Justin Holtzbauer, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1390

Justin Holtzbauer,
Appellant,

vs.

Allina Health System,
Respondent.

Filed May 19, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Bentley, Judge
Dissenting, Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-23-10257

Christopher Kuhlman, Kuhlman Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Samuel A. Savage, Savage-Westrick, PLLP, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark R. Bradford, Erika R. Clyma, Bradford Andersen Norrie & Camarotto, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Taylor Brandt Cunningham, Conlin Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus
curiae Minnesota Association for Justice)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
A health care provider’s disclosure that a person is a patient and currently
hospitalized at a specific facility and in a specific room and bed is “information . . . that
relates to . . . the provision of health care” and therefore constitutes release of a “health
2
record” under section 144.291, subdivision 2(c), of the Minnesota Health Records Act,
Minn. Stat. §§ 144.291-.298 (2024).
OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Appellant Justin Holtzbauer was hospitalized after suffering an injury and did not
want his former spouse to know where he went for treatment. But when she called one of
respondent Allina Health System’s hospitals, an employee disclosed that he was currently
hospitalized at another Allina facility and revealed his room and bed numbers. Shortly
thereafter, she showed up at the hospital and caused Holtzbauer distress.
The issue on appeal is whether Allina released a “health record” in violation of the
Minnesota Health Records Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 144.291-.298 (2024), when its employee
disclosed that Holtzbauer was a patient at a specific hospital in a specific room and bed.
The district court determined that the information was not a health record, as that term is
defined in section 144.291, subdivision 2(c), and granted summary judgment for Allina .
We reverse and remand for further proceedings because we conclude that Allina released
“information . . . that relates to . . . the provision of health care to a patient.” Minn. Stat.
§ 144.291, subd. 2(c). It therefore constituted a health record.
FACTS
The following facts derive from the record and are presented in the light most
favorable to Holtzbauer, the nonmoving party, as is required on summary judgment. See
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 2019).
3
In November 2022, Holtzbauer suffered an injury while working as a tree trimmer.
As he cut a tree limb, a branch swung down and struck him in the chest. Holtzbauer felt
chest pain, so he later asked someone to drive him to the nearest hospital: Allina’s Mercy
Hospital in Coon Rapids. He arrived around midnight. Holtzbauer opted out of the facility
directory and, pursuant to Allina policy, his file was therefore marked as a “confidential
encounter,” meaning that he did not want anyone to know that he was a patient or otherwise
receive information about him.
Holtzbauer texted his former spouse, H.H., to say that he was hospitalized because
he broke his breastbone and had a compression fracture in his neck. He wanted H.H. to tell
their children that he was being hospitalized but did not want them to visit him.
At 6:28 a.m., H.H. texted Holtzbauer asking where he was. He did not text back
immediately, so she began calling hospitals to find him. She would call, provide
Holtzbauer’s name and birth date, and ask if he was there. When she called United Hospital,
an Allina facility, an employee informed H.H. that Holtzbauer was hospitalized at Mercy
Hospital in room 10, bed 3. Because Holtzbauer was marked as a confidential encounter,
the employee’s disclosure violated Allina’s internal policies.
Holtzbauer texted H.H. back at around 9:30 a.m., and the two exchanged
contentious messages. At 11:00 a.m., H.H. arrived at Mercy Hospital and asked to see
Holtzbauer. A nurse saw that he was marked as a confidential encounter and did not
disclose that Holtzbauer was there. Instead, the nurse had H.H. wait at the triage window.
The nurse then went to Holtzbauer’s room and asked if he wanted H.H. to be allowed to
see him. Holtzbauer said yes. The nurse observed that Holtzbauer appeared to be upset that
4
H.H. had come to the hospital. When H.H. entered his room, the two argued for several
minutes. The argument continued over text message after H.H. left.
At 4:00 p.m., H.H. returned to the hospital with their daughters because Holtzbauer
had asked her to bring them to see him. H.H. was told by security that they were too young
to go to Holtzbauer’s room. H.H. went to Holtzbauer’s room alone, and the two got into
another argument. After she left, the argument again continued over text message .
Holtzbauer testified that he had not wanted H.H. to show up at the hospital because he
thought he would “get verbally attacked” by her. But he agreed to see her because “since
she was there already, the damage [was] already done.”
In April 2023, Holtzbauer sued Allina under Minnesota Statutes section 144.298,
subdivision 2(1), which provides a cause of action if a health care provider “negligently or
intentionally requests or releases a health record in violation of sections 144.291 to
144.297.” Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2(1); see also Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Assocs.,
P.A., 889 N.W.2d 279, 288 (Minn. 2016) (noting that Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2(1),
provides a “cause of action”). The complaint alleged that Allina violated the Health
Records Act by disclosing that he was a patient at Mercy Hospital and was assigned a
particular room and bed. Holtzbauer alleged that he suffered “emotional harm, anger,
embarrassment, frustration, shame, and anxiety” because of Allina’s conduct. The parties
proceeded with discovery, and Allina stipulated that its employee disclosed that Holtzbauer
5
was “hospitalized at Mercy Hospital” in a particular room. 1 Notwithstanding that fact,
Allina argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because, even though the disclosure
violated its internal policies, it did not violate the Health Records Act. Alternatively, Allina
argued that it is entitled to summary judgment because Holtzbauer had not presented
evidence establishing that any damages were proximately caused by Allina’s disclosure.
The district court agreed that Allina did not violate the Health Records Act and granted
summary judgment without reaching the causation issue.
Holtzbauer appeals.
ISSUE
Does a provider disclose a health record, as that term is defined in Minnesota
Statutes section 144.291, subdivision 2(c), when it releases information that a person is a
patient and currently hospitalized at a specific facility and in a specific room and bed?
ANALYSIS
This appeal turns on the meaning of the term “health record,” as it is defined in the
Health Records Act, Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c). Holtzbauer argues that the Health
Records Act defines health record to include the information that Allina disclosed to
H.H.—that he was hospitalized at that time at a specific Allina facility—and that the district
court therefore erred by granting Allina’s motion for summary judgment. Allina maintains
that the district court properly granted summary judgment because a health record must be

