State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1374

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lorenzo Devon Doby,
Appellant.

Filed August 18, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-23-2052

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant Dakota County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the district court (1) abused its discretion by limiting the scope of his cross-
examination of the victim, (2) deprived him of due process by permitting the victim to
2
identify him for the first time during the trial under suggestive circumstances, and
(3) abused its discretion by permitting one of the state’s lay witnesses to testify to an expert
opinion. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Lorenzo
Devon Doby with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.344, subdivision 1a(b) (2022). The complaint contained
allegations that Doby engaged in sexual conduct with a 15-year-old victim (the teenager)
in May 2023 and that Doby was 42 years old at the time of the alleged conduct . Doby
pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the state called five witnesses: the teenager, the teenager’s mother, a patrol
officer, an investigator, and a pediatric nurse practitioner. Doby did not testify. The
evidence established the following facts.
The Teenager’s Testimony
The teenager started sneaking out of her home in May 2023, when she was 15 years
old. After sneaking out one night, the teenager encountered two men outside of a bar. One
of them said his name was “Desmond,” but later told her that his real name was “Lorenzo.”
The teenager talked with Lorenzo and the other man for 10 to 15 minutes. During that
time, Lorenzo gave her a “Black & Mild,” which she described as “a cigar but mixed with
a cigarette.” Lorenzo then told the teenager that she was too young to be at a bar and
offered to walk her home.
3
While walking away from the bar with Lorenzo, the teenager ’s conversation with
Lorenzo turned “to more sexual stuff.” Lorenzo told the teenager that they had a “sexual
connection.” Lorenzo then kissed the teenager and asked her if she wanted to have sex
with him at his house.
Upon arriving at his house, Lorenzo led the teenager into the basement. Lorenzo
sat on a couch in the basement, took his pants off, and penetrated the teenager’s mouth
with his penis. Lorenzo became worried that someone else was in the house, and so he
took the teenager into a storage room connected to the basement. Eventually, Lorenzo led
the teenager outside to a white minivan parked in front of his house, where they both took
their clothes off. Lorenzo tried to insert his penis into her vagina while they were in the
minivan. His penis touched the outside of her vagina, but he was unable to insert his penis
any further. Lorenzo then asked the teenager “to suck his penis,” which she did.
Afterward, the teenager talked with Lorenzo in the van for a while before Lorenzo drove
her home. The teenager saw Lorenzo near his house on two more occasions in the
following weeks, but she had no further sexual contact with him.
The teenager testified that she saw Lorenzo “pretty well” on the night he took her
to his house. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked the teenager if she saw Lorenzo
in the courtroom. The teenager identified the defendant, Lorenzo Doby, who was sitting
next to defense counsel.
Investigation and Charging
Later in May 2023, the teenager disclosed to her mother that she had been sneaking
out of her bedroom window and that “she had met somebody.” The teenager then told her
4
mother about Lorenzo’s sexual acts. According to her mother, the teenager disclosed that
the sexual acts occurred in a basement, a “back room,” and a car outside the residence.
After the teenager’s mother contacted law enforcement, a patrol officer responded to the
family’s home and took the teenager’s statement. The teenager then led the officer to
Lorenzo’s residence.
The next day, local law enforcement assigned an investigator to the case. The
investigator identified Doby as the primary suspect based on the teenager’s allegations.
The investigator acquired a search warrant for Doby’s residence, which was executed in
July 2023. While executing the warrant, the investigator found “a lot of cigarillo[ 1] type
of cigars, ” especially on the floor of a white minivan parked outside the home. The
investigator did not attempt to collect any DNA evidence from the minivan or the cigarillos
“because of the time delay.” According to the investigator, “[t] he likelihood that DNA
would not break down in a two- month period is unlikely.” Inside the house, the
investigator found mail addressed to Doby. The investigator also took pictures of the
home’s basement and a storage room adjoining the basement, which were admitted into
evidence.
