State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1302

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daud Yasin Hashi,
Appellant.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-22076

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steve P. Russett, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgments of conviction for felony threats of violence
and misdemeanor domestic assault, appellant argues: (1) that the district court prejudicially
abused its discretion in admitting certain hearsay evidence; (2) that appellant’s substantial
rights were affected by prosecutorial misconduct in cross-examination and closing
argument; and (3) that the district court erred by imposing sentences for both offenses. We
affirm in part because appellant’s first two claims of error do not warrant reversal. But
because we conclude that the district court erred by sentencing appellant for both offenses,
we reverse in part and remand with instructions for the court to vacate the misdemeanor
domestic-assault sentence.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Daud Yasin Hashi with felony
threats of violence, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subd ivision 1
(2022), and misdemeanor domestic assault, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.2242, subdivision 1(2) (2022). The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The following
factual summary stems from the trial evidence.
On October 9, 2023, Hashi went unannounced into the home of his estranged wife,
A.A. At the time, A.A. and Hashi were separated and Hashi did not live in the home. The
couple argued; Hashi pushed A.A. and punched her in the head, chest, stomach, and back.
Hashi also followed A.A. into the kitchen and threatened her with a knife.
3
After Hashi left the home, A.A. went to the hospital. A.A. told a registered nurse
who was assisting her that she was pregnant and experiencing abdominal pain. At trial, the
nurse testified that A.A. said her husband had “punched her repeatedly in the stomach and
on the face” during an argument and threatened her with a knife.
A.A. also consulted with a social worker at the hospital. The social worker described
A.A. as “fearful” and crying. The social worker “was informed that [A.A.] had been
threatened with a knife by the father of her baby” and that the father had stated that he was
“going to kill her and her kids.” According to the social worker, A.A. said that she did not
feel safe in her home. The social worker believed that A.A. wanted to get an order for
protection (OFP) against Hashi and advised A.A. to file a police report.
An Edina police officer spoke with A.A. at the hospital . The officer testified that
A.A. had told him Hashi pushed her, punched her with a closed fist, and threatened her
with a knife. And the officer stated that A.A. seemed “very sad” and was “crying” during
their conversation. Based on his interview with A.A., the officer determined that there was
probable cause to believe that a crime had occurred.
Three days after she went to the hospital, A.A. was interviewed by a Hennepin
County child-protection investigator. The child-protection investigator testified that A.A.
reported Hashi had punched her in the head, chest, and stomach. She also said that A.A.
told her Hashi took a kitchen knife and threatened to kill her if she left him. A.A. told the
child-protection investigator that she was concerned for her unborn child.
An Edina police detective later interviewed Hashi as part of the investigation. The
detective testified that Hashi admitted there had been an argument but denied that he had
4
hit A.A. In addition, t he detective interviewed A.A. The detective stated that A.A. was
“frustrated” because she only wanted to get an order for protection (OFP) against Hashi
but did not want him to be incarcerated . But the detective did not consider A.A.’s
statements unusual because of the detective’s experience that “victims recant in domestic-
assault . . . situation[s].” The detective affirmed that it was “extremely common” for a
victim to report domestic violence and later say that they do not want the alleged aggressor
to be charged with a crime.
Following the investigation, the state filed the felony threats-of -violence and
domestic-assault charges against Hashi, and the matter was ultimately tried before a jury
in March 2024. During the four-day trial, the jury heard testimony from A.A., Hashi, the
couple’s oldest son, police officers, the nurse, the social worker, and the child-protection
investigator.
During direct examination, A.A. confirmed that she did not want to testify. She
denied arguing with Hashi but acknowledged that she told the nurse Hashi “threw a punch
at [her]” and “pushed away the baby” while she was changing the baby’s diaper. She
likewise admitted telling the police officer that Hashi pushed her, punched her, and
threatened her with a knife in the kitchen. But A.A. testified that she lied to the nurse and
that her accusations against Hashi were “not true.” Moreover, A.A. stated that she was
untruthful in her statements to the child-protection investigator. And she said that “actually,
[Hashi] did not hit [her],” explaining that she “totally” “made up all those lies because that
was [her] tactics to find a way to get [Hashi] to leave [her] alone” and “to find a reason to
get . . . a divorce.”
5
Following A.A.’s direct examination, the state moved to admit A.A.’s statements to
the nurse as statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. The state
also sought to admit A.A.’s statements to the social worker, the police officer, and the
child-protection investigator under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. 1 The district
court determined that A.A.’s out-of-court statement to the nurse was admissible under the
medical-diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule and that the remaining statements were
admissible under the residual exception.
Hashi testified in his own defense at trial. He stated that he visited with A.A. and
their oldest son in the living room. Hashi said that, after their oldest son left to go to work,
Hashi and A.A. began arguing. But he denied hitting, punching, shoving, or threatening
A.A. Hashi also disavowed threatening to kill A.A. or the children. He testified that he left
the house about an hour after he arrived.
The couple’s oldest son testified for Hashi. He was home on the morning of the
charged incident and visited with his parents. The oldest son neither saw his parents argue
nor witnessed any abuse. He left the house before Hashi and was not at home when A.A.
went to the hospital. A.A. later told the oldest son that she had lied about Hashi hitting her
and threatening her with a knife.
The jury found Hashi guilty of both offenses. T he district court stayed imposition
of sentence on the felony threats -of-violence offense. And the district court sentenced

