In the Matter of the Application of Jesus Adrian Soto for a Change of Name of Minor.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1314

In the Matter of the Application of Jesus Adrian Soto
for a Change of Name of Minor.

Filed April 28, 2025
Reversed
Wheelock, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CV-23-1029

William J. Wetering, Daniel R. Wetering, Hedeen, Hughes & Wetering, Worthington,
Minnesota (for appellant Kourtney Kaye Verdoorn)

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for respondent Jesus Adrian Soto)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting respondent’s application to
change the name of the parties’ joint minor child, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion by misapplying the law. We reverse.
FACTS
Appellant Kourtney Kaye Verdoorn (mother) and respondent Jesus Adrian Soto
(father) are the parents of a minor child. The parents were in a relationship and lived
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together until mother was five or six months pregnant with the child and she left the shared
residence to move in with her mother in Iowa. In May 2018, mother gave birth to the child
and gave him her surname. Mother and father reunited for a brief period after the child’s
birth but ultimately ended their relationship when the child was about five months old.
Mother retained sole legal and physical custody of the child and lived with her mother for
approximately three years, after which she moved to Minnesota. With mother’s
permission, the child has regularly visited father at father’s parents’ home apart from a
couple of periods of time that include when mother filed a petition for an order for
protection (OFP) in favor of the child and against father in 2019.1
Several years after the child’s birth, father filed a name-change application, seeking
to hyphenate the child’s surname to include both mother’s and father’s surnames. Mother
objected. During a hearing on contested issues that included father’s name -change
application, the district court heard testimony from father, father’s mother, father’s brother,
father’s girlfriend, and mother.2
In support of the petition, father and his witnesses testified that the child has used
father’s surname to refer to himself and father’s family pets and that the community knows
father’s family by their surname because they own and operate a Hispanic grocery store in

1 After mother filed the petition for an OFP, father requested a contested hearing on it, but
it was dismissed before the hearing.

2 During this hearing, the district court also received evidence regarding a dispute over a
dependent-exemption tax allocation that is unrelated to the name-change application.
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Minnesota. They also testified about the Mexican-American heritage of father’s family
and the importance their culture places on a child having both of their parents’ surnames.
During father’s direct examination, father’s attorney asked him why mother did not
want to change the child’s name. Father speculated that mother “didn’t want [to cause the
child] confusion.” During father’s cross-examination, he stated that the fact that the child
does not bear his surname does not affect father. Rather, father was worried about how the
absence of his surname in the child’s name could affect the child and the child’s
relationship to father’s family in the future. At another point during father’s presentation
of evidence, father’s girlfriend stated that mother had pursued an OFP against father.
Father’s girlfriend explained that this happened because she and father had a dispute at
midnight with the child present that resulted in father’s arrest.
During mother’s testimony, she explained that she objected to the child’s surname
being hyphenated. When asked during cross- examination whether it “would be negative
for [the child] to have an identifier last name with each parent,” mother said, “I don’t see
anything bad about it.” However, when asked whether there was anything about father’s
surname that would cause her to feel embarrassment if it were added to the child’s name,
mother responded, “Yes.” And when asked about whether there was a public perception
that bearing father’s surname would be negative for the child, mother testified that “people
in the community are very aware of this stuff that [father] has done, so I would say yes,
[his name would] negatively” affect the child. Specifically, mother testified that members
of father’s community informed her that father had been arrested for domestic violence.
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The district court granted father’s name-change application, and mother appealed.
This court reversed and remanded the district court’s decision because the district court
had improperly shifted the burden to mother to show that father’s requested name change
was not in the child’s best interests rather than requiring father to establish that the name
change was in the child’s best interests before shifting the burden to mother to “show that
the evidence was not clear and compelling that [the child’s] substantial welfare necessitated
such a change.” In re Soto, No. A23-1384, 2024 WL 1848183, at *2 (Minn. App. Apr. 19,
2024) (order op.). In our order opinion remanding this matter, we “express[ed] no opinion
on the underlying merits of the name-change request” and provided that the “district court
may, in its discretion, reopen the record.” Id. The district court did not reopen the record
on remand, but it filed a new order in which it again granted father’s name-change
application.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother raises two issues on appeal. First, mother argues that the district court erred
by misstating the law, contending that the district court stated that there is a presumption
in favor of the request for a name change and that the district court applied that erroneous
presumption on remand. Second, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion
by granting father’s name-change application. We review each of mother’s arguments in
turn.
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I. The district court did not err by misstating the law.
“We review a district court’s application of the law de novo.” Harlow v. State ,
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016). Inadequately briefed issues are
not properly before this court and are forfeited unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn.
1971); accord State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480,
480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky,
733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in family-law appeal).
Minnesota law sets forth the procedure for an individual to change his or her legal
name. Minn. Stat. §§ 259.10, subd. 1 (general filing requirements), .11(a) (establishing
circumstances under which a court may grant or deny a name-change application) (2024).3
Minnesota Statutes section 259.11(a) provides that, “[u]pon meeting the
requirements of section 259.10, the court shall grant the application unless . . . in the case
of the change of a minor child’s name, the court finds that such name change is not in the
best interests of the child.” Here, the district court began its memorandum of law
supporting its order granting father’s name-change application by stating, “The court must
grant the request for change of name for a child unless the court finds, among other
considerations not relevant here, that the name change is not in the best interests of the