While the investigation was underway, the teenager participated in an interview
with a pediatric nurse practitioner. During the interview, the teenager described her
encounter with Doby. Her description during the interview was largely consistent with her
trial testimony.

1 A cigarillo is “[a] small narrow cigar.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 335 (5th ed. 2018).
5
The teenager met with the investigator again in August 2023. The teenager
described Doby’s appearance and said that he had scars on his back and shoulders. The
teenager mentioned no other scars, and she said that Doby did not have any tattoos. Soon
after that discussion, the state filed its complaint against Doby.
Trial
Before trial, Doby moved for permission to cross-examine the teenager on her
allegations of criminal sexual conduct involving other men. In support of the motion, Doby
asserted that the teenager claimed to have had sexual interactions with two other men in
the weeks following the alleged sexual interactions with Doby. Doby argued that the
similarity of the teenager’s allegations involving the three different men “strain[ed]
credulity.” Doby also asserted the evidence was admissible to support his theory that, all
along, the teenager had been sneaking out of her home to see one of the other men, whom
she viewed as a boyfriend, and that she fabricated her allegations against Doby to protect
that other man. The district court denied Doby’s motion to admit the evidence.
Following the district court’s ruling, Doby focused his cross-examination of the
teenager on her physical description of Doby and inconsistencies between her trial
testimony and her prior disclosures. Specifically, on cross-examination, the teenager
testified that the person who sexually penetrated her had scars exclusively on his back and
shoulders and no tattoos. During his defense, Doby introduced three exhibits containing
photographs of his face and torso. The photographs show that Doby has a noticeable scar
across the front of his torso and tattoos on his face, neck, and torso. Doby used the photos
to impeach the teenager’s description of the man who sexually penetrated her.
6
Defense counsel also cross-examined the teenager on her varying descriptions of
the bar at which she met Doby. The officer and investigator testified that the teenager
disclosed meeting Doby at a bar called “Mike’s.”2 But during pretrial discussions with the
state, the teenager described meeting Doby at another bar, “Dave’s.” And during her direct
examination, the teenager testified that she met Doby at Dave’s. On cross-examination,
the teenager testified that she had never gone to Mike’s, despite her prior statements.
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the teenager was not
credible, focusing on the inconsistencies in the teenager’s descriptions of Doby and the bar
at which she met Doby. Defense counsel also argued that the “investigation was terrible”
and asserted that the investigator should have “tried at least” to gather a DNA sample
during the search of Doby’s residence and the white minivan.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Doby guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district
court convicted Doby and sentenced him to the commissioner of corrections for 91 months.
Doby appeals.
DECISION
Doby argues that his conviction should be reversed because the district court abused
its discretion by limiting his cross- examination of the teenager, deprived him of due
process by permitting the teenager to identify him in court, and abused its discretion by

2 To ensure confidentiality of the teenager and other nonparties, we use fictional names to
refer to the bars.
7
overruling his objection to the investigator’s testimony that any DNA in the minivan would
have degraded by the time of the search. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Doby’s cross-
examination of the teenager.

Doby first argues that the district court abused its discretion by preventing him from
cross-examining the teenager about instances of alleged sexual misconduct involving other
men, thereby violating constitutional rights to present a complete defense and confront the
witnesses against him. “Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, even
when a constitutional violation is alleged.” State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Minn.
2015).
“[A] defendant has a constitutional right to due process in the form of a fair trial.”
State v. Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn. 1999). The due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions guarantee that “every criminal defendant has the right to be
treated with fundamental fairness and ‘afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.’” State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. 1992) (quoting
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 7. “The right to present a defense includes the opportunity to develop the
defendant’s version of the facts, so the jury may decide where the truth lies.”
State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996).
Under the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions, criminal defendants
also have the right to “a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact.” State v. Trifiletti, 6 N.W.3d 79, 87 (Minn. 2024) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
8
1012, 1016 (1988)); see also U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art I, § 6. Importantly,
the right to confrontation protects a defendant’s “opportunity to reveal a prototypical form
of bias on the part of [a] witness” through cross examination. State v. Lanz-Terry, 535
N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995).