1 We agree with the dissent that the fact that a person “is hospitalized” at a facility is
synonymous with the fact that the person is a current patient of a hospital. See infra at D-1
n.2.
6
“information of a clinical nature,” and Allina disclosed only “nonclinical identifying
information” that is outside the scope of an action for unlawful release of a health record.
In short, the issue is whether a provider releases a health record by disclosing that a person
is a patient who is currently hospitalized at the provider’s facility.2
Because Holtzbauer appeal s from the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
our review is de novo. Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 371 -72 (Minn.
2022). We will affirm a district court’s grant of summary judgment if “no genuine issues
of material fact exist and . . . the court accurately applied the law.” Id. We “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts and
factual inferences against the moving part[y] .” Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 375 (quotation s
omitted). The legal question presented here requires an interpretation of the Health Records
Act, which is an issue we also review de novo. See Wood v. County of Blue Earth, 994
N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2023) (reviewing questions of statutory interpretation de novo).
In reviewing the district court’s decision, we first consider the meaning of the
definition of “health record” in section 144.291, subdivision 2(c), with a focus on the
category of information that “relates to . . . the provision of health care to a patient.” Minn.
Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c). That inquiry leads us to conclude that Allina released a health
record under the facts of this case. Nevertheless, in the second part of our analysis, we

2 We do not decide whether a provider releases a health record solely by disclosing that a
person is, or has been, a patient of the provider without more detail, such as the fact that
Holtzbauer was hospitalized at Mercy Hospital and assigned to a bed and room. That
question is not before us.
7
address some of the practical implications of our decision that bolster our interpretation of
the plain meaning of the statute.
I
When interpreting statutes, our goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the legislature.” Cambria Co., LLC v. M&M Creative Laminants, Inc., 11 N.W.3d 318, 323
(Minn. 2024) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022)). The legislature has instructed that
words and phrases should be given their “common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08(1) (2024). We also “interpret a statute as a whole so as to harmonize and give
effect to all its parts, and where possible, no word, phrase, or sentence will be held
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” In re Annexation of Certain Real Prop. to City of
Proctor, 925 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “When the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, we will look only to that language in ascertaining
legislative intent.” Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013). We first discern
the plain meaning of the health-record definition, we then assess that meaning within its
statutory context, and , finally, we consider the persuasive value of case law interpreting
the meaning of health record.
A. Plain Meaning of Section 144.291, Subdivision 2(c)
The Health Records Act defines a “health record” as “any information, whether oral
or recorded in any form or medium, that relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of a patient; the provision of health care to a patient; or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of health care to a patient.” Minn. Stat.
§ 144.291, subd. 2(c). For our purposes, the phrase “relates to” is a key element of the
8
definition because it modifies all three categories of information that can constitute a health
record. The supreme court has defined a nearly identical phrase (“relating to”) to mean, “to
stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association
with or connection with.” Phone Recovery Servs., LLC v. Qwest Corp., 919 N.W.2d 315,
320 (Minn. 2018) (quoting 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Minn.
2013)). It recognizes that the plain meaning of the phrase is broad. See id. at 320-21, 325;
see also 500, LLC, 837 N.W.2d at 291 (quoting Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 383 (1992)). Considering that meaning here, a health record is any information
that pertains, refers, or stands in some relation to (1) the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of a patient; (2) the provision of health care to a patient; or (3)
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to a patient.
The parties focus primarily on the category, “the provision of health care to a
patient,” as do we. The dictionary definition of “provision” is “[t]he act of providing or
supplying something.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1419
(5th ed. 2018). Here, the “something” being provided is “health care,” which is defined as
“[t]he prevention, treatment, and management of illness and the preservation of mental and
physical well-being through the services offered by the medical and allied health
professions.” Id. at 810.
Applying these definitions to the record before us, we conclude that Allina released
information that relates to the provision of health care. Allina revealed information that
Holtzbauer was hospitalized at Mercy Hospital. The fact that a person is hospitalized
reveals that the person is presently under the hospital’s care and receiving treatment.
9
Information that identifies the specific facility and location within the facility
reveals even more about the health care being provided. Here, the disclosure that
Holtzbauer was at Mercy Hospital in a specific room allowed H.H. to deduce that he was
in the emergency department. In other situations, disclosure of the facility and room
location could disclose that a person is presently receiving mental health care, reproductive
health care, or cardiovascular care, for example. That information pertains, refers, or stands
in some relation to the provision of health care to a patient.3
Allina sets forth a narrower definition of a “health record” when it comes to
information that relates to the “provision of health care to a patient .” Allina argues that
such health-record information is limited to “the efforts medical professionals undertook
to treat the patient,” i.e., “clinical information.” Through that lens, Allina argues that
information is a health record under the “provision of healthcare” category only if it is
“about . . . the treatment received” or “the actual care provided.” We are unpersuaded.
First, Allina’s proposed definition adds limiting words to the definition of “health
record” in section 144.291, subdivision 2(c), that do not exist in the statute. The definition
includes “any information” that relates to the provision of health care, Minn. Stat
§ 144.291, subd. 2(c) (emphasis added), but Allina maintains that it encompasses only
“clinical information.” By adding the word “clinical,” Allina’s proposed definition violates
the well-established rule that we “do not, and cannot, add to a statute words intentionally