3 We cite the most recent version of the statutes because they have not been amended in
relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566,
575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the
time they rule on a case”). Although Minnesota Statutes section 259.11(b) was amended
by the legislature in 2023, the amendment is not relevant to our analysis. See 2023 Minn.
Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 11, at 1131-32.
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child.” Mother is correct that, in describing the standard in section 259.11(a), the district
court did not set forth the reference to section 259.10 that appears in the first clause.
Mother seems to suggest that this omission is a misstatement of law because mother reads
section 259.10, subdivision 1, to require that both parents agree to the name change before
the court can consider the language of section 259.11(a). In other words, mother contends
that father failed to meet the prerequisite of section 259.10, subdivision 1, in the first clause
of section 259.11(a), and thus that the district court erred by applying section 259.11(a).
But mother cites no authority for her reading of the statutes and makes no argument to
support it. Moreover, mother misreads section 259.10 , subd ivision 1, which requires
notice to, but not the agreement of, both parents as to the name change of a minor child:
“no minor child’s name may be changed without both parents having notice of the pending
of the application for change of name, whenever practicable, as determined by the court.”
Minn. Stat. § 259.10, subd. 1. Beyond pointing out that the district court paraphrased
section 259.11(a) in its memorandum of law, mother has not made clear how the district
court’s paraphrasing was an error of law. Our review of the district court’s memorandum
of law reveals that it is consistent with section 259.11(a), and although the district court
did not include the reference to section 259.10, it did not misstate the law.
Because we discern no obvious prejudicial error and this issue is not adequately
briefed, this argument is forfeited.
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II. The district court abused its discretion by ordering a change of the child’s name
over mother’s objection.
“We review a district court’s grant of a request to change a child’s name for [an]
abuse of discretion.” Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Minn. App. 2011). A district
court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record, if it
misapplies the law, or if its decision is contrary to logic and the facts in the record. Woolsey
v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). We cannot reweigh evidence; rather, we
limit our review of the district court’s findings of fact to an evaluation of whether the record
supports them. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021).
In deciding a name-change application, district courts must determine if changing
the child’s name is in the child’s best interests. Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757. The supreme
court provided five nonexclusive factors for district courts to consider when determining
if a name change is in a child’s best interests in In re Saxton:4
(1) The length of time the child has borne a given name;
(2) The difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment, that the
child may experience from bearing the present or the
proposed surname;
(3) The child’s preference;
(4) The effect of the change of the child’s surname on the
preservation and the development of the child’s
relationship with each parent; and

4 In LaChapelle v. Mitten, this court changed the order in which it listed the Saxton factors.
607 N.W.2d 151, 166 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). Here, the
district court and both parties numbered the Saxton factors in the order in which they appear
in the LaChapelle opinion. We also list the factors in the order in which they appear in the
LaChappelle opinion.
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(5) The degree of community respect associated with the
present and the proposed surname.