1 Hearsay is an out-of- court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay statements are inadmissible unless they fall within a
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Minn. R. Evid. 802; State v. Manthey, 711
N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006).
6
Hashi to 90 days’ imprisonment in the workhouse for the misdemeanor domestic-assault
charge, but stayed execution of that sentence for one year, instead placing Hashi on
probation and ordering him to serve 30 days of electronic home monitoring. Hashi appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not prejudicially abuse its discretion in admitting
hearsay evidence.

Hashi argues that the district court prejudicially abused its discretion by admitting
certain hearsay statements as substantive evidence. In particular, Hashi challenges the
admission of A.A.’s statements to the police officer, the social worker, and the child-
protection investigator under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807 (the residual-hearsay
exception), as well as A.A.’s statements to the nurse under Minnesota Rule of Evidence
803(4) (the medical-diagnosis exception). We conclude that the district court did not
prejudicially abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged hearsay evidence.
“Determinations regarding hearsay evidence are largely within the discretion of the
[district] court.” State v. Whiteside, 400 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 18, 1987). An appellate court reviews such determinations for an abuse of
discretion, and an appellant must show that the admission of the evidence was in error and
that the appellant was prejudiced as a result. Holt v. State, 772 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn.
2009).
Below, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion and prejudicially
erred by admitting the statements that Hashi challenges on appeal under (A) the residual-
hearsay and (B) medical-diagnosis exceptions.
7
A. The district court acted within its discretion by admitting evidence
under the residual-hearsay exception.
Statements not covered under a specific hearsay exception may be admissible under
the residual-hearsay exception outlined in Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807. A reviewing
court conducts a two- step analysis when assessing a district court’s decision to admit
evidence per the residual-hearsay exception. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 292
(Minn. 2019). “First, the district court must look at the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the hearsay statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”
Id. (quotations omitted). Second, the district court “determine[s] whether the three
enumerated requirements of [r]ule 807 are met.” Id. at 293. But the district court’s failure
to conduct the two-step residual-hearsay analysis does not automatically constitute an
abuse of discretion and a reviewing court may independently evaluate whether the
statements are admissible under rule 807. Id. at 294.
When evaluating whether a statement is reliable at the first step of the residual-
hearsay analysis, an appellate court focuses on the totality of the circumstances, “looking
to all relevant factors bearing on trustworthiness to determine whether the extrajudicial
statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” State v. Robinson, 718
N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted). A statement may be considered
inherently trustworthy when: (1) there is no Confrontation Clause issue because the
declarant testifies, admits to making the statement, or is available for cross-examination;
(2) the statement is recorded, removing any real dispute about what the declarant
said; (3) the statement is against the declarant’s penal interest; and (4) the statement is
8
consistent with all the other evidence presented by the state that strongly points toward the
defendant’s guilt. State v. Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Minn. 1985). These are known as
the Ortlepp factors. State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). The
Ortlepp factors are nonexclusive. State v. Martinez, 725 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Minn. 2007)
(applying a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis). By contrast, circumstances tending to
undermine a statement’s trustworthiness include a significant period between the event and
the statement, an unsworn statement that cannot be tested by cross-examination, a
statement offered without firsthand knowledge, and a showing that the declarant had a