But a defendant’s rights to present a complete defense and confront the witnesses
against him are not absolute. State v. Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 2005);
State v. Tate, 985 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Minn. 2023). Although a defendant enjoys a right to
present evidence that is “material and favorable to their theory of the case,” they have “no
right to introduce evidence that either is irrelevant, or whose prejudicial effect outweighs
its probative value.” Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 866 (emphasis omitted). Likewise, the right
to confrontation does not prohibit a district court from imposing reasonable limitations on
cross-examination “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, . . . witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant.” State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2007) (quotation
omitted). Further, a defendant “must comply with established rules of procedure and
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence.” Richards, 495 N.W.2d at 195 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 302 (1973)).
Minnesota’s rape-shield law constitutes one such established rule of evidence. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 (2022); Minn. R. Evid. 412. We have construed the
rape-shield law to “strictly limit” the admissibility of a victim’s prior sexual conduct.
State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18,
9
1991). The rape-shield law provides that “evidence of the victim’s previous sexual
conduct” is only admissible in cases involving consent or evidence of “semen, pregnancy
or disease at the time of the incident.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3(a)-(b); Minn. R.
Evid. 412(1)(A)-(B). The supreme court has recognized a third basis for admissibility
under the rape-shield law—when “admission is constitutionally required by the
defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer
evidence in his own defense.” Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 306 (quotation omitted). In other
words, “[t]he rape-shield law serves to emphasize the general irrelevance of a victim’s
sexual history, not to remove relevant evidence from the jury’s consideration.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
But evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct can be admitted “only if the
probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or
prejudicial nature.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3; Minn. R. Evid. 412(1); see also
Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 306 (observing that the probative-value balancing test applies when
a defendant argues that the admission of a victim’s prior sexual conduct is constitutionally
required). And a district court generally has the discretion to exclude relevant evidence
whose “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Before the district court, Doby argued that evidence of the teenager’s sexual conduct
was admissible for two reasons. First, the evidence would cast doubt on the teenager’s
credibility. In support, Doby offered that the teenager made allegations against two other
10
men within a “couple of weeks” of her allegations against Doby. Doby asserted that these
other allegations were similar to the allegations against Doby. Specifically, the teenager’s
allegations against all three men involved (1) the perpetrator orally penetrating the teenager
with his penis; (2) the perpetrator then unsuccessfully attempt ing to penetrate the
teenager’s vagina with his penis; and (3) the perpetrator then again orally penetrating the
teenager. Doby argued that this evidence would cast doubt on the teenager’s credibility
because it is unlikely that she would experience remarkably similar sexual encounters with
all three men over a short period of time. Second, he argued that the evidence would
provide the motive for the teenager fabricating her claim against Doby. In support of this
argument, Doby offered that there was stronger evidence tying the teenager to one of the
other men, J.,3 than there was to Doby. Doby further offered that the teenager told police
that J. was her boyfriend. Doby asserted that the jury could infer from this evidence that
the teenager fabricated her allegations against Doby to protect J., whom she was in a
relationship with, after being caught sneaking out of her house to see him. The district
court considered Doby’s arguments and ultimately declined to admit the evidence. The
district court determined that the “danger of unfair prejudice is significant and outweighs
any probative value.”
4

3 In the interest of confidentiality, we use the initial “J.” as a pseudonym for the other
man—it does not reflect the actual initial of any individual involved in this case.

4 The district court’s detailed reasoning is contained in an order filed as “confidential.”
Doby filed that order with this court in a confidential addendum under Minnesota Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure 112.04, and the contents of that order remain confidential on
appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 112.02, subd. 1. But we are not precluded from disclosing
information contained in the parties’ publicly filed briefs. Cook v. Trimble, 22 N.W.3d
11
Doby asserts that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence.
He contends that admission of the teenager’s allegations of sexual encounters with other
men was constitutionally required. We are not persuaded.
