In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1391

In the Marriage of:

Maren Ilsa Moseng, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Keith Dwain Moseng,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Yellow Medicine County District Court
File No. 87-FA-19-169

Jason C. Brown, Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Shirlene Perrin, Perrin Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district court’s order modifying physical custody of
the parties’ child and ordering him to reimburse respondent-mother for certain parenting
expenses. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) awarding mother
2
sole physical custody of the child based on a finding that father’s parenting environment
endangers the child because the court looked to stale information and overstated the danger
of certain conduct, and (2) requiring him to reimburse mother for expenses related to the
child’s Xbox. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Keith Dwain Moseng (father) and respondent Maren Ilsa Moseng
(mother) have one joint minor child, who was born in October 2010, during their marriage.
Their marriage was dissolved in 2019, and they were awarded joint legal and joint physical
custody of the child and equal parenting time. The dissolution judgment also assigned
them equal responsibility for paying “necessary fees and costs” for the child.
In March 2023, mother moved for sole physical custody, alleging that custody
should be modified because the child is endangered in father’s care. In supporting
affidavits, she averred, in relevant part, that father (1) “has transported [the child] after
consuming alcohol sufficient to cause intoxication on numerous occasions”; (2) was
involved in an “alcohol-related accident” in April 2020, and pleaded guilty to driving while
impaired (DWI); (3) has driven the child after taking more than his prescribed dosage of
clonazepam; (4) often leaves the child unsupervised for extended periods of time,
sometimes up to 12 hours; and (5) while on vacation, drove with the child at speeds
hovering around 90 miles per hour. She also presented an affidavit from father’s former
fiancée, who lived with him June 2022 to March 2023 and averred, in relevant part, that
(1) she regularly saw loaded firearms unlocked and accessible in father’s vehicle and
house; (2) father took prescribed morphine daily and took prescribed oxycodone and
3
clonazepam regularly, and he should not drive or do his work as a nurse while on those
medications; (3) father often consumes alcohol to the point of intoxication and “made a
habit of drinking and driving”; and (4) on multiple occasions she saw vials of fentanyl in
his vehicle or with his clothing in the house and saw used syringes and alcohol wipes in
the container where he kept his medications.
In addition to her custody-modification motion, mother also sought reimbursement
for father’s half of expenses for the child. She submitted an itemized list of expenses.
The district court determined that mother presented a prima facie case for custody
modification and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At the three-day hearing in October
and November 2023, mother and father testified, as did father’s former fiancée, various
friends and family, and father’s physician. Mother and father’s former fiancée testified
consistent with their affidavits. Father’s brother and brother- in-law described a family
funeral in early 2020 at which they saw father drink alcohol to the point of intoxication and
then attempt to drive off with the child before family intervened. The brother-in-law also
testified about an incident that occurred before the funeral in which he saw father drive
with the child after drinking to the point of intoxication. In his testimony, father
acknowledged his 2020 car accident and resulting DWI guilty plea. But he disputed others’
testimony about his drinking and opiate use and other conduct, though he ultimately
acknowledged driving with the child after drinking in 2020 and not being honest about it
in the affidavit he submitted in opposition to mother’s motion.
After making express credibility determinations as to each witness, including
substantially crediting mother’s testimony and substantially discrediting father’s, the
4
district court made findings about father’s conduct in the years since entry of the
dissolution judgment:
(1) Father has operated a motor vehicle, with the minor child
present, while under the influence of alcohol; (2) Father
sustained serious injuries in a car crash that occurred while he
was under the influence of alcohol; (3) Father suffers from
chronic pain as a result of injuries suffered in the car crash;
(4) Father consumes opiates on a daily basis; (5) Father
routinely consumes alcohol while taking said opiates;
(6) Father has left the minor child alone, or in the care of a third
party, for extended periods of time; and (7) Father has exposed
the minor child to drugs, paraphernalia, vials of fentanyl, and
syringes; and (8) has stored a loaded firearm in the presence of
a child.

The court also found that father drove under the influence of alcohol and opiates, and that
he drove with the child at speeds around 90 miles per hour without credible justification.
The district court determined that these actions by father “over the last several years,
taken collectively, have endangered the minor child’s physical and emotional health.” The
court highlighted three examples: (1) father driving under the influence of alcohol with the
child in the vehicle, (2) father bringing home and leaving empty vials of fentanyl and used
syringes around the house, and (3) father storing a loaded firearm in the child’s presence.
It also found that these circumstances reflect a change since the dissolution judgment and
that modification would serve the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the court granted
mother’s motion, awarding her sole physical custody of the child and ordering father to
reimburse mother for expenses totaling $3,548.41.
Father appeals.

5
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding mother sole physical
custody based on a finding that child is endangered in father’s care.