3 Holtzbauer argues that we should construe “health record” liberally because the HRA is
a remedial statute. But the “canon of liberally construing remedial statutes does not apply
in cases in which, as here, the statute is facially unambiguous.” Qwest, 919 N.W.2d at 325.
10
or inadvertently omitted by the Legislature.” Linn v. BCBSM, Inc., 905 N.W.2d 497, 503
(Minn. 2018) (quoting J.D. Donovan, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 878 N.W.2d 1, 13
(Minn. 2016)); see also Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 931 N.W.2d 791, 800
(Minn. 2019) (“We do not . . . add words to the plain language of a statute to fit with an
identifiable policy.”). Likewise, Allina contends that “provision of health care” is limited
to the “efforts medical professionals undertook to treat the patient (i.e., the actual care
provided).” This limitation also contravenes the principle that we cannot rewrite a statute.
See Linn, 905 N.W.2d at 503.4
Second, limiting the definition of health record to information about the actual care
provided does not give effect to all parts of the definition as set forth in section 144.291,
subdivision 2(c), because it renders the phrase “relates to” superfluous. See Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2024) (“Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.”). Instead of defining a health record as information that “relates to” (i.e.,
pertains, refers, or stands in some relation to) one of the categories of material, Allina
interprets a health record to be information “ about” the care provided. But the supreme
court has already rejected a call to equate the plain meaning of “relating to” with the word
“about.” See Qwest, 919 N.W.2d at 320-22. In Qwest, the court noted that, even if “relating
to” and “about” may in some circumstances be “consistent synonyms,” there was no
definition proposed in that case that offered “about” as a “second reasonable interpretation”

4 In any event, hospitalization is an “effort[] that medical professionals undertook to treat”
Holtzbauer. Therefore, even under Allina’s proposed definition, the fact of his
hospitalization at Mercy Hospital is related to “the actual care provided.”
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of the phrase “relating to.” Id. at 321. Likewise, here, Allina offers no alternative definition
of “relates to” that supports its interpretation of the statute, and we decline to adopt a
construction that would alter the plain meaning of the statutory definition of “health
record.”
Third, our interpretation of information that relates to “the provision of health care
to a patient” still gives meaning to the other categories of information identified in the
health-record definition. It does not, as Allina contends, render superfluous the other two
categories: “the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of a patient”
or “the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to a patient.” Minn.
Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c). In Allina’s view, our interpretation requires that information
relating to the patient’s mental and physical health and condition, or to payments for the
provision of health care, “necessarily also relate[s] to the ‘provision of healthcare.’”
To be sure, there may be information that constitutes a health record under more
than one category. If anything, that result reflects the statute’s broad terms (e.g., “relates
to”) and broad categories that involve related subjects. But the possibility of overlap does
not render the different categories superfluous because each category still has its own
meaning and may cover information not included in the others. Consider, for example, a
provider’s disclosure that a patient has the flu. That disclosure would reveal information
that only relates to the patient’s health condition; without more, it does not relate to the
provision of health care or to payment. Or consider a provider’s disclosure that a patient
updated their file with a new insurance provider. That information may relate to the future
payment for the provision of health care but, without more, it would not relate to the
12
provision of health care itself. Considering the definition of health record as a whole, we
decline to stray from the ordinary meaning of the statute to attempt to reconcile broad
categories that may, in some circumstances, overlap.5
B. Statutory Context
Our determination that Allina released a health record comports with the meaning
of health record in the broader statutory context. Allina disagrees, but none of its arguments
convince us that we should apply a narrower definition of health record than its plain
meaning.
Allina points us to section 144.292, subdivision 4(2), which states that providers
must give written notice of “the right of the patient to have access to and obtain copies of
the patient’s health records and other information about the patient that is maintained by
the provider.” Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 4(2) (emphasis added). Then, subdivision 5