As discussed above, a district court may properly exclude evidence of the victim’s
prior sexual conduct when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, and that rule applies even when the defendant asserts that the evidence
is constitutionally required. See Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 306; Minn. Stat. § 609.347 ,
subd. 3. Accordingly, in analyzing whether the district court abused its discretion, we
focus on the district court’s determination that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed
any probative value.
We begin by considering the probative value of the evidence. Evidence has
probative value “when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” State v. Schulz,
691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. R. Evid. 401 (defining “[r]elevant
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence”). We agree with Doby that evidence of the teenager’s other sexual

196, 201 n.1 (Minn. App. 2025) (citing Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4),
petition for rev. filed (Minn. June 3, 2025). Our discussion of the district court’s
confidential order is therefore limited to the information disclosed in the parties’ publicly
filed briefs filed with this court. And our recitation of Doby’s arguments during trial for
the admission of evidence of the teenager’s sexual conduct is limited to the publicly
accessible transcripts of the trial. While we do not expressly discuss the district court’s
reasoning for excluding the evidence at issue , other than what is referenced in publicly
filed briefs, we have thoroughly reviewed the district court’s order and, for the reasons
below, conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
12
conduct carried some probative value because it has some tendency to establish a motive
for the teenager to fabricate her allegations involving Doby. And the similarity of the
teenager’s allegations involving three different men might have had some tendency to
make her allegations less credible.
While we acknowledge the excluded evidence had some probative value, that
probative value was lessened by other evidence in the record. For instance, Doby’s theory
that the teenager fabricated the sexual encounter with Doby to protect J. was called into
question by the fact that the teenager led police to Doby’s house after the teenager’s mother
reported the sexual abuse. Additionally, the police search of Doby’s home corroborated
the teenager’s description of the home. If the teenager ’s allegations about Doby were a
cover story for her sexual conduct with J., it is unclear how she would know so much about
Doby’s residence. Consequently, to the extent that the evidence was probative of the
teenager’s motive to protect J., its probative value in that regard was minimal. And the
similarities between the teenager’s various allegations—oral penetration and failed vaginal
penetration followed by ejaculation with three different men over a short time—are not
particularly striking. Doby also offered nothing more than speculation that the teenager’s
allegations were false. See State v. Gerring, 378 N.W.2d 94, 96-97 (Minn. App. 1985)
(affirming the exclusion of evidence of complainant’s past allegations of rape when the
evidence “did not prove that the complainant had made a prior false accusation of rape”).
The evidence therefore had little probative value regarding whether the teenager fabricated
her allegations against Doby or her motive for doing so.
13
Next, we consider the potential for unfair prejudice associated with introducing the
evidence of the teenager’s past sexual conduct. See Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 866 (“[A]
defendant has no right to introduce evidence . . . whose prejudicial effect outweighs its
probative value.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3. We agree
with the district court that the evidence carried a significant risk of prejudice. We have
observed that “the admission of evidence of a witness’s prior sexual conduct is highly
prejudicial.” State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 27, 2013). And evidence of a fifteen-year-old’s sexual history with adult men could
have been particularly inflammatory. We also note that Doby’s proffered use of the
evidence could have misled or confused the jury by creating a trial within a trial. Doby
intended to argue that the teenager’s allegations involving J. were supported by stronger
evidence than her allegations involving Doby, thereby suggesting that only the allegations
involving J. were true. To assess Doby’s theory, the jury would have also been tasked with
assessing the veracity of the evidence against J., who was not on trial. This would have
created a substantial risk of misleading or confusing the jury. See State v. Smith,
876 N.W.2d 310, 331 -32 (Minn. 2016) (affirming exclusion of evidence that risked
creating a “trial-within-a-trial” that “would misdirect the jury away from the key inquiry”
(quotation marks omitted)). For these reasons, we conclude that evidence of the teenager’s
prior sexual conduct was particularly inflammatory and prejudicial. See Minn. Stat. §
609.347, subd. 3; Minn. R. Evid. 412(1).