strong incentive to make a false statement. State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 101–02 (Minn.
1981). Focusing on the third and fourth Ortlepp factors, Hashi challenges the admission of
A.A.’s statements to the police officer, the social worker, and the child-protection
investigator under the residual-hearsay exception.
As to the third Ortlepp factor, Hashi asserts that A.A.’s statements were not against
her penal interest. Although this factor generally requires that a declarant’s statements be
against their own penal interests, we have also determined that it encompasses a statement
perceived to be against a declarant’s romantic interest, see State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d
653, 659 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004), and a statement by a
defendant’s girlfriend implicating the defendant, see Whiteside, 400 N.W.2d at 146. During
her testimony, A.A. stated that she did not want to be in court and did not want Hashi to be
incarcerated. She characterized the underlying incident as “a misunderstanding” and stated
that she wanted to “take . . . back” her accusations against Hashi. Because the record
evinces A.A.’s interest in protecting Hashi and maintaining her relationship with him, we
9
conclude that the third factor —whether the statement is against A.A.’s interest—is
sufficiently satisfied. See Whiteside, 400 N.W.2d at 146.
Regarding the fourth factor, Hashi argues that A.A.’s statements are untrustworthy
because they conflict with the rest of the state’s evidence. Hashi asserts that the state’s case
was not strong because A.A. had no visible injuries, police officers did not obtain any
eyewitness statements, and Hashi did not admit guilt. He also contends that A.A.’s trial
testimony differed from her accounts to the witnesses through whom her hearsay
statements were admitted. The supreme court has recognized, however, that jurors “may
accept as the truth the earlier statements in preference to those made upon the stand” and
“[t]here is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided only in accordance with the
truth of words uttered under oath in court.” Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d at 44 n.1 (quotation
omitted). And the trustworthiness of the challenged hearsay evidence is bolstered by the
temporal connection between A.A.’s statements and the date of the offense. See State v.
Tate, 682 N.W.2d 169 , 177 (Minn. App. 2004) (determining a statement made one day
after the incident indicates circumstantial trustworthiness), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29,
2004).
We therefore conclude that the Ortlepp factors support the district court’s
determination that the challenged hearsay statements were trustworthy under the totality of
the circumstances and that the first step of the residual- hearsay analysis is satisfied.
Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 292.
At the second step, we consider whether the statements meet the three requirements
set forth in rule 807. Id. at 293. Under this rule, statements with “equivalent circumstantial
10
guarantees of trustworthiness” to those admissible under the specific hearsay exceptions
are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the district court determines that:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
Minn. R. Evid. 807.
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining that
A.A.’s statements to the officer, social worker, and child- protection investigator were
admissible under rule 807. First, A.A.’s hearsay statements were offered to prove a material
fact—whether Hashi assaulted A.A. Second, the hearsay statements were more probative
than other evidence that could be procured through reasonable efforts because A.A. made
these statements on the day of the underlying incident and during the investigation that
immediately followed. Third, the interests of justice were served by admitting A.A.’s
statements because the statements “promote the growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”
Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 294 (quotation omitted).
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting A.A.’s
statements to the officer, social worker, and child -protection investigator under the
residual-hearsay exception.

11
B. Even if the district court abused its discretion by admitting A.A.’s
hearsay statements through the nurse’s testimony under the medical -
diagnosis exception, Hashi was not prejudiced by the admission of that
evidence.

