Lisa Marie Parkos, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1364

Lisa Marie Parkos,
Respondent,

vs.

David Andrew Sandbeck,
Appellant.

Filed April 21, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-24-540

Samuel J. Edmunds, Sieben Edmunds Miller PLLC, Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Joseph G. Vaccaro, The Law Office of Joseph G. Vaccaro, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s grant of a harassment restraining order (HRO),
appellant argues that his conduct, as found by the district court, does not constitute
harassment and that the HRO is based on protected speech. We affirm.

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FACTS
In May 2024, respondent Lisa Marie Parkos filed a petition for an HRO against her
sister’s son, appellant David Andrew Sandbeck. Following a trial at which both appellant
and respondent testified, the district court found:
1. [Appellant] used Facebook to publicly criticize
[respondent’s] morality, property, and involvement in her
mother’s estate finances as power of attorney.
2. [Respondent] was not tagged in the Facebook posts because
[respondent] blocked [appellant] on Facebook.
3. [Appellant] tagged other family members, her business and
her small town to the Facebook posts in question.
4. [Appellant] agrees that he post[ed] pictures on Facebook of
[respondent] with her face covered with demonic faces.
5. At times [appellant] admits to referring to [respondent]
publicly on Facebook by using terms such as “POA” or
“people with financial powers.”
6. Additionally, [appellant] publicly posted songs on
Facebook that were pointed to [respondent]. [Appellant]
admits to posting these songs with [respondent] in the
“back of his mind.”
7. [Appellant] posted publicly on Facebook identifiable
information about [respondent’s] real estate to criticize her
finances.
8. [Appellant] admits to posting publicly on Facebook about
the June 13, 2024 hearing with the Court as being a
“malicious prosecution.”
9. The Court finds that the intention of the repeated posts over
a month was to intimidate, embarrass, or harm the
reputation of [respondent].

The district court also determined that the “harassment has or is intended to have a
substantial adverse effect on [respondent’s] safety, security, or privacy.” Thus, the district
court granted respondent’s request for an HRO. This appeal follows.