In sum, the record supports the district court’s determination that admission of
evidence of the teenager’s alleged sexual encounters with other men presented a significant
14
danger of unfair prejudice that outweighed any probative value of the evidence. Because
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its inflammatory and
prejudicial nature, we conclude that the admission of the evidence was not constitutionally
required and the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it under the rape-
shield law.
II. The district court properly admitted the teenager’s identification testimony.

Doby next argues that the district court denied him due process by permitting the
teenager to identify him in court during trial under suggestive circumstances. The federal
and state constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to due process of law. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Due process requires that “every criminal
defendant has the right to be treated with fundamental fairness.” Richards, 495 N.W.2d at
191. “[A] defendant may be entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial if the
improper admission of evidence at trial so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Jackson v. State, 817 N.W. 2d 717, 723
(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We review de novo whether an evidentiary decision
violated a defendant’s right to due process. State v. Hooks, 752 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn.
App. 2008).
In the context of eyewitness-identification testimony, due process is implicated
when the identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive. State v. Ostrem,
535 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995). But it is “well-established that an ‘eyewitness
identification . . . only implicates a defendant’s due process rights when the identification
of the defendant by the witness was arranged by law enforcement.’” State v. Jones ,
15
977 N.W.2d 177, 189 (Minn. 2022) (quoting State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 796 (Minn.
2014)); see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 23 3 (2012) (holding that due
process is not implicated by the admission of identification evidence when “no improper
law enforcement activity is involved” in the identification procedure).
Doby contends that the teenager ’s first-time, in-court identification triggered his
right to due process because it was the result of questioning by the prosecution at trial under
especially suggestive circumstances. The state disagrees. Relying on Mosley and Jones,
the state argues that Doby’s due-process rights were not implicated by the in-court
identification because the identification did not involve “law enforcement.” According to
the state, “law enforcement” is limited to police officers and does not include prosecutors.
But neither party has pointed us to binding authority, nor are we aware of any, establishing
whether a prosecutor’s request of a witness to identify the defendant during trial constitutes
an identification arranged by “law-enforcement” for purposes of Mosley and Jones and
thereby implicates the defendant’s due-process rights.
Instead, Doby relies on State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 1987), to support
his position that the teenager’s in-court identification implicates his due-process rights. In
Harris, the appellant contended that an eyewitness’s in-court identification violated his
right to due process. 405 N.W.2d at 229. The appellant alleged that the identification was
impermissibly suggestive because the prosecutor and a victim-witness counselor made
statements to the eye witness, before his in-court identification of appellant, that implied
the appellant was the offender whom the eyewitness observed. Id. at 227, 229. Although
no police officers were involved in the identification procedure, the supreme court analyzed
16
the appellant’s claim under a due-process-violation lens and concluded that the
prosecutor’s and victim-witness counselor’s conduct did not make the eyewitness’s in-
court identification impermissibly suggestive . See id. at 229-30. Doby argues that the
prosecutor’s conduct of asking the teenager to identify him in court is like the affirmative
conduct in Harris. He asserts that, under Harris, “in-court identifications arranged by
prosecutors, like out-of-court identifications arranged by law enforcement, must comport
with [due process].”
Doby also contends that Mosley and Jones are unhelpful to resolving this inquiry
because neither case addresses whether a prosecutor is a member of “law enforcement.”
Instead, the holdings in those cases turn on the fact that the eyewitnesses’ identifications
of the defendants were spontaneous.
5 We agree that Mosley and Jones do not resolve
whether the prosecutor’s question in this case implicated Doby’s right to due process
because the teenager’s identification of Doby was not spontaneous. Further, in Mosley, the
supreme court looked beyond the mere absence of police involvement, concluding that the
appellant’s due-process claim lacked merit “[b]ecause the State did not arrange the
witness’s identification.” 853 N.W.2d at 796 (emphasis added); see also Perry, 565 U.S.
at 232-33 (observing that the United States Supreme Court’s line of decisions on
identifications “turn on the presence of state action” (emphasis added)). A fair reading of

5 In Mosley, an eyewitness testified that she saw a man leave the scene of a murder.
853 N.W.2d at 796. During a break in the eyewitness’s testimony, she told the witness
advocate that she recognized the defendant as the person she saw leave the crime scene.