Under the medical-diagnosis exception, “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history” are not excluded by the hearsay
rule. Minn. R. Evid. 803(4). This rule allows for the admissibility of statements “describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations.” Id. It likewise allows
for statements bearing on the “general character of the cause or external source” of a
person’s medical history, “insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Id.
“The rationale behind the rule is the patient’s belief that accuracy is essential to effective
treatment.” Robinson, 718 N.W.2d at 404 (quotation omitted).
But this rule is not without limitation. Id. Courts must distinguish between
statements that describe the injury or the cause of the injury— which are generally
admissible—and statements that attribute fault or identify the perpetrator of a person’s
injuries. Id. In Robinson, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a domestic-abuse victim
could describe that she had been “slapped . . . really hard on the face” because that
information was pertinent to her medical diagnosis and treatment. Id. at 403–04. But the
supreme court also held that, when “there is an insufficient evidentiary foundation to
establish that the identity of the person who caused an injury was reasonably pertinent to
the medical diagnosis or treatment of that injury, the statement of identity is not admissible
under Rule 803(4).” Id. at 407.
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Hashi acknowledges that A.A.’s statements to the nurse that she was punched in the
stomach and face “clearly fall within the parameters of the medical diagnosis or treatment
expectation” because they “show the ‘mechanism’ of [A.A.’s] physical injuries.” Yet Hashi
contends that the district court should have excluded A.A.’s statements identifying him as
the perpetrator because those statements were not pertinent to the nurse’s medical diagnosis
or treatment of A.A.’s injuries.
We need not decide whether there is an insufficient evidentiary foundation to
establish that the identification of Hashi as the person who caused A.A.’s injuries was
reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis and treatment that A.A. received. See id. This
is because, even if the district court abused its discretion by permitting the nurse to testify
that A.A. identified Hashi as the perpetrator of her injuries, we conclude that Hashi was
not prejudiced.
To demonstrate that a new trial is warranted, an appellant must show that “there is
a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict.” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 473 –74 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). This
is known as the harmless-error standard of review. State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629,
633 (Minn. 2011). It is Hashi’s burden “to establish a reasonable possibility that the jury
would have reached a different verdict had the wrongfully admitted testimony not come
in.” Jaros, 932 N.W.2d at 472. When conducting harmless-error review, appellate courts
consider factors such as how the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was
persuasive, whether the evidence was mentioned in the closing argument, whether the
13
evidence was countered, and the strength of the evidence supporting the state’s case. State
v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024).
Based on our review of these factors, we conclude that Hashi has not carried his
burden of establishing a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different
verdict had A.A.’s hearsay statements not come in through the nurse’s testimony. See
Jaros, 932 N.W.2d at 472. As just noted, evidence was presented through the testimony of
the nurse who assisted A.A. at the hospital—almost all of which was undisputedly
admissible, except for the hearsay statements by A.A. identifying Hashi as the perpetrator
that we have assumed without deciding were erroneously admitted. While the nurse’s
testimony may have been persuasive, A.A.’s direct testimony was likely more persuasive.
And A.A. testified that she identified Hashi as the person who assaulted her. She discussed
the actions she took after the incident, which included immediately going to the hospital
with complaints that she had been repeatedly punched in the face and stomach and was
concerned for her pregnancy. Thus, even if the nurse had not testified to A.A.’s hearsay
statements, the jury would still have heard A.A. herself admit that she had told multiple
people that Hashi hit her. While the state mentioned the nurse’s testimony in closing, most
of the prosecutor’s eight-page argument focused on whether A.A.’s testimony was
credible. The record also reflects that the defense effectively countered the challenged
hearsay evidence during the nurse’s cross-examination. Finally, the evidence supporting
the state’s case was strong on this point, as the jury heard several other witnesses testify
that A.A. had identified Hashi as the perpetrator: the police officer; the social worker; the
child-protection investigator; and A.A. herself.
14
Our analysis of these factors therefore leads us to conclude that Hashi has not
established a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different result if
the district court had not admitted A.A.’s hearsay statements identifying Hashi as the
perpetrator through the nurse’s testimony. Because any assumed abuse of discretion by the
district court in admitting the challenged hearsay evidence was harmless, reversal is
unwarranted.
II. The state committed prosecutorial misconduct that did not prejudice Hashi’s
substantial rights.

Hashi maintains that the prosecutor committed misconduct in cross-examining him
by asking if Hashi could think of any reason his 13-year -old son— who did not testify—
would say that Hashi had hit A.A. in the past. And Hashi asserts that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by arguing in closing that an OFP or restraining order had been
issued in connection with this case. Hashi objected to the prosecutor’s cross-examination
but did not object to the prosecutor’s closing. We conclude that the objected-to
prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the unobjected-
to prosecutorial misconduct did not prejudice Hashi’s substantial rights.
To begin, we address (A) whether the prosecution engaged in misconduct before
turning to (B) whether such misconduct warrants a new trial.
A. The state committed prosecutorial misconduct.
1. Cross-Examination
“A new trial may be required for prosecutorial misconduct where the state asks
questions which by innuendo may lead to a prejudicial supposition as to the existence of
15
facts that cannot be proved.” State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 345–46 (Minn. App.
1993) (citing State v. Currie, 126 N.W.2d 389, 395 (Minn. 1964)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct.
19, 1993)). “Even though [an] objection to [a] question [may be] sustained by the [district]
court, the mere asking of a question[,] which by innuendo may leave a prejudicial
supposition as to the existence of facts that cannot be proved[,] has frequently been held
sufficiently damaging to require a new trial.” Currie, 126 N.W.2d at 395 (footnote
omitted).
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Hashi about the events of October
9, 2023. Hashi responded, “Nothing happened.” The prosecutor then asked Hashi if he
could “think of any reason why [his] 13 -year-old son . . . would say that [Hashi] had hit
[A.A.] before?” The defense objected to the prosecutor’s question and the district court
sustained the objection.
The state concedes that the prosecutor’s question was “improper.” And it is
uncontested that Hashi’s 13-year -old son did not testify at trial. Under these
circumstances—when the prosecutor’s question assumed a highly prejudicial and disputed
fact that was not in evidence—we agree that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
asking Hashi if he could think of any reason his 13-year-old son would say that Hashi had
hit A.A. in the past. See Currie, 126 N.W.2d at 395; Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d at 345–46.
2. Closing Argument