5 The dissent acknowledges that health records—including x-rays, laboratory reports, and
“other technical information used in assessing the patient’s condition”—may relate to both
a “patient’s health condition and a health-care provider’s care and treatment of the patient’s
condition.” Infra at D- 4. Thus, even an interpretation limited to “clinical information”
cannot avoid all redundancy. See State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433,439 n.4 (Minn. 2014)
(“[T]he canon against surplusage merely favors that interpretation which avoids
surplusage[.]”). And as the supreme court has observed, the canon against surplusage “must
be applied with judgment and discretion, and with careful regard to context” because
“[s]ometimes drafters do repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of
substance, either out of a flawed sense of style or to engage in the ill-conceived but
lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach.” In re Krogstad, 958 N.W.2d 331, 335
(Minn. 2021) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176-77 (2012)). We decline to add words to the statute (such
as “clinical information”) in an attempt to avoid any redundancy because, in the context of
this statute, information relating to a patient’s condition or payment may inherently overlap
with the provision of health care. And that is so, regardless of whether health records are
limited to clinical information or not.
13
requires providers to give patients, on written request, “copies of the patient’s health
record, including but not limited to laboratory reports, x-rays, prescriptions, and other
technical information used in assessing the patient’s health conditions.” Minn. Stat.
§ 144.292, subd. 5(1). Reading these two subdivisions together, Allina argues that the list
of examples in subdivision 5, which are clinical in nature, shows that “health records” are
clinical information and are distinct from “ other information about the patient that is
maintained by the provider.” And, invoking the definition of “identifying information,”
Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(d), Allina maintains that “other information” in section
144.292, subdivision 5, includes identifying information like “the patient’s name, address,
date of birth, gender, parent’s or guardian’s name regardless of the age of the patient, and
other nonclinical data which can be used to uniquely identify the patient.” Minn. Stat.
§ 144.291, subd. 2(d). Pulling it all together, Allina posits that the statute “draws a clear
distinction between the release of clinical information (which is actionable) and the release
of nonclinical identifying information (which is not).” We are not convinced for several
reasons.
First, we are not persuaded that the meaning of “health record” in section 144.291,
subdivision 2(c), is limited by section 144.292. That is because section 144.292 sets forth
a patient’s right to access information and focuses only on a subset of health records: those
which may be “copie[ d]” and are “maintained by the provider.” Minn. Stat. § 144.292,
subds. 4(2), 5. That group of health records is inherently narrower than the full breadth of
the statutory definition of “health record” in section 144.291, subdivision 2(c). A “health
record” includes information that is “oral or recorded in any form or medium,” Minn. Stat.
14
§ 144.291, subd. 2(c), and may include some information that would not fall within section
144.292 because it cannot be maintained or copied as those terms are ordinarily understood.
For example, had an Allina employee told H.H. about the specific treatment Holtzbauer
received, that information would not fall within the parameters of section 144.292 because
it was not “maintained ” by Allina and could not be “copied.” Still, it would be a health
record under even Allina’s proposed definition.
Second, the fact that section 144.292, subdivision 5, offers a list of examples of
health records subject to that provision does not mean that the legislature intended to
restrict the meaning of health record in other contexts. The provision states as much when
it references health records “including but not limited to” the examples provided. Minn.
Stat. § 144.292, subd. 5; see also In re Welfare of H.B., 986 N.W.2d 158, 168-69 (Minn.
2022) (explaining that the ordinary meaning of “including” signifies enlargement). The
examples also make sense in the context of that patient-rights provision, as they illuminate
the types of health records that a patient would commonly want to keep for themselves or
take to another provider. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016)
(instructing that we “consider[] the provision at issue in light of the surrounding sections
to avoid conflicting interpretations” (quotation omitted)). For these reasons, it would be
unreasonable to use those examples to limit our understanding of “health record” in the
context of a claim for unauthorized release.6

6 For similar reasons, we are not persuaded that the definition of health record is limited by
the provision concerning the release of health records from one provider to another upon
the written request of a patient. See Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 3 (requiring providers to
furnish “[a] patient’s health record, including, but not limited to, laboratory reports, x-rays,
15
Third, we are not persuaded that Allina disclosed only “identifying information,” as
defined in section 144.291, subdivision 2(d). When H.H. called the Allina facility, she
provided identifying information and got something more in return: information that
Holtzbauer was a patient and currently hospitalized at a specific location in a specific
facility, i.e., that Allina was providing him health care. This is not a case where a health
care provider disclosed only information that could be used to identify a person and nothing
more. We thus do not need to decide whether or when a provider could disclose a health
record by disclosing only identifying information.7
3. Case Law
Allina identifies three nonprecedential opinions to justify its interpretation of the
statute. These opinions are not binding authority, but we may consider them for their

prescriptions, and other technical information used in assessing the patient’s condition, or
the pertinent portion of the record relating to a specific condition, or a summary of the
record” (emphasis added)).

