State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1335

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Douglas David Carr,
Appellant.

Filed July 28, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-22-2410

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges his first- degree criminal sexual conduct convictions, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the entirety of the victim’s forensic
interview at trial. Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
2
FACTS
Investigation
In May 2020, victim M.C., reported to a school therapist “that there had been sexual
abuse happening in the home.” As a mandated reporter, the therapist immediately reported
M.C.’s disclosure to law enforcement. Later that day, M.C. met with a police officer and
gave a recorded statement. M.C. disclosed the sexual abuse and “remembered certain
incidents” but could not provide a timeline. After the interview, the officer referred M.C.
for a forensic interview, which occurred two days later. The officer also referred the matter
to the lead investigator, who later interviewed M.C., her sister K.C., their mother, and
appellant Douglas David Carr.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Carr with six counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct for multiple acts of sexual abuse involving his two children, M.C. and K.C.1
Pretrial Ruling
Prior to trial, the parties filed cross motions regarding the admissibility of M.C.’s
forensic interview. The issue was addressed at the beginning of trial. The state moved to
admit the video recording of M.C.’s forensic interview as substantive evidence under

1 Counts 1 and 2 involved victim M.C. and were charged under Minnesota Statutes section
609.342, subdivision 1(a) (2008) (sexual penetration with a victim under 13 years of age).
Count 3, also applying to M.C., was charged under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342,
subdivision 1(h)(iii) (2004) (significant relationship with a victim under 16 and multiple
acts committed over an extended period of time). Counts 4 and 5 involved victim K.C. and
were charged under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a) (2004) (sexual
penetration with a victim under 13 years of age). Count 6, also applying to K.C., was
charged under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(h)(iii) (2002) (significant
relationship with a victim under 16 and multiple acts committed over time).
3
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807, the residual-hearsay-exception rule. Carr’s counsel
objected, arguing that the residual- hearsay exception applies for unavailable declarants,
which would not be the case at trial because M.C. was available, and that the forensic
interview was a “way to have additional testimony [not] []cross examined.” Counsel also
argued that M.C. would likely be “highly emotional on the stand,” which the jury would
see firsthand, and playing the forensic interview—which is over two hours long—after
M.C. testified would generate undue sympathy.
The state argued that the length of the forensic interview was irrelevant and that the
forensic interview should be admitted because it was “not realistic to expect someone who
experienced seven years of sexual abuse to get on the stand and recall all those incidents.”
The state argued that defense counsel could ask M.C. “anything and everything about [the]
interview or anything that she said.”
The district court discussed the requirements under rule 807 and determined that the
forensic video had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, was more probative than other
admissible evidence at trial, and that admission of the video would best serve the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice. Regarding the admissibility of the forensic
interview, the district court stated, “And so I think that the general purpose behind the
Minnesota Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice are served by admitting that
statement. Again, assuming the foundational elements are met. So I’m not making a ruling
now, but that’s where I’m heading depending on how things go forward.” (Emphasis
added.)
4
The matter proceeded to a three-day jury trial, where the jury heard testimony from
M.C, K.C., M.C.’s mother, the responding police officer, the investigator, the forensic
interviewer, and Carr.
Testimony of M.C.
M.C. testified at trial four years after she initially disclosed the sexual abuse to her
therapist.2 M.C. grew up with two siblings, her mother, and her father, Carr. They first
lived in the “Glyndon” home, then moved to their Grandma K’s home and then Grandma
R’s home before moving to Detroit Lakes. When asked about her first recollection of the
abuse, M.C. testified that it started when she lived in “Glyndon when [she] was very
young,” as early as “two and three-years-old.” She could not remember what happened
but remembered “being scared and feeling disgusted and wanting to run and hide but [she]
couldn’t.” M.C. did recall that one time, when she was in the bathroom, Carr “was trying
to get [her] to put [her] mouth on [his penis].”
M.C. estimated that she was “probably six and a half” when she moved to Grandma
K’s home. M.C. recalled “one or two instances” of abuse but added that they were “really
foggy”; she remembered “the feelings of being scared, [and] really just overwhelm[ed], a
lot of memories.” When M.C. was approximately 10 years old, she moved to her Grandma
R’s home. There were two instances of sexual abuse that stuck out to M.C. in particular.
M.C. described that she was asleep one night and “remember[ed] the feeling of being lifted
off [her] bed and then [she] went back to sleep, but then [she] woke up some place else.”