If a criminal defendant does not object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct during
trial, an appellate court “review[s] the prosecutor’s statements under a modified plain error
analysis.” State v. Davis, 982 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Minn. 2022) (citing State v. Ramey, 721
16
N.W.2d 294, 299–300 (Minn. 2006). Under this test, the defendant must first establish that
the prosecutor erred and then show that the error was plain. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.
An error is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. “A proper
closing argument should focus on the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence.” State v. Yang, 627 N.W.2d 666, 679 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. July
24, 2001). The state “may not make arguments that are not supported by evidence.” State
v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 142 (Minn. 2009).
Hashi contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct two times during closing
argument. First, the prosecutor argued in closing that A.A. “sought an order for protection”
against Hashi. Later, the prosecutor told the jury during rebuttal that an OFP or restraining
order had been issued “in connection with this case.” Hashi did not object to either of these
statements.
We conclude that Hashi has satisfied his burden of establishing that the prosecutor
committed misconduct that is plainly erroneous. Despite the prohibition on “arguments that
are not supported by evidence,” Id. at 142, the prosecutor made statements that there was
a restraining order or OFP issued “in connection with this case” — without any evidence
supporting those statements in the record. Because the prosecutor’s statements were not
supported by the evidence, they contravened caselaw and satisfy the first two prongs of the
modified plain-error test. See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.
B. The state’s prosecutorial misconduct does not warrant a new trial.

We next turn to whether the identified prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new
trial, concluding that it does not.
17
1. Cross-Examination
“When reviewing objected-to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, [appellate courts]
have utilized a harmless-error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of
the misconduct.” State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 150 (Minn. 2012). “In cases
involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct, [appellate courts] require certainty
beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before [an appellate court
will] affirm.” Id. (citing State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1974)). “On the other
hand, in cases involving less serious prosecutorial misconduct, [appellate courts] apply the
test of whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to
convict.” Id. (citing Caron, 218 N.W.2d at 200). Because we conclude that the objected-to
prosecutorial misconduct during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Hashi is harmless
even under the standard for more serious misconduct, we need not grapple with the
continued viability of the two-tiered Caron test and assume without deciding that the
harmless-error test for unusually serious misconduct applies here.
2
“Prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s
verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the misconduct.” State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 297,
304 (Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82, 106 (Minn. 2011)). “Factors
relevant to the determination of whether prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt include how the improper evidence was presented, whether the State