7 The dissent advances an interpretation of that statute that identifying information receives
less protection under the Health Records Act because it may be disclosed without a
patient’s consent to “a record locator or patient information service.” Minn. Stat.
§ 144.293, subd. 8(a). See infra at D-5. But the fact that a provider may disclose identifying
information to a record locator or patient information service without consent does not
mean that it can disclose identifying information to other third parties without consent or
other authorization in the statute. To the contrary, subdivision 8(a) ’s placement within
section 144.293— which identifies when and under what circumstances a provider may
disclose health records—indicates that identifying information that falls within the
definition of a health record and that is not subject to an exception to the consent
requirement (like in subdivision 8(a)) may not be disclosed without consent. In any event,
we do not need to reach that question here because Allina released more than identifying
information.
16
persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). They do not persuade us to
depart from our plain reading of the statute.
First, Allina contends that Lonergan v. Dakota County Social Services supports its
argument that “identifying information” is not a health record. No. A23-1536, 2024 WL
2722164, at *2 (Minn. App. May 28, 2024) . In Lonergan, the district court dismissed a
complaint brought by patients in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) that
alleged the county disclosed health records when it revealed “names, addresses, MRECs
[medical records numbers or client ID numbers], dates of birth, gender, billing/invoice
information, ‘other clinical and nonclinical data,’ and ‘other not public, private data still
unknown to [appellants].’” Id. There, we stated that “[t]here was no error in the dismissal
of the [Health Records Act] claims.” Id. But we did not conduct a statutory-interpretation
analysis, nor did we recite the facts in detail as we do in precedential opinions. Id.; see
Vlahos v. R&I Const. of Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004) (noting
that nonprecedential opinions “rarely contain a full recitation of the facts”). Without
additional details about the information released and the parties’ arguments with respect to
the meaning of the term “health record,” we do not find Lonergan persuasive. And
regardless, Lonergan does not support Allina’s interpretation —that only clinical
information is a health record—because the Lonergan plaintiffs alleged, in part, that
clinical data was disclosed. 2024 WL 2722164, at *2.
Second, Allina points to two other cases in which we concluded that disclosures
were not health records when the disclosed information allowed for an inference that a
person was a patient, without disclosing that the person was, in fact, a patient. In Rhoades
17
v. Lourey, an MSOP patient alleged that a mailed sex -offender registration form that
contained his personal information was a health record because one could deduce that he
was an MSOP patient based on his name and address. No. A18-1120, 2019 WL 1006804,
at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 4, 2019), rev. denied (Minn. May 28, 2019). We concluded that his
name and address was not a health record and rejected the implication that health records
include “information from which a person’s status as a patient could be inferred.” Id. For
the same reason, we concluded in Furlow v. Madonna Summit of Byron that a picture of a
resident at a senior living facility, taken by a nurse’s aide and posted to social media
without the resident’s consent, was not a health record. No. A19-0987, 2020 WL 413356,
at *2-3 (Minn. App. Jan. 27, 2020). In contrast, Allina disclosed that Holtzbauer was a
patient who was hospitalized at Mercy Hospital and assigned to a particular room and bed.
There was no inference required to discern his status as a current patient receiving care.
Rhoades and Furlow, therefore, do not convince us to affirm.
In sum, we see no basis to depart from the plain meaning of the statute and adopt a
narrower definition of “information . . . that relates to . . . the provision of health care to a
patient” that limits the statute’s scope to information about the actual treatment provided.
III
We typically do not consider the overarching effect of a statute absent a
determination that the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous. See State v. Pakhnyuk, 926
N.W.2d 914, 920-24 (Minn. 2019) (considering a statute’s purpose only after determining
18
its plain language is ambiguous). But, as Holtzbauer and the amicus curiae argue,8 a
decision that the disclosure here is not a health record could result in the unauthorized
release of information that the legislature intended to protect. We are reassured that our
interpretation aligns both with the Health Records Act and with common sense.
As amicus emphasizes, the fact that an individual is a current patient at a specific
hospital and in a specific room is inherently personal information that the person may want
to keep private for any host of reasons. As one example, a survivor of domestic violence
who seeks the provision of health care after an assault may justifiably want to keep the fact
and location of the hospitalization private from their abuser. As another example, a person
receiving reproductive health care may wish to keep the fact and location of such care
private from someone outside of the patient-provider relationship. Under our interpretation
of the statute, the provider would be prohibited from disclosing any information relating to
the provision of health care in those circumstances—including the fact and location of
care—without the patient’s consent or other authorization in Minnesota law. See Minn.
Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2. Under Allina’s interpretation, it would not.
9

8 Amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice describes itself as “a professional
association of attorneys who represent Minnesotans who have been wrongfully harmed,
who suffer injuries to their person or property, or who suffer violations to their civil or
human rights.”

9 Allina acknowledges that some providers have a specialized practice—the example it
used at oral argument was Bob’s Mole Removal Clinic—such that information that a
person is a current patient at the provider’s facility might qualify as a health record. Allina
urges that the district court should decide on a case-by-case basis whether that information
constitutes a health rec ord. But, in interpreting section 144.291, subdivision 2(c), we see
no basis to delineate between a general- practice hospital’s disclosure of a patient’s
hospitalization and bed and room number, and a specialty provider’s disclosure of
19
In certain other circumstances, it may be important for a provider to disclose a
patient’s hospitalization even when the patient has not consented—and the statute allows
for that. The dissent raises a concern that, under our interpretation of the statute, family
members may not be able to find a loved one who is suddenly hospitalized. See infra at
D-7-9. But the legislature considered that scenario and developed nuanced exceptions to
the consent requirement in cases of emergency and other situations where a patient may
not be able to consent.
In the context of a “medical emergency,” a provider may disclose a health record
without consent (including the fact and location of hospitalization) “ when the provider is
unable to obtain the patient’s consent due to the patient’ s condition or the nature of the
medical emergency.” Id., subd. 5(a)(1). The dissent construes that exception narrowly and
contends that it may apply only to disclosures from one provider to another. See infra at
D-8. But that limitation does not appear in the text of the provisio n. And because other
exceptions do expressly limit who may receive the information without consent, see, e.g.,
id., subd. 5(a)(2)-(3), (b), we presume the legislature intended not to limit disclosures in
the context of a medical emergency under subdivision 5(a). See Vlahos, 676 N.W.2d at 677
n.4 (“The legislature would not have employed different terms in different subdivisions of
the statute if it had intended those subdivisions to have the same effect.”). Moreover, Allina
has not advanced the position, as the dissent does, that practical difficulties in determining