In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. 1981).
Minnesota Statutes section 259.10, subdivision 1, provides “that no minor child’s
name may be changed without both parents having notice of the pending application for
change of name, whenever practicable, as determined by the court.” If the parent who did
not file the name-change application does not oppose the request , the district court must
grant the application unless it finds that the name change is not in the child’s best interests.
Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757 (citing a former version of Minn. Stat. § 259.11(a)).
But when a parent opposes a name-change application, “the district court must
examine the evidence and arguments of the parent opposing the request.” Id. (citing
Robinson v. Hansel, 223 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. 1974)). “To prevent the district court
from granting the request, the opposing parent must establish that evidence in support of
the name change is not ‘clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child
necessitates such change.’” Id. (quoting Robinson, 223 N.W.2d at 140). District courts
must exercise “ great caution” when granting a name -change application over a parent’s
objection. Id.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in two ways when it
applied the analytical framework that is required based on her objection: first, she argues
that the district court clearly erred in its findings of fact as to three of the Saxton factors;
and second, she argues that the district court erred in its determination that father presented
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clear and compelling evidence that the substantial welfare of the child necessitated the
requested name change. We consider each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Saxton
factors.
The district court determined that the first three Saxton factors were neutral and did
not weigh in favor of or against a determination that changing the child’s name is in his
best interests and that the last two Saxton factors weighed in favor of determining that
granting the application was in the child’s best interests. Mother disputes the district
court’s determinations on factors one, four, and five, as well as its conclusion that,
considering the Saxton factors as a whole, the name change is in the child’s best interests.
We first address mother’s challenges to the individual factors; then we address the
best-interests determination.
First Factor: Length of Time the Child Has Borne His Given Name
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion because caselaw
demonstrates that six years is a sufficient length of time for the child to bond to his name
and, therefore, the first factor weighs against a determination that a name change is in the
child’s best interests.
The district court determined that the first factor was neutral. In doing so, it
balanced the fact that the child has had mother’s surname for six years—“his entire life”—
with father’s and his witnesses’ testimony that, while spending time with them, the child
has referred to himself and the pets at father’s home using father’s surname. In weighing
the testimony, the district court observed that, although the child was learning how to write
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his last name as “Verdoorn,” the addition of the father’s surname to create a hyphenated
last name “should not cause any confusion to the child” because the child is familiar with
father’s surname. The district court’s determination of the weight and import of this factor
appears to be based in part on its finding that “father only seeks to add ‘Soto’ to the child’s
last name. Father does not seek to drop the ‘Verdoorn’ name.”
In the first case mother cites, Saxton, the parents had two children who were aged
nine and seven when one parent applied for a name change for both children. 309 N.W.2d
at 300. The supreme court affirmed the district court’s denial of the name change,
reasoning in part that the children had “borne a given surname for an extended period of
time.” Id. at 302. Although Saxton allows the bearing of a name for less than ten years to
weigh against a name change, it does not establish that six years is sufficient to require that
determination because Saxton involved name changes for two children over the age of six.
Id. at 299-300. Thus, it is unclear whether the elder child’s age dominated a determination
of this factor.
Mother cites Robinson, another case in which the parents disagreed about changing
the children’s last name. 223 N.W.2d at 139. In Robinson, the parents had four children
between the ages of 6 and 17 when the supreme court heard the case. Id. at 140. Again, it
is unclear how the fact that the petition affected multiple siblings older than six years
affected the determination of this factor with respect to the six-year -old child in that case.
See id. at 141. Because of these factual differences, mother’s comparisons do not persuade
us to conclude that it was contrary to logic and the facts in the record for the district court
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not to determine that the six years the child has borne his current name weighs against
determining that the name change is in the child’s best interests.
In addition, our careful review of the record shows that the district court’s findings
of fact are based on evidence that was before the district court. Because we are not
persuaded by mother’s caselaw comparisons and evidence in the record supports the
district court’s factual findings, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that this factor is neutral.
Fourth Factor: The Effect of the Change on the Child’s Relationship with Each Parent
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in its determination of the
fourth factor because father’s testimony regarding the child’s relationship with father was
equivocal and father agreed that the child could change his name of his own volition when
he is older. Therefore, she argues, this factor weighs against a determination that a name
change is in the child’s best interests. Mother does not challenge the district court’s finding
that the fourth factor is neutral with regard to the child’s relationship with her.
The district court determined that granting father’s name-change application would
have a positive effect on the child’s relationship with father and a neutral effect on the
child’s relationship with mother. Father and father’s witnesses testified that the family
surname is important because it represents their ethnic heritage and that hyphenating the
child’s last name with father’s surname listed first is a cultural practice. Although father
also testified that he has a good relationship with the child regardless of the child’s name,
he expressed his wishes for the child’s name to include his surname “so that his child could
feel he was a part of both families.” Here again, the district court highlighted that it was
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relevant to the district court’s analysis that father’s petition requested to add father’s
surname and not remove mother’s surname, as opposed to a request to remove or replace
mother’s surname. Mother’s argument is premised on father’s admission that the child’s
name had no effect on the parent-child relationship with him, and it ignores the district
court’s factual findings about the value of the cultural practices of father’s family,
including naming conventions. Mother’s challenge to the district court’s determination of
this factor asks us to reweigh evidence on appeal, which we cannot do. See Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 221-22.
Because the district court’s findings of fact are based on evidence in the record, and
because the district court’s treatment of this factor was not contrary to logic or the facts
found by the district court, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in deciding that this factor weighed in favor of determining that it is in the child’s best
interests to grant the name-change application.