2 See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 299 n.4 (“We leave for another day the question of whether
the Caron two-tiered approach should continue to apply to cases involving objected-to
prosecutorial misconduct.”).
18
emphasized it, whether it was highly persuasive, and whether the defendant countered it.”
Id. (citing State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 394 (Minn. 2007)). “The strength of the other
evidence supporting the verdict is also a factor in the analysis, but it is not dispositive.” Id.
“Finally, the prejudicial effect of misconduct can be cured by proper instructions to the
jury.” Id. (citing State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 509 (Minn. 2005)). Appellate courts
“presume that jurors follow the [district] court’s instructions.” Id. at 305.
The state’s improper question about Hashi’s 13-year -old son was presented once
during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Hashi—a single comment in a multi-day trial
involving several witnesses, amounting to one three-line paragraph on one page of a 449-
page trial transcript. After the district court sustained Hashi’s objection, the state did not
emphasize the improper premise of its question. The question was not highly persuasive in
the context of the trial evidence as a whole. And Hashi countered it through his testimony
denying the charged criminal conduct, his thorough cross-examination of A.A., his
presentation of his oldest son’s testimony that the oldest son did not witness any abuse, and
his objection to the challenged question, which the district court sustained.
Moreover, the state’s case against Hashi was strong. A.A. testified that she went to
the hospital on October 9 to seek medical treatment. The nurse told the jury that A.A. had
been punched and threatened with a knife. In addition, the social worker, police officer,
and child-protection investigator all testified about A.A.’s disclosures to them that Hashi
had assaulted her. The district court also instructed the jury before closing arguments that
the jurors were “not to speculate as to possible answers to questions [that the district court]
did not require to be answered,” that “the arguments or other remarks of an attorney are
19
not evidence,” and that, “[i]f the attorneys . . . made or should make any statement as to
what the evidence is that differs from [the jury’s] recollection of the evidence, [the jurors]
should disregard the statement and rely solely on [their] own memory.”3
Based on our careful consideration of the foregoing, we conclude that, because the
jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred
during the cross-examination of Hashi, the misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See id. at 304. Our conclusion aligns with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision
in Whitson. There, the supreme court concluded that alleged misconduct was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because: (1) “the alleged misconduct was a single question”
and “[t]he prosecutor made no attempt to elicit the answer again after the defense objection
was sustained and did not refer to the answer at any other point in the trial”; (2) “the
[district] court’s instructions to the jury adequately ameliorated the risk of prejudice” by,
among other things, “instruct[ing] the jury to disregard the witness’s answer”; (3) “the
strength of the other evidence against [the defendant] . . . strongly support[ed] the
conclusion that any prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”;

3 The district court similarly instructed the jury before opening statements: that “[i]t is the
function of the jury to decide from the evidence presented to [it] and only from that
evidence what the facts of the case are”; that “[e]vidence is what the witnesses say on the
witness stand, which is called testimony, and tangible items like photographs and
documents admitted in the trial, which are called exhibits”; that “[t]here are some things
[the jury would] hear in [the] trial that are not evidence,” e.g., “nothing the attorneys say
during the trial is evidence” and “[t]he attorney’s questions are not evidence”; that, “[i]f
[the district court] sustain[s an] . . . objection, it means that the question may not be
answered,” the jury “must ignore the question” and, “[i]f no answer was given before the
objection was made, [the jury] should not speculate about what the possible answer might
have been”; and that, “[f]rom the evidence, [the jury would] . . . decide what the facts are.”
20
and (4) “[t]he inadmissible testimony consisted of only one answer in the course of an 11–
day trial covering over 1,400 pages of transcript.” Id. at 304–05. As in Whitson, we
conclude that the objected-to prosecutorial misconduct in the state’s cross-examination of
Hashi was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Closing Argument
If a defendant establishes plain error, the burden shifts to the state to show that “the
plain error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d
419, 423 (Minn. 2021 ). A defendant’s substantial rights are affected by unobjected-to
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument “when there is a reasonable likelihood that
the error substantially affected the verdict.” Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634 (quotation
omitted). “To meet its burden, the [s]tate must show that there is no reasonable likelihood
that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the
verdict of the jury.” State v. Thompson, 3 N.W.3d 257, 264 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted). To determine whether the state has met its burden, appellate courts consider
“(1) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; (2) the pervasiveness of the
erroneous conduct; and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity to rebut any improper
remarks.” Id. (quotation omitted).
For similar reasons as explained in section II.B.1, we conclude that the state has
satisfied its burden of establishing that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of
the misconduct would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. See id. The
evidence against Hashi was strong, as explained above. As for the pervasiveness of the
erroneous conduct, appellate courts “consider the closing argument as a whole rather than
21
focus on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue
prominence.” State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Here, the prosecutor made only limited references to an OFP or restraining order. These
brief references—considered in light of the state’s closing argument as a whole—do not
compel the conclusion that the erroneous conduct was pervasive. And although he could
not respond further to the state’s rebuttal argument that ther e was an OFP or restraining
order “in connection with this case,” Hashi did expressly rebut the substance of the state’s
improper remarks in his summation by stating: “[T]here isn’t an O[F]P, or a restraining
order or, in fact, divorce papers. None of these things had happened.”
4 Considering the
strong evidence against Hashi, the limited pervasiveness of the state’s prosecutorial
misconduct in its closing argument, and Hashi’s opportunity to rebut the state’s improper
remarks, we conclude that the unobjected-to misconduct did not affect Hashi’s substantial
rights and do not entitle him to a new trial. See Thompson, 3 N.W.3d at 264. In short,
“[t]here is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would
have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302
(quotation omitted).5

4 Although the state objected to Hashi’s argument in this regard by asserting that Hashi had
misstated the evidence, the district court instructed the jurors that they “should rely on
[their] own memory of what the testimony was.” As noted above, appellate courts
“presume that jurors follow the [district] court’s instructions.” Whitson, 876 N.W.2d at
305.