analogous information . In both instances, the provider releases information that it is
actively providing the patient with treatment, care, and observation. That information
relates to the provision of health care.
20
what constitutes a medical emergency would inhibit providers from disclosing health
record information to family members when the statute would allow it.
As another example, in the context of a patient receiving mental health care, the
statute allows family members to obtain access to health records in some circumstances
without the patient’s consent. The statutory section addressing records relating to mental
health says that “a provider providing mental health care and treatment may disclose
[certain] health record information . . . about a patient to a family member of the patient or
other person who requests the information if” specific conditions are met, including that
“the patient agrees to the disclosure, does not object to the disclosure, or is unable to
consent or object, and the patient’s decision or inability to make a decision is documented
in the patient’s medical record.” Minn. Stat. § 144.294, subd. 3.
As these examples illustrate, the statute strikes a careful balance between a concern
for patient privacy and the need for disclosure of records in some express circumstances.
The legislature made a policy choice in determining when to permit the release of a health
record without consent . It is not our job, nor is it appropriate for us, to carve out more
exceptions or to read between the lines as to what the legislature intended when the
language in the statute is clear. In the circumstances of this case, none of the exceptions
apply. And because the information disclosed here falls within the plain meaning of a
health record, it follows that Allina was not authorized to release it absent consent. See
Minn. Stat. § 144.193, subd. 2.
21
DECISION
We hold that Allina released “information . . . that relates to . . . the provision of
health care to a patient ” under the plain meaning of the definition of “health record” in
Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c), when it revealed that Holtzbauer was a patient who was
hospitalized at Mercy Hospital in a specific room and bed. The district court erred by
granting summary judgment to Allina based on its determination that the disclosed
information was not a health record.10
We therefore reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment and remand for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

10 We note that Allina alternatively argues that it was entitled to summary judgment
because Holtzbauer failed to offer evidence sufficient to establish that his damages were
proximately caused by Allina’s disclosure without an intervening, superseding cause of
harm. Although we “may affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any
grounds,” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150 , 163 (Minn. 2012), we may
decline to consider alternative grounds for summary judgment that the district court did not
address, see Monson v. Suck, 855 N.W.2d 323, 329-30 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 30, 2014) (declining to address on appeal alternative arguments that the
district court did not address in the first instance). Because the district court did not consider
Allina’s alternative ground for summary judgment, we decline to reach that issue and
instruct the district court on remand to determine in the first instance whether to grant
Allina’s motion for summary judgment on that basis.
D-1

JOHNSON, Judge (dissenting)
This appeal turns on the meaning of the term “health record,” as used in the
Minnesota Health Records Act.1 See Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c) (2024). Holtzbauer
argues that the statutory definition of that term is “expansive and encompassing” and
“broad and all-inclusive,” with “no limitations.” In contrast, Allina argues that the relevant
clause of the statutory definition is limited to information of a clinical nature, such as
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. The court interprets the term broadly to include the
fact that a particular person is a patient at a particular hospital. In my view, the court’s
interpretation is not justified by the text of the statutory definition or by the context
indicated by the act as a whole. I would interpret the term “health record” to not include
the mere fact that a particular person is a patient at a particular hospital and is in a particular
room.
2

1It is irrelevant that Holtzbauer opted out of Mercy Hospital’s directory and that
Allina violated its own policy by disclosing that he was a patient at that hospital. See supra
at 3-5. Holtzbauer seeks relief on a theory that would apply to any person who is a patient
at a hospital, regardless of whether the person opted out of a patient directory.
2When I refer throughout this opinion to a person who is a patient of a hospital, I
mean that the person is, in the present tense, a patient of the hospital at that particular time.
To me, it is redundant to say that a person is a patient of a hospital and is hospitalized. See
supra at 5 n.1, 6 n.2. Holtzbauer’s former wife apparently shares my understanding. She
testified in her deposition that she called multiple hospitals, provided her former husband’s
name and date of birth, and asked, “Is he a patient?” Holtzbauer’s former wife also testified
that, when she posed that question to Allina’s United Hospital, an Allina employee stated,
“Yes, Justin is at Mercy Hospital, room 10, bed 3.” Holtzbauer’s former wife did not testify
that she asked hospitals whether her former husband was “hospitalized” and did not testify
that Allina disclosed that Holtzbauer was “hospitalized.”
D-2

A.
In interpreting a statute, we should consider the entire statutory scheme of which
the statute is a part. State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn. 2023); State v.
Cloutier, 987 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn. 2023); State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 638, 640
(Minn. 2018). We read a statute as a whole “to harmonize and give effect to all its parts”
because “various provisions of the same statute must be interpreted in the light of each
other.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). In addition,
we should consider the particular context of the statute. See Wocelka v. State, 9 N.W.3d
390, 394 (Minn. 2024); State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020).
The supreme court has summarized the context in which the health records act
operates as follows:
The Minnesota Health Records Act regulates the
relationship between patients and healthcare providers to level
the playing field between the two regarding healthcare records.
Healthcare records often are the sole documentation of the
providers’ provision of healthcare services and, consequently,
patients’ ability to timely access healthcare records is crucial
to patients’ autonomy over their medical care. The statute
limits to whom, under what circumstances, and for what
purpose the healthcare provider may share healthcare records
with other persons and entities, and it provides patients with
various rights to access their own healthcare records.

