State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1415

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Demetrius Santana Perez Solis,
Appellant.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-21-2413

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jamal Zayed, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Following his conviction of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
appellant challenges the district court’s (1) decision to close the courtroom for a portion of
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voir dire and (2) imposition of conditional- release terms on his stayed prison sentences.
We affirm on the closure issue but reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
On May 24, 2020, 20 -year-old appellant Demetrius Santana Perez Solis anally
penetrated 13-year -old A.G. at his home. Then, sometime in late August or early
September of 2020, while driving A.G. to a friend’s house, appellant drove down a dirt
road, tried to remove A.G. from the vehicle, and vaginally penetrated her. During both
incidents, A.G. attempted to stop appellant from penetrating her. Respondent State of
Minnesota charged appellant with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and
two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
The case proceeded to trial in April 2024 . The juror questionnaires asked
prospective jurors about their experiences with sexual abuse and stated: “If you prefer to
talk about these questions and topics with the judge and lawyers in private, check this box
and sign below instead of filling out the attached questionnaire in writing.” Prior to calling
in the prospective jurors, the district court stated that its “practice in [criminal sexual
conduct cases]” is to close the courtroom and individually question prospective jurors who
wish to speak in private if they or someone close to them had an experience with sexual
abuse. The district court noted its concern that if it “question[s] [them] in front of the other
jurors, the jurors can hear all that. . . . And it might taint them.” The district court explained
that, in its experience, victims of sexual abuse can be “visibly angry, upset, mad” and “the
trauma is evident.” The district court noted that it has had “numerous cases appealed where
[it employed this practice] [and the parties] would have brought it up, if it was an issue . . .
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and nobody ever brought it up.” The district court further stated that it would “certainly
make a record” of its reasons for courtroom closure.
In response to questions by the district court in open court at the beginning of voir
dire, prospective juror A stated that his friend was convicted of criminal sexual conduct,
that he did not think his friend was treated fairly, that he had a niece who was molested as
a baby, and that it would be hard for him to be impartial in this case. Prospective juror B
stated that she wanted to talk about her experiences privately. Prospective juror C had
checked the box on her juror questionnaire to request individual voir dire. The district
court and the attorneys decided to question those three prospective jurors individually.
The district court made the following comments about closing the courtroom for
individual voir dire of the three prospective jurors:
The reason for questioning them outside the presence of the
public, or in closed session, is they have either -- well, [juror
B] indicated that she wants to do that. [Juror A], our concern
is he is going to say something that will taint the rest of the
Jury. [Juror C] also asked to be -- to answer in private. The
reason to do that, of course, is that -- well -- well, with [juror
C] and [ juror B] it involves their personal experience with
either -- their own personal sexual abuse or somebody they
know that is close to them.

A couple things. One is that we don’t want the other jurors to
hear any of that or hear any of those details. The other thing is
that -- well, one, they both asked to be questioned individually,
and the reason for that is so that they can -- so they are able to
speak freely without having to be concerned about anyone else
or any other jurors hearing what they have to say. So in the
interest of making sure that they are candid and answer
honestly, we are closing the courtroom or keeping the public
out of this part just so that they can answer fully and freely and
[we] can insure that we have a fair jury.

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The district court excluded the public from the individual voir dire of prospective
jurors A, B, and C. Neither party objected to the courtroom closure.
Prospective juror A stated the reasons why he thought that he could not be impartial
in this case. The state moved to strike for cause, without objection, which the district court
granted. Prospective juror B stated the reasons why she felt she could not be impartial in
this case. Appellant’s counsel moved to strike for cause, without objection, which the
district court granted. However, prospective juror C explained that she checked the box on
the questionnaire only because she thought she was supposed to, not because she had any
concerns about the issues in this case. The district court then reopened the courtroom and
continued voir dire.
Prospective juror D stated in open court that he had “family members who have
gone through a similar situation” to what occurred in this case, and he requested to speak
to the court and attorneys in private in his jury questionnaire. The district court excluded
the public, stating that the “[s]ame reasons that I stated before for excluding the public
apply here, also. It is exactly what I found before.” Again, neither party objected . The
district court then questioned prospective juror D in private. Pr ospective juror D stated
that he was not sure whether he could be impartial in this case. Appellant’s counsel moved
to strike prospective juror D for cause, without objection, which the district court granted.
The district court conducted the remainder of voir dire and trial in open court.
The jury found appellant guilty of two counts of third -degree criminal sexual
conduct, counts III and IV, and acquitted him of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
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counts I and II. Following the jury’s verdict, the district court stated that “[a]ll four verdicts
th[e]n shall be entered on the record” and scheduled a sentencing hearing for June 2024.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced appellant on count III to 36
months in prison, stayed for 15 years, with a ten-year conditional-release term. The district
court sentenced appellant on count IV to 48 months in prison, stayed for 15 years, with a
lifetime conditional-release term “because that is a second conviction.” This appeal
follows.
DECISION
I. Even if we assume that the district court committed error that was plain when
it closed the courtroom for a portion of voir dire, the closure did not affect
appellant’s substantial rights under these particular facts.