Id. In Jones, an eyewitness to a shooting independently found pictures of the defendant on
Facebook and told detectives that she recognized the defendant as the shooter. 977 N.W.2d
at 183.
17
Harris and Mosley is that the involvement of any state action in arranging an identification
implicates a defendant’s right to due process. But we need not resolve this dispute, because
even assuming without deciding that Harris and Mosley establish that the prosecutor’s
request that the teenager identify her assailant at trial constitutes a state-arranged
identification of Doby subject to due -process protections, we conclude that the
identification did not violate Doby’s right to due process.
Appellate courts apply a two-step test to analyze the admissibility of identification
evidence. State v. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn. 1999). First, we consider “whether
the [identification] procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.” Id. (quotation omitted). If it
was, we then consider “whether the identification created a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.” Id. (quotation omitted). But we need not reach the second
step if we conclude at the first step that the identification procedure was not unnecessarily
suggestive. See id. at 162 (ending analysis after determining that the identification
procedure at issue was not unnecessarily suggestive).
Doby contends that, under step one of our analysis, the identification procedure was
unnecessarily suggestive because, at trial, he was seated next to defense counsel and he
was the only Black man in the courtroom other than one of the jurors. Doby asserts that
the state did not need to wait until trial to have the teenager identify Doby. Doby notes
that the state “had several months after it charged Doby to request that police conduct a
formal lineup or photo array.” We are not persuaded that the identification procedure at
trial was unnecessarily suggestive.
18
We acknowledge that in-court identifications are inherently suggestive. See Perry,
565 U.S. at 244 (“Most eyewitness identifications involve some element of suggestion.
Indeed, all in-court identifications do.”). But our inquiry does not end at mere
suggestiveness— we must discern unnecessary suggestiveness to proceed to step two.
Taylor, 594 N.W.2d at 161. This inquiry “turns on whether the defendant was unfairly
singled out for identification.” Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 921.
In Taylor, the appellant argued that law enforcement’s use of a “one-person show-
up” was unnecessarily suggestive. 594 N.W.2d at 160-61.6 The supreme court noted that
a one-person show-up “is by its very nature suggestive.” Id. at 162. But the supreme court
observed that law enforcement had not singled out the appellant “from the general
population based on a description given to them by a victim, and then proceeded to present
him to the victim, in handcuffs, for identification in a one-person show-up.” Id. Rather,
the victim had been introduced to the defendant before the offense; had seen the defendant
“around her apartment building and neighborhood at least ten times”; and, before the show-
up, had twice “singled [the defendant] out by name as her assailant.” Id. The supreme
court concluded that, given the victim’s familiarity with the appellant, the use of a one-
person show-up to quickly identify the appellant as the perpetrator was not unnecessarily
suggestive. Id.

6 Comparable to asking a testifying witness to identify a lone defendant in a courtroom, a
“one-person show -up” is a “one-to-one confrontation between suspect and witness to
crime.” See Taylor, 594 N.W.2d at 159 n.1 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 962 (6th ed.
1990)).
19
The facts in Taylor resemble the facts underlying the teenager’s in-court
identification of Doby, and we similarly conclude that the state’s identification procedure
in this case was not unnecessarily suggestive. Just as in Taylor, there is no evidence that
the state unfairly singled Doby out for identification. See 594 N.W.2d at 162. T he state
did not identify him from the general population based on the teenager’s description and
then proceed to place him in the courtroom for the teenager to identify during her
testimony. See id. Instead, prior to trial, the teenager identified Doby by his first name,
Lorenzo, to at least four individuals: her mother, the officer, the investigator, and the
pediatric nurse-practitioner. The teenager also testified that she saw Doby “pretty well”
the night she went home with him. The teenager added that she saw Doby on two other
occasions near his house before she came forward with her allegations. And the teenager
led an officer directly to Doby’s house, where the investigator later found mail belonging
to him. Given the teenager’s familiarity with Doby, he was not “unfairly singled out” for
identification at trial. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 916. Because the state’s identification
procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, we need not proceed to step two.