A court may modify an existing child-custody order if (1) there has been a change
of circumstances; (2) modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests; (3) the
child’s present environment endangers their physical health, emotional health, or emotional
development; and (4) the benefits of the modification outweigh the detriments with respect
to the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (20 24). A d istrict court has “broad discretion”
when determining custody matters. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn.
2008). Our review of custody determinations “is limited to whether the district court
abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly
applying the law.” Id. at 281-82 (quotation omitted). We will not disturb a district court’s
factual findings, including a finding that a child is endangered, unless they are clearly
erroneous, and we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Id. at 284; Sharp
v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).
Father challenges only the district court’s finding that the child is endangered in his
care. Father contends the court premised this determination on three sources of danger to
the child while in his care—driving with the child while under the influence of alcohol,
leaving fentanyl vials and syringes around, and leaving loaded firearms unsecured in his
home and vehicle—and disputes the validity of each as a basis for finding endangerment.
This argument does not persuade us to reverse for two reasons.
6
First, father understates the district court’s findings and reasoning. The court
highlighted those three types of conduct as evidence of endangerment, expressly
identifying them as “example[s].” And it stated that it found endangerment based on
father’s “actions over the last several years, taken collectively.” This means that its
endangerment finding encompasses other conduct that it found father to have engaged in
during that time, such as routinely consuming both opiates and alcohol, including while
caring for the child; leaving the child alone for extended periods of time; and driving with
the child at very high rates of speed. Father does not dispute the district court’s findings
that he engaged in these actions or that they endangered the child.
Second, the record defeats father’s challenges to the three identified examples of
endangerment. We address each in turn.
Driving with the Child while Intoxicated
Father asserts error in the district court’s consideration of him driving with the child
while under the influence of alcohol. He contends there was only one such incident— in
2020—and that this incident is “too old to constitute present endangerment” in 2023. We
disagree.
A finding of endangerment must be based on the child’s “present” environment.
Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv). This means the environment in existence “at the time of the
modification.” Hassing v. Lancaster, 570 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. App. 1997). But
consideration of the child’s present environment encompasses the child’s circumstances
since the last custody order because “[t]he history of a child’ s care is a relevant
consideration in addressing the child’s current circumstances . . . [and] may indicate what
7
can be presently expected.” Id. A history of dangerous circumstances is relevant if it
“demonstrate[s] that [the child] remain[s] in a presently dangerous situation.” Id. That is
the case here.
Father admits that he drove with the child in his vehicle while impaired in 2020.
Nothing in the record suggests that the child’s environment in 2023, at the time of the
modification motion, h ad changed. Most glaringly, when discussing the 2020 incident,
father did not acknowledge that he has chemical-health issues or describe past or then-
current efforts to address them. Rather, he downplayed his past behavior and denied having
a problem. Indeed, father’s April 2023 affidavit in opposition to mother’s motion denies
that he drove with the child while impaired, but during the evidentiary hearing he admitted
doing so. Additionally, the district court made several findings pointing to the continued
relevance of the 2020 incident. It found that father takes opiates daily and mixes them with
alcohol and “routinely ” does so while caring for the child. It also found that father has
continued to drive while under the influence of alcohol. Ample evidence supports these
findings, including father’s own testimony and that of his former fiancée. Given this
record, we discern no error by the district court in considering father’s driving while
intoxicated—including with the child—as indicative of endangerment.
Fentanyl Vials and Syringes
Father contends the fentanyl vials and syringes in his home and vehicle posed no
danger to the child because they were empty. He implicitly acknowledges that bringing
unprescribed controlled substances and associated paraphernalia into the child’s
environment is dangerous but suggests that the danger evaporates if they no longer contain
8
the controlled substances. He cites no authority for this proposition. And mother
persuasively notes that Minnesota law recognizes the dangers presented by even residual
amounts of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. See State v. Benniefield, 678
N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. 2004) (recognizing that criminalizing drug possession in school
zones serves to protect children from “abandoned drugs or discarded drug paraphernalia”).
Father has not demonstrated error in the district court’s reliance on the regular presence of
empty fentanyl vials and syringes in the child’s environment in finding endangerment.
Loaded, Unsecured Firearms
Father appears to accept the district court’s finding that he keeps loaded, unsecured
firearms in his vehicle and home but argues that this does not endanger the child because
(1) the child has been trained in the safe use of firearms, and (2) the “firearm incidents were
too remote in time.” This argument is unavailing in both respects.
Regarding his first assertion, father cites no authority for the proposition that a child
trained in the use of firearms is not endangered by having loaded and unsecured firearms
in their environment. To the contrary, as the district court noted, Minnesota law
criminalizes leaving a loaded firearm unsecured in a place where the person storing it
knows or reasonably should know “that a child is likely to gain access” to it. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.666, subd. 2 (2024). There is no exception for a child trained in gun safety. See id.
Father’s staleness claim fares no better. In essence, he seeks to diminish his former
fiancée’s testimony about seeing loaded, unsecured firearms in his home and vehicle
because she stopped living with him in March 2023. He suggests that an inspection of his
home in September 2023, which found no unsecured firearms, better reflects the
9
circumstances existing at the time of the evidentiary hearing that October and November.
But the circumstances in father’s home during his former fiancée’s residence, up until the
same month that mother filed her motion, are not too remote to be relevant. See Hassing,
570 N.W.2d at 703 (describing child’s present environment as that in existence “at the time
of the modification”). And his emphasis on the more recent inspection is not persuasive
because, as the district court observed, he requested that inspection and was able to secure
the firearms in a safe before the inspection took place.
In sum, given the numerous and substantial examples of endangering conduct by
father, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the child is endangered in father’s
care. As such, father has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by
modifying physical custody.
II. Father did not preserve a challenge to the Xbox expenses.
Father challenges only a subset of the district court’s expense-reimbursement order:
$328.68 in expenses related to the child’s Xbox. But he did not do so in the district court.
He did not contend that the Xbox expenses are not “necessary fees and costs” for the child.
To the contrary, he affirmatively represented to the court that he considered at least some
Xbox expenses to be reasonable by including them in his proposed list of reasonable
expenses.
1 It is well established that failure to raise an issue before the district court
constitutes forfeiture of the issue on appeal. Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn.

1 Father’s sole challenge to mother’s reimbursement request was that she owed him roughly
the same amount that she was seeking, if not more, and that the parties’ competing expense-
reimbursement claims were “a wash.”
10
App. 2022) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)). On this record,
father has not preserved a challenge to the portion of the reimbursement order related to
the Xbox expenses.
Affirmed.