2 At the time of the initial disclosure M.C. was 17 years old and at the time of trial she was
21 years old.
5
M.C. “knew [Carr] had put his penis inside of [her]. And when [she] woke up, [she] was
crying and [she] was telling him to stop, but he didn’t.”
The second incident of abuse occurred in a “utility area underneath the stairs.” M.C.
described the utility area “like a walkway” that had “just one light.” She could not
remember how it started, but she felt pain because “[Carr’s] penis was inside of [her].”
M.C. testified that she was not yet a teenager at this time.
M.C. testified that after the family moved to Detroit Lakes, Carr’s behavior
remained “exactly the same” except the penetration stopped. When asked if the incidents
she had already testified to were “all the times [she was] abused,” M.C. answered “no.”
M.C. estimated that she was sexually abused “[p]robably once a week. She added that Carr
“was usually either touching [her] while he would masturbate or seeing [her] private parts.”
M.C.’s Forensic Interview
After M.C.’s testimony, the district court admitted M.C.’s forensic interview in its
entirety over the objection of Carr’s counsel and based its decision on the pretrial rule 807
discussions. M.C. was 17 years old at the time of the forensic interview. The full length
of the video recording was 2 hours and 23 minutes. For the first 20 minutes of the
interview, M.C. discussed her pets, hobbies, and members of her family. Approximately
43 minutes into the interview, the forensic interviewer asked M.C. to describe when she
was “really young in the trailer in Glyndon.” M.C. began discussing the bathroom incident
and said she “was almost a toddler” at the time. From then on, M.C. resisted answering
the interviewer’s questions and indicated to the interviewer that it would be easier to
answer “yes or no” questions. As the interviewer tried to elicit more responses, M.C. grew
6
emotional, causing the interviewer to take a break from that topic for approximately six
minutes.
After the break, M.C. began discussing how Carr liked “to tickle [her] back” when
she was in her room and that she couldn’t “say no or else [ he would] get mad, and he
[would] take his anger out on [her] family.” M.C. described that Carr would “start
masturbating behind [her] as he was tickling [her] back.” At this point, M.C. took a 10-
minute break and talked about art, classes, and her dog.
The forensic interviewer resumed questioning and asked M.C. about the “grosser
things that used to happen.” M.C. replied that Carr “used to rape [her] a lot.” M.C.
explained that Carr “liked to make deals” with her so that M.C. felt like she was
“consenting” to it. Carr would also tell M.C. that he didn’t want her cat or dog and would
tell M.C., “you know what you have to do to get it.” M.C. also stated that Carr would
sometimes “yell and scream at [her] until [she] broke down and said fine.”
M.C. proceeded to talk about the incident in the bathroom ; the incident when she
was taken, while asleep, from her bed; and the incident in the utility area underneath the
stairs.
M.C. also discussed two incidents during the forensic interview that she did not
bring up in her testimony. The first involved an incident involving both M.C. and K.C.
together, and the second involved Carr taking nude photographs of M.C. when they lived
in Detroit Lakes. M.C. later indicated that she was done speaking for the day.
During trial, the state fast-forwarded through a portion of the forensic interview
when the interviewer left the room to consult with her team. When the state resumed the
7
video, M.C. did not discuss any other instances of the alleged sexual abuse. M.C. also
discussed other instances where Carr yelled at M.C. and other members of the family.
The jury found Carr guilty on all six counts. The district court convicted Carr on
counts 3 and 6 and imposed consecutive sentences of 144 months.
Carr appeals.
DECISION
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting M.C.’s forensic
interview video under the residual-hearsay exception.

“We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling on hearsay for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A defendant claiming error in
the district court’s reception of evidence has the burden of showing both the error and the
prejudice resulting from the error.” Id. (quotation omitted). We will not “reverse a verdict
even when improper evidence is presented to the jury unless there is a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State
v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
Even when statements are not covered by a specific hearsay exception, they may
8
nonetheless be admitted under the residual-hearsay-exception rule. State v. Hallmark, 927
N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). The residual-hearsay exception provides that:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

Minn. R. Evid. 807.
There are two steps to admit hearsay statements under the residual-hearsay
exception. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 292. “First, the district court must look at the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the hearsay statement has circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, it must determine whether
the above three prongs of rule 807 are met. Id. at 293.
Carr asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the forensic
interview of M.C. under the residual-hearsay exception. Carr does not contest the district
court’s findings under step one. But he argues that the district court erred in step two
because the second and third prongs were not met. Specifically, Carr argues that as it
relates to prong two M.C.’s forensic interview was not more probative on the point for
which it [was] offered than any other evidence procure[d] because M.C.’s testimony about
the sexual abuse at trial was more probative. As it relates to prong three, Carr argues that
admission of M.C.’s forensic interview did not best serve the purposes of the rules of
evidence and the interests of justice as required under rule 807(C) because most of the
9
video was “irrelevant” because “81 minutes of it addressed topics wholly unrelated to the
charged offenses.” We disagree that the district court abused its discretion.
Here, after concluding that the forensic interview had circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, the district court stated, relative to the second prong, “while I recognize
that the most probative evidence is the alleged victim testifying on the stand, I think that
this forensic video is also other evidence that would be admissible at this trial assuming
those foundational factors are met, and it is offered as a material fact.” And in addressing
the third prong, the district court determined that the general purpose behind the rules and
the interests of justice would be served by admitting the forensic interview because the
“only two people that . . . have information about what did or did not happen are [M.C.]
and the defendant.” It reasoned that the jury needed to hear the interview to “ascertain the
truth by weighing the relative credibility of the alleged victim in the record[ed] statement.”
The district court admitted the forensic interview the day after M.C. testified.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the forensic interview
under the residual-hearsay exception. The forensic interview was more probative than
other evidence presented, such as the testimony of M.C., the officer, and the investigator,
because the forensic interview occurred two days after M.C. disclosed the sexual abuse to
her school therapist, whereas the trial occurred roughly four years after the disclosure. See
State v. Perez, No. A24-0335, 2025 WL 366700, at *6 (Minn. App. Feb. 3, 2023)
(concluding that statements made during forensic interviews that occurred “in the days
10
immediately after the complainants disclosed the abuse” was more probative than other
evidence presented, including complainants’ own trial testimony of abuse).3
Moreover, the rules of evidence and the interests of justice are best served by
admitting the evidence because, as the district court observed, the forensic interview
“allow[ed] [the jury] to ascertain the truth by weighing the relative credibility of the alleged
victim in the record[ed] statement, [and in] her sworn testimony.”
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted M.C.’s
forensic interview under the residual-hearsay exception. We conclude that the district court
examined the totality of the circumstances to confirm that M.C.’s forensic interview had,
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and whether the three
enumerated requirements of rule 807 were met. See Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d. at 292-93.
Because the district court’s admission of M.C.’s forensic interview pursuant to rule 807
was not an abuse of discretion, we need not consider Carr’s argument that the erroneous
admission was prejudicial.
Affirmed.

3 We cite th is nonprecedential opinion as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c).