Fifth Factor: The Degree of Community Respect Associated with the Present and Proposed
Surname
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in its determination of the
fifth factor because the evidence relevant to the fifth factor was inconsistent—some
testimony asserted that father’s surname had a positive reputation in the community, while
other testimony asserted that the reputation was negative— and, therefore, the fifth factor
weighs against a determination that a name change is in the child’s best interests.
The district court determined that the degree of community respect associated with
the child’s present name and proposed name weighed in favor of granting the application
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because “it is possible that the addition of ‘Soto’ to the child’s last name would allow the
child to be more widely accepted into the Hispanic community and culture, which could
result in a benefit to the child.” The district court found that including father’s surname to
create a hyphenated last name “would provide the child with a sense of belonging to both
families.” Throughout its discussion of the Saxton factors, the district court credited
father’s and his witnesses’ testimony that their family and businesses are well-respected
and associated with their Mexican-American culture while finding that there was no
evidence showing that “father’s [criminal] charges are widely known in the . . . community
beyond the one individual who advised mother of the charges.” Mother’s challenge to the
district court’s determination of this factor is a challenge to how the district court credited
and weighed that evidence.
Because we cannot reweigh evidence on appeal, see Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22,
and there is evidence in the record to support the district court’s determination, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its determination of this factor.
Best-Interests Analysis
When considering a name-change application, district courts are presented with a
threshold question—whether changing the child’s name is in the child’s best interests.
Minn. Stat. § 259.11(a); accord Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757. The five nonexclusive Saxton
factors guide district courts in answering that question. Here, mother argues that the district
court abused its discretion by determining that father met his burden to present clear and
compelling evidence that the name change is in the child’s best interests.
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After the district court set forth its analysis as to each of the five Saxton factors, it
concluded that father had established that the requested name change was in the child’s
best interests. Although it found that three of the five factors were neutral, it found that
the fourth and fifth factors weighed in favor of a determination that the name change was
in the child’s best interests and, ultimately, that this was sufficient for it to conclude that
father met his burden as the parent requesting the name change. Given that we do not
discern an abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination of the individual Saxton
factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
father made a minimal showing that the requested name change was in the child’s best
interests.
B. The district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law to
mother’s burden.
Because mother opposed the name-change application, she had to show that the
evidence father provided was not “clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the
child necessitates such change.” Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757 (citing Robinson, 223 N.W.2d
at 140). And, in light of her objection, the district court was required to consider mother’s
arguments while evaluating the strength of the evidence to determine whether it met the
“clear and compelling” standard and to exercise “great caution” in doing so. Id. (quotation
omitted). Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion because it was
presented only with evidence that established father’s preference that the child bear both
parents’ surnames, not that the child’s substantial welfare necessitated this change. Mother
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further contends that the district court did not follow caselaw in making its determination
at this step of the analysis.
In its order on remand, the district court correctly stated that, upon determining that
father established that the name change was in the child’s best interests, it was next required
to examine “whether the evidence is not clear and compelling that the child’s substantial
welfare necessitates such a change.” The district court then set forth mother’s “reasons for
objecting” as the following: mother and father were not in a relationship when the child
was born, the child had begun to learn how to write his last name as “Verdoorn,” and father
is known in the community for having been charged with domestic assault. The district
court addressed each of these objections, stating that father has consistently been involved
with the child and has exercised parenting time; that if the child has learned how to write,
it will be easy to add “Soto” to his last name; and that the extent of the knowledge of
father’s criminal record in the community is unknown. The district court then concluded
that “none of the reasons put forth by mother can overcome the clear and compelling
evidence presented showing that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates the change
in name.” The district court arrived at this conclusion, however, without applying the
heightened clear and compelling standard to the evidence, and its findings do not support
its determination that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates the requested name
change.
In particular, the district court concluded that only two of the five Saxton factors
weighed in favor of determining that it was in the child’s best interests to grant the name
change. Furthermore, the basis that the district court set forth to support its determination
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of the fifth factor was based in part on speculation that adding father’s surname to the
child’s name would allow the child to be more widely accepted in the Hispanic community
and culture—which it described as a “possibility.” Given that only two of five factors
weighed in favor of the name change being in the child’s best interests, one of which was
partially based on a possibility that a name change would have a positive impact on the
child, we conclude that the district court applied a standard akin to a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than a clear-and-compelling standard and
that it did not exercise great caution in this case. Because the objecting parent may “prevent
the district court from granting the request” by establishing that the “evidence in support
of the name change is not ‘clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child
necessitates such change,’” Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757 (emphasis added) (quoting
Robinson, 223 N.W.2d at 140), the district court misapplied the opposing parent’s low
evidentiary burden to mother’s detriment rather than to her benefit as the law requires. To
successfully oppose father’s name-change application, mother needed to show only that
father did not establish that granting the application was necessary to the child’s substantial
welfare. Id.
Based on the district court’s factual findings, mother met her low evidentiary bar to
show that father did not establish that changing the child’s name is necessary to his
substantial welfare. C ontrary to the district court’s name-change decision, it found that
father “has a good relationship with his child despite his child not having his last name.”
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Because the district court misapplied the standard for the second step of th is analysis, we
conclude that it abused its discretion by misapplying the law.
Reversed.