State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1369

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bruce Archie Turner,
Appellant.

Filed August 11, 2025
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File Nos. 43-CR-23-749, 43-CR-23-751,
43-CR-23-822, 43-CR-23-823

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kenneth G. Janssen, Brownton City Attorney, Gavin, Janssen & Stabenow, Ltd., Glencoe,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Bruce John Archiebald Turner, Brownton, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
After a consolidated court trial, appellant was found guilty of violating a municipal
blight ordinance in four separate cases. On direct appeal, appellant argues that (1) the state
failed to provide sufficient notice of the blight violations, (2) the state violated its discovery
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obligations, (3) the district court abused its discretion by admitting photographs of his
properties into evidence, and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Bruce Archie Turner owns three vacant properties in the City of
Brownton that are the subject of this appeal. Turner never resided at any of the vacant
properties.
A Brownton ordinance prohibits keeping certain causes of blight on a person’s
property. See Brownton, Minn., Code of Ordinances (BCO) § 54 (2018). As relevant here,
the blight ordinance prohibits a person from maintaining or permitting to be maintained
“the storage or accumulation of junk, trash, rubbish or refuse of any kind” for more than
30 days. BCO § 54.1.1.B “[J]unk” is defined as “parts of machinery or motor vehicles,
unused stoves or other appliances stored in the open; remnants of wood; decayed,
weathered or broken metal or other material or cast off material of any kind, whether or
not the same could be put to any reasonable use.” Id . In addition, the blight ordinance
prohibits “weeds, grass over 6 inches tall, brush or plants, which are a fire hazard or
otherwise detrimental to the health or appearance of the neighborhood.” Id. § 54.1.1.E.
Upon receiving a notice from the city of blight conditions, a property owner must remove
3
or eliminate the blight within three days if the blight is grass over six inches, and within
ten days for any other condition. Id. § 54.II.1.1
After a court trial, the district court found Turner guilty of petty misdemeanor
violations of the blight ordinance in four separate cases involving Turner’s three properties.
The following facts are drawn from the district court’s findings and from other relevant
parts of the district court record.
43-CR-23-749
In May 2023, Officer Warzecha of the Brownton Police Department observed grass
and weeds over 12 inches high at a vacant residential property owned by Turner on 7th
Avenue (the 7th Avenue property). On May 9, 2023, the city mailed Turner a notice of the
blight conditions at the 7th Avenue property. The city sent the notice to Turner’s address
in Rockford, Minnesota. The notice advised Turner that he was in violation of BCO § 54
and that, pursuant to the ordinance, he was required to remove or eliminate the cause of
blight within three days for grass and within ten days for the other conditions.
On May 24, 2023, Officer Warzecha returned to the 7th Avenue property and
observed the grass and weeds were still over 12 inches high. Officer Warzecha issued
Turner a citation for violating BCO § 54.1.1.E.