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DECISION
I.
Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting an HRO in favor of
respondent. This court reviews a district court ’s grant of a n HRO under an abuse -of-
discretion standard. Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004) , rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings
of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision
that is against logic and the facts on record.” Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.W.3d 331, 339 (Minn.
App. 2024) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2024). “A district court ’s
findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to
the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at
843-44. But the district court’s application of the law is reviewed de novo. Harris ex rel.
Banks v. Gellerman, 954 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. App. 2021).
A district court may order an HRO if “the court finds at the hearing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2024). Harassment includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or
unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to
have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.” Id., subd.
1(a)(1) (2024). A determination of harassment under section 609.748 “requires both
objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser and an objectively
reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to the harassing conduct.” Dunham v.
Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).
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Objectively unreasonable conduct includes conduct that “goes beyond an acceptable
expression of outrage and civilized conduct and instead causes a substantial adverse effect
on another’s safety, security, or privacy.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846.
Appellant argues that his conduct, as found by the district court, is “not legally
harassment.” To support his position, appellant cites Witchell v. Witchell, in which the ex-
wife alleged that statements her ex -husband made in the parties’ visitation notebook
constituted harassment. 606 N.W.2d 730, 731 (Minn. App. 2000). This court disagreed,
stating that, “[w]hen [ex] -husband’s statements from the visitatio n notebook are read in
context, it is apparent that [ex] -husband was either responding to written comments that
wife had previously made in the visitation notebook or was addressing his concerns
regarding visitation and the upbringing of the children.” Id. at 732. This court concluded
that, “[a]lthough [ex] -husband’s statements are inappropriate and argumentative, we
cannot say that they were intrusive or that they were intended to adversely affect the safety,
security, or privacy of [ex]-wife.” Id.
This case is distinguishable from Witchell because, unlike ex-husband in that case,
appellant did more than criticize respondent’s behavior. Rather, appellant’s conduct, as
found by the district court, consisted of posting pictures on social media of respondent with
“her face covered with demonic faces.” Appellant also referred to respondent on social
media by terms such as “POA” and “people with financial powers,” and criticized her
morality and involvement in her mother’s estate and finances as power of attorney. And
appellant posted to social media identifiable information about respondent and her real
estate in an effort to criticize her finances. A s found by the district court, a ppellant’s
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conduct caused a substantial adverse effect on respondent’s privacy because, as the district
court found, appellant attacked respondent’s “morality, property, and involvement in her
mother’s estate and finances as power of attorney.”
Moreover, unlike in Witchell, where only ex -wife saw ex -husband’s
communications, appellant posted his comments on social media where many of
respondent’s family and friends viewed the material. Thus, under the circumstances, the
district court’s finding that appellant’s conduct is objectively unreasonable because it “goes
beyond an acceptable expression of outrage and civilized conduct” is not clearly erroneous.
See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846.
Appellant also contends that his conduct does not constitute harassment because the
“content of the posts” show that he “lacked the intent to adversely affect the safety,
security, or privacy of [r]espondent.” But section 609.748 requires “objectively
unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser.” Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 567
(emphasis added); see also Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2008)
(stating that to sustain an HRO petition, the petitioner must prove either “objective ly
unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser” (emphasis added)). The
conjunction “or” signifies alternative paths for an actor to engage in harassment. See
Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008) (stating that courts “normally
interpret the conjunction ‘or’ as disjunctive rather than conjunctive”). As noted above, the
district court’s finding that appellant’s conduct consisted of objectively unreasonable
conduct is not clearly erroneous. As such, appellant’s intent is irrelevant.
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Moreover, appellant’s argument that the record does not support the district court’s
finding that he lacked the intent to harass respondent fails on the merits. “[I]ntent is a state
of mind” that “is generally determined by inferences drawn from the person’s words or
actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Bock, 490 N.W.2d 116, 120
(Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1992). And “[i]ntent is a credibility
question on which [this court] defer[s] to the [district] court.” Vangsness v. Vangsness ,
607 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. App. 2000).
Here, the district court found that appellant used social media to “criticize
[respondent’s] morality, property, and involvement in her mother’s estate and finances as
power of attorney.” The district court also found that appellant copied “other family
members, her business, and her small town” in the social media posts. The district court
then determined that the “intention of [these] repeated posts over months was to intimidate,
embarrass, or harm the reputation of [respondent].” Although appellant di sputes this
determination and testified at trial that his “intention” was “to draw attention to” his
“perceived abuse” by respondent of her role as power of attorney in relation to his
grandmother, the district court did not find appellant’s testimony to be credible. Because
we defer to the district court’s credibility determination, the record supports the district
court’s determination that appellant intended to harass respondent.
Appellant further argues that it is “impossible” for respondent to have an objectively
reasonable belief that she was being harassed because she had “blocked” appellant on her
social media accounts. But again, the district court found that appellant copie d his social-
media posts to “other family members, [respondent’s] business, and her small town.” And
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respondent testified that, based on appellant’s conduct, she “get[s] all kinds of
communication from people saying [appellant] is doing all this and it’s referencing me.”
Respondent’s testimony indicates that, despite blocking appellant on her social -media
accounts, she was still aware of appellant’s conduct. Under these circumstances, the
district court did not clearly err in finding that it was objectively reasonable for respondent
to feel harassed. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
HRO in favor of respondent.
II.
Appellant also contends that the “district court improperly issued an HRO based on
protected speech.” Because this argument was not raised below, it is not properly before
us, and we decline to address it. See In re Welfare of Child. of Coats , 633 N.W.2d 505,
512 (Minn. 2001) (stating that appellate courts “consider only those issues that were
presented and considered by the [district] court”) ; see also In re Welfare of C.L.L. , 310
N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (declining to address constitutional issues raised for the
first time on appeal).
Affirmed.