In sum, assuming without deciding that due-process protections applied to the
teenager’s in-court identification of Doby, the identification procedure at issue was not
unnecessarily suggestive. Therefore, the district court properly admitted the teenager’s
identification of Doby.
20
III. The district court’s erroneous admission of the investigator’s scientific opinion
on DNA was harmless.

Lastly, Doby argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the
investigator to testify about a scientific matter without qualifying the investigator as an
expert. The state responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the
investigator’s testimony was not an expert opinion.
“We review evidentiary rulings, including those related to the admissibility of
expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn.
2016). The admission of expert testimony is an abuse of discretion when the district court’s
ruling is “based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 466 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). “Even if
the district court’s admission of evidence was in error, such admission is harmless if it did
not significantly impact the verdict.” Id.
Under the rules of evidence, a witness may not testify in the form of an opinion
based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” unless the witness is
“qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Minn. R.
Evid. 701-02. Such expert testimony must also have “foundational reliability.” Minn. R.
Evid. 702.
Here, the prosecutor asked the investigator whether he attempted to collect DNA
evidence when searching the white minivan. The investigator testified that he did not and
explained that there was a two-month delay between when law enforcement received the
report of the alleged sexual abuse by Doby and when he executed the search warrant for
21
the van. The investigator added that “[t]he likelihood that DNA would not break down in
a two-month period is unlikely.” At that point, defense counsel objected and the district
court overruled the objection.
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by overruling Doby’s
objection because the investigator was not qualified as an expert to provide testimony about
DNA. Under rules 701 and 702, the rate at which DNA degrades is a matter of “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge.” See State v. Garland, 942 N.W.2d 732, 746
(Minn. 2020) (observing that “[a]n understanding of complex DNA analysis is not within
the knowledge and expertise of a lay jury”). Accordingly, the investigator’s opinion on the
matter was expert testimony, thereby requiring the state to establish the investigator’s
qualifications and lay foundation for that expert testimony. See Minn. R. Evid. 702.
The record reflects that the state did not meet its burden to do so. Nothing in the
trial transcript suggests that the investigator was qualified to testify on the matter based on
his “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” See Minn. R. Evid. 702. In fact,
the state produced no evidence that the investigator had any specialized training or
education that qualified him to opine on the rate at which DNA degrades. Accordingly,
the state failed to establish both the investigator’s qualifications to provide such an expert
opinion and the foundational reliability of his opinion. See id. The district court therefore
abused its discretion by admitting the evidence.
Having determined that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
investigator’s expert opinion on the degradation rate of DNA, we turn to whether the
erroneous evidentiary ruling was harmless. The erroneous admission of evidence is
22
grounds for reversal only when the appellant shows “there is a reasonable possibility that
the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Bigbear,
10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). When assessing the likelihood that
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, we consider the following
nonexclusive factors: “(1) the manner in which the party presented the evidence,
(2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who offered the
evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively countered the
evidence.” Id. In addition, “strong evidence of guilt” is a factor to consider because it
“undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. at 54, 59 (quotation
omitted).
Based on our consideration of the Bigbear factors, we conclude that the admission
of the investigator’s opinion on DNA degradation was harmless. First, the manner in which
the state presented the investigator’s expert opinion indicates that it did not affect the
verdict. In assessing this factor, the supreme court has considered the prominence of the
challenged evidence by looking at “among other things, the relative number of transcript
pages that the evidence occupies” and “whether the evidence was used throughout the
[s]tate’s case.” Id. at 56. The investigator’s opinion testimony was brief, appearing on just
one page of a 700-page trial transcript. It seems that the prosecutor elicited this testimony
in anticipation of Doby’s argument that law enforcement’s investigation of Doby was
underwhelming. Nothing shows that the state used the investigator’s opinion as substantive
evidence of Doby’s guilt. Nor does Doby contend that the state used the investigator’s
23
opinion throughout its case. Consequently, the manner in which the state presented the
investigator’s expert opinion suggests harmless error.