1 The first section of BCO § 54, entitled “Causes of Blight or Blighting Factors,” is
designated by the Arabic numeral “1.” The second section of the ordinance, entitled
“Enforcement and Penalties,” is designated by the Roman numeral “II.”
4
43-CR-23-751 and 43-CR-23-823
In May 2023, Officer Warzecha observed junk piles on a vacant residential property
owned by Turner on 5th Street (the 5th Street property). The junk piles included wood,
building materials, and branches.
On May 9, 2023, the city mailed Turner a notice of the blight conditions at the 5th
Street property. As it did for the 7th Avenue property, the city sent the notice to Turner’s
address in Rockford. The notice advised Turner that he was in violation of BCO § 54 and
that he was required to remove or eliminate the cause of blight within the applicable time
frame.
On May 24, 2023, Officer Warzecha returned to the 5th Street property and
observed the same conditions. Officer Warzecha issued Turner a citation for violating
BCO § 54.1.1.B. Officer Warzecha returned to the 5th Street property on June 7, 2023,
observed that the blight conditions were still present, and issued Turner a second citation
for the blight conditions at the 5th Street property.
43-CR-23-822
In May 2023, Officer Warzecha observed weeds and grass over six inches high on
a vacant lot owned by Turner on 4th Avenue (the 4th Avenue property). On May 22, 2023,
the city mailed Turner a notice of the blight conditions at the 4th Avenue property. The
city again sent the notice to Turner’s Rockford address. The notice advised Turner that he
was in violation of BCO § 54 and that he was required to remove or eliminate the cause of
blight within the applicable time frame.
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On June 7, 2023, Officer Warzecha returned to the 4th Avenue property and
observed the same tall weeds and grass. Officer Warzecha issued Turner a citation for
violating BCO § 54.1.1.E.
Evidence at the Consolidated Court Trial
The state certified the charges as petty misdemeanors and the parties agreed to
consolidate the four cases for trial. The cases were tried to the court in April 2024.
At trial, the court heard testimony from Officer Warzecha about the investigation of
blight conditions at Turner’s properties. The court received into evidence the notices that
the city sent to Turner and photographs of the conditions at the properties that were taken
at the request of Officer Warzecha by his administrative assistant, who was deceased by
the time of trial. The court also heard testimony from the city clerk treasurer about the
blight conditions on Turner’s properties, the notices the city sent to Turner about the
conditions on his properties, and the clerk’s past conversations with Turner regarding city
mail. The city clerk testified that ordinance violation notices are sent to the address that
the city has on file for the property and that the Rockford address was the address the city
had on file for Turner. The clerk explained that she had worked at the city for five years
and, during that entire time, the Rockford address was the only address Turner used. The
city had sent utility bills and other items to Turner at the Rockford address. The city clerk
testified that she had discussed city mail with Turner and Turner had never provided any
address where mail should be sent other than the Rockford address.
Turner represented himself and, in his opening statement, explained that he intended
to restore the properties.
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The district court determined that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Turner had violated BCO §§ 54.1.1.B, E, and it found Turner guilty in all four cases.
Turner appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in determining that the city provided Turner with
sufficient notice of the blight violations.

Turner first argues that the city failed to provide proper notice of the blight
violations. He asserts that the Rockford address utilized by the city is not his legal
residence and that the city should have undertaken additional measures to confirm his legal
address before sending the notices to that address. In a bench trial, the district court’s
findings of fact must be supported by the evidence. See State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449,
453 (Minn. 2002). On appeal, we accept the district court’s findings of fact unless those
findings are clearly erroneous. Id. “The interpretation and application of a city ordinance
is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d
298, 307 (Minn. App. 2007).
The Brownton blight ordinance provides that the owner and occupant of the
property where blight is found to exist “shall be notified, by writing, by the City Clerk to
remove or eliminate such causes of blight or blighting factors from such property within
ten (10) days after service of the notice upon him.” BCO § 54.II.1. The written notice
“may be served personally or by mail, to the last known address of the owner, and if the
premises are occupied, to the premises.” Id.
7
In its findings of fact and verdict in each of the four cases, the district court found
that the city’s notifications of the blight conditions complied with the ordinance because
the notice was sent to the address that the city had for Turner , which was where Turner
received his utility bills for the properties and other city mail. We discern no clear error in
this finding. The record evidence establishes that, because Turner’s properties were
unoccupied, the city sent the blight notices to Turner’s Rockford address. The Rockford
address was Turner’s last known address, the address that the city had on file for him, and
the address where the city had sent Turner’s mail for the last five years. See id. (providing
that blight notice may be served by mail at “the last known address of the owner”).
Turner also appears to contend that the city should have personally served the blight
notices on him at his legal address. As noted, the blight ordinance provides that, if the
premises are unoccupied, the blight notices “may be served personally or by mail, to the
last known address of the owner.” Id . The word “may” is permissive. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.44, subd. 15 (2024). Because the ordinance plainly states that the notice “may” be
served personally, the city was not required to personally serve Turner. BCO § 54.II.1.
And because the ordinance provides that the notice, whether made personally or by mail,
be made “to the last known address of the owner,” the city was not obligated to serve
Turner at his legal residence. Id. Finally, neither the plain language of the ordinance, nor
any other authority, supports Turner’s assertion that the city should have undertaken
additional efforts to determine his legal address in order to comply with the ordinance’s
notice provision. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in determining
8
that the city provided Turner with sufficient notice of the blight conditions on his Brownton
properties.
II. The district court did not err in determining that the state did not commit a
discovery violation.