Findling v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 998 N.W.2d 1, 7-8 (Minn. 2023).
These purposes of the act are evident in two sections. Section 144.292, captioned
“Patient Rights,” generally requires health-care providers to give patients access to their
own health records and specifies the circumstances in which a provider may refuse to do
so. See Minn. Stat. § 144.292 (2024). Section 144.293, captioned “Release or Disclosure
D-3

of Health Records,” generally limits the circumstances in which a health-care provider may
release a patient’s health record to a third party. See Minn. Stat. § 144.293 (2024). To be
specific, a provider may release a patient’s health record to a third party only if the patient
has given written consent or if there is “specific authorization in Minnesota law.” Id.,
subd. 2.
These provisions of the act require a clear understanding of the term “health record.”
The act includes a statutory definition of that term, which identifies three types of
information: “any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that
relates to [1] the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of a patient;
[2] the provision of health care to a patient; or [3] the past, present, or future payment for
the provision of health care to a patient.” Minn. Stat. § 144 .291, subd. 2(c) (numerals
added) (emphasis added). Holtzbauer has focused his argument on the second type, which
I have italicized, and that is the legal basis of the court’s decision.
B.
For four reasons, I would conclude that the statutory definition of “health record” is
narrower than the interpretation given it by the court and, thus, does not include the mere
fact that a particular person is a patient at a particular hospital and is in a particular room.
First, other provisions of the act illustrate the meaning of “health record” by giving
examples. We may discern the meaning of a statutorily defined term by referring to
examples within the statute. See, e.g., State v. Bee, 17 N.W.3d 150, 153-54 (Minn. 2025).
Section 144.293 requires that, if a patient makes a written request for one provider to
release a health record to another provider, the first provider “shall promptly . . . furnish[]
D-4

to” the other provider the patient’s “health record, including, but not limited to, laboratory
reports, x-rays, prescriptions, and other technical information used in assessing the
patient’s condition.” Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 3 (emphasis added). The specific
examples of health records provided by the act—laboratory reports, x-rays, and
prescriptions—typically reveal specific and detailed information concerning a patient’s
health condition and a health-care provider’s care and treatment of the patient’s condition.
In addition, the catch -all example “other technical information” suggests that a health
record must be technical in nature. These examples support Allina’s argument that the
second clause of the statutory definition of “health record” should be limited to information
of a clinical nature.
3 Information consisting of the mere fact that a particular person is a
patient at a particular hospital is not similar to the examples of health records provided by
the act.
Second, the statutory definition of “health record” is juxtaposed with another
statutory definition that is a closer fit with the information at issue in this case and—
importantly—is given less privacy protection. The act defines “identifying information”
to mean “the patient’s name, address, date of birth, gender, parent’s or guardian’s name
regardless of the age of the patient, and other nonclinical data which can be used to
uniquely identify a patient.” Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(d) (emphasis added). Contrary

3Allina does not make an argument that would require the court to insert the word
“clinical” into the phrase “any information . . . that relates to.” See supra at 9-10. Allina
argues that “the first two categories [of health record] relate to clinical information about
the patient.” Specifically, Allina argues that the second clause of the statutory definition
of health record includes only “information that discloses the actual treatment provided to
a patient.”
D-5

to the general pro-privacy thrust of section 144.293, “identifying information” may be
released by a provider to a certain type of third party (“a record locator or patient
information service”) “without consent from the patient,” unless the patient has made a
specific election to not participate in such a service. Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 8(a)
(emphasis added). Because the legislature expressly included a patient’s name and date of
birth in the statutory definition of identifying information, but not in the statutory definition
of health record, we should presume that a patient’s name and other identifying information
are not included in the statutory definition of health record. In addition, the catch-all
example “other nonclinical data” strongly suggests that, as Allina argues, a health record
must be clinical in nature. See Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(d).
Third, the court’s interpretation of the second clause of the statutory definition is so
broad that it would make the first and third clauses superfluous. “The canon against
surplusage dictates that we avoid interpretations that would render a word or phrase
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Shefa v. Ellison, 968 N.W.2d 818, 825 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted). If the second type of health record—“any information . . . that relates
to . . . the provision of health care to a patient”—is broad enough to include a person’s
name and other identifying information or the fact that the person is a patient at a particular
hospital, the first and second types of information would be “completely unnecessary.” See
Sterry v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corrections, 8 N.W.3d 224, 233-34 (Minn. 2024) (applying
canon against surplusage). That is so because, given the court’s broad interpretation of the
second type of health record, the first type, a patient’s “health condition,” necessarily
would relate to “the provision of health care to a patient” given that a patient seeks out “the
D-6

provision of health care” for the purpose of addressing a “health condition.” Likewise, the
third type of health record, “payment for the provision of health care to a patient,”
obviously would relate to “the provision of health care to a patient” because the language
describing the third type incorporates the language describing the second type. The court
interprets the second type of health record so broadly that, in effect, it encompasses all
three types.4
Fourth, the court places too much weight on the phrase “relates to,” which the court
describes as “a key element of the definition.” See supra at 7-8. That phrase, by itself,
does not shed any light on the meaning of “health record.” The phrase merely serves as a
connector between the word “information” and the modifying phrase describing the three
types of health record. As a general matter, it is appropriate to construe the phrase “relates
to” to mean “‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to
bring into association with or connection with.’” See supra at 8 (quoting Phone Recovery
Servs., LLC v. Qwest Corp., 919 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. 2018) (quoting 500, LLC v. City
of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Minn. 2013))). But t he court stretches an elastic
concept too far. The Qwest court concluded, quite naturally and logically, that the phrase