Next, we consider the persuasiveness of the investigator’s expert opinion. Id. at 54.
Because the investigator is a member of law enforcement, the jury was more likely to trust
his testimony about the degradation rate of DNA. See State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909,
915 (Minn. App. 2001) (noting that a sergeant’s status as a police officer may have
increased the risk of the jury being unduly influenced by his inadmissible testimony), rev.
denied (Minn. May 29, 2001). As a result, the jury was more likely to be persuaded by the
state’s insinuation that any effort to collect DNA from the minivan would have been futile.
This factor suggests that the erroneous admission of the investigator’s expert opinion was
not harmless.
Third, we consider whether the prosecutor used the investigator’s expert opinion
during closing argument. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54. It is undisputed that the state did not
mention the investigator’s opinion on DNA degradation during closing argument. This
factor therefore supports a conclusion that the error was harmless. Moreover, because the
state did not rely on the investigator’s testimony during closing argument, the
persuasiveness of the investigator’s expert opinion is less important, as the state did not
attempt to persuade the jury of any facts based on that opinion.
Fourth, we consider Doby’s opportunity to counter the erroneous admission of the
investigator’s expert opinion. Id. Doby asserts that he did not counter the investigator’s
testimony “and was in no position to do so given the state’s failure to provide pretrial notice
of its intent to elicit [the investigator’s] expert opinion.” But, during closing, defense
24
counsel argued that the “investigation was terrible” and noted that the investigator did not
find any DNA. Defense counsel further argued that the investigator could have “tried at
least” to gather DNA evidence. Therefore, Doby not only countered the expert opinion,
but he also used the expert opinion to support his theory that the investigation was poor,
resulting in no physical evidence implicating Doby. On the other hand, the investigator’s
expert opinion undercut the strength of Doby’s argument that the investigation was poorly
done. If the jury believed the investigator’s opinion that any DNA in the van would have
already degraded when the search took place, the jury likely also discredited Doby’s
defense based on the lack of physical evidence. We therefore determine that this factor is
neutral.
Lastly, we consider the strength of the evidence of guilt. Id. The strength of the
state’s evidence depended largely on the teenager’s credibility. In that regard, her
testimony about Doby’s conduct was generally consistent with her prior disclosures to
police, her mother, and a pediatric nurse practitioner. The teenager consistently described
Doby bringing her to his house and then performing sexual acts on a couch in his basement
and in a white minivan outside of his home. And her descriptions of Doby’s home and the
white minivan were corroborated by the investigator’s testimony about the search of
Doby’s home. The teenager also consistently described Doby offering her, in her words, a
“cigar but mixed with a cigarette.” The investigator again corroborated the teenager’s
account by testifying that he observed “cigarillo[s]” in the white minivan and around
Doby’s home. And the teenager led law enforcement to Doby’s home, where law
enforcement found mail addressed to Doby. Lastly, the teenager identified Doby in the
25
courtroom as the man who sexually penetrated her. We conclude that these facts testified
to by the teenager are strong evidence of Doby’s guilt, thereby “undermin[ing] the
persuasive value of” the erroneously admitted expert opinion. Id. at 54 (quotation omitted).
Based on our application of the factors outlined in Bigbear and weighing of those
factors, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the investigator’s brief
expert testimony significantly affected the verdict. While the investigator’s opinion may
have been persuasive, the state did not dwell on that opinion and the evidence of Doby’s
guilty was strong. As a result, the erroneous admission of the investigator’s expert opinion
was harmless, and Doby is not entitled to a new trial.
Affirmed.