Turner asserts that the state failed to disclose a witness before trial in violation of
the district court’s discovery order and its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963). Turner appears to argue that the state failed to disclose the name of the
administrative assistant who accompanied Officer Warzecha during his investigation into
the blight conditions at Turner’s properties and, at Officer Warzecha’s direction, took
photographs of the properties that were later admitted at trial.
Under Brady, the state must disclose “material evidence favorable to the defendant.”
Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). To
establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show (1) the evidence is favorable to him
because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was
suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence is material,
“in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.”
Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Evidence is
material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 418 (quotations
omitted). Whether a discovery violation under the rules of criminal procedure or Brady
occurred presents a mixed question of law and fact that appellate courts review de novo.
Id.; State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005).
9
On February 22, 2024, the district court issued a discovery order requiring that the
state “shall provide to the Defendant all documents or recordings” that the state intended
to offer at trial or that were relevant or exculpatory. Before trial, the state confirmed that
it had disclosed all relevant and exculpatory documents and recordings, including Officer
Warzecha’s police report.
During his testimony at trial, Officer Warzecha testified that an administrative
assistant had accompanied him on his visits to Turner’s properties and, at his direction, had
taken photographs of the blight conditions. Turner moved to compel disclosure of evidence
and to dismiss the case because, he argued, the state failed to disclose the identity or
involvement of the administrative assistant, in violation of the district court’s discovery
order and Brady. The state objected to Turner’s motion, arguing that the administrative
assistant’s name was mentioned in Officer Warzecha’s police report and that the state first
learned that the assistant had taken the photos when Officer Warzecha testified to that fact
at trial. The district court denied Turner’s motion. The district court determined that the
assistant’s name was disclosed on the police report and that disclosure of the administrative
assistant’s name was not required by the discovery order and was not exculpatory.
Applying de novo review, we discern no error in the district court’s determination
that the state did not violate the pretrial discovery order or Brady. The record establishes
that the state, in compliance with the district court’s discovery order, provided Turner with
all relevant or exculpatory documents or recordings. The administrative assistant’s name
was listed in Officer Warzecha’s report that was disclosed to Turner. In addition, the
assistant was deceased at the time of Turner’s trial. Turner does not explain how the result
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of the trial would have been different if the assistant’s involvement in Officer Warzecha’s
investigation had been disclosed to him. Accordingly, the evidence of the assistant’s role
in Officer Warzecha’s investigation of the blight conditions on Turner’s properties was not
material. Zornes, 903 N.W.2d at 418 (explaining that e vidence is material for Brady
purposes “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Therefore, Turner has
failed to establish that the state violated the discovery order or its Brady obligations.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting photographs of
Turner’s properties.

Turner argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting photographs
of the blight conditions at the three properties, asserting that the photographs are “false
evidence.” At trial, Turner objected to admission of the photographs of his properties,
arguing that the photographs lacked a time and date stamp and were taken by the
administrative assistant, who did not testify at trial. The district court determined that the
photos were sufficiently authenticated and overruled Turner’s objection.
“The admission of photographs is a matter left to the discretion of the [district
court].” State v. Sullivan, 502 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. 1993). “Photographs are
admissible if they accurately portray anything that a witness may describe in words, or the
photographs are helpful as an aid to an oral description of objects and conditions, provided
they are relevant to some material issue.” State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 237 (Minn.
2005). Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence” to the defendant’s guilt “more probable or less probable than it
11
would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. We review a district court’s
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn.
2014). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a new trial is required because
the erroneously admitted evidence substantially influenced the verdict. State v. Sanders,
775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009).
“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). A photograph can be
authenticated through testimony of a witness with knowledge “that a matter is what it is
claimed to be.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).
Here, the photographs of the blight conditions on Turner’s properties were
authenticated by Officer Warzecha’s testimony that he was present when the photograph s
of the 5th Street and 7th Avenue properties were taken on May 24 and when the
photographs of the 4th Avenue property were taken on June 7. Officer Warzecha further
testified that the photographs were fair and accurate depiction s of the conditions of
Turner’s properties he personally observed on those dates. Because Officer Warzecha had
knowledge about the blight conditions at Turner’s properties when the photographs were
taken and testified that the matters in the photographs were what they were claimed to be,
Officer Warzecha’s testimony provided sufficient authentication for the photographs. See
Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting the photographs of Turner’s properties.
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IV. There was sufficient evidence to find Turner guilty of violating the blight
ordinance.