Appellant argues that the district court’s exclusion of the public while questioning
three prospective jurors, A, B, and D, violated his constitutional right to a public trial. We
are not convinced.
Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution provide
criminal defendants with the right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amend VI; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 6. This public-trial right extends to voir dire. See State v. Petersen, 933 N.W.2d
545, 547 (Minn. App. 2019). But a criminal defendant’s public-trial right is not absolute,
and courtroom closure may be justified if the district court finds that the four factors
identified in Waller v. Georgia, 567 U.S . 39, 48 (1984), known as the Waller factors, are
met: “(1) the party seeking to close the hearing . . . advance[s] an overriding interest that
is likely to be prejudiced, (2) the closure is no broader than necessary to protect that interest,
(3) the district court considers reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and (4) the
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district court makes findings adequate to support the closure.” Petersen , 933 N.W.2d at
550 (quotations omitted) (alteration in original). The Waller factors are also found in Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 4(4)(c). While a district court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s
public-trial right is a structural error, if the defendant does not object at trial, an appellate
court’s review is limited to a plain-error analysis. See Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347,
356 (Minn. 2022); Petersen, 933 N.W.2d at 550.
Appellant properly acknowledges that, because he did not object at trial, this court
applies a plain -error standard of review. Under a plain-error analysis, an appellant must
establish (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected appellant ’s substantial rights.
Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356. “An error is plain if it is clear and obvious; usually this
means an error that violates or contradicts the case law, a rule, or an applicable standard of
conduct.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). “The defendant bears a
heavy burden of persuasion on the third prong, which is satisfied if the defendant shows
that the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Word, 755
N.W.2d 776, 782 (Minn. App. 2008). If a defendant satisfies all three prongs, then an
appellate court “may correct the error only when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356 (emphasis in
original).
Assuming without deciding that the district court committed plain error by failing
to address the first three Waller factors, we conclude that any plain error did not affect
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appellant’s substantial rights.1 Appellant’s brief argues that he need not do a substantial-
rights analysis, and offers no analysis, because “structural errors – like the denial of the
right to a public trial, defy analysis for harm, [and] courts assume such errors are harmful
for purposes of the plain error test.” (Quotations omitted). But this argument is contrary
to Pulczinski, which states that appellate courts apply plain-error review to unobjected-to
claims of a violation of a public-trial right. 972 N.W.2d at 356. When analyzing the third
prong of the plain-error test, we look at whether the error was prejudicial and whether it
affected the outcome of the case. State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Minn. App.
2010).
First, the district court’s error did not prejudice appellant. To the contrary, appellant
benefitted from the error and struck two jurors for cause. We also note that appellant did
not object to the state’s striking the other individually questioned prospective jurors for
cause. Second, appellant presents no evidence to show that the courtroom closure affected
the outcome of the case. The prospective jurors subject to the courtroom closure were not
selected for the jury, so they could not have affected the outcome of the case. We therefore
conclude that the district court’s error did not affect appellant’s substantial rights .
Accordingly, his plain-error argument fails.

1 We strongly encourage district courts, when determining whether to close the courtroom,
to analyze explicitly all four Waller factors.
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II. The district court erred when it imposed conditional-release terms on
appellant’s stayed prison sentences.

Appellant argues that the district court erred when it imposed conditional-release
terms on his stayed prison sentences for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. We agree.
“The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. The courts may only impose sentences which the legislature has
prescribed. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Minn. 1999). Minn. Stat. § 609.3455
(2024) requires that a person convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct serves a
conditional-release term only “after . . . release[] from prison.”
A jury found appellant guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2020), a crime to which section 609.3455 applies.
Instead of executing appellant’s sentences, which would have required him to go to prison,
the district court placed appellant on probation and stayed his sentences for 15 years. Under
section 609.3455, the ten-year conditional-release term is imposed only “when a court
commits an offender to the custody of the commissioner of corrections.” This court in
State v. Thong, 892 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn. App. 2017), explained that “a person is
committed to the custody of the commissioner when the person’s sentence is executed.”
2

2 The state argues that the Thong decision compels us to conclude that the district court did
not err when it imposed conditional-release terms on appellant’s stayed sentences. 892
N.W.2d at 846. But Thong is distinguishable from the case at- hand. First, Thong is a
felony driving-while-intoxicated case, not a criminal-sexual-conduct case, and does not
involve section 609.3455. Id. at 844. Second, the district court executed Thong’s sentence
after it revoked his probation, which made imposing the five-year conditional-release term
appropriate. Id. at 845-46. The state’s reliance on Thong, given the facts of this case, is
misguided.
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Because appellant’s sentences were stayed and not executed, he was never committed to
the commissioner of corrections, and the district court improperly imposed a conditional-
release term on both sentences.3 We therefore reverse and remand to the district court to
resentence appellant consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

3 Appellant also argues that the district court erred when it imposed a lifetime conditional-
release term on count IV. Because we agree with appellant that the district court erred in
in imposing conditional-release terms on his stayed sentences, we need not reach this
argument. We nevertheless note that caselaw is clear that, when a district court convicts
an appellant simultaneously of multiple sex offenses and appellant has “no other
convictions at the time of his adjudication that would subject him to lifetime conditional
release under section 609.3455,” imposing a lifetime conditional-release term is improper
and remand to the district court for resentencing is required. State v. Brown, 937 N.W.2d
146, 157 (Minn. App. 2019); see Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subds. 6, 7(b).