4The court reasons that the first type of health record does not make the second or
third types superfluous, and that the third type does not make the second type superfluous.
See supra at 11-12. But that reasoning does not address the pertinent question. Allina
argues that “if Mr. Holtzbauer’s broad and virtually unlimited interpretation were to
prevail, the second part of the definition . . . would swallow the other two discrete parts of
the same definition,” which “ would be rendered superfluous because, under Mr.
Holtzbauer’s broad view, they necessarily also relate to the ‘provision of health care.’”
The court does not directly confront the question whether its interpretation of the second
type makes the first and third types superfluous.
D-7

“portions of Minnesota Statutes relating to taxation” includes statutes that impose fees or
charges that are expressly defined by another statute as a “tax.” 919 N.W.2d at 323-24
(emphasis added) (citing Minn. Stat. § 15C.03 (2016), and Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 19
(2016)). But in this case, a patient’s name and other identifying information, or the mere
fact that a particular person is a patient at a particular hospital, is not expressly included in
any statutory definition of “provision of health care.” The court errs by applying the
“relates to” language to concepts that are related only in an attenuated way to the provision
of health care.
If the legislature intended to prohibit Minnesota hospitals from engaging in the
commonplace practice of disclosing that a particular person is a patient and is in a particular
room, the legislature would have done so with specificity and clarity, not with a definition
of “health record” that refers only to “the provision of health care” but omits any mention
of a patient’s name and other identifying information or the fact that a particular person is
a patient at a particular hospital and is in a particular room.
C.
I am concerned that the court’s opinion will have negative consequences for those
persons who do not wish to keep secret the fact that they are hospitalized and for those
persons’ family members and friends. It surely is true that, every day, in a hospital
somewhere in Minnesota, a family member learns that a loved one is suddenly hospitalized
and rushes to the hospital to learn of the loved one’s condition, to comfort the person, to
consult with physicians, or to supply a health -care directive. Or a clergyperson goes to a
hospital to visit a member of the clergyperson’s religious community, perhaps in an end-
D-8

of-life scenario. Or a law-enforcement officer goes to a hospital to interview the victim of
a crime, perhaps to obtain critical evidence before it is too late. The possible scenarios are
too numerous to catalog here. The court’s opinion likely will prohibit a large number of
such beneficial disclosures but only a small number of harmful disclosures.
The court asserts that the disclosure of a person’s hospitalization would not be
prohibited in a “medical emergency.” See s upra at 19-20 (citing Minn. Stat. § 144.293,
subd. 5(a)(1)). I am not so sure. The statutory provision cited by the court is located among
other provisions regulating the disclosure of a health record by one provider to another
provider. See id., subds. 3, 5(a)(2), 5(a)(3), 5(b), 6, 9(b). It is an open question whether
the medical-emergency exception is limited to allowing multiple providers to coordinate
treatment during an emergency or whether it also would allow the disclosure of a health
record by a provider to a person who is not a provider.
But even if the medical-emergency exception would allow the disclosure of a health
record to a person who is not a provider, practical obstacles likely would arise. By its
terms, the exception applies only if “the provider is unable to obtain the patient’s consent
due to the patient’s condition or the nature of the medical emergency.” Id., subd. 5(a)(1).
In a true emergency, it may be unclear whether a patient is able to consent to the release of
a health record, or the patient’s ability to do so may change from moment to moment, or
medical professionals may be so preoccupied providing critical care that they are unable to
ascertain the patient’s ability to consent. Furthermore, the medical professionals who are
most likely to know the patient’s ability to consent likely will be in an examination or
operating room, removed from the provider employees who receive an inquiry. In short,
D-9

the medical-emergency exception may have more value in theory than in practice.
Moreover, the court’s allowance for medical emergencies does not account for situations
that are not emergencies. For example, if a young child or an elderly person with dementia
is found alone and taken to a provider for non-emergency care, how will the provider
connect the patient with a family member or custodian?
The court also asserts that information that a particular person is a patient at a
special-purpose medical facility might effectively reveal a health record because of the
nature of the facility. As examples, the court refers to persons receiving mental-health
care, reproductive-health care, or cardiovascular care. See supra at 9, 18. In his principal
brief, Holtzbauer makes a similar argument, which also refers to persons receiving
chemical-dependency treatment. In its responsive brief, Allina acknowledges the concern
that “the disclosure of the name of the medical facility may, in certain circumstances, reveal
the patient’s condition or the treatment they are receiving.” But Allina contends that the
hypothetical scenarios mentioned by Holtzbauer are “not this case.” Allina reiterated at
oral argument that it is not asking this court to establish a “blanket rule” that information
concerning a particular person’s status as a patient at a particular medical facility never
would be a health record. In Allina’s view, a court should consider the facts of each case
and determine whether a particular disclosure of information conveys information relating
to a person’s health condition or a provider’s provision of health care.
This case is about a patient at a hospital that apparently is a general-purpose hospital
that provides care for many types of health conditions. Allina disclosed information that
allowed Holtzbauer’s former wife to determine that he was a patient in the emergency
D-10

department of the hospital, which apparently provides many types of emergency health
care to treat many types of emergency health conditions. In such circumstances, the mere
fact that a particular person has been admitted to a particular hospital’s general-purpose
emergency department and is in a particular room does not convey information relating to
either that person’s “physical or mental health or condition” or to that hospital’s “provision
of health care to” the person. See Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c).
In sum, I would affirm the decision of the district court, which concluded that
Holtzbauer cannot prove his claim because Allina did not disclose a “health record” to his
former wife. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.