Finally, Turner asserts that the state issued “false citations” and failed to allege facts
that constitute a crime. We construe Turner’s argument to be a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence.
Due process requires the state to prove every element of a charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d
361, 366 (Minn. 1988); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts “carefully examine the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and assume the fact- finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary
evidence. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). Appellate courts “use the
same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
In cases 43-CR-23-749 and 43-CR-23-822, the district court found Turner guilty of
violating BCO § 54.1.1.E for blight conditions at the 7th Avenue property and at the 4th
Avenue property. This section of the blight ordinance prohibits a property owner from
maintaining or permitting to be maintained “weeds, grass over 6 inches tall, brush or plants,
which are a fire hazard or otherwise detrimental to the health or appearance of the
13
neighborhood.” BCO § 54.1.1.E. At trial, Officer Warzecha testified that he observed
weeds and grass over six inches high at the 7th Avenue and 4th Avenue properties on the
charged dates, the court received into evidence photographs of the properties taken on the
charged dates that show grass and weeds “well over 6 inches high,” the city clerk testified
that the city provided written notice to Turner instructing him to remove or eliminate the
blight and that Turner failed to remove or eliminate the blight within the time period
specified in the ordinance. This evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Turner violated BCO § 54.1.1.E by failing remove or eliminate the blight conditions
at the 7th Avenue and 4th Avenue properties. See State v. Ellis, 441 N.W.2d 134, 136
(Minn. App. 1989) (concluding there was sufficient evidence for the district court to find
defendant guilty of violating municipal ordinance based on evidence that (1) a violation
had occurred, (2) the landlord was responsible, (3) the city had provided the landlord with
notice of the violation and (4) the landlord failed to correct the violation in the time required
by the ordinance), rev. denied (Minn. July 12, 1989).
Turner argues that Officer Warzecha did not physically measure the grass and that
estimates of the grass’s height do not constitute sufficient evidence to prove a blight
ordinance violation. However, this court defers to credibility determinations made by the
district court and will not reweigh witness testimony. State v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738,
741 (Minn. App. 2002). Here, the district court credited the officer’s testimony that the
grass appeared well over six inches tall. In addition, the district court received photographs
of the grass, which it determined depicted grass that was “well over 6 inches high.” We
therefore reject Turner’s argument.
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In cases 43-CR -23-751 and 43-CR -23-823, Turner was found guilty of violating
BCO § 54.1.1.B for blight conditions at the 5th Street property. Section 54.1.1.B prohibits
a person from maintaining or permitting to be maintained “the storage or accumulation of
junk” for more than 30 days. “[J]unk” is defined as “parts of machinery or motor vehicles,
unused stoves or other appliances stored in the open; remnants of wood; decayed,
weathered or broken metal or other material or cast off material of any kind, whether or
not the same could be put to any reasonable use.” BCO § 54.1.1.B.
Officer Warzecha testified that he observed piles of junk, including wood from
building materials, branches, and other items, on the 5th Street property on May 24. When
Officer Warzecha returned to the property on June 7, he observed the conditions had not
changed. The district court found that the photographs of the 5th Street property showed
several areas in which junk was piled on the property. There
was a large pile of building materials, which appears to include
siding, plywood and potentially other materials as well,
stacked haphazardly lying in the grass with leaves, twigs and
other detritus built up around the pile; the pile also looked to
be warped. Those conditions indicate it has been in place for
an extensive period of time. There was a ladder laying in the
grass, which has been there long enough for grass and weeds
to grow up through the slats. There were concrete blocks of
some type [lying] about in the grass. There was a large (clearly
several feet high by several feet across) box of some type, with
scrap wood pieces on top as well as some type of wood or
flexible material dangling off the side, along with some type of
outdoor chair sitting upside down on top of the box. There was
also a large pile of branches and twigs, again which had been
there long enough for green vegetation to grow through/up it.

Finally, the evidence also established that the city had mailed written notice to
remove or eliminate the blight to the address it had on file for Turner, and that Turner failed
15
to remove or eliminate the blight at his 5th Street property within the time period specified
in the ordinance. This evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Turner
violated BCO § 54.1.1.B. See Ellis, 441 N.W.2d at 136.
Turner argues that he had building permits for the 5th Street property, and that the
“junk” was extra siding for an active construction project. But, on appeal, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder believed the
state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence. Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the state presented
sufficient evidence for the district court to find Turner guilty of violating Brownton’s blight
ordinance.
Affirmed.