding for proper consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay because there was no
PSI and the restitution hearing did not address the defendant’s ability to pay).
Here, the district court failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider Feldhake’s
income, resources, and obligations in awarding and setting $73,668 in restitution. See
Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 664. This is because the district court did not “expressly state[],
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either orally or in writing, that it considered [Feldhake’s] ability to pay.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
We are mindful that, during prior proceedings in which the district court scheduled
the contested restitution hearing, the court asked Feldhake’s counsel “how much time . . .
[counsel] expect[ed of the hearing] to be based on the issue of the amount of restitution
versus ability to pay,” to which counsel replied that “the amount of restitution is the . . .
main issue here.” And, in discussing a potential payment schedule after deciding to award
the full amount of restitution that D.J.K. requested, the district court noted that such a
schedule is not “really dependent on the total amount, it’s dependent on ability to pay.”
Although the defense anticipated that it would primarily challenge the restitution
amount, Feldhake nonetheless also challenged the state’s restitution request by arguing,
among other things, that she “[did] not have the ability to pay.” Thus, the “statutory duty
to consider [Feldhake’s] income, resources, and obligations in awarding and setting the
amount of restitution” remained with the district court. Id. (footnote omitted). And despite
its reference to Feldhake’s ability to pay in discussing a potentia l payment schedule with
the attorneys, the district court ultimately did not include such a schedule or structure that
reflected Feldhake’s capacity for making periodic payments. See State v. Maidi, 537
N.W.2d 280, 285–86 (Minn. 1995); see also Wigham, 867 N.W.2d at 666. We therefore
conclude that the district court abused its discretion because it did not expressly state —
either on the record at the contested restitution hearing or in its written order—that it
considered Feldhake’s ability to pay.
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In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering D.J.K.’s claim
for $200,000 in lost wages to determine the restitution award because the lost -wages
amount was supported by the facts in the record. But the district court abused its discretion
by ordering Feldhake to pay restitution for the $10,000 in purported rental-home
construction costs because that amount lack ed sufficient evidentiary support. And the
district court abused its discretion by failing to expressly state that it considered Feldhake’s
ability to pay. We therefore reverse the restitution order and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. On remand, given the amount of loss that we have determined
is supported by the record, the district court is limited to deciding whether the remaining
restitution award should be amended in light of Feldhake’s ability to pay.
Reversed and remanded.