5 Hashi also argues that the cumulative effect of the identified prosecutorial misconduct
violated his right to a fair trial. A defendant “is entitled to a new trial if the errors, when
taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying [the defendant] a fair trial.” State v. Yang ,
774 N.W.2d 539, 560 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “When considering a claim of
22
III. The district court erred in sentencing Hashi on both counts.
Lastly, Hashi contends that the district court erred by imposing separate sentences
for each of his convictions because the offenses arose from the same behavioral incident.
More specifically, Hashi urges us to vacate his sentence for domestic assault because the
offenses did not arise from different behavioral incidents. The state does not dispute that
the charges arose from a single behavioral incident but nonetheless asserts that the stay of
imposition on the threats-of-violence offense is not a sentence. Based on our review of the
record, we conclude that the district court erred in sentencing Hashi on both counts.
“[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this
state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
subd. 1 (2022). Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 “generally prohibits multiple
sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part
of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). For that reason, district courts sentence defendants on “the most
serious of the offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident because imposing up to
the maximum punishment for the most serious offense will include punishment for all
offenses.” Id. (quotation omitted). Whether offenses are part of a single behavioral incident
is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016).

cumulative error, we look to the egregiousness of the errors and the strength of the [s]tate’s
case.” State v. Williams, 908 N.W.2d 362, 366 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
Consistent with the analysis above, however, we conclude that the errors at issue were not
egregious and that the state’s case was strong because there is ample evidence in the record
supporting the verdict. Hashi’s claim that the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial
misconduct violated his right to a fair trial is therefore unavailing.
23
Appellate courts review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application
of the law de novo. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated two tests for determining whether
multiple offenses arose from a single behavioral incident. State v. Bauer, 776 N.W.2d 462,
478 (Minn. App. 2009), aff’d, 792 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. 2011). “The test to be applied
depends on whether the offenses involved are intentional crimes”—as is the case here—
which require that we consider “whether the conduct (1) shares a unity of time and place
and (2) was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” Id.; see also Minn.
Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (requiring intent to inflict or attempt to inflict bodily harm
upon another for misdemeanor domestic assault); Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (noting
that the threats-of-violence offense includes threatening to commit a crime of violence with
the purpose to terrorize); State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975) (stating
that to act with “[p]urpose” means to have an objective or intent). “The [s]tate bears the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct was not a single
behavioral incident.” State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 365 (Minn. 2020).
Here, the jury found Hashi guilty of felony threats of violence and domestic assault.
The district court stayed imposition of sentence on the threats-of-violence offense for three
years. On the domestic-assault offense, the district court stayed execution of a 90 -day
workhouse sentence for one year, placed Hashi on probation, and ordered Hashi to serve
30 days on electronic home monitoring. We conclude, however, that the state has not
carried its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that Hashi’s conduct
occurred in more than a single behavioral incident. See id.
24
First, the evidence presented shows that the two offenses shared a unity of time and
place because the incident occurred on the morning of October 9, 2023, in A.A.’s home.
Second, in light of the relationship of the offenses to one another, the record supports a
determination that Hashi’s conduct was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal
objective. State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 829 (Minn. 2011). In particular, the trial
evidence establishes that Hashi had a singular motivation—to frighten A.A. We are
therefore satisfied that Hashi’s crimes arose from a single behavioral incident.
As we have previously recognized, a stay of imposition is treated as a conviction
and is considered a “stayed sentence” under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. State v.
Bradley, 906 N.W.2d 856, 859–60 (Minn. App. 2017) (concluding that “a stay of
imposition is an actual sentence that merely lacks a pronounced duration”), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 28, 2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 3(1) (2022) (allowing a court
to rescind a stay of imposition and “impose sentence and stay the execution thereof”).
Because the two offenses arose out of the same behavioral incident, the district court
erred by sentencing Hashi on both counts. We therefore reverse and remand to the district
court with instructions to vacate the misdemeanor domestic-assault sentence. See
Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d at 589.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.